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TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Joinderand Severance

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 sets forth the requirements
for joinder of offenses and joinder of defendants in federal practice.
Rule 8(a) permits the joinder of offenses against a single defendant if
they are (1) of the same or similar character, or (2) based on the same
act or transaction, or (3) based on two or more acts or transactions
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or
plan.2329 Rule 8(b) permits joinder of two or more defendants "if they
are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the
same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or
2330
offenses.1
Although joinder of offenses or defendants may be proper under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8, a defendant may still move for
severance under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 if the joinder
is prejudicial to him.13 1 The denial of severance under Rule 14 is
within the discretion of the trial court2332 and will be reversed on appeal only if the defendant shows that the joint trial was "so manifestly
prejudicial that it outweighs the dominant concern with judicial econ2329. FED. R. CuM. P. 8(a) provides:

Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a
separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misde-

meanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act
or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
2330. FED. R. CRAM. P. 8(b) provides:
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if
they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same
series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants
may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defend-

ants need not be charged in each count.
2331. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of of-

fenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial
together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a sever-

ance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a
motion by a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the gov-

emnment to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in
evidence at the trial.

2332. United States v. Ortiz, 603 F.2d 76, 78 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1020

(1980).
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omy and compels the exercise of the court's discretion to sever." 2333
The Ninth Circuit has recently considered several cases where defendants have contested their joint trials with other defendants.
1. Joinder by common conspiracy charge
In United States v. Kaiser,2 3 34 Kaiser, one of five defendants, contended that the district court erred in denying his motion for mistrial
based on his allegedly improper joinder with the other defendants
under Rule 8(b). He was indicted on two substantive drug charges and
a charge of conspiracy to distribute heroin. 2335 The only link between
Kaiser and the other defendants, who were charged with various other
offenses, was the conspiracy charge. He was acquitted of the conspiracy charge at the close of the Government's case because of the inadmissability of some of the Government's evidence.23 362 337He was,
however, convicted of one count of distribution of heroin.
The Ninth Circuit stated that a single conspiracy count can link
defendants together to allow joinder under Rule 8(b).233 8 However, the
conspiracy charge must have been made in good faith.2339 Since Kaiser
proffered no evidence of governmental bad faith in charging him with
conspiracy, his appeal based on misjoinder was dismissed.23 4 °
Kaiser and co-defendant Acosta also appealed the district court's
denial of their motions for severance under Rule 14.2341 The Ninth
Circuit held, without substantial analysis, that Kaiser neither met the
burden of proving "clear," "manifest," or "undue" prejudice from the
joint trial, nor showed that the jury was unable to "compartmentalize"
2333. United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S.
1111 (1977) (citing United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 359 (9th Cir. 1975), cert
denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Thomas, 453 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1069 (1972)).
2334. 660 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. deniedsub nom. House v. United States, 455 U.S.
956 (1982); cert. deniedsub nonz Remsing v. United States, 457 U.S. 1121 (1982).
2335. Id at 728, 733, 735.
2336. Id at 729-30..
2337. Id at 733.
2338. Id (citing United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir.) (conspiracy
charge sufficient to link defendants charged with separate substantive offenses for joinder
purposes), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979)).
2339. 660 F.2d at 733 (citing United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979); United States v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1971)
(government cannot avoid requirements of Rule 8(b) merely by adding conspiracy count
linking the defendants)).
2340. 660 F.2d at 733.
2341. Id
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the evidence against the various defendants. 2342 The court rejected
Acosta's claim of prejudice because his arguments related to the con2343
spiracy count on which he was acquitted.

Similarly, in UnitedStates v. Abushi,2 34 four defendants contested
their joinder in a single trial under Rule 8(b). The defendants were

indicted on charges of illegal dealing in food stamps and conspiring to

defraud the United States. 2345 Three of the defendants had engaged in

illegal food stamp dealings with federal agents over a one-year period. 2346 They claimed that the conspiracy charge was brought in bad
faith.2 347 The Ninth Circuit summarily dismissed this claim, as the evidence was sufficient to establish the conspiracy. Thus, it was clear that

the Government did not act in bad faith in charging the three defend23 48
ants with conspiracy.
The fourth defendant, Abushi, had fraudulently redeemed food

stamps at the same store as the other three defendants, but had participated in only one act with the other three defendants.2 349 He contended that the Government's evidence showed the existence of two

unrelated conspiracies rather than one conspiracy, and that "proximate
or simultaneous conspiracies with one common conspirator ' 2350 are not
sufficient to establish a single conspiracy. 235 I The Ninth Circuit declined to decide whether the conspiracy charge was properly formu2342. Id (citing United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 856 (1980); United States v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1971)).
2343. 660 F.2d at 733.
2344. 682 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1982).
2345. Id at 1291.
2346. Id at 1291-92.
2347. Id at 1296.
2348. Id See supra notes 2338-39 and accompanying text.
2349. Id at 1296.
2350. 1d
2351. Id Abushi relied for this argument on United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658 (5th
Cir. 1977). In Levine, two defendants who had independently produced allegedly obscene
films using the same actors and technical facilities were charged with a single conspiracy in
addition to various substantive charges. The defendants contested joinder of their trials
under the single conspiracy charge. The Government admitted that there was no evidence
that the defendants were aware of each others' activities but argued that the joinder was
proper since "the indictment conclusively demonstrate[d] that the substantive offenses were
inextricably woven into the conspiracy count due to the nature of the offenses, their close
proximity in time and place, and the presence of common elements leading to their commission." Id at 664. The Fifth Circuit held the joinder improper because "[tihe only real
underpinning for the government's conspiracy count was the false legal premise that proof
of proximate or simultaneous conspiracies with one common conspirator was sufficient to
establish the existence of a single conspiracy." Id at 665. The Fifth Circuit further stated
that to sustain the conspiracy charge, and thus the joinder of the defendants, the prosecution
must show that the defendants knew or must have known of each other, and that they acted
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lated so as to sustain the joinder,23 52 but rather rejected Abushi's claim
by simple application of Rule 8(b). 3 53 The court stated that the requirements of Rule 8(b) are met "'as long as all defendants participated in the same series of transactions, . . . even though not all

defendants participated in every act.' "2354 One person may serve as a
common link between the transactions.
The court held that the
facts alleged in the indictment and proved at trial were sufficient "common link[s]" to allow joinder under Rule 8(b).2356
The defendants also claimed that the trial court erred in denying
their motion for severance under Rule 14.2357 The Ninth Circuit summarily rejected this claim, stating that since there was sufficient evidence of one overall conspiracy, the defendants had not shown that
they were prejudiced by their joint trial. Therefore, there was no abuse
of discretion.2358
These cases indicate that in the Ninth Circuit a defendant's attack
on joinder under a linking conspiracy count will fail unless he shows
that it was not brought in good faith. Furthermore, even if the conspiracy count alone is insufficient to sustain joinder, the joinder may still be
upheld under the "same series of transactions" language of Rule 8(b).
Thus, misjoinder will be found only when a conspiracy count was
brought in bad faith and the individual substantive counts are so unrelated as to not constitute the "same series of transactions."
2. Prejudicial joinder
In UnitedStates v. Rasheed,2359 defendant Phillips contended that

the trial court improperly denied her motion for severance under Rule
14. Defendants Phillips and Rasheed were jointly tried on various
counts relating to a mail fraud scheme, and for obstruction of jusin furtherance of a common plan. Id (citing Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539,
556-57 (1947)).
2352. 682 F.2d at 1296. The court declined to decide whether Levine should be followed in
the Ninth Circuit. Id
2353. Id See supra note 2330.
2354. 682 F.2d at 1296 (quoting United States v. Burreson, 643 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 847 (1981)).
2355. 682 F.2d at 1296 (citing United States v. Patterson, 455 F.2d 264, 266 (9th Cir.
1972)).
2356. 682 F.2d at 1296. Note that the court specifically did not hold that these "common
links" rendered the conspiracy charge sufficient to sustain the joinder. See supra note 2351
and accompanying text.
2357. Id at 1296.
2358. Id See supra notes 2332-33 and accompanying text.
2359. 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
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tice.2 360 Most of the evidence at the trial was against Rasheed; in fact,
much of it related to events which occurred before Phillips joined the
scheme.2 36 1
The Ninth Circuit stated that the existence of stronger evidence

against a co-defendant is insufficient to sustain a motion for severance. 2362 The court further stated that the ultimate question in determining the propriety of severance is whether the jury could follow the
court's admonitory instructions and independently weigh the evidence
against each defendant.2 3 63 The court held that, because the district

judge had repeatedly instructed the jury not to consider against Phillips
any evidence of acts committed prior to the date of her joining the
scheme, and because Phillips showed nothing indicating that the jury
was unable to compartmentalize the evidence, the district judge did not

abuse his discretion in denying Phillips' motion for severance.2364

A similar issue arose in United States v. Armstrong,2 3 65 where de-

fendant Armstrong was tried for various fraud offenses with three codefendants. He contended that it was error to deny his motion for sev-

erance because only a small part of the trial was devoted to him.2366
The Ninth Circuit, however, noted that nine out of thirty-nine witnesses testified in relation to Armstrong, and that this was not "unduly
disproportionate." The court therefore held that Armstrong failed to
show the "clear," "manifest," or "undue" prejudice necessary to reverse his conviction.2 36 7
In United States v. DeRosa,2 368 five defendants were tried jointly
on various drug related charges, including one Racketeer Influence and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) count which was the sole basis for
2360. Id at 845.
2361. Rasheed was the founder of a church where he established a scheme to solicit donations by implying that the donors would receive in return an "increase of God" of four times
the original donation. Id About a year after the beginning of the scheme, Phillips became a
minister of the church, then a full-time employee and director. She kept the books for the
church and helped run the donation program. Id. at 846.
2362. Id at 854 (citing United States v. Gaines, 563 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977)).
2363. 663 F.2d at 854 (quoting United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1127-28 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979)).
2364. 663 F.2d at 854-55. The court noted that there was never any attempt to confuse the
date of Phillips joining the church, and that the jury had shown its ability to distinguish the
evidence against each defendant by convicting Phillips on the obstruction of justice charges,
while acquitting Rasheed. Id at 855.
2365. 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
2366. Id at 1336.
2367. Id (citing United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 449
U.S. 856 (1980)).
2368. 670 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1982).
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trying all the defendants together. At the close of the Government's
case, the court dismissed the RICO count against two of the defendants, DeSantis and Bertman. 2369 These two then moved for severance,
to continue in a joint trial. The
claiming prejudice if they were forced
2370
district court denied the motion.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that special attention should
be paid to the possibility of prejudice when the count forming the original basis for joinder is dismissed.2 37 1 In particular, where a RICO
count is used to join the defendants, the label "racketeer" may besmirch all of them, even after dismissal.2 372 In determining if DeSantis
or Bertman were prejudiced by the joint trial, the court divided the trial
evidence into three categories:
(1) incriminating evidence that would be admissible against
the complaining defendant even in a separate trial; (2) incriminating evidence, directly relevant to that defendant's guilt,
that would not be admissible in a separate trial, but is admitted at the joint trial with an instruction that it is inadmissible
against the complaining defendant; and (3) evidence inadmissible in a separate trial, which does not expressly relate to the
guilt of the complaining defendant, but which creates a risk of
*2373
guilt by association .
With respect to Bertman, the court stated that all of the evidence
incriminating him at the joint trial would have been admissible at a
separate trial. It also noted that none of the evidence incriminating the
other defendants contained any specific reference to Bertman. Finally,
the court concluded that because Bertman's activities involved discrete,
simple transactions easily distinguishable by the jury from those of his
co-defendants, and because the admissible evidence against Bertman
was so compelling, the possibility that the jury convicted Bertman
based on guilt by association with the other defendants was remote.23 74
2369. Id at 892.
2370. Id. at 897.
2371. Id. (citing Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 516 (1960)).
2372. 670 F.2d at 897 n.l 1 (citing United States v. Guiliano, 644 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.
1981)). The court noted, however, that in this case the jury's copy of the indictment did not
link Bertman or DeSantis to the RICO count, and the prosecutor had refrained from arguing their relationship to the racketeering enterprise in a prejudicial way.
2373. 670 F.2d at 898.
2374. Id at 899. The court emphasized that the trial judge gave the jury exemplary instructions throughout the trial, and that during closing arguments both "the prosecutor and
defense counsel effectively sorted out the evidence against each defendant." Id The court
did note, however, that there may be cases where a defendant with a "limited role" may
prove prejudice from joinder. Id at 899 n.14. Such prejudice is more likely where a defend-
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With respect to DeSantis, the court also found that the evidence

was so compelling that the risk of prejudicial guilt by association with
the co-defendants was insubstantial. 237 5 It stated that the Government
had based its case against DeSantis only on evidence admissible

against him and had not attempted to impugn him by reference to the
evidence of his co-defendants' guilt. The court found only two in-

stances of inadmissible references to DeSantis during the joint trial and
determined them to be "inconsequential."

37
' 6

It therefore held that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bertman's and DeSantis's severance motions.23 77
In United States v. Doe,2378 defendant Doe was tried jointly with
defendant Roe on various drug charges related to the smuggling of her-

oin from Korea. 2379 During the investigation and pretrial proceedings,
Doe repeatedly exculpated Roe while incriminating himself. Before
trial and at the conclusion of the Government's case, Doe moved for
severance because he felt a "moral obligation" to testify on behalf of
ant played a limited role in many transactions with the co-defendants, than where a defendant, like Bertman, played a role in a limited number of transactions with the co-defendants.
Id In the latter case, the jury can more easily distinguish the evidence relevant to each
defendant.
2375. Id. at 900.
2376. Id In one instance co-defendant DeRosa identified a drug supplier as "D." Although the Government implied that "D" was DeSantis in its opening argument, it did not
use this implication in its closing argument. In the second instance, DeRosa implied that
DeSantis was a cocaine supplier. The trial court held the testimony inadmissible against
DeSantis. The Ninth Circuit noted that this could not have prejudiced DeSantis since DeSantis conceded at the trial that DeRosa portrayed DeSantis as a cocaine supplier. Id at
899-900.
2377. Id DeSantis asserted three additional grounds for severance, each of which the
court briefly dismissed. Id at 897 n.10. He contended first that since the linking RICO
charge was not alleged in good faith, severance was required after its dismissal. Id (citing
United States v. Ong, 541 F.2d 331, 337 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977)).
The Ninth Circuit rejected this contention, noting sufficient support in the record to uphold
the trial judge's ruling that the Government did not act in bad faith. 670 F.2d at 897 n.10
(citing United States v. Aiken, 373 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 833 (1967)).
Secondly, DeSantis claimed that joinder was improper because the RICO count was based
on an incorrect legal theory. The court held that DeSantis had waived this argument by not
raising it pretrial. 670 F.2d at 897 n.10 (citing FED. R. CIuM. P. 12(f); United States v.
Braunig, 553 F.2d 777, 780 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 959 (1977)). Finally, DeSantis
claimed that the joint trial prejudiced him since he was unable to argue inferences from the
fact that he testified and his co-defendants did not. The Ninth Circuit rejected this claim,
stating that it was persuaded that such inferences would not have helped DeSantis and thus
finding no abuse of discretion by the trial judge. 670 F.2d at 987 n. 10 (citing United States
v. De La Cruz Bellinger, 422 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir.) ("Unless a defendant can show that his
defense probably would have benefited from commenting on a co-defendant's refusal to
testify, denial of the motion to sever is not prejudicial."), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 942 (1970)).
2378. 655 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1980).
2379. I1d at 923.
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Roe but did not wish to testify on behalf of himself.2380 Doe contended
that with separate trials he could testify for Roe without being compelled to testify against himself at his own trial.23 8 ' The trial court
denied the motion and Doe testified, exculpating Roe and incriminating himself.23 82 He was found guilty on two counts while Roe was
acquitted.2 38 3
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected Doe's contentions, stating
first that Doe was not compelled to testify on behalf of Roe but did so
of his own choice. 238 4 Secondly, the court stated that even if the severance motion were granted, Doe would only have been protected against
his own testimony if his trial had occurred before Roe's. If it had occurred after, his testimony at Roe's trial could have been introduced at
his own trial. The court thus concluded that separate trials would have
eliminated possible prejudice from the joint trial only if Doe's occurred
first and Roe's occurred second. 2385 The court determined that Doe
had made no request in his severance motion to have his own trial first,
and even if he had, the trial court would have been within its discretion
to reject the motion. 238 6 It therefore held that the district judge did not
abuse his discretion in failing to grant the severance motion.2 3 87
Finally, in United States v. Sears,2388 defendant Strozyk was
charged jointly with defendants Sears and Werner on one count of robbery of a savings and loan. Sears and Werner were also charged with a
second count of bank robbery. Strozyk moved the trial court for severance of both offenses and defendants. The district court granted
Strozyk's motion to sever the savings and loan count from the bank
robbery count but denied his motion to sever his trial from the other
2380. Id. at 924.
2381. Id. at 926.
2382. Id at 924.
2383. Id
2384. Id at 926 (citing United States v. Gay, 567 F.2d 916, 918 (9th Cir.) (defendant may
not call co-defendant to the witness stand in joint trial), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978);
United States v. Roberts, 503 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113
(1975)).
2385. 655 F.2d at 926.
2386. Id at 926-27 (citing United States v. Gay, 567 F.2d 916, 919-21 (9th Cir.) (severance should not be allowed to give defendants greater rights, such as the right to order their
individual trials, than they would have had without a joint indictment), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 999 (1978)).
2387. 655 F.2d at 927 (citing United States v. Gay, 567 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978); Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 1004 (1969)).
2388. 663 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 (1982).
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2389
defendants' on the first count.
On appeal, Strozyk claimed several instances of prejudice arising
from the joint trial.2 3 90 First, he claimed that he was unable to fully
cross-examine a witness who testified that Strozyk told him the details
of the savings and loan robbery.23 91 Strozyk contended that the witness
actually learned the details from Sears while Sears was in jail after being arrested for the bank robbery. He was prevented from raising the
issue of where this conversation occurred, however, since doing so
would inform the jury of Sears' involvement in another crime. The
court rejected this claim, stating that the location of the alleged conversation between Sears and the witness was not relevant, and that
the court that raising Sears' incarcerStrozyk's counsel had agreed with
2392
Strozyk.
assist
not
would
ation
Second, Strozyk claimed that he was prejudiced when another witness mentioned the bank robbery committed by Sears and Werner
alone, contending that the jury might have inferred that he was involved in it.2393 The court rejected this claim also, accepting the district
with respect to
court's statement that the existence of another count 2394
Sears and Werner was not communicated to the jury.
Third, Strozyk claimed that a witness' whispered comments to the
judge, along with lengthy sidebar discussions, implied to the jury that
testimony was being curtailed and caused him to appear guilty. 2395
The court rejected this claim, stating that these procedures were initially suggested by Strozyk's counsel in order to avoid mention of the
bank robbery and hence prejudice to Sears and Werner.2 39 6
Finally, Strozyk claimed that some of the testimony against Sears
alone prejudiced him at trial. 2397 The court, however, emWerner
and

2389.
2390.
2391.
2392.
2393.
2394.

Id at 898.
Id. at 900.
Id at 901.
Id
Id
Id

2395. Id. at 901-02.

2396. Id at 902.
2397. Id This testimony included a witness' statement that Strozyk admitted that he
(Strozyk) and "some others" had robbed a savings and loan. The unnamed "others" were,
in fact, co-defendants Sears and Werner. Strozyk claimed that the statement was inadmissible as a confession by one defendant against a co-defendant. See Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968). The Ninth Circuit found the testimony admissible and noted that while
it might be harmful to Sears or Werner, it did not improperly prejudice Strozyk. 663 F.2d at
902. Strozyk also claimed prejudice from a witness' confusion of him with co-defendant
Sears. The Ninth Circuit dismissed this claim, stating that Strozyk could have, but did not,
cross-examine the witness to clarify the matter, and that the jury was instructed to consider
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phasized that the trial court had instructed the jury to compartmentalize the evidence and to weigh the evidence separately against each
defendant.2 39 8 It thus held that Strozyk had received a fair trial and
was not prejudiced by joinder with Sears and Werner.23 99
These decisions demonstrate the reluctance of the Ninth Circuit to
overturn a district court's finding that a defendant was not denied a fair
trial by being joined with other defendants. In order to find an abuse
of discretion by the trial judge, the Ninth Circuit must find clear, manifest, or undue prejudice. Because the judge can successfully abate possible prejudice due to joinder by limiting the admissibility of evidence
and by carefully instructing the jury to compartmentalize and weigh
the evidence separately against each defendant, it is not surprising that
reversals due to improper joinder are rare.
3.

Procedure-time of severance motion

In United States v. Barker,2' the defendant moved before trial to
sever perjury and false statement counts from the substantive assault
and deprivation of civil rights counts.2 40 1 Since the alleged perjury and
false statements were simply denials of the substantive counts, Barker
contended that inclusion of all counts in a single trial would indicate to
the jury that the Government and the grand jury did not believe his
denials and would thus impeach his testimony.2 4 2 He also contended
that the Government's introduction of his grand jury testimony denying the offenses in order to prove the perjury counts compelled him to
testify at the trial regarding the substantive counts.2 4°3
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that a motion to sever under
Rule 14 must be timely made and properly maintained.24 °4 Unless the
severance motion is renewed at the close of all the evidence, 4°5 or at
that witness' testimony only against Sears. Id Lastly, Strozyk claimed that he was
prejudiced by testimony about the "dramatic" arrest of Sears and Werner. The court found
no prejudice since the testimony clearly indicated that Strozyk was not involved. Id
2398. 663 F.2d at 902.
2399. Id
2400. 675 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
2401. Id at 1058.
2402. Id
2403. Id
2404. Id (citing United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 958, 965 (9th Cir.) (right to severance
waived when pretrial motion not renewed after prejudicial evidence became known), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 956 (1977)).
2405. 675 F.2d at 1058 (citing United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir.
1972)).
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least at the introduction of the allegedly prejudicial evidence, 240 6 it is
waived. 40 7 The court, therefore, did not address Barker's contentions,
but simply held that because he had not properly maintained his motion by renewal during the trial or at the close of evidence, he had
waived his right to appeal his conviction on the basis of the trial court's
denial of his pretrial severance motion.2408
B.

Guilty Pleas

1. Competency to plead guilty
By pleading guilty, a defendant waives important constitutional
rights to trial before a judge or jury. Such waivers must not only be
voluntary, 4°9 "but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."24 10 It is therefore an obvious requirement that a defendant
be competent to plead guilty. In the Ninth Circuit, "[a] defendant is
not competent to plead guilty if a mental illness has substantially impaired his ability to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives
presented to him and to understand the nature of the consequences of
his plea.""241 If questions of the defendant's competency are raised at
the time of the guilty plea, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing
on the issue.2 412 If the judge himself entertains or should reasonably
have entertained a good faith doubt as to the competency of a defendant to plead guilty, the due process clause requires the court, on its own
2406. 675 F.2d at 1058 (citing United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 958, 965 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 956 (1977)).
2407. 675 F.2d at 1058 (citing United States v. Burnley, 452 F.2d 1133, 1134 (9th Cir.
1971)).
2408. 675 F.2d at 1058-59.
2409. FED. R. CrM. P. 11(d) provides:
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by
addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is
voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea
agreement. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness
to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the attorney for the government and the defendant or his attorney.
2410. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
2411. Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1973) (quoting Schoeller v. Dunbar,
423 F.2d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir.) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834 (1970)).
This standard of competency, established by the Sieling court, is higher than the standard of
competency to stand trial, which is "the ability to understand the nature of the proceedings
in which one is engaged and to assist in one's defense." Spikes v. United States, 633 F.2d
144, 146 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Clark, 617 F.2d 180, 185 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981)). See generally Note, Competence to Plead Guilty: A New Stan.
dard, 23 DuKE L.J. 149 (1974).
2412. Spikes v. United States, 633 F.2d at 145 (citing Sieling, 478 F.2d at 214).
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motion, to hold a competency hearing. 24 13 Appellate review of the isto ensue is limited to whether a reasonable judge would be expected
241 5
tertain genuine doubt 2 4 14 about the defendant's competence.
In Chavez v. United States,24 6 the Ninth Circuit reversed its earlier holding that Chavez was denied a fair competency hearing before

accepting his guilty plea.2417 The court noted that the expanded appellate record 2418 clearly showed that at the time of Chavez's guilty plea,

he had had a hearing in which the district court had conducted an inquiry regarding both his understanding of the proceedings and his
competence. The district court found him competent and accepted the
guilty plea. The Ninth Circuit, finding no evidence that the trial court
used an incorrect standard of competency, 24 19 affirmed the conviction.
2.

Effect of factual basis for guilty plea

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 (f) 242 ° requires that the

court make an inquiry to satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for a
guilty plea. 24 21 The rule serves two purposes. First, it assists the dis2 422
trict court in ensuring that the defendant's plea is truly voluntary
and thus a valid waiver of the right to trial by jury, to confront one's

2413. Sailer v. Gunn, 548 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir. 1977).
2414. The Ninth Circuit believes the terms "good faith doubt," "genuine doubt," "sufficient doubt," "bona fide doubt," "reasonable doubt" (or "reasonable grounds") and "substantial question" describe equivalent standards. Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 516
n.l (1981).
2415. Bassett v. McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616, 621 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 849 (1977).
2416. 656 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1981).
2417. Chavez v. United States, 641 F.2d 1253, 1260-61, withdrawn, 656 F.2d 512 (9th Cir.
1981). In the first case, the Ninth Circuit described the facts giving rise to Chavez's assertion
that his conviction should be overturned because the trial court did not order, on its own
motion, a hearing on his competency to plead guilty. Id at 1255. After a lengthy examination of the due process requirements for a competency hearing and their statutory bases, the
court held that there was sufficient evidence to require the trial court to hold an evidentiary
hearing on Chavez's competency to plead guilty. Id at 1260. Since the record revealed no
such hearing, the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction and remanded to the district court,
with orders to vacate the conviction and the guilty plea and to rearraign Chavez. Id at
1260-61.
2418. Apparently the record on appeal for the first case did not reflect the "competency
proceedings" which were in the district court docket. 656 F.2d at 515. The Ninth Circuit
granted the Government's motion to expand the record to include this information. Id at
514.
2419. Id. at 514.
2420. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f) provides that "[n]otwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of
guilty, the court should not enter ajudgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as
shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea."
2421. See generaly 9 FED. PROC. L. ED. § 22:534 (1982).
2422. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969).
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accusers and against compulsory self-incrimination.2 4 23 Second,adherence to the rule develops a complete record that enables expeditious
review on appeal and discourages "frivolous post-conviction attacks on
the constitutional validity of guilty pleas."2424 The Ninth Circuit has
recently considered the collateral effect of this finding of a factual basis
for a guilty plea.
In United States v. Barker,2425 the defendant was indicted for first
degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. 2426 Barker then entered a guilty plea, under a plea agreement, to second degree murder.
At the hearing, the district judge attempted to establish that Barker,
whose English language ability was limited, fully understood the effect
of her plea.2427 After Barker's counsel assured the judge that she understood, the judge accepted the plea, dismissed the first degree murder
and conspiracy indictment and sentenced Barker to twenty years
imprisonment.2428
Barker, with new counsel, moved to set aside her plea and convic2
tion 429 on the ground that she had not been adequately informed of
the nature of the second degree murder charge.2 4 30 The district judge
set aside the judgment and vacated his order dismissing the indictment.243 1 Barker then attacked the reinstated first degree murder and
conspiracy charges, arguing that because the district court's finding of a
factual basis for second degree murder "acted as an acquittal" to the
first degree murder and conspiracy charges, she was being placed in
double jeopardy.24 32 The district court rejected her implied acquittal
theory and denied the motion to dismiss the indictment.2433
2423. Id at 466.
2424. Id at 465.
2425. 681 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1982).
2426. Id at 590.
2427. Id FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) provides in part that before accepting a plea of guilty, the
court address the defendant in open court, inform him and make sure he understands the
nature of the charges and the minimum and maximum penalties provided by law for the
charges to which the plea is offered. Rule Il(d) requires in part that the court further ensure
the plea was given voluntarily and not in response to threats or promises apart from the plea
agreement.
2428. 681 F.2d at 590.
2429. Barker made this motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976), which provides in
pertinent part that "[a] prisoner in custody. . . claiming the right to be released upon the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States. . .may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate. . . the sentence."
2430. 681 F.2d at 590.
2431. Id.
2432. Id
2433. Id The district court noted that while the Ninth Circuit had not yet considered this
type of implied acquittal claim, the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth
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The Ninth Circuit was also unpersuaded by Barker's argument.24 3 4

It held that the district judge's review of the factual basis for a guilty
plea on a lesser charge is not analogous to a jury's determination of
guilt of a lesser included offense.24 35 The court stated that the trial

judge's review was not a forum for consideration of the factual basis of

2 436
charges abandoned by the prosecutor as a result of a plea bargain.
It then held that the determination of a defendant's guilt "is restricted
to the specific charge to which the defendant has agreed to plead

'
guilty."2437
Thus, the Ninth Circuit followed the majority of the other

circuits which have rejected the implied acquittal theory.24 38
3.

Plea agreements

Defendants often bargain with prosecutors to either plead guilty to
a lesser charge in exchange for dismissal of a more severe charge, to
plead guilty to some of the charges in exchange for dismissal of the
remainder, or to plead guilty to all the charged offenses in exchange for

the prosecutor's recommendation of a particular sentence. Such plea
agreements are an essential part of the criminal justice system. They

lead to prompt resolution of cases and, with proper implementation,
promote effective and just administration of criminal law.2 4 39 The proand District of Columbia Circuits had considered and rejected this type of claim. Id at n. I.
(citations omitted).
2434. Id at 591. Barker relied on Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), where the
defendant was tried for first degree murder but the jury convicted him of second degree
murder after being given a lesser included offense instruction. Id at 185-86. After an appellate court reversed his conviction, Green was re-tried for first degree murder. Id at 186.
The Supreme Court held that the second trial violated the double jeopardy clause since the
defendant was "in direct peril of being convicted and punished for first degree murder at his
first trial." Id at 190. The Barker court distinguished Green by noting that unlike Green,
Barker had not stood trial on the first charge and thus had not been "in direct peril." 681
F.2d at 591.
2435. 681 F.2d at 591.
2436. Id The court noted that the prosecutor's decision to plea bargain was within "'the
executive's undeniable discretion to decide not to pursue a particular prosecution any further.'" Id (quoting United States v. Myles, 430 F. Supp. 98, 101 (D.D.C. 1977), at'd,569
F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). The district judge only has the discretion to accept or reject the
plea bargain, tempered by a concern for the public interest. 681 F.2d at 592 (citing United
States v. O'Brien, 601 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1979); FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(2)).
2437. 681 F.2d at 592. Barker, however, claimed that her case presented "extraordinary
circumstances," implying that the district judge had considered and rejected the elements of
first degree murder. She claimed that her responses, and those of her co-defendant, to the
trial judge's numerous questions during her plea hearing revealed "the very essence of the
Government's case." The Ninth Circuit, however, refused to infer from these circumstances
that the district judge had considered and rejected the first degree murder charge. Id
2438. See supra note 2433.
2439. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
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cedures governing the conduct of parties to plea agreements are set
forth in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 (e). 2 " 0 Before this rule
can be applied by a court, however, a determination must be made
regarding whether plea negotiations, in fact, have taken place. The
Ninth Circuit has recently considered this issue in United States v.
Doe 2441

Defendants Doe and Roe were taken into custody after their implication in an attempt to smuggle heroin into the United States. 2" 2
Doe expressed a willingness to cooperate with further investigation by
the drug enforcement agents, waived his right to counsel, and answered
the agents' questions regarding his participation in the drug smuggling
scheme.2" 3 Doe then met with a United States Attorney, agreed to and
did cooperate fully with drug enforcement authorities. 2444 Doe and
Roe were later indicted for conspiracy, possession, and importation of
heroin.2" 5 At trial, Doe admitted his guilt and exculpated Roe. 2 " 6
Doe was convicted
on the substantive charges, while Roe was acquitted
2 44 7
on all counts.
Doe appealed his conviction on the ground that the trial court
"improperly excluded testimony relevant to the substance of the plea
agreement." 2 "4 He asserted that the plea agreement consisted of the
Government's agreement to drop charges against Roe and to recommend a reduced sentence for himself in exchange for his cooperation
2440. FED. R. CruM. P. l1(e) provides that the government and the defendant may negotiate for the purpose of reaching a plea agreement. The court may not participate in such
discussions, but if an agreement is reached, the court may accept or reject the agreement or
defer its decision until after consideration of the presentence report. Except in certain circumstances, withdrawn guilty pleas, offers to plead guilty or nolo contendere, pleas of nolo
contendere, and statements relating to such pleas or offers are inadmissible in civil or criminal proceedings against the person who made the plea or offer.
2441. 655 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1980), as corrected, 656 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1981).
2442. 655 F.2d at 922-23.
2443. Id at 923.
2444. Id
2445. Id
2446. Id at 924.
2447. Id
2448. Id The exclusion of this testimony arose in an evidentiary context. The appellant
argued that under FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(e)(6), evidence of "statements made in connection
with, and relevant to" a plea of guilty or an offer to plead guilty is "not admissible in any
civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer." Id at 925. Doe
made a pretrial motion to suppress statements he had made to government agents after his
arrest, claiming that they were made during plea negotiation. Id at 923. At the hearing on
his motion, the court excluded testimony which Doe claimed would have shown that he was
engaged in plea negotiations. Id at 925. It was this exclusion of testimony which he argued
on appeal was improper. Id at 924.
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with the authorities. The United States Attorney testified that there
was no plea agreement, but rather that Doe only requested favorable
treatment for Roe in exchange for his cooperation. 2 ' 9
The Ninth Circuit allowed that the exclusion of the testimony
might have been improper, 2450 but concluded that no prejudice had occurred because it found nothing in the record to show that Doe was
ever engaged in plea negotiations. 245 ' The court reiterated the two factors normally examined in determining the existence of plea negotiations: (1) whether the accused subjectively expected to negotiate a plea;
and (2) whether the accused's belief was reasonable considering the objective circumstances.2 4 52 The court indicated that Doe's actions did
not satisfy the first part of the test since nothing in the record showed
that Doe had pled or offered to plead guilty.2 45 3 The court stated that
rather than attempting to plea bargain, Doe had simply incriminated
himself in order to exculpate Roe. The court also noted that even if an
agreement had been made, Doe was not prejudiced by admission of his
statements made to the agents during their investigation because he
fully incriminated himself in both his testimony and his closing statement.24 54 Finally, the court concluded that even if an agreement had
been made, there was no evidence of the Government's failure to comply.2455 Therefore, it held that the trial court's exclusion of testimony
regarding the alleged plea agreement was not improper. 2456
The Ninth Circuit has also recently considered the propriety of
certain conditions upon which a plea agreement was based. In Phill#?s
v. United States,24 57 the defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea
bargain, to three counts of mail fraud and using a fictitious name to
defraud.2458 Twenty-three other counts were dismissed. At the guilty
plea proceedings, the defendant agreed that restitution would be determined by the probation department and would not be limited by the
2449. Id
2450. Id The testimony might have been admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule
under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
2451. 655 F.2d at 925.
2452. Id This two-part test is outlined in United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366
(5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), and was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Pantohan, 602 F.2d 855, 857 (9th Cir. 1979) and United States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878, 885
(9th Cir. 1980).
2453. 655 F.2d at 925.
2454. Id at n.8.
2455. Id At the sentencing hearing, the Government asked for and was denied the right to
allocute (presumably on behalf of Doe) at the sentencing proceedings. Id at 925, 927-29.
2456. Id at 925.
2457. 679 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1982).
2458. Id at 193.
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amounts he had received as a result of his fraudulent activities as set
forth in the indictment. 2459 He was sentenced to one year in prison,
given five years probation and ordered to make $6,000 restitution. Defendant signed a stipulation agreeing to pay the $6,000 in monthly installments, but then challenged his sentence on the ground of excessive
restitution as a probation condition.2 46 0 The district court denied his
motion.246 1
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court had the power to
order the defendant to pay $6,000 restitution as a probation condition
even though the counts to which he pleaded guilty did not specify any
monetary loss. 2462 The court noted that 18 U.S.C. section 3651 provides that as a condition of probation, a defendant "[mlay be required
to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was
had. . ...,246 The court stated, however, that the defendant was not
being made to pay an amount related to a dismissed count but rather
an amount that he could realistically pay as determined by the probation department. 2z" The court also stated that the term "offense" as
used in section 3651 could be interpreted, in the case of mail fraud, to
refer to the entire fraudulent scheme involving the use of the mails
rather than to any specific fraudulent mailings.2 465 The court thus concluded that when a defendant agrees to pay restitution pursuant to a
2459. The indictment for all 26 counts indicated he had fraudulently received $1,856.81.
Id at 193 n.l. The subsequent probation report indicated he had received $59,125. Id at
193.
2460. Id at 194.
2461. Id
2462. Id
2463. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976) (emphasis added). The defendant evidently argued that the
$6,000 was well in excess of the losses sustained by the victim of the three charges to which
he had pleaded guilty. See supra note 2459. In fact, the court cited three cases upholding
this argument. United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002, 1007-08 (3d Cir. 1977) (restitution
exceeding amount of loss caused by offense for which conviction was had is illegal); Karrell
v. United States, 181 F.2d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir.) (restitution limited to damages of counts on
which defendant was convicted), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950); United States v. Follette,
32 F. Supp. 953, 955 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
2464. 679 F.2d at 193-94.
2465. Phillips, 679 F.2d at 196 (citing United States v. Tiler, 602 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1979)). In
Tiler, the defendants were ordered to pay $100,000 restitution as a condition of probation
after pleading guilty to a conspiracy count. The remaining substantive counts were dismissed. The defendants argued that no damages could flow from a conspiracy count since it
is an inchoate crime, an agreement to commit a crime at some future time. Id at 33. The
Second Circuit held "that restitution may be ordered as a condition of probation for actual
damages charged in the indictment to have been caused by the operation of the conspiracy
over time." Id at 34. See also United States v. Landay, 513 F.2d 306, 307-08 (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894 (1962).
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plea bargain which was fully explored in open court, and later signs a
"the Court is bound
stipulation that the restitution is to be paid, then
2466
by law to carry out that specific agreement."
4. Withdrawal of guilty plea
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d), a defendant

may move to withdraw a guilty plea only before sentence is imposed. 2"

7

In the Ninth Circuit, a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a

plea is freely allowed, 2468 but is not a right. 2469 The trial court should
consider, in general, the defendant's understanding of the nature and
consequences of the plea, the role of counsel, the breach of a plea bargain, and prejudice to the government. 2470 On appeal, the Ninth Cir-

plea only on
cuit will reverse a denial of a motion to withdraw a2guilty
4 71
a showing of abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
In United States v. Garrett,24 72 the defendant pleaded guilty pursu-

ant to a plea agreement. This agreement allowed Garrett to remain
free on bond until the date set for sentencing. In addition, the Washington district court ordered Garrett to telephone his probation officer
2466. 679 F.2d at 194 (citing United States ex rel. Robinson v. Israel, 603 F.2d 635 (7th
Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019 (1980); United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F.
Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1981)). The Phillps court relied heavily on the reasoning in McLaughlin
for its justification of a broader reading of 18 U.S.C. § 3651. It agreed with the McLaughlin
court's analysis that full restitution may be ordered when:
(1) the amount of loss suffered by an identifiable aggrieved party is certain;
(2) the defendant admits, and there is no factual question as to whether the defendant caused or was responsible for the aggrieved party's loss; and
(3) the defendant consents freely and voluntarily, to make full restitution and
that it be a condition of probation.
679 F.2d at 194-95 (quoting McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. at 908). See also United States v.
Landay, 513 F.2d 306, 308 (5th Cir. 1975) (restitution of amounts greater than those in
convicted counts upheld where defendant "freely and voluntarily admitted the exact amount
the [bank] claimed he owed").
The Phillos court further agreed with the McLaughlin court that not to allow full restitution would severely restrict plea bargaining and frustrate the rehabilitation goals of the
probation system. 679 F.2d at 195.
2467. FED. R. CRuM. P. 32(d) provides:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made only
before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct
manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction
and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.
2468. United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 471 F.2d 294,294 (9th Cir.), cert.denied, 411 U.S.
970 (1973).
2469. United States v. Youpee, 419 F.2d 1340, 1343 (9th Cir. 1969).
2470. For a comprehensive list of circumstances affecting withdrawal of a guilty plea, see 9
FED. PROc. L. ED. § 22:561 (1982).
2471. United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 471 F.2d at 294.
2472. 680 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1982).
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twice a month.2 47 3 After failing to make the required calls, the Government sought a warrant based on failure to comply with conditions of
release.24 74 A Florida federal court also issued a warrant for his arrest
based on a separate indictment. After being taken into custody, Gar-

rett moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that the plea agreement was broken by ithe issuance of the warrants, and that he was not
adequately informed of the consequences of the guilty plea because he

"'was not told his conviction in Seattle could act as an enhancing prior
conviction .... , "2475 The trial court refused to grant the motion to
withdraw the guilty plea.247 6
The Ninth Circuit dismissed Garrett's first contention, stating that

the Government fully complied with the plea agreement, and that Garrett's claims "as to the bond conditions and the Florida arrest warrant
based on a different indictment [were] simply irrelevant. 2477 The court
then stated that the Ninth Circuit had not previously addressed the issue of whether sentence enhancement is a collateral consequence of

plea agreements.2478 It noted that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11 requires that a defendant be told of the direct but not collateral con-

sequences of a plea, 2479 and that other courts have held possible enhancement of subsequent sentences to be collateral. 2480 The court thus

held that enhancement was collateral since the Washington district
court had no control or responsibility over the criminal proceedings in
Florida, where the enhanced sentence due to the guilty plea would oc-

cur.248 ' Having found both of Garrett's attacks on his guilty plea un2473. Id at 65.
2474. Id.
2475. Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief.
2476. Id at 64.
2477. Id at 65 (emphasis in original). The requirement to make the telephone calls was a
release condition, not part of the plea agreement.
2478. Id
2479. Id (citing United States v. King, 618 F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1980)).
2480. 680 F.2d at 65-66 (citing Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); Weinstein v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 597, 600 (C.D.
Cal. 1981)).
2481. 680 F.2d at 66. The court analogized the sentence enhancement consequences of a
guilty plea to the possible deportation consequences that it had previously determined to be
collateral. Id (citing Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S.
895 (1976)). In Fruchtman, an alien contested the validity of his guilty plea because the
district court did not inform him that it rendered him subject to deportation. Id at 948. The
Fruchtman court listed as direct consequences of a guilty plea the maximum allowable sentence (citing Combs v. United States, 391 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1968)); recidivist provisions
(citing Berry v. United States, 412 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1969)); and loss of state probation or
parole (citing United States v. Myers, 451 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1972)); and as collateral consequences civil proceedings leading to commitment (citing Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Insti-
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tenable, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the trial judge had not abused his

discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.2482
C. Jury Administration

1. The right to a trial by jury
The Constitution guarantees the right to a trial by jury in criminal
proceedings 24 83 and in suits at common law.2484 The Ninth Circuit has

held that 5these constitutional guarantees do not apply in tax
248
disputes.
In Dawn v. Commissioner of InternalRevenue,2 48 6 the defendants
petitioned the Tax Court for a determination of an assessed deficiency.

The Tax Court granted the Government's motion for summary judgment, and the taxpayers appealed. The Ninth Circuit held that the tax-

payers were not improperly denied a jury trial
because taxpayers are
2487
not entitled to a jury trial in the tax courts.

2. Juror bias
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees

the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, "indifferent"
jurors. "The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even
tution, 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir.), cert.denied, 414 U.S. 1005 (1973)); loss of good time credit
(citing Hutchinson v. United States, 450 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1971)); loss of right to vote and
travel abroad (citing Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 916 (1965)); and the possibility of undesirable discharge from the armed service (citing
Redwine v. Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963)). 531 F.2d at 949. The Fruchtman court
held that possible deportation was a collateral consequence because it "'was not the sentence of the court which accepted the plea but of another agency over which the trial judge
has no control and for which he has no responsibility."' Id (quoting Michel v. United
States, 507 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1974)). The court further stated that to require a district
judge to inform the defendant of the manifold collateral consequences of a guilty plea would
be an unmanageable burden. 531 F.2d at 949.
2482. 680 F.2d at 66.
2483. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2484. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
2485. Olshausen v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 820
(1960). In Oishausen, the court stated that Congress has provided for the resolution of tax
disputes through civil rather than criminal proceedings because remedial rather than punitive sanctions will better protect government revenues. Id at 27 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909);
Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909); Passavant v. United States, 148 U.S. 214
(1893)). The 01shausen court further stated that tax proceedings were created by statute and
thus did not originate in the common law. 273 F.2d at 28. Therefore, neither the sixth nor
seventh amendments apply in tax disputes.
2486. 675 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1982).
2487. Id at 1079 (citing Dahl v. Commissioner, 526 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)).
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the minimal standards of due process.""" The United States Supreme
Court and the Ninth Circuit have recently considered cases in which
defendants have claimed that certain jurors in their trials were biased
against them because of improper actions of jurors, improper actions of
outside parties, or the jurors' exposure to outside influences.
In Smith v. Phillps,24 89 the Supreme Court considered whether the

active seeking of employment with the District Attorney's office by
Smith, one of the jurors in the defendant's trial, constituted a violation
of the defendant's due process rights under the fourteenth amendment.
The attorneys who were prosecuting Phillips were informed of Smith's
employment application more than a week before the end of trial, but
they concluded that in light of Smith's statements during voir dire,2490
it was unnecessary to inform the trial court or defense counsel about
this application. The jury convicted Phillips of two counts of murder
and one count of attempted murder. At the conclusion of the trial, the
court and defense counsel were informed of Smith's application and
the prosecutors' knowledge of this application.24 91
After a hearing before the trial judge, the court denied Phillips'
motion to set aside his conviction, finding that Smith's employment application "'in no way reflected a premature conclusion as to. . .[Phillips'] guilt, or prejudice against . . [Phillips], or an inability to
consider the guilt or innocence of. . . [Phillips] solely on the evidence.' "2492 The district court, however, granted Phillips' application

for federal habeas corpus relief. The court held that although Phillips
had not shown actual juror bias, bias could be imputed to Smith because the average man in the position of a juror applying for employment with the District Attorney's office would have believed that the
jury's verdict would directly affect the evaluation of his employment
2 93
application. A
In a divided opinion, the Supreme Court reversed. 4 94

Justice

Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that the constitutional remedy
2488. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
2489. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
2490. Id at 212-13 n.4. The juror had declared during voir dire that he intended to pursue
a career in law enforcement, that he had already worked as a store detective, and that he had
contacts with the District Attorney's office. He had also declared his belief that he could be
a fair and impartial juror. Defense counsel had then permitted him to take his seat among
the jurors despite the availability of several peremptory challenges. Id
2491. Id at 213.
2492. Id (quoting People v. Phillips, 87 Misc. 2d 613, 621, 384 N.Y.S.2d 906, 912 (1975)).
2493. 455 U.S. at 214 (citing Phillips v. Smith, 485 F. Supp. 1365, 1371-72 (S.D.N.Y.
1980)).
2494. 455 U.S. at 211.
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for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant

has the opportunity to prove actual bias. 4 95 The Court rejected Phillips' argument that because of the human propensity for self-justifica-

tion, a court cannot possibly ascertain a juror's impartiality by relying
solely upon that juror's testimony; therefore, the law must impute bias

to jurors in Smith's position. 49 6 Instead, the Court stated that such
testimony is not inherently suspect because "'surely one who is trying
as an honest man to live up to the sanctity of his oath is well qualified

to say whether he has an unbiased mind in a certain matter.' "2497
The Court further stated that "due process does not require a new

trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising
situation."24 98 Instead, due process simply requires a jury that is will-

ing and capable of deciding the case solely on the evidence before it,
and a trial judge who will prevent prejudicial occurrences or determine
the effect of such occurrences if they happen.2 49 9
Finally, the Court noted that under the federal habeas corpus statute, 2500 a state trial judge's findings of fact are presumptively correct.
2495. Id at 215-16 (citing Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981); Remmer v. United
States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950)). In Dennis, the
defendant was convicted by a jury for failure to comply with an investigation by the House
Committee on Un-American Activities. The jury consisted primarily of government employees, whom Dennis claimed were inherently biased because they were subject to discharge if there were reasonable grounds for believing that they were disloyal to the
government. The Court rejected this claim, stating that Dennis had an opportunity to prove
actual bias but failed to do so. 339 U.S. at 171-72.
In Remmer, the defendant was convicted of income tax evasion. During trial, one of
the jurors was offered a large sum of money in exchange for a favorable verdict. Without
informing defense counsel, an independent investigation was ordered by the court. When
defense counsel was notified after trial, they moved to vacate the verdict. The Supreme
Court, although recognizing the seriousness of the attempted bribe and the investigation, did
not require a new trial. Rather, it remanded the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the incident complained of resulted in actual bias. 347
U.S. at 229-30.
In Chandler, the defendants were convicted of various theft offenses at a trial which was
televised to the public. The defendants argued that the jurors would be unduly influenced
by the unusual publicity and sensational courtroom atmosphere created by the televising of
the trial. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the defendants had not shown that
the jury's ability to decide the case solely on the evidence actually had been impaired. 449
U.S. at 581.
2496. 455 U.S. at 215.
2497. Id at 217 n.7 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. at 171).
2498. 455 U.S. at 217.
2499. Id
2500. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976) provides that "in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court.., the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous." But cf.
infra notes 2507 & 2521.
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This statutory presumption can be overcome only by convincing evidence, 5 "' which the defendant here failed to provide.250 2 The Court
concluded that since post-trial hearings affording defendants an opportunity to prove actual bias are constitutionally sufficient in the federal
courts, Phillips' constitutional rights under the due process
clause of the
250 3
fourteenth amendment could not have been violated.
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that the use of
"implied bias" is not and should not be foreclosed in appropriate circumstances 5 °4 She used as examples of appropriate circumstances jurors who are employees of the prosecuting agency, or are related to a
participant or party to the trial, or are witnesses to or involved with the
criminal transaction. 50 5 She concluded that in these cases, because a
juror may be unaware of his own bias or may have an interest in concealing it, a post-conviction hearing may be inadequate to reveal the
2506
bias.
In his dissenting opinion Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, stated that "in cases like this one, where the
probability of bias is very high, and where the evidence adduced at a
2501. 455 U.S. at 218 (citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 551 (1981)).
2502. 455 U.S. at 218. The district court did not take issue with the factual findings of the
state trial judge. Id
2503. Id Phillips also argued that not only was the prosecutors' failure to inform him
about Smith's application a denial of due process, but it deprived him of a hearing during
trial to seek an alternate juror. The Court characterized this argument as contradictory to
the primary argument; Phillips could hardly argue that due process had been denied for
failure to obtain a hearing when his primary argument was that a hearing was insufficient.
Id at 218-19 n.8. The arguments are not necessarily contradictory, however, because: (1) if
after a hearing, the motion to replace the juror is denied as a result of that juror's testimony,
the primary argument may still be raised; and (2) the nature of the hearings are different; it
is much easier to replace a juror than to upset a jury verdict. Id at 241-42 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
2504. Id at 221 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2505. Id at 222.
2506. Id Justice O'Connor stated that none of the Court's previous opinions precluded the
use of a conclusive presumption of implied bias in appropriate circumstances. Id at 223.
She noted that in Remrner v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), see supra note 2495, a postconviction hearing was adequate to determine juror bias because the allegations of bias were
founded upon the misconduct of a third party rather than upon the juror himself, and consequently, this juror had little reason to shield his biases. Similarly, the opinion in Dennis v.
United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950), see supra note 2495, did not foreclose a finding of implied bias in more serious situations, id at 172-73 (Reed, J., concurring); and in Leonard v.
United States, 378 U.S. 544, 544-45 (1964) (per curiam), implied bias was used to reverse a
conviction where prospective jurors for the defendant's second trial heard the trial court
announce the defendant's guilty verdict in a first trial. Justice O'Connor also stated that the
federal courts should not be deterred by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976), see supra notes 2500-02
and accompanying text, because in extraordinary situations involving implied bias, state
court findings of "no bias" are by definition inadequate. 455 U.S. at 222-23 n.l.
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hearing can offer little assurance that prejudice does not exist, the juror
should be deemed biased as a matter of law. '2 5°7 He argued that where

a juror actively seeks employment with the District Attorney's office,
the probability of bias is substantial. It may be either conscious, or part
of a calculated effort to get a job; or it may be unconscious, since he

may feel an affinity with his potential employer in spite of a sincere
effort to remain impartial.

8

If the juror has a conscious bias, he is

unlikely to admit it at a post-trial hearing, whereas if he has an uncon2 50 9
scious bias he can hardly testify about it since he is unaware of it.
In support of his argument, Justice Marshall noted that in order to
preserve the right to an impartial jury,251 ° the Court has demanded
very strict precautionary standards in the areas of voir dire examina-

tion, 25 1 selection of jurors from a representative cross-section of the
community, 251 2 pretrial and trial publicity,2 5 3 and potentially prejudi-

cial conduct by third parties.251 4 He stated that for the Court to permit
a juror with a high probability of bias, as shown by his conduct, to be
able to disprove any bias merely on his own post-verdict assertion that

he was not biased, goes utterly against the Court's historical insistence
on applying strict safeguards over the right to an impartial jury.2 51 5

Justice Marshall also noted that the adoption of a conclusive presumption of bias has longstanding precedent in English common
2507. 455 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall elaborated that a juror
applying for a position with the District Attorney's office should be automatically disqualified as a matter of law. Likewise, if the juror's efforts at securing employment are not revealed until after trial, any conviction should be set aside automatically, despite the absence
of proof of actual bias. Id
2508. Id. at 230.
2509. Id The Court has previously acknowledged the tremendous difficulty in proving
actual bias or lack of bias, particularly if the bias is unconscious. Id at 230-31 (citing Peters
v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961); Crawford v.
United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909)).
2510. "The right to a trial by an impartial jury lies at the very heart of due process." 455
U.S. at 224 (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 721-22).
2511. 455 U.S. at 225 (citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); Ham v. South Carolina,
409 U.S. 524 (1973)).
2512. 455 U.S. at 226 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Peters v. Kiff, 407
U.S. 493 (1972); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)).
2513. 455 U.S. at 227 (citing Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)).
2514. 455 U.S. at 227 (citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Remmer v. United
States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954)).
2515. 455 U.S. at 228. Justice Marshall expressed the fear that the standard set by the
majority would be ineffective not only when a juror applies for a position with the District
Attorney, but even when a juror is actually employed or serving as a prosecutor. Id.
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law, 25 16 and that many states, including New York, have adopted im-

plied bias by statute 2517 or by case law. 2518 He emphasized, as did Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion, that none of the cases relied

upon by the majority foreclosed the use of an implied bias standard in

appropriate circumstances.2519 While Justice O'Connor implied that
"appropriate circumstances" would be those which were more unusual
and apparent in nature,252° Justice Marshall stated that they would ex25 2 1
ist any time the probability of bias was very high.
The underlying determinate of the opinions in Smith as to whether

a post-trial evidentiary hearing is sufficient to uncover alleged juror
bias seems to be grounded in different philosophical assumptions about
the nature of man. Since the majority believes that "'one who is trying
as an honest man to live up to the sanctity of his oath is well qualified

to say whether he has an unbiased mind in a certain matter,'

"2522

the

underlying assumption of the majority appears to be that man is inher-

ently honest. The dissent leans toward the argument that a juror's testimony at a hearing is inherently suspect because man has a strong
propensity for self-justification.2523 It can be argued, however, that
whether man is basically honest or suspect is a counterfeit issue; that all
2524
men inherently possess both natures.

Given this possible flaw in both opinions, it appears that the ma2516. Id at 232-33 (citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES

480-81 (,V. Hammond ed.

1890); 2 THORNE, BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 405 (1968)).

2517. 455 U.S. at 233 & n.10.
2518. Id at 234 & nn.12, 13. Justice Marshall also noted that a number of lower federal
courts have suggested that implied bias may be appropriate in some circumstances. Id at
238 n.19.
2519. Id at 236-38. See supra note 2506.
2520. See supra text accompanying note 2505.
2521. 455 U.S. at 231. Justice Marshall also stated that the federal habeas corpus statute,
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976), does not preclude the use of an implied bias standard to overturn a state court finding of fact. Id at 239.
2522. Id at 217 n.7 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171 (1950)).
2523. Id at 230.
2524. "Then the Lord God formed (yyitzer) man." Genesis 2:7. "Why was the word
'yyitzer' (and He formed) spelled with two letters 'y'? Because the Holy One, blessed be He,
created two impulses, the one good and the other evil." Berakoth 61a. The Hebrew word
'yyitzer' also means impulse; hence the double 'y' is taken to indicate the two impulses in
man-the good impulse and the evil impulse. See A. COHEN, EVERYMAN'S TALMUD 88
(1949).
The majority opinion, therefore, is flawed because there can be no assurance that a man
can or will be totally honest, whether consciously or unconsciously, when he testifies. The
dissenting opinion is also flawed because no man is or can be totally impartial; thus a defendant need only investigate the jurors' backgrounds until he can find "appropriate circumstances" with which to invoke the implied bias doctrine, and virtually every jury verdict will
be subject to reversal.
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jority opinion is the most practicable. Although in some situations it
may leave the defendant vulnerable to a biased juror, safeguards such
as voir dire and peremptory challenges should adequately protect the
defendant in most situations. If the constitutional standard of due pro-

cess was to include implied bias, the dangers of unwarranted mistrials
and reversals due to weakly supported allegations of juror bias would

have no remedy.
Assuming that a post-trial hearing is sufficient to determine juror
bias, there does exist one troubling aspect of the Smith majority opin-

ion. It emphasized that the burden of proving actual bias rests on the
defendant,25 25 whereas the Court, in one of the cases it relied on,2526

placed a heavy burden on the government to disprove actual bias in
situations involving jury tampering.25 27 Admittedly, Smith involved ju-

ror bias resulting from juror misconduct rather than jury tampering,
yet in both situations there was a high probability of bias, and it is
difficult to determine why the burden of persuasion should fall upon
the defendant in the former situation and upon the government in the

latter.
In the Ninth Circuit, the trial court has discretion to determine
whether and when to hold a hearing on allegations of juror bias or

misconduct, and the extent and nature of that hearing.2528 At this hearing, the trial court must determine the truthfulness of the allegations

and, if truthful, whether the bias or prejudice amounted to a deprivation either of the defendant's fifth amendment due process or sixth
amendment impartial jury rights such that he was deprived of a fair

trial. 2529 Not every allegation or incident of juror bias or misconduct is
held to require a new trial. The Ninth Circuit will reverse a conviction
2525. "This Court has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a
hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias." 455 U.S. at 215
(citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954)).
2526. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954). See supra note 2495.
2527. The Remmer Court stated:
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly
or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is,
for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial. . . . The presumption is
not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish...
that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.
347 U.S. at 229.
The Smith dissent failed to note this difference, perhaps because it was not so much
concerned with the nature of the post-trial hearing, but with whether under certain circumstances a hearing could be sufficient at all.
2528. United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818
(1977).
2529. Id at 1228-29.
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only if it is found that the trial judge so abused his discretion that the
to have been deprived of his fifth or sixth
defendant must be253
deemed
0
amendment rights.
In United States v. Baiileaux,2531 the defendant moved for a
change of venue due to extensive pretrial publicity concerning the
crimes for which he was charged.2 532 Although the district court de-

nied Bailleaux's motion, it announced its willingness to reconsider the
motion if it should appear after voir dire that an impartial jury could
not be assembled. It then made a careful inquiry of the prospective
jurors during the voir dire and excused all jurors who voiced any doubt
as to their ability to render a fair and impartial verdict.2533
The Ninth Circuit found that the district court had not abused its
discretion by denying the motion.2534 It noted that most of the publicity had occurred more than a year before the selection of the jury, and
that the publicity consisted of factual, neutral coverage of only the
crimes themselves rather than of Bailleaux's guilt or innocence.2535
The court also noted the precautions the trial court took during voir
dire, 2536 and the fact that Bailleaux was convicted of only three of the
five counts brought against him.2537 Under all these circumstances, the
Ninth Circuit determined that the publicity was not of a nature that
could have deprived Bailleaux of a fair trial.2538
In United States v. Bagnariol,2539 undercover government agents

operating under the guise of a fictitious corporation involved the defendant politicians in a scheme whereby the politicians agreed to enact
gambling legislation in exchange for part of the profits realized by the
corporation. 2" During trial, one of the jurors went to the public li2530. Id at 1229.
2531. 685 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1982).
2532. Id at 1108. The defendant commissioned a public opinion poll which showed that
over 80% of the general public in the district had heard or read about the crimes. Id at
1109.
2533. Id at 1109.
2534. Id The court stated that a denial of a motion for change of venue should be reversed
only upon a showing of clear abuse of discretion. Id at 1108 (citing United States v. Pry,
625 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 925 (1981)).
2535. 685 F.2d at 1108-09. The court further noted that, to the extent that the publicity did
focus on an individual suspect, it was directed in part to another individual who was involved. Id at 1109.
2536. Id at 1109.
2537. Id.
2538. Id at 1108-09 (citing United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1073 (D. Md.
1976)).
2539. 665 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962 (1982).
2540. Id at 880-81.
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brary and discovered that the fictitious corporation was not listed in
any business publication.2 5 41 The juror then reported this to some of

his fellow jurors and indicated that he found it odd that the defendants
had not conducted a similar investigation into the corporation with
which they intended to do business. 2 542 After conviction, the defendants appealed, alleging that the introduction by the juror of this extrinsic evidence undermined their defense of entrapment, an essential
element of which was their belief in the legitimacy of the
corporation.

254 3

The Ninth Circuit first stated that the constitutional requirement
for trial by jury necessarily implies that the evidence developed against
a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom
where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right to confrontation, cross-examination, and counsel. 25 " It therefore concluded
that a trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing into the precise
nature of any extrinsic material allegedly used by the jury, and if any
possibility is found that the extrinsic material could have affected the
verdict, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.25 45 Although the determinations of a trial court are given great weight, they must be reviewed
in the context of the entire record because of the threat to the defendants' fundamental right to an impartial jury.254
The court then noted the absence of a bright line rule for determining when a conviction must be reversed because of the introduction
by one of the jurors of extrinsic evidence into the jury's deliberations.2547 However, by reviewing several cases, it was able to derive
some of the primary factors commonly used in a trial court's decision:
(1) whether the extrinsic evidence related to a material aspect of the
case; 2548 (2) whether there was a direct and rational connection between
2541. Id at 883.
2542. Id at 883-84.
2543. Id at 884.
2544. Id at 884 & n.3 (citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965); Gibson v.
Clanon, 633 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981)).
2545. 665 F.2d at 885 (citing United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir. 1979)).
The court stated that neither the trial court nor the appellate court can go further and inquire into the internal deliberative process or subjective effects of extraneous information,
since to do so would violate the sanctity of the jury room. 665 F.2d at 884785 & n.4 (citing
McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915); United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 747
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019 (1980); Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau,
523 F.2d 140, 148-50 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976); FED. R. EVID. 606(b)).
2546. 665 F.2d at 885.
2547. Id
2548. Id at 885, 887 (citing United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981)
(obscene and threatening phone calls received by juror's spouse deemed not material to issue
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the extrinsic material and a prejudicial jury conclusion; 2549 (3) whether

the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing; 255 0 and (4) whether
the material was truly extrinsic, i.e., not part of an extrinsic jury
deliberation.5 5 1

Applying these factors, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because it
was undisputed at trial that the fictitious corporation did not exist, the

information gathered by the juror was irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the defendants.25 5 2 It stated that to find a material connection

between the absence of a corporate listing and the defendants' belief in
the legitimacy of the corporation required an assumption that the jury
reached an irrational conclusion. The jury must be regarded, however,
as a rational body, capable of making fine factual distinctions. 25 3 Fiof defendant's guilt or innocence), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982); United States v. Johnson, 647 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1981) (jury's hearing of unadmitted portions of tape recording
deemed irrelevant to any issue in case); Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.) (jury
members' consultation of medical dictionary to determine rarity of defendant's blood type
and effect of morphine on witness' ability to identify defendant held to be crucial evidence
and grounds for reversal), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981)).
2549. 665 F.2d at 885 (citing United States v. Bagley, 641 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir.) (judge's
statement to jury that witness had not been granted immunity deemed non-prejudicial because it was accurate, probably admissible, and had been followed by curative instruction),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 942 (1981); United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1384-85 (10th Cir.
1980) (deputy marshal's explanation of defendant's eligibility for sentencing under Youth
Corrections Act deemed presumptively prejudicial); Llewellyn v. Stynchcombe, 609 F.2d
194, 195-96 (5th Cir. 1980) (jury's finding of witness list of previous arson incident deemed
non-prejudicial because other evidence of prior arson had already been admitted); United
States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1979) (official court file left in jury room held
prejudicial because it contained inadmissible evidence of prior charges); Farese v. United
States, 428 F.2d 178, 179-80 (5th Cir. 1970) (large sum of money found in pocket of defendant's shirt left injury room deemed prejudicial because alleged crime involved a large monetary gain)).
2550. 665 F.2d at 885-86 (citing United States v. Renteria, 625 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (5th Cir.
1980) (case remanded because trial judge refused to conduct a hearing into effect of tape
recording left with jury, portions of which were not admitted into evidence)).
2551. 665 F.2d at 886, 887 (citing United States v. Bassler, 651 F.2d 600, 601-03 (8th Cir.
1981) (notes taken by juror during trial deemed intrinsic to deliberations), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1151 (1982); Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 151-53 (3d Cir.
1975) (information of other killings and investigations leaked into jury room deemed to be
part of normal jury pressures and intra-jury influences), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976)).
2552. 665 F.2d at 888. The court noted that implicit in the knowledge that a corporation
did not exist is that it would not be listed as a corporation in periodicals. The research
merely confirmed what the jurors already knew. The court also noted that the defendants
never asserted a belief that the corporation's name appeared in business publications. Id
2553. Id The court stated that any belief that the defendants may have had that the corporation was legitimate would have been equally credible regardless of whether the company
existed or whether its name appeared in a publication. It noted that an unlisted company is
not necessarily criminal, and that a listed company could be a front for criminal activity just
as easily as one that was not listed. Id
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nally, because the trial judge conducted a thorough investigation into
the incident,2 554 and the evidence presented against the defendants was
so overwhelming,2 55 5 the court held that the extrinsic evidence did not

affect the defendants' right to a fair trial to the extent of requiring a
reversal. 55 6
In UnitedStates v. Sears,255 7 a juror was overheard to say "nice
job" or "good job" to an FBI agent who had just testified. Upon questioning by the court, the juror explained that he had a hearing problem

and that his remark was merely out of appreciation that the FBI agent
had spoken in a loud and clear voice. The court extended defense

counsel an opportunity to question the juror, which was declined, and
because
subsequently rejected a defense motion to disqualify the juror
25 58
of bias and incompetency due to the hearing impairment.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the trial court acted well
within its discretion in determining that the defendants received a fair
trial by an impartial and competent jury.2559 The court stated that the
trial judge had questioned the juror extensively enough to satisfy him-

self that the juror was not biased. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit
noted that the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the juror

closely before deciding that his hearing problem would not deny the
defendants' rights to due process or a fair trial.2 560
In United States v. Armstrong,2 5 6 l during a jury deadlock, the hus-

band of one of the jurors received two annoying phone calls. The
caller stated: "'tell your wife to stop hassling my brother-in-law at
court.' ,,2562 The next day the deadlock was broken and the defendants
were convicted. On appeal, the defendants moved for a mistrial, argu-

ing that these extraneous communications created an unrebutted pre2554. Id at 884, 889. The trial court questioned each juror individually about the nature
of the material, the extent of the discussion, and other circumstances. However, it avoided
inquiry into the subjective effects of the extrinsic discovery on the jury. Id at 884.
2555. Id at 889. For a discussion of the "overwhelming-evidence" test, see Bates v. Nelson, 485 F.2d 90, 93-94 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974). The Bagnariol
court noted that the judge gave clear and careful instructions to the jury to consider only
evidence presented at trial to reach a verdict. This alone may have justified an affirmance.
Id (citing United States v. Bagley, 641 F.2d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 942
(1981); Llewellyn v. Stynchcombe, 609 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1980)).
2556. 665 F.2d at 889.
2557. 663 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 (1982).
2558. Id at 899-900.
2559. Id at 900.
2560. Id See Lyda v. United States, 321 F.2d 788, 790-91 (9th Cir. 1963).
2561. 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
2562. Id at 1331.
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sumption of prejudice.2563
The Ninth Circuit stated that although the presence of an outside

influence upon the jury establishes a presumption of prejudice,215 " the
primary concern of the court was whether the impact of this influence

deprived the defendant of a fair trial.25 65 The court noted that the
phone calls did not refer to the merits of the case, did not articulate
threats, and were not identified with either side. Furthermore, the juror
had stated that she would not let the calls interfere with her duties as a
juror.25 66 The court therefore held that the incident had not affected
the affected the essential fairness of the trial,2567 and affirmed the
conviction.2 6 8

In United States v. Sharo, 2569 a juror offered to arrange an acquittal for the defendants in exchange for a sizable amount of cash.
Upon discovery of the offer, the juror was replaced, and each remaining juror was questioned about any involvement with or any bias resulting from the incident.2 570

Satisfied that there had been no

2563. Id at 1331-32.
2564. Id at 1332 (citing Remner v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), see supra note
2495; Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892); United States v. Goliday, 468 F.2d 170,
171-72 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 934 (1973)).
2565. 654 F.2d at 1332. The Government argued that the phone calls did not trigger a
presumption of prejudice because they were merely part of the intra-jury differences, not an
outside influence. The court elected not to draw a line between outside communications
concerning intra-jury matters and those which relate to other matters, stating that it was not
as concerned with the nature of the jury incidents as with the prejudice they may have
worked on the fairness of the defendants' trial. 1d (citing United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d
394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974); Cavness v. United States, 187 F.2d 719 (9th
Cir. 1951)).
2566. 654 F.2d at 1333.
2567. Id The court stated that these facts rendered the case completely different from
those where reversal was required. Id (citing Rernmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954)
(attempt to bribe a juror); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) (jury exposed to
extra-record facts and public opinion on the evidence)).
2568. 654 F.2d at 1333. The court also held that the defendants' other arguments relating
to certain jury incidents were not grounds for reversal. Revelation of a numerical split
among the jury, although to be discouraged, does not require a mistrial. Id at 1333 (citing
United States v. Williams, 444 F.2d 108, 109 (9th Cir. 1971)). Similarly, illness of a juror
does not require a mistrial. 654 F.2d at 1333. Finally, deference is accorded to the district
court as to when a mistrial should be declared because of a deadlocked jury. Id (citing
United States v. Cawley, 630 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1980)).
2569. 669 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1982).
2570. Id at 599. After being told that the tainted juror had been replaced, each juror was
asked:
(1) whether he or any family member had been contacted by anyone about the
case; (2) whether any fellow juror had sought to discuss the case with him;
(3) whether he had discussed the case with fellow jurors; (4) whether anything had
occurred which led [him] to believe that he could not be fair and impartial;
(5) whether he had overheard any fellow juror discussing specific testimony on the
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involvement with nor any apparent bias resulting from the incident, the
trial judge denied the defendants' motion for a mistrial and permitted
the jury to proceed to a verdict. 57 '
The Ninth Circuit stated two possibilities of prejudice against the
defendants: (1) the tainted juror may have attempted to influence other
jurors in favor of the defendants, which instead prejudiced those jurors
against the defendants; and (2) the unexpected removal of the juror
coupled with the unusual questioning by the court may have caused
some of the jurors to suspect that one of the defendants had instigated
or engaged in the misconduct.2572 The court further stated that it would
evaluate the answers the jurors gave to the unusual voir dire in the
context of the heavy burden that falls upon the Government to disprove bias when jury tampering in any form occurs.2573
With respect to the first possibility of prejudice, the court examined the voir dire conducted by the trial court to determine if it effectively rebutted the strong presumption that prejudice infected the
proceedings. 74 It found that several jurors had discussed the case,
and determined that although these jurors characterized their conversations as innocuous or joking, a juror is unlikely to admit to a judge that
he discussed the case against the judge's express instructions. 75 The
court nevertheless admitted that if direct contact with the tainted juror
were the only source of prejudice, the evidence would present a very
close case.2576
The court then examined the voir dire with respect to the second
guilt or innocence of any defendant; (6) whether he thought that the court's questioning was occasioned by out-of-court conduct by any of the parties; and
(7) whether anything had occurred during the trial that might deprive any party of
a fair or impartial verdict.
Id
2571. Id at 603.
2572. Id at 599-600.
2573. Id at 599 (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. at 229 (1954), see supra notes
2495; United States v. Ferguson, 486 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1973)). In Ferguson, the Sixth Circuit held that where one juror is found to have been prejudicially tainted from an outside
influence, a heavy burden falls upon the government, even though the tainted juror is removed, to disprove any prejudice or bias of any other juror with whom the tainted juror had
contact. 486 F.2d at 971.
2574. 669 F.2d at 600-01.
2575. Id at 601. The court also noted that even a juror's good faith belief in his own
impartiality is not dispositive. Id (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1961)). This
is the same rationale as that of the dissent in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 231 (1982)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
2576. 669 F.2d at 601.
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possibility of prejudice, 2577 and found that at least one of the jurors had

probably believed that one of the defendants had engaged in misconduct.2 578 The court therefore held that the Government had not carried

its heavy burden of rebutting the presumption of prejudice, and ruled
25 79
that the motion for a mistrial should have been granted.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Skopil stated that tainted juror
cases should not automatically be evaluated in terms of a presumption
of prejudice, but rather in terms of whether the defendant received a

fair trial.2580 He determined that when a tainted juror is excused before

jury deliberations begin, the trial judge is obligated to determine

whether the jurors deliberating on the verdict were improperly con-

tacted.2 581 He also stated that the district court has discretion to deter-

mine how extensive an investigation must be conducted to uncover any
contact, and whether a juror's assurances can be believed.2582 Justice
Skopil concluded that because the investigation in this case revealed

that several of the jurors deliberating on the verdict had been tainted, a
mistrial was required; however, this was because Shapiro was deprived

of a fair trial, not because the Government failed to rebut a presump2 5 83
tion of prejudice.
2577. Id at 601-02. The trial judge asked each juror, "Do you have any idea or suspicion
about the reason for this questioning of you?" Id at 602.
2578. Id at 601. The court also found that the trial judge's assurances to the jurors that no
misconduct had occurred were insufficient to dispel any doubts created by his inquiry. Id at
602-03 n.7.
2579. Id at 603. The court emphasized that it was not adopting a per se rule requiring
that a mistrial be declared whenever a jury taint originates from within the jury. The court
reiterated, however, that in such a situation, the Government has the burden of showing that
the tainted juror did not influence the others. Id
2580. Id at 603-04 (Skopil, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d
1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982),seesupra note 2565 and accompanying text; United States v. Forrest, 620 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1980) (case remanded after
tainted juror was excused before deliberations to determine whether prejudicial material
reached jury), affid after remand, 649 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Brown, 571
F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978) (no abuse of discretion when trial judge questioned and dismissed
juror without further questioning of the other jurors); United States v. Ferguson, 486 F.2d
968 (6th Cir. 1973) (presumption of prejudice standard applied only after it was found that
one or two of the deliberating jurors had already been influenced by the tainted juror before
he was excused)).
2581. 669 F.2d at 604.
2582. Id at 604-05.
2583. Id at 605. Judge Skopil cited United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978),
and United States v. Forrest, 620 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1980), for the proposition that cases
similar to Shapiro can be analyzed in terms of the fairness of the trial received by the defendant rather than in terms of a presumption of prejudice. 669 F.2d at 604. He stated that
a presumption of prejudice could arise only in cases such as Remmer v. United States, 347
U.S. at 229,seesupra note 2495, and United States v. Ferguson, 486 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1973),
where an improperly contacted juror has been permitted by the trial court to deliberate on
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The above cases demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit almost always

evaluates allegations of juror bias or misconduct in terms of whether it
is shown from the record that the defendant was deprived of a fair
trial.258 4 In some cases involving jury tampering, however, there seems
to be a question whether the allegations of bias should be evaluated in
terms of whether the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial, or

whether the government was able to rebut a presumption of prejudice
against the defendant.25 85 This question, however, appears as if it will

most often be resolved in favor of the "fair trial" approach.2586 For this
reason, the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Phillis

2 587

will proba-

bly have little effect upon Ninth Circuit law since it did not adopt a
"presumption of prejudice" approach, and the Ninth Circuit has appar-

ently not adopted an "implied bias" approach. Thus, the Ninth Circuit
"fair trial" evaluation should be sufficient to overcome any constitutional objection in most cases of alleged juror bias.
D. ProsecutorialMisconduct
The Ninth Circuit has long recognized the existence of a duty of
good faith on the part of the prosecutor towards the court, the grand
jury, and the defendant. 25 88 A significant breach of this duty may vio-

late the defendant's right under the due process clause of the fifth
the verdict. 669 F.2d at 605. However, because the Shapiro facts are so similar to those in
Remmer and Ferguson (Shapiro also involved impermissibly contacted jurors who were permitted to deliberate on the verdict), it appears unlikely that Justice Skopil would ever apply
a presumption of prejudice standard.
2584. E.g., United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1982), see supra
note 2535 and accompanying text; United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 889 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962 (1982), see supra note 2557 and accompanying text; United
States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Werner v. United
States, 455 U.S. 1027 (1982), see supra note 2560 and accompanying text; United States v.
Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982), see
supra notes 2565, 2566 and accompanying text.
2585. E.g., United States v. Shapiro, 669 F.2d 593, 599 (9th Cir. 1982), see supra note 2574
and accompanying text.
2586. See United States v. Shapiro, 669 F.2d at 603-05 (Skopil, J., concurring); United
States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981). TheArstrong court noted that the two
standards were nearly identical: "Thus, having been presented with facts establishing a jury
irregularity, whether or not we speak in terms of the rebuttable presumption of prejudice or
of the fairness of the defendants' trial, we reach the same result." 654 F.2d at 1332. Justice
Skopil's concurring opinion in Shapiro, while drawing a distinction between the tests, stated
that the presumption of prejudice test was appropriate only in certain circumstances, and
favored using the "fair trial" approach under the Shapiro facts. 669 F.2d at 603-05, see
supra note 2584.
2587. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
2588. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 1974) (prosecutor's knowledge
of perjured testimony before a grand jury is abuse of prosecutorial duty).
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amendment. 89 In evaluating appeals based on allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct, the Ninth Circuit examines whether: (1) the
prosecutor committed an error; (2) the issue was preserved for appeal;
and (3) the defendant was prejudiced.25 9 If the answers to these three
issues are affirmative, the defendant's conviction should be reversed.2 11 The Ninth Circuit has followed this rule in recent cases involving prosecutorial misconduct, although without always using a
step-by-step analysis.
1. Prosecutorial misconduct during grand jury proceedings
Two recent Ninth Circuit cases involved claims by the defendants
of prosecutorial misconduct during grand jury proceedings which led
to their indictments. The Ninth Circuit, however, may use "its supervisory power to dismiss [a grand jury] indictment for flagrant
prosecutorial misconduct only where there there is a clear basis in law
and fact, and when necessary [to preserve] the integrity of the judicial
2592
process."
In UnitedStates v. McLaughlin,2593 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of a motion to dismiss a grand jury indictment.
The defendant had contended that "his constitutional right to due process [had been] violated by the prosecutor's capricious conduct. '2594
McLaughlin was ultimately convicted of eight counts of filing false fed25 95
eral tax returns.
On appeal, McLaughlin argued that the district court's refusal to
dismiss the indictment was erroneous, citing three instances of
prosecutorial misconduct as the basis for his claim. McLaughlin first
argued that the Government's failure to set an earlier pre-indictment
conference was in bad faith, and that the Government had misled defense counsel into believing that presentation of the indictment was
scheduled for a later date. McLaughlin next claimed that the Government failed to present defense witnesses to the grand jury, thus "stampeding" the grand jury into returning an indictment. Finally, the
defendant claimed that the Government prejudiced the grand jury by
2589. Id at 785.
2590. United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 942
(1981).
2591. See id
2592. United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 853 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing United States v.
Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 880-81 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982)).
2593. 663 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1981).
2594. Id at 951.
2595. I d at 950.
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reading a part of defense counsel's letter indicating that McLaughlin
fifth amendment right against self-incriminaintended to exercise his
2 5 96
testify
to
called
if
tion
The Ninth Circuit summarily dismissed McLaughlin's first contention, stating that he had cited no authority supporting his claim that he
was entitled to a lengthier notice period.2 59 7 The court rejected McLaughlin's second claim after an examination of the record indicated
that, under the circumstances, the Government adequately presented
McLaughlin's defense to the grand jury.2598 With respect to the final
claim of misconduct, the court did not decide whether it was proper for
the prosecutor to read the statement revealing McLaughlin's intention
to exercise his fifth amendment rights.25 99 Instead, the court focused on
the lack of "bad faith" and the "inadvertent" nature of the alleged misconduct, concluding that it could not "say that there has been fundamental unfairness or a threat to the integrity of the judicial
process. ' '26°° The Ninth Circuit, therefore, upheld the district court's
denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment.260 1
In United States v. Rasheed,2 60 2 the Ninth Circuit similarly considered a defendant's claim that her indictment should be dismissed because of prosecutorial misconduct during grand jury proceedings.
Defendant Phillips was convicted of obstructing justice and aiding and
abetting defendant Rasheed in committing mail fraud.2603 Rasheed
was the founder of a church through which he established a scheme to
solicit donations by preaching that the donors would receive in return
2596. Id. at 951.
2597. Id The record indicated that not only had McLaughlin's counsel been notified two
weeks prior to the presentation of the indictment, but that one week later he had been informed that the grand jury investigation was in process and had been supplied with a tentative date for the presentation of the indictment. Id
2598. Id McLaughlin's attorney requested the appearance of five defense witnesses only
one day before the expected indictment date. The prosecutor read to the grand jury a letter
by defense counsel summarizing the expected testimony of the witnesses. The prosecutor
also explained McLaughlin's defense of reliance on the advice of his accountant. The grand
jury was informed that the witnesses could testify later that day or the next day, but decided
to return the indictment without hearing them. Id
2599. Id The court stated instead that a grand jury is not prejudiced by notice of a defendant's intent not to testify because a prosecutor may call someone to testify whom the prosecutor knows will exercise his fifth amendment right. Id (citing United States v. Samango,
450 F. Supp. 1097, 1106 (D. Hawaii 1978), a§'d, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979)).
2600. 663 F.2d at 951.
2601. Id (citing United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1311-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 825 (1977)).
2602. 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
2603. Id at 845.
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an "increase of God" of four times the original donation. 2604 Approximately one year after the scheme began, Phillips became a minister of
the church, and later, a full-time employee and director. She kept the
books for the church and helped run the donation program.2 6 °5 During
the grand jury investigation and pursuant to a court order, the former
attorney for the church provided certain documents which formed the
basis for the obstruction of justice charges against Phillips. In response
to certain questions by the prosecutor, the attorney testified to the nature of the documents, the manner by which he had acquired them,
Phillips' agreement to produce the documents herself, and Phillips'

subsequent failure to do

so.

26°

Phillips argued that the prosecutor's

questions were improper because they elicited responses in breach of
the attorney-client privilege. 60 7
The Ninth Circuit determined that Phillips had not demonstrated
that a breach of the attorney-client privilege had occurred.2 60 8 First,
the court stated that while the attorney had represented the church, it
was unclear whether the attorney had represented Phillips personally.260 9 The court was also unable to determine whether the attorney
had testified to matters which Phillips had told him in confidence,261 0
implying that there was doubt concerning whether the privilege even
existed. Second, the court noted that the attorney was himself in danger of becoming an accessory to the obstruction of justice if he did not
produce the documents because the attorney possessed documents that
Phillips had failed to produce pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.
The court stressed that the attorney had been ordered by the district
court to produce the documents and to testify.26 1' Finally, the court
pointed out that an attorney is more aware of the scope of the attorneyclient privilege than the prosecutor,26 12 implying that the burden of
preventing improper testimony lies with the witness-attorney rather
than the prosecutor. The Ninth Circuit thus held that since there was
substantial doubt that the attorney's testimony was a breach of privi2604. Id.
2605. Id at 846.
2606. Id at 853.
2607. Id
2608. Id at 854.
2609. Id
2610. Id
2611. Id (citing generally In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.), aft'd, 381 F.2d 713
(4th Cir. 1967); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-l01(C)(2) (1979)
(attorney may reveal confidences when required by law or court order)).
2612. 663 F.2d at 854 (citing In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.) (attorney must
testify but can claim privilege to specific questions), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980)).
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lege, the prosecutor had committed no misconduct requiring the dismissal of the indictment.2 6 13
These cases again demonstrate the Ninth Circuit's reluctance to
dismiss indictments because of alleged prosecutorial misconduct during
grand jury proceedings. Even when such misconduct has arguably occurred, the court will uphold an indictment so long as the prosecutor
acted in good faith and the error does not threaten the integrity of the
judicial process.
2.

Prosecutorial misconduct during trial

Prosecutorial misconduct during trial can take many forms. These
forms include the failure to disclose required information to the court
or defense counsel, 6 14 impermissible comments on a defendant's failure to testify, 261 5 improper references to matters not in evidence, 6 16
and impermissible vouching for the credibility of witnesses. 261 7 The
district judge is normally in the best position to understand the circumstances surrounding any alleged misconduct and to evaluate its effects. 2 618 Thus, when reviewing appeals based on allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct, the Ninth Circuit gives great deference to the
district judge's management of the case. 26 19 Further, since allegations
of prosecutorial misconduct are ordinarily not of constitutional dimension, the Ninth Circuit will reverse the district court's ruling only if it
determines that it was more probable than not that the misconduct materially affected the verdict. 262° Both the Ninth Circuit and the United
States Supreme Court have recently considered claims of prosecutorial
misconduct during trial.
In Smith v. Phillips,26 2' the Supreme Court considered whether defendant Phillips was denied a fair trial as a result of juror bias together
with the prosecutors' failure to disclose the possibility of such bias.
Phillips was convicted on two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder. During trial, one of the jurors applied for an investi2613. 663 F.2d at 854.
2614. See infra notes 2621-38 and accompanying text.
2615. See infra notes 2639-55 and accompanying text.
2616. See infra notes 2656-67 and accompanying text.
2617. See infra notes 2668-83 and accompanying text.
2618. Orebo v. United States, 293 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.denied, 368 U.S. 958
(1962).
2619. Id
2620. United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 915-16 (9th Cir. 1977). But see authority cited infra at notes 2677-80 for discussion of when the court might require a showing of
high probability that the misconduct affected the verdict.
2621. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
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gator's position with the district attorney's office. The prosecutors in
Phillips' case learned of the application approximately one week before

the end of Phillips' trial, but failed to inform either the court or defense
counsel of the application.2 62 2 After a verdict of guilty was rendered,

but prior to sentencing, the District Attorney informed the court and
defense counsel about the application and that the prosecutors knew
about it during trial.2 62 3 Phillips then moved to set aside the verdict,

asserting
juror misconduct and prosecutorial misconduct during
24

trial.

26

The trial court denied Phillips' motion, stating that Phillips had
not been prejudiced.2 62 5 The appellate court affirmed the conviction
without opinion,2 6 26 and the New York Court of Appeals denied leave
to appeal.2 627 Four years later, Phillips petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus, contending he was denied due process because of juror bias and
because the prosecutor knew of, but did not communicate, this conduct
to the court or defense counsel. 2628 The district court granted the writ,
finding "implied" but not "actual" juror bias.2 629 The Second Circuit,
however, affirmed the district court's ruling, not on the basis of implied
juror bias but on the ground that "the failure of the prosecutors to disclose their knowledge denied [Phillips] due process. 26 3 °
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, thus denying
habeas relief to Phillips.263' The Court's opinion focused primarily on
the issue of juror bias, 2632 the same issue on which the New York State
2622. Id at 212-13.
2623. Id at 213.
2624. Phillips' motion was made pursuant to N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.30(2) (McKinney 1971). People v. Phillips, 87 Misc. 2d 613, 384 N.Y.S.2d 906 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
2625. 87 Misc. 2d at 630, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
2626. People v. Phillips, 52 A.D.2d 758, 384 N.Y.S.2d 715 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
2627. People v. Phillips, 39 N.Y.2d 949, 352 N.E.2d 894, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1039 (1976).
2628. Phillips v. Smith, 485 F. Supp. 1365, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
2629. Id at 1371-72. Although the district court granted relief because of implied juror
bias and not prosecutorial misconduct, the court did state that the prosecutors "must share
the responsibility for this inexcusable abridgement of the petitioner's Sixth Amendment
right." Id at 1372.
2630. Phillips v. Smith, 632 F.2d 1019, 1022 (2d Cir. 1980). In a prescient dissent, Judge
Van Graafeiland argued that the Second Circuit did "exactly what the Supreme Court has
said should not be done" by focusing on the moral culpability of the prosecutor, rather than
on the fairness of the trial for the defendant. Id at 1024 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
A Ninth Circuit panel adhering strictly to the three-step analysis, see supra notes 2588-90
and accompanying text, would probably not have affirmed the grant of habeas relief on
prosecutorial misconduct grounds.
2631. 455 U.S. at 221.
2632. For a discussion of the juror bias issue in this case, see id at 212-18.
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634 However, the Court
courts, 2633 as well as the district court, focused. 23
briefly addressed the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, which was the

basis of the Second Circuit's holding.2635 The Court emphasized that
"the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial

misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prose' 2636

Since the lower courts had explicitly found that the juror's
conduct did not prejudice Phillips, 2637 the prosecutors' failure to discutor.

close that conduct did not deny Phillips a fair trial.2638
In UnitedStates v. Armstrong,2639 the Ninth Circuit considered de-

fendant's allegations of prejudicial misconduct by the prosecutor during trial. The three defendants were convicted on various counts of

mail fraud, wire fraud, inducement to travel interstate in order to defraud, and falsifying a loan application. 264 During the closing argument, the prosecutor had indirectly commented on defendant

you hear him
Armstrong's failure to testify by asking the jury: "Did
' 2 41
deny the misrepresentations, Ladies and Gentlemen?

2633. See supra notes 2624-26 and accompanying text.
2634. See supra note 2628 and accompanying text.
2635. See supra note 2629 and accompanying text.
2636. 455 U.S. at 219. In reiterating this rule, the Court relied on two precedents, Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), where it
considered the effect of the alleged misconduct and not merely its existence.
In Brady, the prosecutor suppressed evidence, requested by the defendant, of a confession of the defendant's accomplice which might have mitigated the defendant's sentence.
The Court agreed with the appellate court's holding that nothing in the suppressed evidence
was material to the issue of guilt but that it might be material to the issue of the defendant's
punishment. Id at 86-88. The Court, therefore, held that suppression of the evidence constituted misconduct. The Court stated that a prosecutor's suppression of requested evidence
"violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id at 87.
In Agurs, the prosecutor failed to disclose unrequested evidence which might have supported the defendant's self-defense claim in her murder trial. Id at 98-99. The Court stated
that although the prosecutor had a constitutional obligation to disclose unrequested exculpatory evidence, this particular evidence would not have materially affected the defendant's
verdict. Thus, the Court upheld the conviction, stressing that " [i]f the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the
character of the prosecutor." Id at 110-1 14.
2637. 455 U.S. at 220 (citing People v. Phillips, 87 Misc. 2d 613, 627,384 N.Y.S.2d 906, 915
(Sup. Ct. 1975)).
2638. 455 U.S. at 221. The Court expressly declined to condone the prosecutor's conduct.
Id at 220. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice
Stevens, argued that Phillips' conviction should be reversed on the ground of implied juror
bias. Id at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Having so found, he then argued that the prosecutors' failure to disclose the juror's conduct prejudiced Phillips by preventing him from substituting an alternate juror. Id at 240 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2639. 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
2640. Id at 1331.
2641. Id at 1336 n.6.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the comment was

prohibited, 2" 2 but stated that it would reverse the conviction only if the
comment could possibly have affected the verdict.2"

3

The court then

determined that the comment was a single isolated statement that did
not stress any inference of guilt. Moreover, the trial judge gave a curative instruction. The court, therefore, held that the statement was

"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,"2644 and affirmed the
conviction. 2 " 5

In United States v. Fleishman,2 6 defendant Fleishman alleged
misconduct in the prosecutor's comments about the defendants' failure

to testify and in an attempt by the prosecutor to shift the burden of
proof to the defendants. 2" 7 The Ninth Circuit found both arguments
meritless, 2648 and affirmed the convictions of Fleishman and his two codefendants on various charges related to possession and to distribution
of cocaine.264 9 The court defined the test to determine the acceptability
of prosecutorial comment on a defendant's failure to testify as
"whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a
character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a
26 50
comment on the failure to testify.
In examining the comments Fleishman claimed were objectionable, the court found that they did not directly refer to the defendants'

failure to testify but rather referred to gaps in the defense counsel's
arguments and lack of testimony by witnesses who could have allegedly
exonerated the defendants. 265 1 The court held the prosecutor's com2642. Id at 1336 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (prosecutor's comments on defendant's failure to testify violates the fifth amendment's protection against selfincrimination)).
2643. 654 F.2d at 1336.
2644. Id at 1336-37 (citing United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 1980)
(prosecutorial error not ground for reversal if court convinced it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981)).
2645. 654 F.2d at 1337.
2646. 684 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1982).
2647. Id at 1343.
2648. Id
2649. Id at 1332.
2650. Id (citing United States v. Wasserteil, 641 F.2d 704, 709 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting
Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955))).
2651. 684 F.2d at 1343-44. The allegedly objectionable comments were:
I want you to listen carefully to the defense lawyers and weigh the testimony in the
light of their arguments, as well as in the light of the argument that I am making to
you. For example: . . . [The prosecutor then described a number of suspicious
actions of the defendants]. I would like you to listen very carefully to what the
defense lawyers say about this. If they don't seem to. . . really resolve these questions, I think you can ask yourselves why not.
Id at 1343 n.16 (citing R.T. 688-89).
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ment on the defense's failure to call witnesses was permissible because

it was "not phrased as to call attention to defendant's own failure to
2652

testify."
With respect to Fleishman's contention that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof,2 6 53 the court simply cited the record where the prosecutor said, "[the defendants] are not required to
produce evidence, but they are allowed to produce evidence. 2 65 4 The
court also noted that the trial court's jury instructions were sufficient to

cure any prejudice arising from the prosecutor's allegedly impermissible comments.2 65 5
In United States v. Tham,2 65 6 Tham claimed that the prosecutor

improperly suggested that Tham had "fixed" a previous criminal case
by influencing the trial judge in that case to grant his motion for a

judgment of acquittal. Tham further claimed that during closing argument, the prosecutor improperly vouched for a witness's credibility and
improperly referred to the participation of others in the charges filed
against Tham.26 57
The Ninth Circuit, after restating the three-step analysis for deter-

mining prosecutorial misconduct, examined the record and found that
the prosecutor had acted improperly by asking Tham if he had known
the judge in the previous case and if he had ever done a favor for that
judge. 65 8 The court also found that Tham had preserved the issue for

appeal.2659 It concluded, however, that there was an insufficient show-

ing of prejudice to reverse the conviction.2

660

The court doubted that a

Well, ladies and gentlemen, the defense has no burden at all to bring forward evidence. If there was exculpatory evidence ... why didn't the defense bring it in?
They are not required to produce evidence, but they are allowed to produce
evidence. And they can call any witness they think may help their case. If they
had witnesses that would exculpate them, why didn't they call these witnesses?
...
After all, they are in trial, and if they have exculpatory evidence they can
present it to you, if they choose. Why didn't that person testify, if there was such a
person.
Id (citing R.T. 789).
2652. Id (citing United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied,
449 U.S. 1113 (1981)).
2653. See supra note 265 1.
2654. 684 F.2d at 1344.
2655. Id (citing United States v. Smith, 441 F.2d 539, 540 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam)).
2656. 665 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1981).
2657. Id at 857. At trial, Tham was convicted of fifteen counts of embezzlement of union
assets and four counts of false entry in union records. Id
2658. Id at 860-61. The court ruled that the questions were improper notwithstanding
that Tham himself raised the issue of the previous trial and the previous judge's rulings in
acquitting him. Id at 861.
2659. Id
2660. Id
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reasonable juror would have inferred any improper conduct on Tham's
part from the prosecutor's questions, and it concluded that it was more
probable than not that the misconduct did not materially affect the
jury's verdict.2 66 '
The court then found that no misconduct had occurred during
closing argument. 2662 Tham had first claimed that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of a witness by suggesting that the
witness was telling the truth because his plea agreement with the Government so obligated him.2 663 The court found no misconduct here because the prosecutor's argument was in rebuttal to defense counsel's
attack on the witness's credibility,2664 and because the district judge admonished the jury to treat the testimony of a witness with immunity
266
"with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness."
Tham had also claimed that the prosecutor's reference to the participation of others, such as the grand jury and the United States Attorney, in
the charges against him was improper.2666 The court, however, found
that the prosecutor's conduct was proper because Tham's counsel had
argued that the charges were the result of a personal vendetta by the
prosecutor,7 and thus the prosecutor was merely rebutting those
charges.

266

In United States v. West,2 668 a defendant again claimed that the
Government, during closing argument, improperly vouched for the
credibility of a witness. Defendant West was convicted of bank rob2661. Id The court applied the standard used in United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d
911, 915-16 (9th Cir. 1977) (if prosecutorial misconduct found, error is reversible unless
more probable than not that misconduct did not materially affect verdict).
2662. 665 F.2d at 862.
2663. Id at 861. Tham relied heavily for this argument on the court's earlier ruling in
United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 942 (1981),
where a conviction was reversed based on the impropriety of a similar closing argument. In
Roberts, the prosecutor contended during the closing argument both that a Government
witness was bound to tell the truth by his plea agreement, and, without any evidence in the
record, that a Government agent was in the courtroom to monitor the witness's testimony.
In reversing that conviction, the court held that a prosecutor cannot vouch for the credibility
of a government witness by placing the prestige of the government behind him. Id at 533.
The Tham court distinguished Roberts on the ground that in this case there was no contention that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence. 665 F.2d at 862.
2664. Id at 862. In his closing argument, defense counsel had argued that the witness's
plea agreement did not require him to tell the truth, but rather to testify favorably for the
prosecution. Id
2665. Id
2666. Id
2667. Id (citing United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 889-90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1120 (1975)).
2668. 680 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982).
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bery. During trial, the prosecutor asked a witness to identify West's
accomplice from a photospread. 2 669 The prosecutor then allegedly saw
West give the witness a hand signal indicating the number of the correct photograph. Defense counsel denied that a hand signal had been
given, and the judge did not see it. The prosecutor, therefore, called as

a witness an Assistant United States Attorney who had been in the
2 670
courtroom and who testified that she had seen the signal given.

During closing argument, the prosecutor focused on the Assistant
United States Attorney's testimony to impugn the credibility of West
and the witness involved in the signalling incident. The prosecutor bol-

stered the credibility of the Assistant United States Attorney by implying that as an officer of the court and member of the United States
Attorney's Office, she was telling the truth.2 671 The defense counsel did
not object to the prosecutor's comment at the time but waited until the

jury was deliberating to make a mistrial motion.2672
The Ninth Circuit determined that the prosecutor's closing argu-

ment had improperly suggested to the jury that the Assistant United
States Attorney's testimony was believable because of her relationship
to the Government and the court. 2673 The court rejected the Govern-

ment's contention that the prosecutor's comments in closing argument
were in rebuttal to defense counsel's statement to the jury that it should

judge the witnesses' actions and not rely on the Assistant United States
Attorney's testimony.26 74 The court noted that defense counsel's state-

ment had not questioned the veracity of a witness, but had only asked
2675
the jury to closely examine all the testimony.

2669. Id at 654.
2670. Id
2671. Id at 655. The prosecutor had stated:
If you are willing to believe that an officer of this Court and a member of the U.S.
Attorney's Office is going to commit perjury, which is what she would have had to
do, to believe that she never saw the Defendant signal the number five to the Witness then I would think that the whole case--that you would have doubt about the
whole case, and that you would have to acquit the Defendant if you are willing to
believe that; that this conviction is so important to the Government. . . that an
officer of the U.S. Attorney's Office would take that stand and commit perjury.
Id
2672. Id at 656 n.4.
2673. Id The court relied on United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 942 (1981). See supra note 2662.
2674. 680 F.2d at 656. Defense counsel had stated, "[a]nd you, ladies and gentlemen, are
the judges of the actions of the Witnesses. You judge their demeanor. If you want to accept
the Prosecutor's statement that she saw a hand move, then you can. But, you were the
individuals who were watching." Id
2675. Id The court thus recognized that this was not a case where defense counsel made a
direct attack on the Government, its conduct of the case, or the credibility or integrity of its
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Finding that the closing argument was improper, the court then
determined that it was sufficient error to require reversal.267 6 The court
stated that it was compelled to reverse the conviction if it was more
probable than not that the error materially affected the verdict.2677
Even though the defendant's objection was not timely,2673 the court applied the "more probable than not" harmless error rule 679 rather than
the more stringent "highlyprobable that the error materially affected
the jury's verdict" plain error rule.2 680 This approach-the "more

probable than not" standard-was used because the trial court had
considered the defendant's mistrial motion on its merits rather than on

its timeliness. 268 1 The court noted that West's previous trial for the

same crime had resulted in a hung jury, and that the principal difference in this second trial was the testimony of the witness and of the
Assistant United States Attorney involved in the hand signalling inciwitnesses or agents. In such cases otherwise improper vouching by the prosecution might be
allowed. Id (citing Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 359-60 n.15 (1957); United States
v. Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054, 1061 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980); United
States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749,757 n.1 I (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. LaSorsa, 480 F.2d 522,
526 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973)). Cf.United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855
(9th Cir. 1981), supra note 2656.
2676. 680 F.2d at 657.
2677. Id (citing United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1977)).
2678. 680 F.2d at 656 n.4.
2679. Id at 657. For a discussion of the "harmless error" standard, see United States v.
Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 914-16 (9th Cir. 1977).
2680. United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir.) (citing United States v. Segna,
555 F.2d 226, 231 (9th Cir. 1977)) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 927 (1978).
2681. 680 F.2d at 656 (citing United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 927 (1978)). In Dixon, defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument but waited until the jury retired to make a
motion for mistrial. The judge denied the motion on its merits rather than on the fact that it
was untimely. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that "[i]n these circumstances, we will
apply the harmless error rule" rather than the plain error rule. Id at 1143. The Dixon court
did not elaborate its reasoning for this holding.
In a special concurring opinion to West, Judge Wright stressed the "special circumstances" which warranted review and reversal even though the defendant's objection had
been untimely. 680 F.2d at 657 (Wright, J.,
concurring). He noted that the key issue in the
trial was witness credibility and that the prosecutor had overstepped her bounds by vouching for a witness's credibility. Id at 658. Although agreeing with the majority's reliance on
Dixon, supra, for justifying appellate review, he also implied that the misconduct was plain
error and thus the conviction was reviewable absent a timely objection. Id It is unclear
which standard of review, harmless error or plain error, Judge Wright would have applied in
this case. However, in an earlier majority opinion, United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530,
534 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 952 (1981), Judge Wright noted that "[v]ouching
for a government witness in closing argument has often been held to be plain error, reviewable even though no objection was raised." Id (citing United States v. Ludwig, 508 F.2d
140, 143 (10th Cir. 1974)).
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dent.2 68 2 Since the second trial resulted in a conviction, the court concluded that it could not say that it was more probable than not that the
error had no effect on the verdict.2 68 3
In dissent, Judge Meredith argued that the defense counsel's closing argument indirectly impugned the credibility of a Government witness and thus invited the prosecutor's comment vouching for the
witness's veracity. 268 4 He also argued that, even if the comment was
improper, the defense counsel waived the right of review by not objecting at a time when the trial court could have removed the taint.2 685
In United States v. Saavedra,26 8 6 the defendant contended that she
was prejudiced by improper prosecutorial statements during closing argument. Saavedra was convicted of various charges stemming from a
scheme in which prison inmates fraudulently obtained credit card
numbers and then used these numbers to send money orders by wire to
co-conspirators waiting at specific Western Union offices. Saavedra
was one of the outside recipients of the money orders.2 68 7
On appeal, Saavedra cited three statements in closing argument by
the prosecutor which allegedly prejudiced her. First, the prosecutor
had stated that David Porter, a cardholder whose number was fraudulently obtained and used, was the same person whose name appeared
in one of the transactions as "David Burder. ' 268 8 Second, the prosecutor had stated that Saavedra had used the alias "Hamly" when picking
Third, the prosecutor had indicated
up some of the money orders.2 689
2690
jail.
in
been
had
Saavedra
that
The Ninth Circuit dismissed Saavedra's first claim because the
Government had offered evidence that "Porter" and "Burder" were the
same person. 2 691 The court dismissed her second claim, noting that
while the reference to "Hamly" as an alias used by Saavedra was admittedly incorrect, the record contained several references to Saavedra's use of other aliases; thus the misstatements about "Hamly"
2682. 680 F.2d at 657.
2683. Id
2684. Id at 659 (Meredith, J., dissenting). See supra note 2673 and accompanying text.
2685. 680 F.2d at 659 (Meredith, J., dissenting). Judge Meredith indicated that the prosecutor's remarks, even if improper, were not plain error reviewable without a timely objection. See supra note 2680 and accompanying text.
2686. 684 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982).
2687. Id at 1295.
2688. Id at 1299. The opinion is unclear on why Saavedra contended this statement
prejudiced her.
2689. Id
2690. Id
2691. Id See supra note 2687.
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constituted harmless error.2 692 The court also noted that the trial judge
had instructed the jury not to consider the closing arguments as evidence during their deliberations.2 6 93 In considering Saavedra's third
claim of misconduct, the Ninth Circuit stated that improper statements
during closing argument "only require reversal where they are 'so gross
as probably to prejudice the defendant, and the prejudice has not been

neutralized by the trial judge.'

"2694

The trial judge in this case, following defense counsel's objection,
had instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statement and had
stated that he could not recall any evidence that Saavedra had been in
jail. The Ninth Circuit held that any prejudice had been neutralized by
the trial judge's instruction, and it rejected Saavedra's claim.26 95
In United States v. Ochoa-Sanchez,26 9 6 the defendant alleged
prosecutorial misconduct when, during the testimony of his former attorney, the Government prosecutor attempted to establish that the attorney had withdrawn from the case because he believed that OchoaSanchez would lie on the stand. 2697 Ochoa-Sanchez was ultimately convicted of illegal importation8 and possession of a controlled substance
269
with intent to distribute.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction, acknowledging that the prosecutor's question was probably improper.26 99 The
court stated that, "[p]rosecutorial misconduct must be evaluated in the
context of the entire trial. It justifies reversal only when it denies the
defendant a fair trial." 270° Because the improper question was an isolated incident in a trial lasting several days and the answer was
favorable to Ochoa-Sanchez, and because Ochoa-Sanchez made no assertion that the Government acted in bad faith, the court held that
Ochoa-Sanchez was not prejudiced. 270 1
2692. Id
2693. Id
2694. Id (quoting United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 971 (1977)).
2695. 684 F.2d at 1299.
2696. 676 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 219 (1982).
2697. Id at 1289.
2698. Id at 1284.
2699. Id at 1289.
2700. Id (citing United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354, 1381 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 934 (1981)).
2701. 676 F.2d at 1289 (citing United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855, 860 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981)).
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In United States v. Spawr OpticalResearch,Inc. ,2702 the defendants
alleged prosecutorial misconduct during both the grand jury proceedings and trial. Spawr Optical Research, Inc., and two principals in that
corporation, were convicted of various illegal export activities relating
to the shipment of laser mirrors to the Soviet Union.27 °3 The Spawrs
alleged, with respect to the grand jury proceedings, that the Government failed to return some exculpatory evidence that they had submitted pursuant to subpoenas. 27 4 They also alleged that during trial a
Department of Defense attorney interfered with their expert witness
and they were thus denied their rights to compulsory process and to
confront witnesses. 70 5 Finally, they alleged that an interview with one
of the prosecutors, televised on the first day of jury deliberations, was
prejudicial.27 °6
The Ninth Circuit briefly dismissed the first claim, stating that the
Spawrs made no factual showing of misconduct during grand jury proceedings other than a "self-serving assertion. . that the prosecution
refused to disclose documents within its possession. ' 270 7 The court dismissed the Spawrs' second claim, noting that while the Department of
Defense attorney did speak with the witness during his cross-examination, it was on the witness's initiative. The Ninth Circuit also noted
that the attorney was not part of the prosecution team and was attending the trial only to answer possible questions concerning classified information. The court thus determined that the conversation with the
witness was not interference. It then noted that while the attorney had
returned to Washington, D.C. before the end of trial, the Spawrs did
not show how this denied their rights to compulsory process or to confront witnesses.2708
Finally, the court dismissed the Spawrs' last claim, noting that,
while the broadcast did include film of the Spawrs leaving the courthouse, the prosecutor had made his comments three months earlier and
did not mention the Spawrs or their case.2709 Further, the trial judge,
when notified of the upcoming broadcast, considered all the alternatives proposed by counsel to protect the jury from possible prejudice,
including sequestration, and instructed the jury not to watch the news
2702.
2703.
2704.
2705.
2706.
2707.

685 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1875 (1983).

Id at 1078 n.I.
Id at 1082.
Id
Id
Id

2708. Id.
2709. Id
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or talk to anyone who might have viewed the broadcast. 2710 The Ninth
Circuit found this sufficient protection for the Spawrs since it is assumed that the jury followed the judge's instructions, absent a showing
to the contrary. 271'
The survey cases indicate that a defendant in the Ninth Circuit

seeking to dismiss an indictment or overturn a conviction based on
claims of prosecutorial misconduct faces a heavy burden since he
must
2712 Of
prejudice.
resultant
also
but
error
prosecutorial
show not only
the nine cases surveyed here, the Ninth Circuit found prosecutorial error in five, but in only one, UnitedStates v. West,27 13 did the court find

that the error resulted in prejudice requiring reversal. It is worth noting that the West court based its finding of prejudice on the fact that a

previous trial of the same defendant, on the same charges, with the
same evidence, but without the prosecutorial error, resulted in a hung
jury.27 14 It is very rare that a defendant would have available such a
clear demonstration of prejudice. 27 15 More commonly, the court's decision will follow from an examination of the facts of each case and a

determination of whether the prosecutorial errors truly represented
"'fundamental unfairness' or a threat to 'the integrity of the judicial

process.'

"2716

E.

Continuance

The grant of a continuance to a party in federal criminal practice
is within the discretion of the trial court.2 7 17 Only when there is a claim

of clear abuse of that discretion will an appellate court review the mat2710. Id
2711. Id (citing Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1968) (jury presumed to have understood and followed the court's instructions)).
2712. See, e.g., supra notes 2620-37 and accompanying text.
2713. 680 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra notes 2668-83 and accompanying text.
2714. Id at 657. See supra note 2682 and accompanying text.
2715. Compare United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 535 (9th Cir. 1980) (conviction
reversed because court could not say that prosecutor's improper comments were harmless
and the Government did not have strong case), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 942 (1981), supra note
2663, with United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1199, 1200 (9th Cir.) (conviction upheld
where court found prosecutor's improper comments would not have changed jury's verdict
because evidence was strong), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979).
2716. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825
(1977) (citing United States v. Leibowitz, 420 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1969)). The Chanen court
reviewed the facts of four cases where grand jury indictments were dismissed for
prosecutorial misconduct and compared them to four others where the indictments were
upheld. 549 F.2d at 1309-11.
2717. United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Isaacs v.
United States, 159 U.S. 487, 489 (1895)).
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ter and determine if prejudice occurred. 27 18

In United States v. Regner,27 19 the defendant was charged with
mail fraud arising from a hospitalization claim for injuries suffered in a
taxicab accident in Hungary. Prior to trial, Regner requested a six
month continuance to enable him to gather evidence in Hungary. At
the hearing on the continuance motion, defense counsel conceded that
six months were probably not required. The trial court therefore
granted only five weeks. 2720 Regner's counsel never asked for further
continuances and went to trial immediately after the five weeks had
" 2 ' After conviction, Regner claimed
elapsed.27
that the district court
was in error by not granting the six month continuance.2 7 22
The Ninth Circuit held that because Regner neither required the
full six months nor requested further continuances to gather evidence
from Hungary, he could not claim he was prejudiced by going to trial
at the end of the five week continuance.2 7 23
In United States v. Coletta,2 72 4 defendant Castro and two co-defendants were convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. After the
verdict, but before sentencing, Castro discharged his attorney and another was appointed.2 725 Ten days after he was appointed and five
days before the scheduled sentencing hearing, the new attorney moved
for a continuance because he was unfamiliar with the facts of the case,
had not seen the presentence report, and had not yet interviewed Castro. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Castro at the
scheduled hearing. The judge assured Castro's attorney that he would
entertain a motion for modification of the judgment if the attorney discovered grounds for such a motion. The judge also instructed the probation department to make available the presentence report. The
2726
attorney indicated that this was satisfactory.
On appeal, Castro claimed that the district court's denial of a continuance violated his due process rights, his right to counsel, and the
requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(A).27 27
2718. Hernandez, 608 F.2d at 746.
2719. 677 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 220 (1982).
2720. Id. at 756.
2721. Id. at 757.
2722. Id.
2723. Id.
2724. 682 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1187 (1983).
2725. Id. at 826.
2726. Id.
2727. Id. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(c)(3)(A) provides in part:
Before imposing sentence the court shall upon request permit the defendant, or his
counsel if he is so represented, to read the report of the presentence investigation
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The Ninth Circuit rejected each of Castro's contentions. The court
noted that Rule 32(c)(3)(A) requires the sentencing court to disclose the
presentence report only if the defendant or his counsel requests disclosure.27 28 Since Castro's attorney did not make such a request before
the sentencing hearing, "[h]is inability to review the report thus resulted from his own failure to act, not from the judge's refusal to grant
2729
a continuance.

The Ninth Circuit also rejected Castro's claim that his attorney's
inability to effectively comment on the presentence report at the sentencing hearing deprived him of his right to counsel and due process. 2730 The court stated that while due process requires the judge to
fairly consider information material to mitigation of punishment, 2731 it
does not require disclosure of the presentence report.27 32 The court
noted that since both Castro and his attorney had the opportunity to
address the court prior to sentencing, and since the judge indicated that
he would consider post-sentencing motions if justified by information
the attorney discovered, Castro's due process rights were not
violated.2733
Neither Regner nor Coletta presented facts which would impel the
Ninth Circuit to contravene the long-standing rule that the trial court
has discretion to grant continuances. In both cases the trial judges denied requested continuances but fashioned adequate procedures to
safeguard the defendants' rights. Thus, the Ninth Circuit saw no abuse
.of discretion which would mandate reversal.
F

Admission of Evidence

1. Relevancy
a. generally
Evidence must meet the test of relevancy as set forth in the Federal
Rules of Evidence in order to be admissible.2 73 4 It is not necessary that
exclusive of any recommendation as to sentence ... .; and the court shall afford
the defendant or his counsel an opportunity to comment thereon and, at the discretion of the court, to introduce testimony or other information relating to any alleged factual inaccuracy contained in the presentence report.
2728. 682 F.2d at 827 (citing United States v. Winn, 577 F.2d 86, 92 (9th Cir. 1978)).
2729. 682 F.2d at 827.
2730. Id.
2731. Id. (citing United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Wolfson, 634 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1980)).
2732. 682 F.2d at 827 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249-51 (1949)).
2733. 682 F.2d at 827.
2734. FED. R. EVID. 401 provides that "fr]elevant evidence means evidence having any
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a given item of evidence be directed towards a disputed fact, but
merely towards a fact which is of consequence to the determination.
Evidence that is essentially background in nature is universally admitted as an aid to understanding. 3 5 The Ninth Circuit recently considered several cases in which defendants argued that the trial court erred
in admitting or excluding certain evidence on the ground of relevancy.
In United States v. Astorga-Torres,2 73 6 the defendants were convicted of possessing and distributing heroin. The defendants had been
arrested after attempting to sell drug enforcement agents heroin, which
they had packaged in condoms bearing the date December 1979. After
the arrest, the DEA agents retrieved three more condoms from the septic tank servicing the defendants' motel room. One of the condoms
contained heroin, while the remaining two bore the date December
1979. The defendants sought to suppress this evidence on the ground
that their connection to it was so tenuous as to be irrelevant.27 37
The Ninth Circuit, however, determined that the evidence was relevant because it was unlikely that anyone else would have found it
necessary to dispose of like items during the relevant time span. Thus,
it held that the evidence was admissible against the defendants, and its
2738
weight as proof was a determination for the jury.
In United States v. Federico,2739 the defendants were convicted of
conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine. Federico challenged the
admission into evidence of certain items, including a pair of binoculars
and a notebook containing an alleged accomplice's name and phone
number, and also possible drug notations.2 74°
The Ninth Circuit determined that the evidence met the threshold
level of relevancy in making it more probable than not that Federico
had conspired to distribute drugs.2 74 ' The court not only found that
the evidence was admissible as bearing on Federico's knowledge and
familiarity with drugs and drug transactions but that the evidence was
noncumulative.2 7 42 Therefore, it held that the trial judge did not abuse
his discretion in determining that the probative value of the evidence
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
2735. FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee note.
2736. 682 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 455 (1983).
2737. Id. at 1335.
2738. Id.
2739. 658 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981).
2740. Id. at 1341.
2741. Id. at 1342.
2742. Id.
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2743

In his dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Alarcon stated that the

admission by the district court of this circumstantial evidence was prej-

udicial. 27 4 He noted that although the evidence was probative of Fe-

derico's knowledge of drugs and possible intent to engage in drug
dealings, neither the notebook nor the binoculars had any probative
value on the core issue of whether Federico conspired to commit the
particular crime alleged. Judge Alarcon determined that he would
hold the evidence inadmissable as irrelevant to prove that Federico
agreed to the conspiracy with which he was charged.2 74 5
In United States v. Barnett ,2746 the defendant was charged with

aiding and abetting Donald Hensley in the attempted manufacture of
phencyclidine and with using the United States mails to facilitate the
commission of this crime. The district court granted Barnett's motion
to suppress certain evidence seized in a search of his residence, includ-

ing instructions for the manufacture of phencyclidine and other drugs,
catalogs of controlled substances, manufacturing instructions, mailing
lists for alleged drug related correspondence, and business correspon-

dence sent or received by the United News Service operated by Barnett. 74 7 In granting the motion, the district court reasoned that none of

the items seized in the search of Barnett's residence were "contraband,
evidence of criminal activity, or connected with criminal activity. 2748
The Ninth Circuit, however, held that the items seized were ad.missible as relevant evidence in aiding the Government's prosecution.2749 It stated that although the items in the search warrant did not
2743. Id. (citing United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 889 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
962 (1979)).
2744. 658 F.2d at 1344 (Alarcon, J.,
dissenting).
2745. Id. at 1347 (citing United States v. Bosley, 615 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (9th Cir. 1980) (a
prior delivery of cocaine by the defendant outside the scope of the alleged conspiracy was
inadmissible to prove defendant's connection with the conspiracy)).
2746. 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982).
2747. Id. at 837-38. Barnett was linked to the alleged crime following the arrest of Donald
Hensley who was charged with attempted manufacture of phencyclidine. Id. at 838-39.
Hensley admitted forwarding a postal money order to United News Service for instructions
regarding the manufacture of phencyclidine; he pleaded guilty to attempted manufacture of
phencyclidine. Id. at 838. Agent Sherrington of the DEA obtained the cancelled money
order from the Postal Inspector's Office and found that it was endorsed by a G.Barnett and
stamped "United News Service." .d. at 839. Under an assumed name, Agent Sherrington
sent the United News Service a money order requesting instructions to manufacture
phencyclidine, and later received many of the same documents about how to manufacture
phencyclidine. .d. Based on these facts and others, a search warrant was issued listing items
which were then seized from Barnett's apartment. Id. at 839-40.
2748. Id. at 838.
2749. Id. at 843 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (mere evidence could be
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directly relate to Barnett's transactions with Hensley, the evidence was
highly relevant to prove Barnett's knowledge, intent, and identity as the
2 750
perpetrator.
In United States v. Skinner, 7 5 t the defendant was convicted of first
degree murder. His defense was that his fear of his victim caused him
to carry a gun while visiting the victim. 275 2 In considering whether the
trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the reason
Skinner hated his victim, the Ninth Circuit held that Skinner's reasons
for hating his victim were irrelevant to his alleged claim of self-defense
and would have only served to harm his case by tending to show pre2753
meditation and malice.
In United States v. Hanigan,2 754 the defendant was convicted of
aiding and abetting a robbery affecting commerce. 2755 Hanigan contended on appeal that the district court erroneously excluded, on the
ground of irrelevance, five photographs of a cattle-crossing culvert near
the ranch where the crimes occurred.2 75 6 In affirming the district
court's findings, the Ninth Circuit held that these photographs were irrelevant because none of the evidence presented to the jury placed the
victim near this particular culvert.2 75 7
The preceeding cases demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit will uphold the admission of evidence not only when it renders it more probable than not that the defendant committed the particular crime alleged
but also when it tends to show the defendant's intent or knowledge.
Although the majority of the Federico court stated that the evidence in
question was relevant because it made it more probable than not that
the defendant committed the alleged crime,27 58 the dissent's reasonseized pursuant to a search warrant if the facts set forth in the affidavit described evidence
which would aid in a certain apprehension or conviction)).
2750. 667 F.2d at 843 (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 483-84 (1976) (seizure
of evidence of other acts is allowable when the nature of the alleged crime is complex, and
when the evidence tends to prove a suspect's intent regarding the criminal activity described
in the affidavit)). The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court's exclusion of evidence
that Barnett did not advertise in certain magazines was not compelled on first amendment
grounds merely because the evidence consisted of speech. 667 F.2d at 844. It noted that if a
defendant's words or silence are relevant to prove an issue in a case, then they are admissible
subject to the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and rules of evidence. Id.
2751. 667 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1982).
2752. Id. at 1310.
2753. Id.
2754. 681 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1189 (1983).
2755. Id. at 1128.
2756. Id. at 1131.
2757. Id.
2758. 658 F.2d at 1342 (footnote omitted).
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ing2759 foreshadowed the Ninth Circuit's later reasoning in Barnett that
the evidence need only show general knowledge of criminal activity to
be admissible. Finally, the Ninth Circuit will not reverse a conviction,
even when arguably relevant evidence was excluded, if admission of
that evidence would have prejudiced the defendant's case.
b. authenticationof evidence

The Federal Rules of Evidence require as a condition precedent to
admissibility that evidence be "sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims."2 760 This threshold

and authentication is reviewable only
determination of identification
2761
for an abuse of discretion.
In United States v. Kaiser,2 76 2 the defendants were convicted of

conspiracy to distribute, distribution, and possession with intent to distribute heroin.27 63 At trial, the Government used the testimony of

DEA agent Taylor to provide the necessary foundation for the authentication and identification of several of its exhibits. Taylor's testimony,
however, later was stricken. The defendants argued that retention of
the exhibits as evidence, in the absence of Taylor's testimony, constituted an abuse of discretion. 2764
The Ninth Circuit found that the district court's refusal to strike
three of the Government's exhibits was an abuse of discretion.2 7 6 It
noted that one of the exhibits had been identified only by Taylor's excluded testimony. The remaining two exhibits had been identified by
both Taylor and an informant, but the informant's extremely equivocal
identification, standing alone, was insufficient to provide an adequate
foundation.2766 The court also stated that, in spite of its determination
that the district court erred in striking Taylor's testimony, it could not
now consider his testimony in evaluating the adequacy of the exhibits'
identification, because this would effectively deny the defendants their
2759. Id. at 1347 (Alarcon, J.,
dissenting).
2760. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
2761. United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1349 (9th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 435 U.S.
1000 (1978).
2762. 660 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. deniedsubnom. House v. United States, 455 U.S.
956 (1982).
2763. Id. at 728.
2764. Id. at 731. The testimony was stricken because it purportedly violated the Jencks
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). The Jencks Act requires, in part, that written statements by
government witnesses be signed or at least approved by the witness.
2765. 660 F.2d at 73 1.
2766. Id.
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right to cross-examine Taylor.2767
c.

chain of custody

In order for certain evidence to be admissible, the proponent must
show that the evidence is in substantially the same condition as it was
when the crime was committed.2

768

This chain of custody must be es-

tablished when the evidence is of a type which can be easily confused
or tampered with or is not readily identifiable. Factors in determining
admissibility include "the nature of the article, the circumstances surrounding the preservation and custody of it, and the likelihood of intermeddlers tampering with it."27 69 The trial court's determination on the

adequacy of the chain of custody will not be overturned absent an
abuse of discretion.277 °
In United States v. Kaiser,277 1 defendants Kaiser and Acosta were
each convicted of one count of distributing heroin. They contended
that their convictions should be reversed because there was an inadequate chain of custody established for the heroin exhibits admitted
against them.2772
With respect to Acosta, the Ninth Circuit found no evidence that
the heroin had been mishandled or tampered with in any manner. It
stated that the district court appeared justified in presuming that the
heroin was properly mailed to the lab, and that at least two of the three
balloons of heroin admitted against Acosta were positively identified
by both the3 deputy and the chemist sufficiently to uphold his
277
conviction.

With respect to Kaiser, the Ninth Circuit found that the gap in
time between the mailing of the heroin and the chemist's examination
of it was insignificant in light of the presumption of regularity accorded
the procedures of the DEA laboratory and the absence of any evidence
of impropriety. 2774 The court stated that the chemist's later testimony
rendered any error in admission harmless.2 775 Finally, the court found
no evidence that the removal of portions of the heroin by a DEA agent
2767. Id. (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)).
2768. Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1960).
2769. Id.
2770. Id.
2771. 660 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. deniedsub nom. House v. United States, 455 U.S.
956 (1982).
2772. Id. at 733.
2773. Id.
2774. Id. (citing Gallego, 276 F.2d at 917).
2775. 660 F.2d at 733-34.
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or by an informant in any way altered the composition of the substance
ultimately tested by the chemist.2 77 6 Thus, the court held that there was
no abuse of discretion by the district court in admitting the heroin as an
exhibit against either Acosta or Kaiser.27 77
2.

Prejudice

a. generally
Relevant evidence admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the possibility of unfair prejudice. 2778 Unfair prejudice
"means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis. '2 779 Relevant evidence may also be excluded when its probative
value is outweighed by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
needless presentation of cumulative evidence, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury.2780 The trial judge has wide discretion in determining if relevant evidence should nonetheless be excluded, and his or
her determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion.2 7 8 ' The Ninth Circuit recently considered whether the evidence in certain cases should have been excluded because of the possibility of unfair prejudice or the lack of necessity for its presentation.
In United States v. Andrini,2 78 2 the defendant was convicted of the
malicious destruction of a building by means of explosives. The building was set afire with gasoline-filled water jugs ignited by cigarettes and
a pyrotechnic fuse. 2783 At trial, a witness testified that shortly after the
arson Andrini had told him that the best way to start a large fire was by
igniting a rag stuffed in a plastic bottle filled with gasoline. Andrini
argued on appeal that this testimony was inadmissible under Rules
away from the crime
404(b) and 403 because it shifted the jury's focus
2784
charged and pictured him as a pyromaniac.
2776. Id. at 734.
2777. Id.
2778. FED. R. EvlD.403.
2779. Id. advisory committee note. For example, an undue tendency to render a decision
on an emotional basis would demonstrate unfair prejudice.
2780. FED. R. EVID. 403.
2781. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127 (1974); United States v. Larios, 640 F.2d
938, 941 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 889 (9th Cir.), cer. denied,
441 U.S. 962 (1979); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1349 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978); United States v. Keamey, 560 F.2d 1358, 1369 (9th Cir.), cer.
denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977).
2782. 685 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1982).
2783. Id. at 1095.
2784. Id. at 1096.
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The Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the trial court
in admitting the testimony. 7 85 The court stated that the evidence
showed that Andrini possessed a special skill which was used in the

commission of the arson, and that it was probative in identifying Andrini as the perpetrator. It further stated that the prejudicial effect of

the evidence was not sufficient to outweigh its probative value.27 86
In United States v. Bailleaux,278 7 the defendant was convicted of

conspiracy to interfere with commerce and attempted extortion. Bailleaux argued that the trial court should have excluded substantive evidence of his prior criminal conduct because it was "prejudicial. ' 278 8

The Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the trial
court.278 9 The court stressed that the issue was not whether evidence

was prejudicial, but whether evidence was unfairy prejudicial; therefore, the more highly probative the evidence is, the greater the showing
of prejudice required to exclude it.2790 The court also stated that the

trial court must consider both the need for evidence of prior criminal
conduct to prove a particular point279 1 and the jury's difficulty in distinguishing the probative from the prejudicial aspects of the evidence.2 79 2
In spite of the considerable danger of unfair prejudice in Bailleaux's case, the court held that the evidence was admissible.2 7 93 The
Ninth Circuit premised its holding on the facts that the evidence was
2794
highly relevant to prove Bailleaux's modus operandi and identity
and that the district court had instructed the jury twice as to the limited
2785. Id. at 1097.
2786. Id. See United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 248-49 (1st Cir. 1976) ("familiarity
with burglar alarms relevant where alarm bypass was distinctive feature of burglary");
United States v. Campanile, 516 F.2d 288, 293 (2d Cir. 1975) ("experience in fencing coins
relevant in large coin theft").
2787. 685 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1982).
2788. Id. at 1109-10.
2789. Id. at 1112.
2790. Id. at 1111.
2791. Id. at 1112 (citing United States v. Lawrance, 480 F.2d 688, 691-92 n.6 (5th Cir.
1973); C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 190, at 453
(2d ed. 1972)).
The Government had a substantial need for the evidence of the prior criminal conduct
because it tended to prove the extortionist's identity. The Government lacked any direct
evidence on this point. 685 F.2d at 1112 n.4.
2792. Id. at 1112.
2793. Id.
2794. Id. Both the charged offense and Bailleaux's prior criminal conduct involved an
extortion attempt whereby the perpetrator poisoned a store's food items and then demanded
diamonds to forestall further poisonings. The poisonous substance, the wording of the extortion notes, the instructions for contacting the extortionist, and the procedure for leaving
the extortion payment were all strikingly similar in both incidents. Id. at 1110.
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purpose for which the evidence could be used.27 95
In UnitedStates v. Booth,2 79 6 the Government appealed the district

court's pretrial orders excluding evidence of a list of gun stores and
ammunition. Booth was charged with bank robbery. The Government
offered this evidence to prove that he used a loaded weapon, thereby

endangering people's lives during the commission of the bank robbery.
In order to convict the defendant of placing others in danger during the
commission of a bank robbery, the Government was required to establish that at least one of the weapons was loaded.27 97
The Ninth Circuit held that the trial judge abused his discretion in
excluding this evidence.2 79 8 The court stated that the evidence was not

rendered inadmissible simply because it was prejudicial.2799 It noted
the distinction between prejudicial evidence and evidence which creates "unfair prejudice," the latter being inadmissible under Rule
403.2800 The court concluded that there was no danger of unfair
28 0
prejudice which substantially outweighed the relevance of the list. '
In United States v. Wright,2 8 °2 the defendant was convicted of tax

evasion. 280 3 Wright argued that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting certain narcotics evidence which he claimed was more prejudicial than probative. The Ninth Circuit stated that the Government

may offer evidence in a tax evasion case which tends to prove that the
defendant's
increase in net worth is attributable to currently taxable
28 4
income.

The Ninth Circuit found the drug-related evidence rele-

vant to show Wright's possible involvement in the drug trade as a likely
2795. Id. Evidence of prior criminal conduct cannot be used to show that the defendant is
likely to have committed the crime charged, but may be considered for other purposes such
as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge and identity. FED. R. EVID.
404(b).
2796. 669 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1981).
2797. Id. at 1239-40. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) proscribes the jeopardizing of a person's life by
the use of a dangerous device during the commission of a bank robbery.
2798. Id. at 1239. The district court excluded the evidence because it was highly prejudicial and of little probative value due to the following: (1) the list was not in Booth's handwriting; (2) it was not found within the immediate area of Booth's other possessions; (3) it
did not have Booth's fingerprints on it; and (4) the Government failed to show a connection
between the list and Booth. Id.
2799. Id. at 1240 (citing United States v. Mahler, 452 F.2d 547, 548 (9th Cir. 1971), cer.
denied, 405 U.S. 1069 (1972)).
2800. 669 F.2d at 1240.
2801. Id.
2802. 667 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1982).
2803. Id. at 795.
2804. Id. at 795. 667 F.2d at 799-800 (citing Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 13738 (1954) (evidence in tax evasion trial can be used to support inference that increase in net
worth is attributable to currently taxable income)).
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source of income.28 °5 The court therefore concluded that the challenged evidence was sufficiently probative and that the trial judge did

not abuse his discretion in admitting the evidence. 20 6
In UnitedStates v. Regner,28 °7 the defendant was convicted of mail
fraud. 280 8 On cross-examination of Regner, the Government was per-

mitted, over the defendant's objection, to inquire into Regner's prior
claims for and receipt of various insurance benefits.

80 9

The district

court admitted the evidence for the limited purpose of rebutting
Regner's testimony of his unfamiliarity with insurance claims. 2810 On
appeal, Regner argued that any probative value of the evidence was

outweighed by its prejudicial effect of casting him as a "scourge upon
society.' '28 11 The Ninth Circuit held that there was no abuse of discre-

tion by the trial judge because the evidence was probative of Regner's
familiarity with insurance claims.281 2
2805. Id. at 800.
2806. 667 F.2d at 800. Wright relied on United States v. Hall, 650 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir.
1981), for the proposition that special protections for the defendant as well as careful scrutiny by the courts are required in a net worth case. 667 F.2d at 800. The court found
Wright's reliance misplaced because Hall involved prejudice arising from failure to give key
jury instructions rather than from a determination of the relevancy of certain evidence. Id.
2807. 677 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 220 (1982).
2808. Id. at 755.
2809. 677 F.2d at 756.
2810. Id.
2811. Id.
2812. Id. The court also rejected Regner's argument that the questioning concerning prior
insurance claims was beyond the scope of direct examination, because the examination related to, and was probative of Regner's familiarity with filing insurance claims. Id. The
Ninth Circuit rejected Regner's claim that the district court erred in failing to give an immediate instruction to the jury with respect to the limited admissibility of the evidence of his
prior insurance claims. Id. at 757.
Finally, the court reserved judgment on the Government's argument that evidence of
the prior insurance claims was admissible under Rule 404(b) because it was probative of
similar acts, thus demonstrating either motive, intent, plan, preparation or identity. Id.at
756.
The Ninth Circuit also reserved judgment in United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1031 (1982), on whether particular evidence was more
prejudicial than probative. Defendants Rasheed and Phillips were convicted of federal mail
fraud. Id.at 845. At trial, the Government submitted into evidence computerized summaries of the defendants' financial records. Id.at 849. The defendants argued that these summaries were inadmissible under Rule 403 because the "scientific aura" they created was
more prejudicial than probative. They also argued that the summaries were inadmissible
under Rule 1006 because some of the summaries were based on inadmissible documents.
Id. at 850.
The Ninth Circuit stated that "even if there was error [in admitting the summaries,] it
was harmless unless it [was] more probable than not that the error materially affected the
verdict." Id. (citing United States v. Vaile-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 915-16 (9th Cir. 1977)).
The court concluded that because there was substantial evidence other than the summaries
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In United States v. Hooton, 28 13 the defendant was convicted of engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without a federal license. 28 14 On appeal, Hooton argued that the trial court abused its
discretion in suppressing evidence of testimony by gun collectors, gun
dealers, and agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
on trading activities of a typical hobbyist collector.2 '
The Ninth Circuit noted that despite the trial court's ruling, defense counsel elicited extensive testimony from approximately twenty
prosecution and defense witnesses concerning the activities of gun collectors.2816 Thus, the court held that the trial judge did not abuse his
evidence which was cumulative and only "mardiscretion by excluding
2817
ginally relevant.
These decisions indicate that the Ninth Circuit strictly construes
the exclusionary scope of Rule 403. The court looks to the totality of
the evidence admitted to determine the effect of specific evidence on
the defendant's trial. Although evidence may be prejudicial, the important determination is whether it is unfairly prejudicial so that its
admission constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial court. The
Ninth Circuit appears more likely to exclude evidence which is cumulative and only marginally probative than that which is highly probative yet prejudicial.
b.

unfair surprise

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, unfair surprise is not recognized as a ground for exclusion of relevant evidence. 2818 The reasons
for this lack of recognition are that modem procedural requirements
granting of a
render claims of unfair surprise highly dubious, and the
2819
continuance is considered a more appropriate remedy.
In United States v. Hanigan,28 20 the defendant was convicted on
retrial of aiding and abetting a robbery affecting commerce. 282' On appeal, Hanigan argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitof the defendants' fraudulent activities, the summaries had not been necessary to the verdict.
Thus, the court ruled that their admission was harmless error. Id.
2813. 662 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1004 (1982).
2814. Id. at 630.
2815. 662 F.2d at 636.
2816. Id.
2817. Id.
2818. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note.
2819. Id.
2820. 681 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1189 (1983).
2821. Id. at 1128-29.
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ting at his second trial the testimony of a witness who had not testified
at his first trial. Hanigan did not contend that the evidence was inadmissible, but rather that he was unfairly surprised because he was not
notified of the proposed testimony until mid-trial.28 2 2 The district court
admitted the testimony based on its findings that the Government had
acted in good faith and Hanigan had failed to prove he was prejudiced
2 823
by admission of the testimony.
In affirming the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit stated
that Hanigan had not established any prejudicial surprise. It noted that
the Government had given the witness' statement to defense counsel as
soon as it was available, and the district court had conducted a preliminary conference at which it found much of the testimony inadmissible.
Finally, Hanigan vigorously attacked the witness' credibility through
his own arguments and the use of other witnesses who contradicted the
testimony. Thus, the court held that there was no abuse of
discretion.28 24
3.

Character

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts by an accused are inadmissible to prove that the accused acted in conformity with a unique
character trait.2 825 However, the same evidence may be admissible to
show preparation, intent, knowledge, opportunity, identity, motive,
plan or absence of mistake or accident. 2826 The discretion to admit or
exclude such evidence resides in the trial judge, and his decision will be
reversed on appeal only if he has abused his discretion.2 8 27 The Ninth
Circuit has recently considered several cases in which it was necessary
to determine whether evidence of prior acts was admissible according
to the above criteria.
In UnitedStates v. Andrini,2 82 8 the defendant was convicted of arson by setting a building afire with "four gasoline-filled water jugs ignited by cigarettes and a pyrotechnic fuse. ' 2829 At trial, a witness
2822. Id. at 1132.
2823. Id.
2824. Id.
2825. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
2826. Id.
2827. United States v. Green, 648 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1981).
2828. 685 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1982).
2829. Id. at 1095.
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testified that shortly after the arson, Andrini told him that the best way
to start a large fire was to stuff a rag in a plastic bottle filled with gasoline and ignite it.2830 On appeal, Andrini argued that this testimony
was inadmissible character evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.283 '
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.28 32 Although doubting that Andrini's "plastic-bottle" statement could be considered evidence of an
"act" under Rule 404(b), the court held that the evidence was admissible as proof of the identity of the perpetrator.2833 The court stated that
under the identity exception to Rule 404(b), "the characteristics of both
the act and the offense must be sufficiently distinctive to warrant an
inference that the" same person committed both the act and the offense.2834 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the device described by the
witness and the device used in the arson were sufficiently distinctive to
warrant an inference that Andrini committed the arson.2835
In United States v. Bailleaux,2

36

the defendant was convicted of

conspiring to interfere with commerce. Bailleaux contended that the
district court committed reversible error by admitting evidence relating
to (1) Bailleaux's prior conviction of a similar offense in Oregon, and
(2) the acts on which the Oregon conviction was based.2837
The Ninth Circuit first stated that evidence of prior criminal conduct is admissible under Rule 404(b) only if: (1) there is clear and convincing proof that the defendant committed the -prior crime; (2) the
prior crime is not too remote in time from the charged offense; (3) the
prior criminal conduct is similar to the offense charged; and (4) the
prior crime is introduced to prove an element of the charged offense
which is a material issue in the case. 28 38 With respect to the introduction into evidence of Bailleaux's prior conviction, the court concluded
2830. Id. at 1096.
2831. Id. See supra note 2825.
2832. 685 F.2d at 1097.
2833. Id.
2834. Id. (citing United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 1978)).
2835. 685 F.2d at 1097. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that both devices consisted of perforated gasoline-filled bottles which were ignited by some type of fuse inserted in one of the
perforations. Id. The only notable difference is that one device was to be thrown and the
other was to remain stationary.
2836. 685 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1982).
2837. Id at 1109.
2838. Id. at 1109-10 (citing United States v. Herrera-Medina, 609 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 847 (1978);
United States v. Frederickson, 601 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 934 (1979)).
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that it need not determine whether the four-part test had been satisfied.
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that it was Bailleaux himself who first offered evidence of his prior conviction while testifying on direct examination.2 39 Thus, the court determined that Bailleaux could "not object
to the Government's subsequent inquiries into the relevant aspects of
'2
his prior conviction. 1t
With respect to the evidence of the acts upon which Bailleaux's
prior conviction was based, the court also found no abuse of discretion.
The Ninth Circuit determined that the Government had met each requirement of the four-part test,2 84 ' and that the evidence was, therefore,
admissible to show both modus operandi and the identity of the
perpetrator.2 42
In United States v. Hooton,2843 the defendant was convicted of
trading in firearms without a federal license. Hooton argued that the
trial court erred in admitting evidence of three acts for which he was
not charged: (1) a sale of firearms prior to the indictment period; (2) a
business arrangement concerning the ordering of guns for resale; and
(3) an involvement in assisting another individual in distributing
guns.2 8 " The Government argued that the evidence was admissible to
show both intent and a common plan or scheme to acquire guns for the
purpose of selling rather than collecting them. 2845 Hooton alleged that
his intent was immaterial because his "collector" defense was based on
the fact that the nature and number of his gun-related activities were
insufficient to prove he was a dealer.28 4 6 In addition, Hooton claimed
the evidence of other acts was inadmissible to prove a common scheme
because it was completely unrelated to the acts for which he was on
28 47
trial.
The Ninth Circuit determined that Hooton's intent to deal in firearms, as opposed to his intent to merely enhance his gun collection, was
2839. 685 F.2d at 1110.

2840. Id.
2841. The court noted that: (I) the Government produced several witnesses who testified
that Bailleaux committed the Oregon crimes, (2) the Oregon offenses were committed ten
days prior to the crimes in question, (3) the crimes were strikingly similar both in nature and
in the manner in which they were committed, and (4) the Government introduced the evidence in order to establish Bailleaux's modus operandi and identity. Id. at 1111.
2842. Id. at 1112.
2843. 662 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1004 (1982).
2844. Id. at 634.

2845. Id.
2846. Id.
2847. Id.
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an integral issue in the case.2848 The court set forth the following three-

part test for determining the admissibility of evidence of other acts to
prove intent under Rule 404(b): "1) the prior act is similar and close
enough in time to be relevant, 2) the evidence of the prior act is clear

and convincing, and 3) the probative value of the evidence outweighs
any potential prejudice." 2849 The court held that the trial court had not

abused its discretion by admitting the evidence for the limited purpose
of proving intent because the evidence of the other acts satisfied all

three criteria.285°

In UnitedStates v. Skinner,8 5 1 the defendant was convicted of first
degree murder. At trial, a Government witness testified on cross-exam-

ination that Skinner had previously pulled a gun on him. Skinner argued that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike this
or2 by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding the
testimony, 285
testimony.

The Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion, stating that the
testimony, although improper, was neither the product of direct questioning by the Government, nor the result of any impropriety on the
Government's part.285 3 The court also noted that the defense had
2848. Id. at 635 (citing United States v. Angelini, 607 F.2d 1305, 1309-11 (9th Cir. 1979)).
The court noted that "even in general intent crimes, the government can offer evidence of
other acts as part of its case-in-chief when it is obvious that the defense will raise lack of
intent as a defense." 662 F.2d at 635 (citing United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1337-38
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978)). The court noted further that Hooton
would obviously raise lack of intent as a defense because he had raised a "collector" defense
at his first trial and defense counsel's opening statement at the second trial implied that the
same defense would be raised again. 662 F.2d at 635.
2849. 662 F.2d at 635 (citing United States v. Bronco, 597 F.2d 1300, 1302-03 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1111 (1977)).
2850. 662 F.2d at 635. The court determined that the other acts consisted of the same type
of transaction as the crime charged, and that they occurred immediately prior to or contemporaneously with the indictment period. Id. The Ninth Circuit further stated that evidence
of the prior acts was clear and convincing because Hooton failed to attack the evidence of
the gun sales at the pretrial hearing, stipulated to the existence of the resale business arrangement, and admitted his involvement in gun distribution in a tape-recorded interview
with a federal agent. Id. Finally, the court concluded that evidence of the other acts was
merely probative of intent and not significantly prejudicial because an individual gun sale is
not a crime absent an overall scheme of unlicensed gun dealing. Id.
2851. 667 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
2852. Id. at 1310.
2853. Id. (citing United States v. Green, 648 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); United
States v. Aims Back, 588 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979)). In Green, the defendants were convicted of conspiring to obstruct justice, conspiring to make false statements, and conspiring
to violate citizens' civil rights. 648 F.2d at 589. The Ninth Circuit held that the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of a Government witness on direct examination and by failing to give the proper limiting instruction regarding the testimony. Id. at
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called another witness who explained and mitigated Skinner's prior
28 54

act.

In United States v. Cutler, 8 55 the defendant was convicted of con-

spiracy to commit mail fraud and arson, mail fraud, and the use of an
explosive to destroy a building. Cutler contended that the trial court

abused its discretion by restricting defense counsel's cross-examination
of Cutler's employee, Levoff, regarding other building fires in the surrounding area.285 6 He argued that this testimony should have been admitted under Rule 404(b). 285 7 The Ninth Circuit, however, found no
abuse of discretion because Levoff ultimately testified regarding the

previous fires.2858
Cutler also contended that the trial court abused its discretion by

refusing to admit the following extrinsic evidence: (1) testimony regarding Levofi's alleged prior arson activities; (2) evidence of additional fires; and (3) a government report. 2859 He again argued that this
evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b).286 ° The Ninth Circuit
found no abuse of discretion because Cutler had failed to make adequate offers of proof in support of admitting this extrinsic evidence.2 86 '
593. Portions of the testimony were arguably relevant, but either did not directly address the
issues in the case or were more prejudicial than probative. Id.
In.4ims Back, the defendant was charged with rape, and during direct examination, the
government called a witness who testified that she also had been raped by Aims Back. 588
F.2d at 1285. The testimony was admitted; however, the only limiting instruction given was
that Aims Back was never charged with the witness' alleged rape and the jury should merely
consider the witness' testimony in establishing the pattern of events of the night in question.
Id. The Ninth Circuit found that the witness' testimony was inadmissible because the probative value of the testimony was outweighed by its propensity to prove only criminal disposition. Id. The court also determined that the instruction given enhanced the prejudicial
effect of the testimony. Id. at 1286.
2854. 667 F.2d at 1310. The Ninth Circuit held that the failure to give a limiting instruction was not an abuse of discretion. The court reasoned that admonishing the jury would
only have emphasized the testimony because the motion for an instruction was delayed. Id.
2855. 676 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1982).
2856. Id. at 1249.
2857. Id.
2858. Id. (citing United States v. Green, 648 F.2d 587, 592-93 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)).
2859. 676 F.2d at 1249.
2860. Id. See United States v. Batts, 573 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir.) (evidence that defendant had previously offered and negotiated sale of cocaine was admissible to show knowledge
and intent with respect to present drug charges), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978).
2861. 676 F.2d at 1250. The court stated that:
where. . . a trial judge has excluded evidence, '[e]rror may not be predicated upon
[such] a ruling. . unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and. . . the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent
from the context within which questions were asked.'
Id at 1249. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that in his offer of proof, Cutler failed to identify
any witness or state the anticipated substance of the witness' testimony regarding Levofis
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The preceding cases demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit liberally

admits evidence of prior acts under Rule 404(b). In fact, the Ninth
Circuit has even found statements of an accused admissible as acts
under Rule 404(b). However, the Ninth Circuit will not reverse convic-

tions resulting from the exclusion of evidence of other acts for which
the defendant cannot make a sufficient offer of proof.

4. Impeachment
a. priorconvictions
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) provides that evidence of prior

convictions is admissible to attack the credibility of a witness when the
evidence is either elicited from the witness or established by public rec-

ord, subject to the following conditions:
[T]he crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of

admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, re2862
gardless of the punishment.

Crimes involving "dishonesty or false statement" include "perjury
or subornation of perjury, false statements, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of crimen
falsi, the commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to tes-

tify truthfully. ' 28 63

In determining the admissibility of prior

convictions under Rule 609(a)(2), the Ninth Circuit has found it neces-

sary not only to consider the nature of the crime involved,286 but also
alleged prior arson activities. Id. Cutler also failed to advise the court of any records, documents, or witnesses which could substantiate his claim that Levoff had burned down other
buildings. Id. at 1250. Finally, Cutler admitted his inability to introduce the government
report because the witness, whose statements in the report incriminated Levoff, intended to
invoke the protection of the fifth amendment. Id.
2862. FED. R. EvID. 609(a). The Ninth Circuit has held that convictions admitted under
Rule 609(a)(2) are automatically admissible; the court need not conduct a balancing test.
See United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 871 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Dixon, 547
F.2d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 1976).
2863. FED. R. EVID. 609 conference report.
2864. In United States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit considered which crimes involve "dishonesty or false statement" within the meaning of Rule
609(a)(2). The court held that a prior conviction of petty shoplifting was inadmissible under
this Rule because it did not involve some element of "misrepresentation or other indicum of
a propensity to lie." Id. at 806. Accord United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 871 (9th Cir.
1980); United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1185 n.9 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied,
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the manner in which the crime was committed.2

865

The trial court's

decision to admit or exclude evidence of prior convictions will only be
reversed if the court has abused its discretion.2 866 The Ninth Circuit
has recently considered several cases in which evidence of prior convictions was offered to impeach a defendant's credibility.
In United States v. Glenn,2867 the defendant was convicted of pos-

session of marijuana for sale, possession of phencyclidine, and driving
under the influence of drugs. The trial court admitted evidence of a

1975 burglary conviction and a 1977 grand theft conviction to impeach
Glenn. 8 68 The Ninth Circuit held that the admission of evidence of
the prior convictions was erroneous under Rule 609(a)(2).2 86 9 It stated

that although Glenn's prior convictions might show a lack of respect
for the persons or property of others, the convictions did not "'bear
directly on the likelihood that [Glenn would] testify truthfully,' "2870
and thus, did not involve "dishonesty or false statement. '2 87' The
court further stated that the record did not show any of the circumstances of Glenn's prior convictions, thus making it impossible to determine whether they were committed by fraudulent or deceitful
means.28 72 Nevertheless, the court upheld Glenn's conviction because,
in view of the abundant evidence of guilt, the admission of the prior
444 U.S. 1034 (1980); United States v. Donoho, 575 F.2d 718, 721 (9th Cir.) (per curiam),
vacated, 439 U.S. 811 (1978); United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188, 190-91 (10th Cir.
1978); United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977);
United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 360-64 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 281-82 (3d Cir. 1976).
2865. The Ninth Circuit has held that a conviction for burglary or theft may be admissible
under Rule 609(a)(2) if the crime was committed by fraudulent or deceitful means. United
States v. Donoho, 575 F.2d 718, 721 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), vacated,439 U.S. 811 (1978); see
also United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 847-48 (7th Cir. 1977). The prosecution has the
burden of showing that the crime was committed fraudulently or deceitfully. United States
v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 364 n.28. (D.C. Cir. 1976).
2866. United States v. Hendersot, 614 F.2d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1980).
2867. 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982).
2868. Id. at 1272.
2869. Id. at 1273.
2870. Id. (quoting United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir.) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977)).
2871. 667 F.2d at 1273.
2872. Id. The Government argued that burglary and theft convictions reflect on credibility, relying on United States v. Wilson, 536 F.2d 883 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982
(1976), and United States v. Hatcher, 496 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1974). 667 F.2d at 1273 n.l.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that this reliance was misplaced because neither case was decided under Rule 609. The court noted that although theft crimes may bear on credibility,
they may nevertheless be inadmissible under Rule 609(a)(2). Id. (citing United States v.
Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
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convictions was not prejudicial.2873
In UnitedStates v. Leyva,2874 the defendant was convicted of forging and uttering United States Treasury checks. The district court admitted evidence of Leyva's prior conviction of misdemeanor welfare
fraud under Rule 609(a)(2). 2875 Leyva argued that this evidence was

inadmissible under Rule 4032876 because it was more prejudicial than
probative.2 8 77 The Ninth Circuit held that Rule 403 is inapplicable

where evidence of the prior offense is relevant to impeach credibility. 2878 It construed Rule 609(a)(2) as a congressional judgment that
where the issue is credibility, the probative value of crimes involving

dishonesty or false statements always outweighs the prejudicial effect. 2879 Therefore, the court ruled that the prior conviction was admissible to impeach Leyva.2 88 °
The Ninth Circuit considered the scope of Rule 609(a)(1) in United

States v. Lops,2881 where the defendant, a convicted felon, was found
guilty of receipt of a firearm shipped in interstate commerce. Lipps
argued on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion under Rule

609(a)(1) by allowing evidence of four prior felony convictions for burglary and robbery to impeach his testimony.2882 The Ninth Circuit
noted that Lipps' credibility was not at issue because he had either stipulated to or admitted all elements of the crime.2 88 3 The court further
noted that the trial court had not explained why the evidence was more
probative than prejudicial.28 84 The court rejected the Government's

contention that evidence of the prior convictions was probative of the
element of the crime requiring the defendant to be a felon, because the
2873. 667 F.2d at 1273-74 (citing United States v. Hall, 650 F.2d 994, 998 n.6 (9th Cir.
1981)).
2874. 659 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982).
2875. Id. at 121.
2876. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ..
2877. 659 F.2d at 121.
2878. Id. The court noted that in United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, 288 (5th Cir.
1980), the Fifth Circuit held that "Rule 403 simply has no application where impeachment is
sought through a crimen falsi." 659 F.2d at 122.
2879. 659 F.2d at 121 (citing United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980);
United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1111 (1977);
and United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976)).
2880. 659 F.2d at 122.
2881. 659 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
2882. Id. at 962.
2883. Id.
2884. Id. Rule 609(a)(1) requires the trial court to make such a determination. See
United States v. Mehrmanesh, 682 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982).
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defendant had already stipulated to this fact.2885 It also rejected the
Government's argument that knowledge of the prior convictions would
give the jury a "'more comprehensive view' of the defendant's trustworthiness 288 6 because Lipps had never attempted to misrepresent himself to the jury.2 88 7 Finally, the court found the Government's use of
the defendant's prior convictions to impeach his common law wife was
improper because prior convictions cannot be used to impeach another
witness.28 88
The Ninth Circuit thus held that the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of Lipps' prior convictions. 2889 The court held the error to be
harmless, however, because Lipps had admitted to each element of the
of the offense, rendering evidence which related to his credibility
immaterial.2 89 o
In United States v. Mehrmanesh,2891 the defendant was convicted
of distributing heroin. On appeal, Mehrmanesh challenged the district
court's denial of his motion to preclude the Government's use of a 1975
conviction for importing hashish to impeach his credibility. 28 92 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the motion.28 93 The court noted that the trial judge had
made the requisite finding under Rule 609(a)(1) that the probative
value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.2 89 4 It also accepted the Government's contention that, based on the opening statement of the defense counsel, there was a reasonable possibility that
Mehrmanesh would misrepresent himself to the jury by denying any
involvement in drug trafficking.28 95
2885. 659 F.2d at 962.
2886. Id. (quoting United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980)).
2887. 659 F.2d at 962.
2888. Id.
2889. Id.
2890. Id.
2891. 682 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1982).
2892. Id. at 1309.
2893. Id. (citing United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980)).
2894. 682 F.2d at 1309.
2895. Id. (citing United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980)). The Cook court stated that "[a] court [is] unwilling to let a man
with a substantial criminal history misrepresent himself to the jury, with the government
forced to sit silently by, looking at a criminal record, which, if made known, would give the
jury a more comprehensive view of the trustworthiness of the defendant." 608 F.2d at 1187.
Mehrmanesh also challenged the denial of a second motion to restrict the scope of the
Government's cross-examination. 682 F.2d at 1309. He had sought to prohibit the Government from cross-examining him about facts relating to an upcoming prosecution for posses-
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In United States v. Hammond,2" 9 6 the defendant was convicted of

bank robbery. Hammond contended that his case was prejudiced by
the testimony of a pretrial services officer, which revealed that he 2had
8 97
previously had a probation officer and had been in a "lockup" area.
Hammond argued that this testimony contravened the trial court's ear-

lier ruling excluding all evidence of his prior felony convictions. 28 98
The Ninth Circuit held that any error due to the officer's testimony
was harmless because the trial court had immediately cautioned the
2 899
jury to disregard the reference to Hammond's probation officer.

The court further held that the reference to Hammond's prior lockup
was harmless error because it probably did not
materially affect the
29 °
verdict in view of the other evidence of guilt.

These decisions demonstrate that while a defendant's credibility
may not be impeached under Rule 609(a)(2) by a prior conviction not
involving dishonesty or false statement, the trial court is not required to
weigh the probative value of such a conviction against its prejudicial
effect. The court, however, must weigh the probative value of evidence

of a prior felony conviction against its prejudicial effect under Rule
609(a)(1). If the court decides, however, that a prior felony is more

probative than prejudicial, this decision will be given deference. Finally, although admissions of prior felony convictions may constitute
error, vague references during trial to prior crimes are not grounds for
reversal where cautionary instructions are immediately given to the
jury.
b. priorinconsistent statements
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a constitutional right
sion of controlled substances for distribution. The court held that the denial of the motion
was not an abuse of discretion, since Mehrmanesh's proposed testimony denied any involvement in the distribution of controlled substances. Id at 1310. Thus, the evidence of the
unconvicted bad acts (facts concerning the upcoming trial) was relevant to impeach the credibility of Mehrmanesh's proposed testimony, and was properly admitted under Rule 608(b).
Id FED. R. EVID. 608(b) provides for impeachment by cross-examination about prior unconvicted bad acts if the acts are more probative of dishonesty than prejudicial.
2896. 666 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1982).
2897. Id. at 440.
2898. Id.
2899. Id. The court noted that a curative instruction is adequate even when a witness
refers specifically to a defendant's prior conviction. Id. (citing United States v. Belperio, 452
F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1971)).
2900. 666 F.2d at 440-41 (citing United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir.
1977)).
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to confront the witnesses testifying against him.2 901 The sixth amendment guarantees the defendant's right to cross-examine these witnesses
290 2
to challenge their credibility.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 613(a), a witness may be examined concerning a prior statement, written or unwritten, without dis-

closing the statement's content to the witness during the
examination. 90 3 Under Rule 613(b), extrinsic evidence of a witness'

prior inconsistent statement is admissible if the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement, and the opposing party is
given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness about it.2 9 ° 4 The
Ninth Circuit has held that defense counsel in particular should be
given maximum opportunity to impeach the credibility of key Govern-

ment witnesses,

290 5

and it has maintained this philosophy in its recent

cases.
In United States v.Williams,29 °6 the defendant was convicted of

conspiracy, attempt to collect, and collection of debt by extortion. 290 7

At trial, Williams attempted to introduce into evidence a prior incon-

sistent statement made by his alleged co-conspirator, who was also the

key Government witness, 29 8 which tended to show that Williams lacked the requisite criminal intent.290 9 The Government objected to the
admission of the statement on the basis that it was "an unsigned statement, ' 910 and the trial court sustained the objection.2 9 1'
2901. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
2902. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974).
2903. FED. R. EVID. 613(a) provides that "[i]n
examining a witness concerning a prior
statement made by him, whether written or not, the statement need not be shown nor its
contents disclosed to him at that time, but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to
opposing counsel."
2904. FED. R. EVID. 613(b) provides that "extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless that witness is afforded an opportunity to explain
or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him
thereon ....
2905. Burr v. Sullivan, 618 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1980).
2906. 668 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1981).
2907. Id.at 1066.
2908. William's alleged co-conspirator pled guilty before trial and testified for the Government. Id.
2909. Id. at 1068. At trial the Government witness testified that he may have talked to
Williams about "putting pressure on [the victim] to make payment." On cross-examination,
he denied telling Williams that the victim would be hurt if he did not pay. Id. The night
before trial he stated to defense counsel that he had led Williams to believe that harm would
come to the victim and later to himself if payment was not made. Id.
2910. Id. at 1067. The Government did not cite any authority to support this objection.
Id.
2911. Id.at 1069.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that Williams had propto introduce the statement by first giving the witness an
attempted
erly
opportunity to explain or deny the statement.2912 It also noted that
defense counsel properly authenticated the statement 29 13 with the wit-

ness' testimony admitting that he had made the statement and that it
was true,29 14 and by calling another witness who testified that the Gov2915
ernment witness had read the statement and agreed to its veracity.
The court therefore held that the exclusion of the statement was error.2916 Furthermore, because the evidence admitted to prove Williams' guilt could also have supported a verdict of not guilty,29 17 and
because the entire record showed that, at worst, Williams was only a
peripheral figure in the conspiracy, 2918 the court held that this error was
prejudicial.291
In UnitedStates v. McLaughlin,2 92 0 the defendant was convicted of

making and subscribing false tax returns. On appeal, McLaughlin argued that the trial court had erred in refusing to admit certain evidence
he had offered to impeach the Government's key witness, McLaughlin's former accountant. 292 1 The evidence consisted of: (1) a tape re2912. Id. at 1068-69. Although the witness' statements on the stand were ambiguous, he
ultimately denied making the statement. Id. at 1069 n.10.
2913. Id. at 1067. Under FED. R. EVID. 901(a), "[t]he requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." FED. R. EVID.
901(b)(1) provides that testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is
claimed to be is one means of authentication.
2914. 668 F.2d at 1067. The court's conclusion contradicts its later statement that the Government witness ultimately denied making the statement. 668 F.2d at 1069 n.10.
2915. Id. at 1067 & n.7.
2916. Id. at 1068-69.
2917. 668 F.2d at 1069. Tape recorded conversations between the victim and Williams' coconspirators indicated that Williams probably had little knowledge of the extortion scheme.
Further, taped conversations between Williams and the victim, which the Government argued contained threats by Williams, could also have been reasonably construed as a friend's
concern for the seriousness of the victim's situation. Id.
2918. Id. at 1069-70. Williams was only responsible for introducing the victim to the lenders; he was not involved in setting the repayment terms of the loan. Williams had little
contact with the victim after the loan was completed, he never attempted to collect the loan
and he did not initiate any of the conversations which were taped with the victim concerning
the loans. Id.
2919. Id. at 1070 (citing Burr v. Sullivan, 618 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1980); Patterson v.
McCarthy, 581 F.2d 220, 221 (9th Cir. 1978)).
2920. 663 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1981).
2921. Id. at 952. Under a grant of immunity, the accountant testified that he had advised
McLaughlin that he must withhold federal taxes from the amounts paid to certain carpenters
he had employed. Id. McLaughlin claimed at trial that this accountant had, to the contrary,
advised him that the carpenters' paychecks were not subject to withholding because the
carpenters were independent contractors. Id.
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cording of a 1975 meeting between McLaughlin, the accountant, and
the company's bookkeeper; and (2) statements allegedly made by the
accountant during a 1977 meeting between McLaughlin, the accountant, and McLaughlin's attorney. The district court excluded the tape
recording on the ground that it contained no statement by the accountant inconsistent with his testimony at trial.2 922 The court excluded the
1977 statements on the ground that the accountant had not been given
a fair opportunity to deny or explain the inconsistent statements, as
required by Rule 613(b). 92 3
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial court that the 1975 tape
recording contained no statement inconsistent with the accountant's
trial testimony,2924 noting that the 1975 conversation was completely
unrelated to the case.2925 The court therefore held that the tape record2926
ing was not admissible under Rule 613(b).
The court held, however, that the trial court had erred in excluding
the 1977 statements from evidence.29 27 It relied on the Notes of the
Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules, which provide that specification of a particular time or sequence is not required under Rule 613(b)
to establish a sufficient foundation for the introduction of a prior inconsistent statement.2 928 Because the accountant witness had been adequately reminded on cross-examination of the time, place, and persons
present at the 1977 meeting, and because he denied making the statement in question, the court concluded that the foundation in this case
had been sufficient. 2 9 2 9 Furthermore, because this improperly excluded
evidence directly impeached the Government's key witness and was related to a critical issue in the trial, the court held that the error was not
harmless, and accordingly reversed McLaughlin'S conviction.29 3 °
2922. Id.

2923. Id. at 953.
2924. Id. at 952-53 (citing United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975)).
2925. 663 F.2d at 953. The meeting was held long after the last act charged and concerned
the accountant's future plans. Id.
2926. Id.
2927. Id.
2928. Id. The Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EVID. 613(b) provides that "[t]he
traditional insistence that the attention of the witness be directed to the statement on crossexamination is relaxed in favor of simply providing the witness an opportunity to explain
and the opposite party an opportunity to examine on the statement, with no specification of
any particulartime or sequence" (emphasis added).
2929. 663 F.2d at 953. The court noted that McLaughlin should have been permitted to
give his version of the meeting, whereupon the Government could have recalled the accountant to give him an additional opportunity to explain or deny the alleged statement. Id.
2930. Id. at 954.
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In UnitedStates v. Mniz,2 931 the defendant was convicted of assaulting a fellow prison inmate. At trial, the victim testified on direct
examination that he had no doubt that Muniz had stabbed him.2 932 On
cross-examination he denied having said to another inmate, Montijo,
that "it was [Muniz] but it wasn't [Muniz]."'2 93 3 When Montijo took the

stand and counsel for Muniz asked him about the victim's statement,
the Government objected successfully on hearsay grounds. 2934 On appeal, Muniz argued that even if the statement was hearsay,2935 it should
have been admitted to impeach the victim because it was evidence of a
prior inconsistent statement.2936 However, the Ninth Circuit refused to
review the trial court decision because Muniz failed to make the argument at trial.2937 It did note that the issue of the victim's confusion had

come to the jury by means of other testimony, and it concluded that the
exclusion of the evidence was not plain error.29 38

These decisions further demonstrate the Ninth Circuit's attitude of
generally allowing the defendant maximum opportunity to impeach the
credibility of key Government witnesses by way of prior inconsistent
statements. It appears quite flexible in determining whether the foundational prerequisites for the admission of these statements have been
met, and it will only exclude such statements if there is no real evidence
of inconsistency, or if no purpose for the statements is argued before
the trial court.
c.

witness bias

One of the most important functions of the right to cross-examine
is to expose a witness' motivation in testifying. Thus, cross-examination may be directed toward revealing the witness' possible biases,
prejudices, or ulterior motives as they relate directly to the issues or
2931. 682 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982).
2932. Id. at 639.
2933. Id.
2934. Id.
2935. "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R.
EVID. 801(C).

2936. 684 F.2d at 639. Despite their hearsay nature, a witness' prior inconsistent statements can be used to impeach him. Benson v. United States, 402 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir.
1968); FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A), advisory committee note.
2937. 684 F.2d at 639-40. The court noted that unless the party states the specific grounds
for admissibility at trial, the issue is not preserved for review (citing United States v. Fredericks, 599 F.2d 262, 264 (8th Cir. 1979); FED. R. C~aM. P. 51). See also United States v.
Wilson, 666 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1982); FED. R. EVID. 103(a).
2938. 684 F.2d at 640 (citing United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981)).
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personalities in the case at hand.2 93 9 The Ninth Circuit has held that

the jury must have sufficient information to appraise a witness' bias
and motives. 294 0 The court considered whether such information was
941
present in the recent case of United States v. Cuter.
Defendant Cutler was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail

fraud and arson, and of mail fraud.2942 Evidence adduced at trial indicated that Cutler had paid his employee, Levoff, to hire an arsonist to

burn his warehouse. On appeal, Cutler contended that the trial court
had abused its discretion in restricting his cross-examination of Levoff
about other fires that had occurred on the premises of other businesses
in which Levoff had been involved.29 43
The Ninth Circuit first noted that the scope and timing of cross-

examination of witnesses is subject to the discretion of the trial

judge. 29 1 It then found that although the cross-examination had been

delayed, it had not been restricted. 2945 The court stated that evidence
brought out in the cross-examinaton gave the jury sufficient information to appraise Levoff's bias and motives; hence, the trial judge had
not abused his discretion.2 94 6
2939. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974).
'[E]vidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the [accused]
so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.. . . [I]t is even more
important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact might be perjurers or persons motivated by
malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.'
Id. at 317 n.4 (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959)).
2940. United States v. Bleckner, 601 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1979); Skinner v. Cardwell,
564 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1009 (1978).
2941. 676 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1982).
2942. Id. at 1247.
2943. Id. The trial court required the defense to defer the cross-examination of Levoff
until after Cutler's testimony. Id.
2944. Id. at 1248 (citing United States v. Bleckner, 601 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1979)).
2945. Id. The court noted that Levoff was ultimately questioned about the earlier fires, as
well as about his plea agreement, his prior felony conviction, his false testimony in an unrelated proceeding, his prior parole violation, and his motive for testifying against Cutler. Id.
at 1248-49.
2946. Id. at 1248-49. Cutler also challenged the trial court's exclusion of extrinsic evidence
concerning Levofl's alleged history of committing arson. Id. at 1249. The Ninth Circuit,
however, held that, under FED. R. EVID. 608(b), extrinsic evidence of specific instances of a
witness' unconvicted prior conduct is not admissible to attack his credibility. Id. at 1249
(citing United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435, 441 (9th Cir. 1976)). The court also stated that
this extrinsic evidence was inadmissible under Rule 613(b) because Cutler had failed to lay a
proper foundation. 676 F.2d at 1249 (citing United States v. Williams, 668 F.2d 1064, 106869 n.9 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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suppressedstatements

Statements suppressed because of a violation of Miranda v. Arizona 2 9 4 7 may be used on cross-examination to impeach a defendant
who elects to testify on his own behalf.2948 However, they may never
be used as direct evidence against a defendant,2949 and if they were
made as the result of coercion, they may not be used for any purpose.2950 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that the government

may not raise an issue on cross-examination solely to introduce a suppressed statement.2951

The Ninth Circuit has recently considered

whether certain statements obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona
were properly used for impeachment purposes.
In United States v. Miller,291 2 the defendants were convicted of
participating in a fraudulent real estate refinancing scheme. Before the
trial, defendant Miller moved to suppress certain statements he had
made to an FBI agent which incriminated his co-defendants.2953 The
trial court held that the statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona and excluded them from the Government's case-in2 95 4
The Government, however, used these statements to impeach
chief.
Miller at trial after he testified that his co-defendants knew nothing
about the refinancing scheme.2955 On appeal, the defendants contended that Miller's statements were inadmissible because: (1) they
had been involuntary; and (2) they were used to impeach Miller on
issues not raised in his direct examination testimony.2956
The Ninth Circuit first determined that, although the FBI agent
had told Miller that he was facing a long prison sentence, and that he
was contemplating employing Miller in a new business if he exonerated
himself, Miller's statements were not the result of coercion.2957 The
2947. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2948. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Cf. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545
P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976). The California Supreme Court has interpreted article I,
section 15 of the California Constitution to forbid the use for any purpose of statements
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 16 Cal. 3d at 133, 545
P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
2949. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
2950. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1978); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936).
2951. United States v. Whitson, 587 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1978).
2952. 676 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1982).
2953. Id. at 363.
2954. Id.
2955. Id.
2956. Id.
2957. Id. at 364 (citing United States v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir. 1979) (defendant
held to have voluntarily waived his right to remain silent even though FBI agents had in-
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court then determined that Miller's direct testimony about the details of
the real estate transactions was sufficient to raise the issue of the codefendants' knowledge of the scheme. 2958 The court therefore held that
Miller's testimony was subject to impeachment by the evidence obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.2 95 9
5.

Testimony

a. opinion testimony
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a non-expert witness
is restricted on direct examination to describing relevant facts about
which the witness has personal knowledge.2 9 60 Ordinarily, a non-expert witness may not state opinions or draw conclusions from his or her
observations unless: (1) they are rationally based on the witness' perceptions, and (2) they are "helpful to a clear understanding of his [or

her] testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.

2 961

An expert

witness, on the other hand, is permitted to give opinion testimony because of his or her training, knowledge, and skill in drawing conclu-

sions from information or data which the lay witness does not
possess. 2962 A trial court's ruling excluding expert or lay opinion testimony will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.2963
duced him to confess by telling him that a co-conspirator was under arrest)). Cf.Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (defendant's statements were held not to be voluntary when
they were made while defendant was hospitalized, confused, and in great pain at the time of
questioning).
2958. 676 F.2d at 364 (citing United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); United States v.
Whitson, 587 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1978)). In Havens, after the defendant denied any involvement in a smuggling operation, the Government was permitted to use an illegally seized tshirt to show his involvement with the operation. The Court held that because the issue of
involvement had been raised on direct examination, impeachment was proper. 446 U.S. at
627-28.
2959. 676 F.2d at 364.
2960. FED. R. Evio. 701. Rule 701 provides that:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally
based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of
his testimony on the determination of a fact in issue.
2961. Id.
2962. FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 702 provides that:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
2963. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 407 (1927); United States v.
Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Butcher, 557 F.2d 666, 670
(9th Cir. 1977); Cardwell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 504 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
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the defendant was convicted of as-

sault resulting in serious bodily harm. The assault arose out of an incident during which defendant fired shots at his brother and his brother's
common law wife. At trial, the district court refused to allow Skeet the
opportunity to present opinion testimony by his brother and sister-inlaw concerning whether the shooting was accidental.2965
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that in order for lay opinion
testimony to be admissible, the testimony must be based on the witnesses' own observations and recollections, rather than upon their
opinions or conclusions drawn from their observations and recollections.2966 Non-expert opinions may be admitted if the facts are so complex, or difficult to describe,2967 that they could not otherwise have been
presented to the jury so as to enable it to form its own opinion or to
reach an intelligent conclusion. 2968 The court held that there was no
error in the trial court's ruling, concluding that the testimony in this
case did not involve facts of the requisite complexity to necessitate an
opinion from a non-expert.2969
In United States v. Booth,29 70 the Government sought to introduce

a criminologist's testimony that no fingerprints were found on a vehicle
used in a robbery and the criminologist's opinion concerning the reason that no fingerprints were found on the vehicle. 297 1 The trial court
ruled that it would not permit the witness to testify as to 2972
either of these
matters on the ground that this evidence was irrelevant.
The Ninth Circuit first found that the expert was qualified to testify that there were no fingerprints found on the vehicle.29 73 Moreover,

the testimony was relevant because discovery of a piece of surgical
glove found in the vehicle coincided with the fact that the robbers were
2964. 665 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1982).
2965. Id. at 984.
2966. Id. at 985 (citing Randolph v. Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d 844, 847-48 (10th Cir.
1979); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1053 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1100 (1977)).
2967. 665 F.2d at 985. Examples of facts which are this complex or difficult to describe
would include a person's physical or mental condition, a person's reputation or character,
emotions manifested by acts, the speed of a moving object or other things that arise in a
witness' daily observations, including perceptions of height, size, odors, flavors, colors, and
heat. Id.
2968. Id.
2969. Id. at 986.
2970. 669 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1981).
2971. Id. at 1240.
2972. Id.
2973. Id.
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described as wearing flesh-colored gloves.2 974 Thus, the court held that
the trial court had abused its discretion in excluding this portion of the
testimony.2 9 75 The Ninth Circuit determined, however, that the Govemnment had failed to show that the expert witness' training qualified
him to give his opinion as to why there were no fingerprints on the
vehicle.2 976 The court stated that the jury was just as capable as the
expert of concluding that the reason there were no fingerprints found
on the vehicle was because the occupants had either used gloves or
wiped away their fingerprints.29 7 7 Therefore, the court held that the
trial court had not abused its discretion with respect to this portion of
the testimony.29 78
In UnitedStates v. leishman,2979 the defendants were convicted of
various drug-related offenses. On appeal, defendant Combs argued
that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting the opinion
testimony of Clayton, a Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")
agent, that Combs was acting as a "look out. '29 80 Combs also objected
to the admission of testimony by Greenwood, an expert in handwriting
analysis, that a note found in a motel room was written by Combs.2 9 8 '
The Ninth Circuit first held that the admission of Clayton's testimony was not an abuse of discretion.29 82 It stated that, although it
went to an ultimate issue in the case, the testimony was admissible because it was relevant, and its probative value outweighed its prejudicial
effect.298 3 The court rejected Combs' argument that Clayton's testimony was equivalent to testifying that Combs was guilty, distinguishing between opinions of a defendant's guilt or innocence, and expert
testimony concerning the different roles persons play in illegal activities.298 4 The court also found that the foundation establishing Clayton's expertise in narcotics countersurveillance activities was sufficient
2974. Id.
2975. Id.
2976. Id.
2977. Id.
2978. Id.
2979. 684 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 464 (1982).
2980. Id. at 1335.
2981. Id. at 1336.
2982. Id. at 1335.
2983. Id. at 1335-36 (citing United States v. Masson, 582 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Milton, 555 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. McCoy, 539 F.2d 1050 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert.denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977); FED. R. EviD. 704, which provides in pertinent
part: "[t]estimony in the form of an opinion. . . is not objectionable because it embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.")).
2984. Id. (citing United States v. Masson, 582 F.2d 961, 963 n.5 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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to allow the admission of his testimony.298 5
The Ninth Circuit then held that the district court had not abused
its discretion by admitting Greenwood's handwriting testimony.2 986 It
rejected Combs' argument that the limited level of certainty of Green-

wood's testimony was more prejudicial than probative,2987 stating that
the issue raised related to the weight accorded the testimony, rather

than to its admissibility. 2988 The court also found that Greenwood had
been properly qualified as a handwriting expert, and that notwithstanding his uncertainty concerning his conclusions, his testimony was still
helpful to the jury in determining the note's relevance.2 9 89

The results of polygraph examinations have not as yet gained general acceptance in the Ninth Circuit. It is rarely held that a trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to permit the results of a polygraph

examination into evidence. 2990 The proponent seeking admission of
polygraph results has the burden of laying a proper foundation by
showing the scientific basis and reliability of the polygraph expert's tes-

timony. 2991 Even if a proper foundation is laid, the results may be
excluded on the basis of confusion, waste of time, or prejudice.2 9 92
In United States v. Eden,299 3 the defendant was convicted of em-

bezzlement and conversion of federal student loan funds and of concealing material facts from the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare ("HEW"). Eden voluntarily submitted to a polygraph examination concerning these events. On appeal, Eden argued that the trial
2985. Id. at 1336. Clayton testified that as a DEA agent for nine years, he had been involved in over 250 narcotics operations, at least half of which involved lookouts which Clayton personally witnessed. He also described the factors used in determining whether
someone is engaged in countersurveillance. Id.
2986. Id. at 1336 (citing United States v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295, 1296 n.l (9th Cir. 1979)).
2987. Id. at 1336. Combs relied for this argument on the holdings of several cases where
expert testimony was held to be inadmissible because of its prejudicial impact. See United
States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261 (6th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973). The court distinguished
these cases on the basis that they involved the admission of testimony "of purported experts
based upon insufficiently substantiated scientific theories, techniques, or tests." 684 F.2d at
1337.
2988. Id.
2989. Id. at 1336.
2990. United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1360 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 923
(1976); United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
2991. United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d at 1360 (citing United States v. Wainwright, 413
F.2d 796, 803 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013, 1014 (1923); United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 94 (E.D. Mich. 1972)).
2992. United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d at 1360 (citing United States v. Urquidez, 356 F.
Supp. 1363, 1365-67 (C.D. Cal. 1973)).
2993. 659 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982).
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court abused its discretion in failing to admit the results of the
examination.2 9 94
The Ninth Circuit, however, found no abuse of discretion, noting
the trial court's opinion that the examination lacked control questions
and other safeguards.2 99 5 Furthermore, the trial court's opinion stated
that the examination appeared even less reliable than those reported in
previous cases.2 99 6
These decisions demonstrate that, regardless of whether opinion
testimony is lay or expert, the Ninth Circuit will exclude it from evidence if it is just as easy for the jury as for the witness to draw a conclusion from the available facts. 2997 However, where the value of opinion
testimony becomes more probative, the Ninth Circuit will admit such
testimony as long as the witness testifying qualifies as an expert, even if
2 998
the admission results in some prejudice to the defendant.
b. prejudicialtestimony
The trial judge is in the best position to determine the probable
impact of prejudicial testimony on the jury.2999 His or her judgment is
accorded deference by the appellate court. 3 ° A motion for mistrial is
also directed to the discretion of the trial court, and its determination
will be upset only upon a showing that there has been an abuse of
discretion." ° ' The Ninth Circuit has recently considered whether a
mistrial was warranted when a trial judge admitted prejudicial testimony in favor of the prosecution, then struck the testimony and gave
curative jury instructions.
In United States v. Sanford,3 ° 2 the defendant was convicted of
3 °3
possession, concealment, transfer, and delivery of counterfeit notes.
During the direct examination of Leroy Jones, the key prosecution witness, counsel prompted him to disclose that his heart condition had
prevented him from testifying at trial two days previously. 3°°4 The trial
2994. Id. at 1381. The trial court based its decision on United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d
1349 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975); and United
States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
2995. Id. at 1381-82.
2996. Id. at 1382.
2997. See supra notes 2964 & 2970 and accompanying text.
2998. See supra note 2979 and accompanying text.
2999. United States v. Bagley, 641 F.2d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 1981).
3000. Id.
3001. United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 777 (9th Cir. 1980).
3002. 673 F.2d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir. 1982).
3003. Id. at 1071.
3004. Id.
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court admitted the evidence but later ruled it irrelevant and "'out' of
the case," instructing the jury to disregard any evidence ordered stricken by the court. 300 5 On cross-examination, Jones testified that he had
cooperated with the Government only after he had been arrested for
possession of counterfeit notes. 3 6 On appeal, Sanford contended that
he was prejudiced by the prosecution's attempt to arouse sympathy
from the jury for the witness.3° 7
The Ninth Circuit found that even if an attempt to influence the
jurors had occurred, it was unlikely that the jury would sympathize
with Jones to the extent they would sympathize with the victim of a
crime. °° Moreover, the jury was apprised of Jones' arrangement with
the Government. 3 00 9 The court stated that in order to determine the
prejudicial effect of the inadmissible evidence, its probative value must
be weighed against that of the admissible evidence supporting the verdict.3 10 Concluding that there was substantial evidence supporting the
verdict and "little force to the tainted evidence," the court held that the
3 0 11
trial court had not abused its discretion.
c. testimony by a United States Attorney
The Ninth Circuit had not addressed the issue of the propriety of
testimony by a United States Attorney until recently. 30 1 2 However, the
following two rules have been followed by the Second Circuit: (1) only
after "all other sources of possible testimony have been exhausted"
should a United States Attorney, participating in a case, be called to
testify; 30 13 and (2) although not disqualified as witnesses in cases in
United States Attorneys are nevertheless
which they play no other part,
30 1 4
testify.
to
not encouraged
In United States v. West,3 °1 5 the trial court allowed an Assistant
United States Attorney who had been seated in the spectator section of
3005. Id. at 1072.
3006. Id. at 1071. After deciding to cooperate with the Secret Service, Jones had arranged
a meeting with Sanford and returned from that meeting with twenty counterfeit one hundred dollar bills; he testified that Sanford had given him the bills. ld. at 1071.
3007. Id. at 1072.
3008. Id.
3009. Id.
3010. Id. at 1072-73.
3011. Id. at 1073.
3012. United States v. West, 680 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1982).
3013. United States v. Torres, 503 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1974).
3014. United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 545 F.2d 785, 793 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 917 (1977).
3015. 680 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982).
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the courtroom and who had not participated in the investigation or
trial, to testify that a hand signal had been given by West to a witness.3" 6 The Ninth Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing the attorney to testify, reasoning that the attorney had played no other role in the case, and that the district court's
only other alternative would have been to forego altogether any testimony on the signalling incident. 0 17
6.

Hearsay

Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. 30 1 8 Hearsay is not admissible in federal
courts,30 1 9 except as provided by the rules governing hearsay exceptions 302 0 or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court or an act of
Congress.30 2 '
a. definition of "statement"
The Federal Rules of Evidence define a statement as "(1) an oral
or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion. 30 22 The Ninth Circuit has recently
considered two cases where defendants have contended that testimony
concerning the behavior and acts of a co-conspirator was erroneously
admitted hearsay.
In United States v. Brock, °23 the defendants were convicted of
committing various drug offenses. At trial, DEA agents testified that
3016. Id. at 654-55. West argued that it was improper to allow the attorney to testify
because there was another witness available. However, neither the defense nor the Government had identified the alternate witness at trial. Id. at 655. In any event, the witness was
an FBI agent who was seated at the prosecutor's table during the trial. Id. Consequently,
this witness would have presented the same risks as those presented by the United States
Attorney. Id.
3017. Id. at 655.
3018. FED. R. EvID. 801(C).
3019. FED. R. EviD. 802.
3020. FED. R. EVID. 803, 804.
3021. FED. R. EvID. 802. This provision excepting other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court or an act of Congress renders certain hearsay admissible which would be otherwise
inadmissible. Some examples are: FED. R. ChUM. P. 4(a) (affidavits to show grounds for
issuing warrants); FED. R. CiuM. P. 12(b) (affidavits to determine issues of fact in connection
with motions); 29 U.S.C. § 161(4) (1976) (affidavit as proof of service in NLRB proceedings);
38 U.S.C. § 5206 (1976) (affidavit as proof of posting notice of sale of unclaimed property by
the Veteran's Administration).
3022. FED. R. EvID. 801(a).
3023. 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1271 (1983).
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they had observed the defendants' alleged co-conspirator, Bernard,
picking up an order of chemicals, after which he attempted to evade
DEA surveillance. 30 24 The Ninth Circuit found that these evasive attempts were not intended as "communicative" acts; instead, they were
merely nonassertive conduct, which is not hearsay.30 25 Thus, the court
held that the testimony was admissible if relevant.30 26 It further held
that, even if irrelevant, any error in admitting the testimony was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt 30 27 and the unlikelihood that the jury was influenced in its assessment of the defendants'
activities by evidence that Bernard had once attempted to evade DEA
3028
agents.
In United States v. Astorga-Torres, 2 9 the defendants were convicted of various drug and firearm offenses. A DEA agent testified at
trial that the DEA had previously conducted two drug transactions
with the defendants' alleged co-conspirator, who pled guilty.30 30 The
Ninth Circuit stated that this behavior was clearly not intended as an
assertion and was therefore admissible.30 3'
b. purpose of statement
The hearsay doctrine bars the use of an out-of-court statement to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 30 32 The hearsay exclusionary
rule does not render inadmissible a statement offered for a purpose unrelated to the statement's truth.30 3 3 The Ninth Circuit has recently considered the purposes for which certain testimony was offered in order to
determine whether it was excludable as hearsay.
In United States v. Saavedra,3034 the defendant was convicted of
charges stemming from a scheme involving the wrongful charging of
Western Union money orders to improperly obtained Master Charge
3024. Id. at 1314-15.
3025. Id. at 1315 n.2 (citing 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
801(a)[01], at 801-53-57 (1979)) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN].
3026. 667 F.2d at 1315 n.2.
3027. Id. at 1315 (citing United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 772 (9th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 3025, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801183-84 & n.64 (1979)).
3028. 667 F.2d at 1315-16.
3029. 682 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1982).
3030. Id. at 1334.
3031. Id. at 1335. The court also found that this evidence was relevant as an indication of
the co-conspirator's modus operandi. Id.

3032. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
3033. 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 417 at 103 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as LOUISELL].

3034. 684 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982).
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numbers. °35 On appeal, Saavedra contended that the victims' testimony concerning statements made by other parties during telephone
conversations was hearsay. 30 36 The Ninth Circuit found that this testimony had not been offered to show the truth of the callers' statements,
but to show how credit card numbers were fraudulently obtained by
persons posing as law enforcement officers. 30 37 This testimony provided
circumstantial evidence that the later unauthorized use of the credit
card numbers to purchase money orders was intentional and that Saavedra had38 not acted alone; therefore, it was not excludable as
30
hearsay.
Saavedra also objected to the testimony of an informant who had
overheard a telephone conversation in which one of Saavedra's co-conspirators impersonated a sheriffs officer. 3 3 9 The informant had also
retrieved a piece of paper discarded by the caller which bore the cardholder's phone number and credit card number, as well as a name used
by Saavedra as an alias. 3 4 The Ninth Circuit found that the testimony relating to the contents of the conversation and the piece of paper was not offered for the truth of the matters asserted therein, but was
offered as evidence of how the fraud was conducted and Saavedra's
connection42 to it.304 1 Thus, this testimony also was not excludable as
30
hearsay.
In United States v. Muniz,30 4 3 the defendant was convicted of assaulting a fellow prison inmate. Muniz argued that a certain prison
officer would testify that other inmates had told him that Muniz was
not the man who stabbed the victim, showing that the prison officials
had failed to pursue or preserve evidence that someone else might have
committed the crime. 3 °4 The trial court excluded the testimony as
hearsay, thus implying that Muniz had actually offered the testimony to
prove that he had not assaulted the victim. It ruled, however, that the
3035. Id. at 1295.
3036. Id. at 1297.
3037. Id. at 1298.
3038. Id. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with Saavedra's claim that the evidence failed to
sufficiently connect her to the phone calls. The victims testified that they had neither
charged nor authorized anyone else to charge money orders to their credit card accounts. A
representative of Western Union testified that money orders had been charged to these accounts. Soon after these money orders were sent, Saavedra deposited similar amounts of
money in the bank accounts of her alleged co-conspirators. Id.
3039. Id.
3040. Id.
3041. Id.
3042. Id.
3043. 684 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982).
3044. Id. at 639.
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scope of the prison investigation could be pursued through other questions not involving hearsay. 3°45 The Ninth Circuit found that the trial
court's exclusion of the testimony was within its discretion.3° 6
c. erroneous admission of hearsay
The erroneous admission of hearsay does not require automatic
reversal; instead, the prejudicial impact of the error 'must be considered.3 47 Trial court errors in admitting or excluding evidence are
deemed to be harmless when they are found not to affect "substantial
rights" of a party.3°4 These errors are divided into two groups, constitutional and non-constitutional, with a different admissibility standard
used for each.3 49
If an error implicates constitutionally protected rights, 3050 the
court must find it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt or reverse.3 5'
Non-constitutional errors will cause reversal unless it is more probable
than not that the error did not materially affect the verdict. 30 52 United
States v. Hollingshead3 53 presents an example of a constitutional error
which the Ninth Circuit found to be harmless, and in United States v.
Felix-Jerez3054 the court considered a non-constitutional error which
required reversal.
In Hollingshead,the Ninth Circuit held that the improper admission of hearsay testimony, even if it violated the defendant's rights
under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, was an error
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 55 Hollingshead was convicted
of receiving bribes as an employee of the Los Angeles branch of the
3045. Id.
3046. Id.
3047. United States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 1980).
3048. 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 3025,
103[06], at 103-43 (1979); see 28 U.S.C. § 2111
(1976).
3049. United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 915 (9th Cir. 1977).
3050. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (self-incrimination clause of the fifth
amendment); United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 915-16 (9th Cir. 1977). See
Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (confrontation clause of the sixth amendment); United States v. Barclift, 514 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.)
(exclusionary rule based on unreasonable search under the fourth amendment), cert.denied,
423 U.S. 842 (1975).
3051. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
3052. United States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. ValleValdez, 554 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1977).
3053. 672 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1982).
3054. 667 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982).
3055. 672 F.2d at 755.
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Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

°56

He maintained that the

trial court erred in denying his motion to strike hearsay testimony regarding Federal Reserve Bank payments of net profits to the United
States Treasury.30 5 7 The Government conceded that this testimony was
hearsay but contended that58any error in admission was harmless be30
yond a reasonable doubt.
The Ninth Circuit determined that the net earnings of the Federal
Reserve Bank are returned to the United States Treasury as a matter of

law, 30 59 and that the district court's instructions to the jury included an
explanation of this procedure.3 °6° It concluded that the challenged

hearsay testimony was merely cumulative, and any error was therefore
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.a°sl
In United States v. Felix-Jerez,3 °62 the Ninth Circuit held that the

improper admission of a hearsay statement was not harmless error
where the statement was the most significant evidence on the only ele-

ment of the crime at issue. 3063 The court stated that it could affirm Felix-Jerez's conviction for prison escape only if it found "fair assurance"

that the verdict "was not substantially swayed by the error" and that

"substantial rights were not affected." 3°6 Since the hearsay statement
was the only evidence presented on whether Felix-Jerez was outside of
the prison with the intent never to return and its contents were highly
prejudicial, 3 ° 5 the Ninth Circuit found that no such "fair assurance"
3056. Id. at 752. Evidence presented at trial showed that Hollingshead had received bribes
and kickbacks from independent contractors, and had participated in a conspiracy to submit
fictitious competitive bids. Id. at 753.
3057. Id. at 754.
3058. Id. at 754-55.
3059. Id. at 755 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 290 (1976)).
3060. 672 F.2d at 755.
3061. Id.
3062. 667 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982).
3063. Id. at 1302-04.
3064. Id. at 1304 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)).
3065. 667 F.2d at 1302-04. The hearsay statement contained an admission by Felix-Jerez
that he had planned to escape and had not intended to return. Id. at 1303. The record
revealed that he had been discovered by an off-duty guard walking along a roadway about
ten miles from the prison. At that time, he had two bottles of wine in his possession, and one
had been partially consumed. He had also consumed two six-packs of beer the previous
day. No alcoholic tests were given to determine if he was intoxicated at the time he was
picked up. The court therefore determined that Felix-Jerez was probably intoxicated during
his absence from the prison, and that this could have served to negate the existence of the
specific intent to avoid confinement required to obtain a conviction. Id. at 1302-04. The
admission of the highly prejudicial hearsay statement, however, probably caused the jury to
convict Felix-Jerez. Id. at 1303. See Vicksburg & Meridian R.R. v. O'Brien, 119 U.S. 99,
103 (1886) ("[It is well settled that a reversal will be directed unless it appears, beyond
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was possible, and it reversed the conviction.'...
d

statements defined as "not hearsay"

Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) excepts from the definition of
hearsay a list of eight different statements which are defined as "not
hearsay. ' 30 67 During this survey period, the Ninth Circuit reviewed
three specific types of "not hearsay": prior statements of identification
made by a witness,3 68 admissions by a party-opponent, 30 69 and statements by co-conspirators. 0 70
i. prior statements of identification
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) provides that a statement
by a witness which identifies a person is not hearsay.30 7' In United
States v. Eemy, °72 the Ninth Circuit held that an FBI agent's testimony concerning an eyewitness' identification was not hearsay where
the eyewitness was available for cross-examination.3 73
Elemy was convicted of robbing four savings and loan associations.30 74 At trial, FBI agent McNeal testified that a bank employee,
Claudia Hines, identified Elemy at a police line-up as one of the robbers.3 °75 Elemy contended that since Rule 801(d)(1)(C) refers only to
doubt, that the error complained of did not and could not have prejudiced the rights of the
party.").
3066. 667 F.2d at 1304.
3067. LOUISELL, supra note 3033, § 411 at 57. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) provides that a "statement is not hearsay" if it is (1) a prior statement by a witness which satisfies the conditions
laid out in the rule, or if it is (2) an admission by a party-opponent.
3068. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).
3069. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(A), 801(d)(2)(B), 801(d)(2)(D).
3070. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(E).
3071. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) provides that a statement is not hearsay if "[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is. .. one of identification of a person made after perceiving him
3072. 656 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1981).
3073. Id. at 508. Accord United States v. Cueto, 611 F.2d 1056, 1063 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Fritz, 580 F.2d 370, 375-76 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 947
(1978); United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1251-52 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
973 (1978).
3074. 656 F.2d at 507.
3075. Id. at 508. Hines had identified Elemy and his co-defendant at trial, but the probative value of her in-court identification was called into question by her out-of-court identifications. Before trial, agent McNeal had shown Hines a "photo spread" and she had
identified Elemy's co-defendant. Later at a police line-up she identified Elemy as one of the
robbers, but incorrectly identified someone else as the other robber. At trial Hines explained
that her partially incorrect identification stemmed from her mistaken belief that both suspects were present in the line-up, and she testified that approximately thirty minutes after

1984]

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

testimony by a witness regarding previous identifications made by that

witness, the trial court erred in admitting testimony by a person who
did not make the identification. 7 6
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument and stated that the

"plain words of rule 801(d)(1)(C) do not contain the limitation urged

by Elemy.'" 3° 77 The court further stated that identification statements
are admitted as substantive evidence because out-of-court identifications are believed to be more reliable than those made under the sug-

gestive conditions prevailing at trial, and the availability of the
declarant for cross-examination eliminates the major danger of hearsay
testimony. 7 8 These reasons still apply even when the person testifying
is not the person who made the identification, as long as the latter also
testifies and is available for cross-examination. 30 79 Because Hines did

testify and Elemy's counsel was permitted to cross-examine her at
length, and there was nothing in the record to suggest that Hines was

unavailable for reexamination after McNeal had testified, the court
held that Rule 801(d)(1)(C) encompassed McNears testimony concerning the identification statements made by Hines, and consequently was
not hearsay. 0 80
Elemy indicates that the application of Rule 801(d)(1)(C) in the

Ninth Circuit is broad; it paves the way not only for testimony by the
identifier, but also for testimony by third persons to whom the identithe line-up she told McNeal that she was positive Elemy was one of the robbers. McNeal
testified that at the line-up Hines had stated that Elemy moderately resembled one of the
robbers. He further testified, over defense counsel's hearsay objections, that after the line-up
Hines had told him that the original identification was incorrect, since she was certain that
Elemy was one of the robbers. Id. at 507-08.
3076. Id. at 508.
3077. Id.
3078. Id. (citing Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73 n.3 (1967); FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(C) advisory committee note). In Gilbert, the Supreme Court stated that there is a
split among the states concerning admissibility of prior extrajudicial identification, both by
witnesses and third parties present at the prior identification. See Annot., 71 A.L.R. 2d 449
(1960). The Court noted that the recent trend is to follow the California rule which admits
as substantive evidence a prior identification by a witness who is available for cross-examination at trial. See People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 626, 354 P.2d 865, 867, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273,
275 (1960) (holding that identification is admissible, not only to corroborate an identification
made at the trial, but as independent evidence of identity; reasoning that the earlier identification has greater probative value than an identification made in the courtroom after the
circumstances of the trial have intervened).
3079. 656 F.2d at 508. The court noted that Congress enacted Rule 801 to remedy two
perceived problems: (1) the typical situation where the witness's memory is uncertain and
he therefore can only testify as to his previous identification; and (2) the instance where
before trial the witness identifies the defendant and then because of fear refuses to acknowledge the earlier identification. Id.
3080. Id.
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fier was speaking. The corroborative
impact of such third party testi30 8 1
mony can be considerable.
ii. party admissions
Statements made by a party or his agent, or those adopted by a
party, are not hearsay if offered against that party. 308 2 A clear example
of this rule's application in the Ninth Circuit was recently set forth in
United States v. Traylor.308 3 During defendant Traylor's trial for conspiring to import and distribute cocaine, a Government witness testified
that she was a friend of Traylor's and that Traylor had described to her
how he smuggled cocaine into the country. °84 Traylor argued that the
trial court erred in admitting, these statements because they did not further the alleged conspiracy. 085 The Ninth Circuit held that Traylor's
308 6
out-of-court statements were not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(A),
08 7
3
and were admissible against Traylor as admissions by a party.
In UnitedStates v. Doe, 088 the defendant contended that the trial
court improperly excluded testimony at a pretrial hearing relevant to
the substance of a plea agreement; and thereby erred when it allowed
the defendant's statements, allegedly made during plea negotiations, to
be admitted into evidence at trial through the testimony of a Government witness. 30 89 At this pretrial hearing, the Government had maintained that there was no plea agreement. 30 90

Doe, however, had

attempted to introduce his brother's testimony concerning a conversation between his brother and a DEA agent, where the agent indicated
3081. LOUiSELL, supra note 3033, § 421 at 211-12.
3082. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2). The advisory committee's note on this rule states that admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that
their admissibility is the result of the adversary system rather than a requirement of the
hearsay rule. No guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the case of an admission. FED.
R. EvID. 801 advisory committee note (citing 4 J. WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 1048 (Chadbourne
rev. 1972) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 266
(1961)).
3083. 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1981).
3084. Id. at 1331-32.
3085. Id. at 1332.
3086. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) provides that a statement is not hearsay if the statement
is offered against a party and is his own statement, made in either his individual or representative capacity.
3087. 656 F.2d at 1332 (citing United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 519 (9th Cir. 1979)).
3088. 655 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1981), as corrected, 656 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1981).
3089. Id. at 924-25. FED. R. CRiM. P. I l(e)(6) provides that evidence of statements made
in connection with and relevant to a plea of guilty are not admissible in any civil or criminal
proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer. See also FED. R. EvID. 410.
3090. 655 F.2d at 924.
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that if Doe cooperated he would recommend a reduced sentence.3 °9 '
The trial court rejected this testimony as inadmissible hearsay. 0 92
The Ninth Circuit held that Doe's contention regarding the admis-

sibility of his brother's testimony was meritorious under Rule
801(d)(2)(D), because Doe's brother might have been acting as Doe's
agent.30 93 However, because there was no evidence which established
the existence of plea negotiations, 30 94 and no evidence that the Government had failed to ask for a reduced sentence, the court found that Doe

was not prejudiced by the exclusion of his brother's testimony.

95

In UnitedSlates v. Sears, 3096 the Ninth Circuit held that a defend-

ant's silence during her co-defendant's description to a third party of
the robbery they allegedly committed allowed the admission of those

statements against the defendant under the theory of adoptive admissions.3 0 9 7 The court stated that an admission by silence exists only if
the statements were made in the defendant's presence and hearing, and

the defendant actually understood what was said and had an opportunity to deny it. 3 0 9 8 It further stated that, as a preliminary matter, the
district court must determine whether under the circumstances an innocent defendant would normally have been induced to respond.30 99 The

district court must also find that sufficient facts have been introduced
for the jury to conclude reasonably that the defendant actually did
hear, understand, and accede to the statements. 3 10 0 After these threshold determinations are made by the district court, the jury may then
determine whether the defendant actually heard, understood, and acquiesced in the statements. 3 10 ' The Sears court concluded that, al3091. Id.
3092. Id.
3093. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D)). Rule 801(d)(2)(D) provides that a statement
is not hearsay if it is offered against a party, and is a statement by his agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency, made during that relationship.
3094. 665 F.2d at 925. The court found that Doe had never pled guilty or offered to plead
guilty, but had merely attempted to exculpate a co-defendant by inculpating himself. Id.
3095. Id. The court noted that even if all of the statements contemplated a plea bargain
and were excludable under Rule I l(e)(6), Doe was not prejudiced since he fully incriminated himself at trial. 1d. at 925 n.8.
3096. 663 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 (1982).
3097. Id. at 904-05. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B), which provides that a statement is not
hearsay if it is offered against a party and is a statement of which he has manifested his
adoption or belief in its truth.
3098. 663 F.2d at 904 (citing United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976)).
3099. 663 F.2d at 904 (citing United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976)).
3100. 663 F.2d at 904 (citing United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d at 1076).
3101. 663 F.2d at 904 (citing United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1196 (9th Cir.), cert.
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though there was evidence that the defendant had a hearing
problem,3 102 the district court had properly sent to the jury the question
of whether the defendant had actually heard and understood that she
was being implicated in the robbery, and that she had acquiesced in her
3 10 3
co-defendant's statements about the crime.

In United States v. Felix-Jerez,3 1 a divided Ninth Circuit held
that a written statement, prepared by a United States Marshal from

notes he took during a post-arrest interrogation of the defendant
through an interpreter, was not an admission because the defendant
had never read, seen, or signed the statement.3 105 The court stated that
because Felix-Jerez had never read or signed the document which was

prepared by an adverse witness, the question as to whether it was FelixJerez's "own statement," as defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(A), depended on
whether Felix-Jerez had adopted the statement by some other conduct.3 " The court concluded that, since Felix-Jerez did not even
know the document existed until the beginning of his trial, and he did

not testify at trial, the prosecution had not met its burden of showing
310 7
admissibility.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Kilkenny argued that the majority
ignored the fact that Felix-Jerez never questioned the voluntariness of
the interview, or the accuracy of the translation. 10 8 He found that this
behavior represented an adoption of the statement, and that the landenied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979); United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976)).
3102. 663 F.2d at 904. The district court had been presented with conflicting evidence
concerning whether the defendant's hearing problem prevented her from hearing her codefendant's description of the robbery, but she had seemed able to communicate with her
counsel while not wearing her hearing aids. Further, during her co-defendant's description
of the robbery, the defendant was sitting only two or three feet away, counting the stolen
money. Id.
3103. Id. at 905.
3104. 667 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982).
3105. Id. at 1299.
3106. Id. (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); 7 WIGMORE supra note
3082, § 2134).
3107. 667 F.2d at 1299 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975)). The court noted
that a contrary result would produce dangers unacceptable in the context of criminal prosecutions. An admission of criminal conduct is a weighty piece of evidence; when offered in
the form of a document, it takes on even greater weight, and the factfinder is more likely to
rely on its accuracy. There is a danger, however, that a written statement may be paraphrased, incorrect, or recorded with a different emphasis. When, as in Felix-Jerez, the
charge included an intent element, that misplaced emphasis may be decisive. 667 F.2d at
1299-1300. The court further noted that these problems may have been compounded by the
fact that Felix-Jerez's statements were translated from Spanish to English by a prison camp
guard. Id. at 1300 n.l.
3108. 667 F.2d at 1304 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
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guage of the interpreter was therefore admissible as the defendant's
own statement under the language conduit theory.3 1 ° 9 Further, he
urged that if the written statement could not be considered Felix-Jerez's "own statement" under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), then it was an admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) because the interpreter was Felix-Jerez's
agent. 3 110 The dissent concluded, therefore, that the statement read
into evidence was not hearsay and was properly admitted.3 1 1 1
Under these facts, where the defendant spoke no English, the
translator was a prison guard, and the defendant was incarcerated at
the time of the interview, the dissenting judge's emphasis on the voluntariness of the interview and the voluntary consent to the use of the
interpreter seems misplaced. The majority took the position that the
guard was not appointed by the defendant, and that there was an obvious conffict of interest between them. Therefore, both the agency and
the language conduit theories seem inapplicable. 3 1 2 The majority
opinion serves to prevent adverse witnesses from offering into evidence
written statements, which appear to be confessions, without acknowledgement from the defendant that he has adopted them as his "own
statements." This is an appropriate protection for defendants under
our adversary system.
These decisions demonstrate that out-of-court statements made by
the defendant are easily admissible in the Ninth Circuit as "not hearsay" statements. Further, a defendant's silence may be held to constitute an adoption of a co-defendant's statements as his own. Written
statements by an adverse party, however, will require more than silence
on the defendant's part to constitute adoption, and asserted agency relationships will be closely examined by the courts.
iii.

co-conspirator statements

Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) also treats the statements of
3109. Id. at 1305 (citing United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1973) (a
translation is a defendant's statement; assuming an accurate translation and a voluntary
interview, the interpreter is merely a language conduit); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d
661, 664 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969)). Judge Kilkenny argued that the
majority position implies that a non-English speaking defendant's confession could never be
admitted into evidence unless he signed or adopted the statement once it was written in
English. This signature, however, would be superfluous due to the defendant's inability to
understand the document's English contents. 667 F.2d at 1305.
3110. 667 F.2d at 1305 (citing United States v. Santana, 503 F.2d 710, 717 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1053 (1974); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D)).
3111. 667 F.2d at 1306. Judge Kilkenny stated that since Felix-Jerez voluntarily consented
to the use of an interpreter, the interpreter became his agent. Id. at 1305.
3112. Id. at 1300 n.1.
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co-conspirators as admissions by a party-opponent rather than as hearsay. 3 113 In order for a co-conspirator's statements to be admitted into

evidence, certain prerequisites must be met. There must be independent evidence of a conspiracy and of the defendant's connection to the
conspiracy; there must also be a showing that the statements were made
both during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.3 ' 14 The Ninth Circuit has established that there must be substantial independent evidence of the conspiracy, although such evidence may be circumstantial;
however, once the existence of the conspiracy is shown, only "slight
evidence" is required to connect the defendant. 3 15 It is the responsibility of the trial judge to determine whether a sufficient foundation has
been established for declarations to be admissible under the co-conspirator exclusion. 311 6 The order of proof is within the sound discretion of
the trial judge, who may conditionally admit co-conspirator statements
subject to a later motion to strike.3117
During this survey period, the Ninth Circuit has decided several
cases where the admission of statements by co-conspirators was challenged. Two cases discuss the admission of a co-conspirator's statement made
after the defendant was arrested. In United States v.
Mason, 3 1 8 the defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine. Mason had been arrested after DEA agents observed his arrival
and departure from the house of a known drug dealer, Johns; later that
evening Johns attempted to sell cocaine to DEA agents, and stated that
his "source" had left sometime earlier. 3 119 Mason argued that Johns'

statement was inadmissible because it failed to satisfy the criteria that
statements must be made during and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.312°
The Ninth Circuit rejected Mason's argument, stating that observations made by the DEA surveillance team, establishing that Mason
3113. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered
against a party and was a statement by a co-conspirator of that party during the course and
in furtherance of the conspiracy.
3114. United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. MirandaUriarte, 649 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 519
(9th Cir. 1979).
3115. United States v. Weaver, 594 F.2d 1272, 1274 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing United States v.
Testa, 548 F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1977)).
3116. United States v. Miranda-Uriarte, 649 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing United
States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 519 (9th Cir. 1979)).
3117. United States v. Miranda-Uriarte, 649 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing United
States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1169 (9th Cir. 1980)).
3118. 658 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1981).
3119. Id. at 1269.
3120. Id.
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was Johns' only visitor during the relevant time period, independently
connected him to the conspiracy.3 12 1 The court further stated that even
though Johns' statement was made after all the other co-conspirators
had been arrested, from Johns' perspective the objectives of the conspiracy remained to be met, and therefore the statement was made during the conspiracy.3 12 2 Finally, the court rejected Mason's argument
that Johns' statement was merely "idle chatter," finding instead that it
was a statement of reassurance, made in furtherance of the conspiracy

and thus admissible.

23

In United States v. Saavedra,' 24 the defendant was convicted of
wire fraud and conspiracy in connection with a scheme to charge

money orders to improperly obtained credit card numbers. On appeal,
Saavedra argued that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay tes-

timony of an informant concerning information written on a piece of
paper and a phone conversation where the informant overheard Saave-

dra's alleged co-conspirator represent himself as a sherif's officer 3and
1 25
saw him write down a credit card number and Saavedra's alias.
Saavedra contended that these statements were not admissible under
the rule excluding co-conspirator statements from the definition of

3121. Id. The court cautioned, however, that although independent evidence of the defendant's connection to the conspiracy need only be slight, evidence that the defendant was
a conspirator must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a conviction. Id. at 1270
(citing United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856
(1980)). The court also stated that in the context of sufficiency of the evidence, the "slight
connection" language means that the defendant need play only a slight part in the conspiracy in order to be held criminally responsible for participation. 658 F.2d at 1270 (citing
United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 1981)).
3122. 658 F.2d at 1269. The court found that Johns' statement was made to elicit payment,
and may have been an attempt to facilitate future deliveries. Id. at 1270 (citing United
States v. Fitts, 635 F.2d 664, 667 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1233
n.12, 1237-38 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1977)). The
court noted that conspiracies do not necessarily end when all but one of the co-conspirators
are arrested, and that an unarrested co-conspirator still operating in furtherance of the conspiracy may say and do things which may be introduced against the arrested co-conspirators
if the conspiracy is still in operation. 658 F.2d at 1269-70 (citing United States v. Wentz, 456
F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1972)). See also United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 747, 750 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Payseur, 501 F.2d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 1974). The test, therefore, is not whether some of the
conspirators have been arrested, but whether the remainder of the conspirators were able to
continue with the conspiracy. See United States v. Burnett, 582 F.2d 436,438 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 844 (1976).
3123. 658 F.2d at 1270 (citing United States v. Sandoval-Villalvazo, 620 F.2d 744, 747 (9th
Cir. 1980)). See also United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam); United States v. Cambindo-Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 632 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 940 (1980).
3124. 684 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982).
3125. Id. at 1295.
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after her
hearsay because the co-conspirator's conversation took place
3? 1 26
arrest and thus after her part in the conspiracy had ended.
The Ninth Circuit first held that this testimony was not hearsay
because it was not offered to prove the truth of the conversation but to
show how the fraud was conducted.3

127

The court then found that this

testimony did constitute a statement by a co-conspirator in furtherance
of the conspiracy.3128 It stated that although statements made by Saavedra after her arrest could not be used against her fellow conspirators,
any statement by them in furtherance of the conspiracy was admissible
against her as long as the conspiracy survived.3129
In several recently decided cases, the defendants have contended
that the evidence was insufficient to establish the existence of a conspiracy or their connection to it. In United States v. Federico,3130 the de-

fendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine. During a
meeting between DEA agents and Federico's alleged co-conspirator,
Miller, Miller had stated that he did not have any drugs and would
have to meet his supplier.3 13 1 DEA surveillance established that Miller

then met and spoke to Federico, who led Miller to an airfreight parking
lot. After another meeting between the two, Miller returned and delivered cocaine to a waiting DEA informant.1 32 Federico argued that the
DEA agent's testimony concerning Miller's initial statement was inadmissible because the evidence was insufficient to133establish the existence
of a conspiracy or Federico's connection to it.

A divided Ninth Circuit found that although the evidence may not
have been sufficient for the jury to have found a conspiracy beyond a
reasonable doubt, it was sufficient to establish the prima facie case of
conspiracy required to admit the statement.313 4 The court further
3126. Id. at 1298.
3127. Id. See supra notes 3037-38 and accompanying text.
3128. Id.
3129. Id. (citing United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 750 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1019 (1980); United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Wentz, 456 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1972). The court found that Saavedra's arrest did not
terminate the conspiracy since her co-conspirators had been unaware of her arrest and had
continued their activities. 684 F.2d at 1299.
3130. 658 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981).

3131. Id. at 1340.
3132. Id.
3133. Id. at 1342.
3134. Id. at 1343 (citing United States v. Vargas-Rio, 607 F.2d 831, 837 (9th Cir. 1979)).
The court noted that substantial evidence is necessary to show a prima facie case of conspiracy. 658 F.2d at 1342 n.7 (citing United States v. Weaver, 594 F.2d 1272, 1274 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 927
(1978)).
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found that the evidence was sufficient to connect Federico to the con-

spiracy and, therefore, it held that Miller's statements were properly
admitted.3 13 5

Judge Alarcon dissented from the holding, finding the evidence
legally insufficient to connect Federico to the commission of any
crime.3 136 He stated that Miller's hearsay statements were admissible
only if independent evidence established that a conspiracy existed and
that Federico had knowledge of and participated in the particular con-

spiracy alleged. 1 37 He concluded that Miller's statements to the DEA
agents and his two conversations with Federico were insufficient to

connect Federico with a conspiracy.31 38 His decision appears to be
based on a different interpretation of the facts presented in the trial

transcript.
In UnitedStates v. Brock,3 13 9 the two defendants were convicted of
conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. 31 40 The

defendants were arrested, along with their alleged co-conspirator, Bernard, in a motor home operating as a methamphetamine laboratory.

41

Bernard had previously placed three orders for canisters of chemicals
commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. DEA agents
had placed a beeper in the cannister of the second order of chemicals
and had tracked it to the defendants' residence. The agents had also
observed one of the defendants picking up the third order of Bernard's

chemicals.3 1 42 The defendants contended on appeal that the district
court erred in admitting Bernard's out-of-court statements because the
31 43
evidence was insufficient to link them to Bernard's activities.
3135. 658 F.2d at 1343. Federico had relied on United States v. Weaver, 594 F.2d 1272
(9th Cir. 1979), for his argument that the evidence was insufficient to connect him to the
conspiracy. In Weaver, the Ninth Circuit found that there was a prima facie case of conspiracy but no "slight evidence" to connect the defendant. Id. at 1274. Weaver had been a
passenger in a truck driven by a man who delivered cocaine to DEA agents; the court concluded that aside from one conspirator's statement that his "connection" was in the truck,
there was no evidence to connect Weaver to the conspiracy. Id.
The Federico court found that Weaver was not persuasive. It distinguished this case by
finding that unlike Weaver, Federico had acted affirmatively by driving his own car and
leading the way to the various rendezvous points; therefore, he could not argue that he had
been present as a mere passenger when the transaction occurred. 658 F.2d at 1343.
3136. Id. at 1344 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
3137. Id. at 1346 (citing United States v. Weaver, 594 F.2d 1272, 1274 (9th Cir. 1979)).
3138. 658 F.2d at 1346-47 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
3139. 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1271 (1983).
3140. Id. at 1313.
3141. Id. at 1315.
3142. Id. at 1314.
3143. Id. at 1315.
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The Ninth Circuit found that the independent evidence of both the
existence of the conspiracy and the defendants' connection to it was
clearly sufficient. 3 " It stated that a rational jury could find that Bernard's second and third orders of chemicals, their acquisition and
transportation, were in furtherance of a single conspiracy involving
both defendants. The court therefore held that Bernard's statements
were admissible.3 145
In United States v. Kaiser,31 46 defendants House, Schafer, and
Remsing were convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin. At trial, an

undercover DEA agent testified that House and Schafer had previously
sold him heroin. During one of these transactions, House and Schafer
had stopped by a tavern owned by Remsing, had met briefly with

3 147
Remsing, and had then returned and delivered heroin to the agent.
House argued that it was error to admit Remsing's statements because

there was insufficient evidence to establish the existence of the conspir3 148
acy and Remsing's connection to it.
The Kaiser court first stated that it was not necessary that all of the
independent evidence establishing the drug conspiracy and Remsing's

relation to it be introduced before Remsing's declarations could be
used against House.3 14 9 The court then held that the evidence in this

case was sufficient and substantial enough to permit the introduction of
Remsing's statements. 1
In UnitedStates v. Spawr OpticalResearch,Inc. ,315 the defendants

were convicted of unlicensed export of laser mirrors to the Soviet
3144. Id.
3145. Id. The court found that the defendant's objections to testimony about Bernard's
statements and actions regarding the first order of chemicals were more substantial. It stated
that these statements probably were not within the co-conspirator's exclusion under Rule
801(d)(2)(E). Id. Nonetheless, the court held that these possible errors were clearly harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. (citing 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note
3025, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-183-84 & n.64 (1979)). Seesupra notes 3023-28 and accompanying text discussing the court's analysis of Bernard's non-assertive conduct.
3146. 660 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1121 (1982).
3147. Id. at 729.
3148. Id. at 734.
3149. Id. (citing United States v. Di Rodio, 565 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1977)). The Di
Rodo court noted that the trial court faces difficult problems of admissibility and order of
proof when treating out-of-court statements of co-conspirators. Often such evidence must
be offered before independent proof of the conspiracy, its duration, or its object has been
established. When such proof is not forthcoming, the prejudicial effect of the testimony can
often be minimized by limiting instructions, or the testimony may prove to be insignificant
in light of other, overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. at 576.
3150. 660 F.2d at 734.
3151. 685 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1875 (1983).
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Union. 152 The Spawrs had shipped two orders of laser mirrors, destined for the Soviet Union, through Weber in West Germany. 3 15 3 They
shipped the first order without a valid export license; prior to the second shipment Spawr applied for and was denied an export license because the mirrors were found to have "significant strategic
applications" which posed a threat to national security. The Spawrs
shipped the second
order of mirrors anyway, first to Switzerland and
3 15 4
Moscow.
to
then
On appeal, the Spawrs contended that the Government failed to
establish the existence of a conspiracy, and therefore Weber's statements, as an unindicted co-conspirator, should not have been admitted.315 5 The district court had admitted the challenged statements
subject to a motion to strike if the Government failed to provide sufficient proof, and it later determined that the evidence was sufficient.31 5 6
The Ninth Circuit found that there was ample independent evidence to
establish a prima facie case of conspiracy,3157 and affirmed the lower
court's decision that Weber's statements were admissible as those of a
co-conspirator.3 5 8
In UnitedStates v. Fieishman,1 59 the defendants were convicted of
various drug related offenses. Defendants Green and Combs contended that Fleishman's statements concerning the existence, location,
and activities of his alleged confederates were improperly admitted
against them. 31 60 The Ninth Circuit found that Fleishman's attempts
to call his partners, his meetings with them during negotiations, and his
repeated trips to their hotel, provided sufficient independent evidence
to establish a prima facie conspiracy. 3 16 1 The court also found that the
defendants' behavior in meeting with Fleishman, and the paper found
in their hotel room with notations of the price and terms of a cocaine
3152. Id. at 1078.
3153. Id. at 1079.
3154. Id.
3155. Id. at 1082-83.
3156. Id. at 1083. See United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1334 (9th Cir.), cert.denied,
452 U.S. 920 (1981).
3157. 685 F.2d at 1083 (citing United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 1981)).
3158. 685 F.2d at 1083.
3159. 684 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 464 (1983).
3160. Id. at 1337. The court noted that Fleishman's statements concerning the whereabouts of his partners who controlled the deliveries and amounts of the cocaine were, without
question, in furtherance of the conspiracy's objectives. Id. at 1337 n.7 (citing United States
v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir. 1979)). Fleishman's statements were also admissible
against him as party admissions. Id. at 1338 n.8 (citing United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847,
853 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977); Klein v. United States, 472 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1973)).
3161. 684 F.2d at 1338.
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transaction, were sufficient circumstantial evidence to connect them to
the conspiracy. Therefore, it held that the statements were properly
admitted.3 16 2
In another recent case, a defendant challenged the admission of
statements by claiming that they were not made in furtherance of the
conspiracy. In United States v. Sears,3 16 3 the defendants were convicted of bank robbery and kidnapping. In the process of escaping
after the robbery, defendants Sears, Werner, and Strozyk had stopped
at the home of friends to count their loot and dispose of their disguises.
The friends were unexpectedly at home, and Sears was obliged to explain their presence to keep them from calling the police and to allow
them to use their home. 3 16 On appeal, Werner contended that Sears'
statements were inadmissible against her because they were not made
during or in furtherance of the conspiracy to rob the bank.3 16 5
The Ninth Circuit first stated that since Sears made his statements
during the course of the escape, they were certainly made during the
course of the conspiracy.31 66 The court then stated that Sears' statements were not only an admission of the crime, but were also necessary
to insure a successful escape; 31 6 7 therefore, his statements did serve to
further the objectives of the conspiracy and were admissible against
Werner.3 16 8
In the preceding cases the Ninth Circuit determined that the statements of co-conspirators were admissible; however, during this survey
period there were three cases in which the challenged statements were
found to be inadmissible. In United States v. Williams,31 69 the defendant was convicted of conspiring to collect debts by extortion. At trial,
Williams argued that evidence of his co-conspirator's attempt to extort
additional money from their victim was inadmissible because it was the
co-conspirator's separate venture, unknown to Williams, and thus was
not in furtherance of their conspiracy. The trial judge ruled, however,
that the evidence was admissible because Williams had not withdrawn
3162. Id.
3163. 663 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. deniedsub nom. Werner v. United States, 455 U.S.
1027 (1982).
3164. Id. at 905.
3165. Id.
3166. Id. (citing United States v. Caplan, 633 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1980)).
3167. 663 F.2d at 905. The court found that Sears' statement to Strozyk to get rid of the
garbage bag containing the disguises could easily be construed as a statement in furtherance
of the conspiracy. Sears' friends also testified that they were intimidated by Werner, as she
had held a gun in her lap and glared at them. Id.
3168. Id.
3169. 668 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1982).
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from the conspiracy. 3 170
The Ninth Circuit stated that the absence of withdrawal from a
conspiracy was not the proper test for the admissibility of a co-conspirator's statement.31 7 ' It therefore held that the trial judge did not properly determine whether the co-conspirator's statement was made during
and in furtherance of the conspiracy before admitting it into evidence,
and that such a determination would have to be made in the event of a
3 172
new trial.

In United States v. Miller,3 17 3 the defendants were convicted of
charges stemming from a fraudulent scheme which purported to assist
homeowners in avoiding foreclosure, but in reality only increased the
monthly mortgage payments, liquidating the homeowners' equity for
the defendants' financial gain.3174 One of the homeowners was unable
to testify at trial, and the district court allowed testimony from the purchaser that this homeowner stated that he did not intend to make his
3 175
new monthly payments because they were too high.
The Ninth Circuit held that the trial court erred in admitting these
statements under the co-conspirator's exclusion from the hearsay rule.
It stated that, even if it could be assumed that the purchaser was a coconspirator, these statements were made after the conspiracy had
ended, they did not further the objectives of the conspiracy, and they
3 176
should therefore have been excluded.
In United States v. Tray/or,3 17 7 defendants Traylor and Andrews
were convicted of conspiring to import and distribute cocaine .3 17 At
trial, McCausland, a friend of Traylor's, testified about statements
made by the defendants concerning their drug-related activities. 179 On
3170. Id. at 1070.
3171. Id.
3172. Id. (citing United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 519 (9th Cir. 1979)).
3173. 676 F.2d 359 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 126 (1982).
3174. Id. at 360-61.
3175. Id. at 364.
3176. Id. The court also found that the evidence of Miller's guilt was overwhelming and
that the erroneously admitted statement was therefore harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
3177. 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1981).
3178. Id. at 1329.
3179. Id. at 1332. Traylor had described to McCausland how he smuggled cocaine into
the country by using a back brace. He had stated that he was planning a trip with his wife
and granddaughter and could bring back cocaine at that time; he had also made general
conversation about drug use and importation. Both Traylor and Andrews had asked McCausland to bring them utensils used to mix mannite with cocaine. Id. Andrews had also
stated to McCausland that he could sell a pound of cocaine to someone in Alaska for
$40,000, so he could make sure that Mrs. Traylor got her money back. Id. at 1333.
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appeal, Traylor and Andrews argued that these statements were inadmissible hearsay.3180
With respect to Traylor's statements, the Ninth Circuit first determined that they were admissible against Traylor under Rule
801(d)(2)(A), as party admissions. 3181 It further determined, however,

that the statements were inadmissible against Andrews. 31 82 The court
stated that Traylor's statements were either mere conversation or casual
admissions of culpability to someone he had decided to trust.3183 It
further stated that even though these statements concerned the activities of the conspiracy, including future plans, they were not made in
furtherance of the conspiracy since they did not seek to induce McCausland to join the conspiracy and did not assist the conspirators in
achieving their objectives.3184

With respect to Andrews' statements, the Ninth Circuit determined that they were not only admissible against Andrews under Rule
801(d)(2)(A), but were also made in furtherance of the conspiracy and
thus were admissible against Traylor.1 85 It concluded that the inadmissible hearsay added very little to what was admissible, and therefore held that the error in admitting Traylor's statement against
386
Andrews was harmless.
These cases show that the Ninth Circuit consistently requires that,
in order to admit evidence under the co-conspirator's exception to the
hearsay rule, there must be independent evidence of a conspiracy and
of the defendant's connection to it, and the statements must be made
during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The district court is given
broad discretion in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to
prove the existence of a conspiracy and the defendant's connection to
it; thus, evidence establishing a conspiracy need only be circumstantial,
3180. Id. at 1331-32.
3181. Id. at 1332. See supra notes 3083-87 and accompanying text.
3182. Id. at 1332.
3183. Id. at 1332-33 (citing United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam); United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1049 (1976)).
3184. 656 F.2d at 1333 (citing United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 726-27 (9th Cir.
1981); quoting United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)).
3185. 656 F.2d at 1333. The court also determined that McCausland's testimony regarding
her observations of Andrews' involvement in sorting out the cocaine, in obtaining the mannite and mixing it with the cocaine, and in taking five bags of cocaine for himself, was not
hearsay. Id. (citing United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 518 (9th Cir. 1979)).
3186. 656 F.2d at 1333. The court based its determination on FED. R. C iM. P. 52(a),
which provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." Id. See United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 728
(9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
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and evidence connecting the defendant to the conspiracy need only be
slight. The review of whether statements were made during or in furtherance of a conspiracy appears to be stricter. Thus, although statements made after a defendant's arrest may still be considered to have
been made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy, statements
merely concerning a conspiracy's activities but not actively furthering
that conspiracy's objectives will not be considered to have been made
in furtherance of that conspiracy. Finally, a defendant's failure to
show that he had withdrawn from a conspiracy by the time his coconspirators made their statements is not by itself sufficient to allow the
admission of those statements. However, even if statements are improperly admitted as "not hearsay" under the co-conspirator's exclusion, the Ninth Circuit usually holds their admission to be harmless
error.
e. exceptions
Exceptions to the hearsay rule are listed in Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804. Rule 803 sets forth twenty-four exceptions, including a "catchall" category, which may be invoked without regard to the
availability of the declarant.31 8 7 Rule 804 lists five exceptions which
may be invoked only if the declarant is unavailable as a witness; these
exceptions are well recognized by common law tradition.3 1 88 During
the current survey period the Ninth Circuit reviewed the application of
five types of hearsay exceptions.
i. public records
Public records and reports are excepted from the hearsay exclusionary rule under Rule 803(8). 3 189 The public records exception is justified by the high probability that public officers will perform their
official duty to make accurate records and by the possibility that public
3187. 4 LOUISELL, supra note 3033 § 437, at 103.
3188. Id. § 485 at 983.
3189. FED. R. EvID. 803(8) provides that public records and reports are not excluded by
the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness. Public records are
defined as:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or
agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to
report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and
against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EvID. 803(8).
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inspection of records may reveal inaccuracies and cause them to be
corrected.3 19 o

ii. recorded recollections
The Ninth Circuit has upheld the use of the "recorded recollection" exception under Rule 803(5).3191 The doctrine allows a witness to

submit a writing as a substitute for his testimony if he cannot recall the
relevant events at the time of trial. Documents admitted under this

doctrine must meet three requirements: (1) the document must pertain
to matters about which the witness once had knowledge; (2) the witness

must now have insufficient recollection about such matters; and (3) the
document must be shown to have been made by the witness and to
have accurately reflected his knowledge when matters were fresh in his

memory.3192 Meaningful cross-examination is precluded by the witness's lack of memory. However, it is felt that satisfaction of these
three criteria ensures that recorded recollections are as reliable as those
3 t 93
hearsay exceptions which apply when the declarant is not available.
In United States p. Felix-Jere, 31 94 the Ninth Circuit held that a
written statement, prepared by a United States Marshal from notes he

made during a post-arrest interrogation he conducted of the defendant
through an interpreter, Was not admissible as a recorded recollection
because there was no compliance with the second requirement set forth
above.3 19 5 The court noted that the written statement may have qualified as a hearsay exception, but the record revealed that the proper

foundation had not been laid to show its admissibility. In particular,
there was no showing that the witness had insufficient recollection to

enable him to testify fully and accurately at the trial.3196 In fact, the
3190. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 315, at
735-36 (2d ed. 1972).
3191. United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1285 (9th Cir. 1975). FED. R. EVID. 803(5)
provides that a memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had
knowledge is not excluded by the hearsay rule, when that witness now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, and the record is shown to have been
made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in his memory and reflected that
knowledge correctly.
3192. United States v. Edwards, 539 F.2d 689, 691-92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984
(1976); accord Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
3193. See FED. R. EvID. 804.
3194. 667 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982).
3195. Id. at 1301.
3196. Id. at 1302 (quoting United States v. Judon, 567 F.2d 1289, 1294 (5th Cir. 1978)); see
also I 1J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 803(5)[4,5] (1976). While witnesses are at
liberty to examine a document which they prepared to refresh their recollection, such a
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marshal had not even been asked if he had problems recalling the interview with Felix-Jerez. 3 197 The court therefore concluded that the
3 198
admission of the statement was error.
In United States v. Patterson,1 99 however, the Ninth Circuit held

that grand jury testimony by a witness was admissible as a past recorded recollection. 32 °° Defendant Patterson was convicted of receiv-

ing stolen property and of conspiring to transport stolen motor vehicles
(forklifts) in interstate commerce.320 ' Patterson's nephew, McKay, tes-

tifled before the grand jury, under a grant of immunity, that Patterson
had told him that the forklifts were stolen from California. At trial,
McKay testified that he could not remember Patterson telling him

about the source or legality of the forklifts. 320 2 The prosecution tried
unsuccessfully to use a transcript of the grand jury testimony to refresh

McKay's recollection.320 3 The trial judge allowed parts of the grand
jury transcript to be read into the record after McKay stated that he did
not think he had lied to the grand jury, and that he had recalled the
events better when he had testified before the grand jury.3 2°
The Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's

determination that the foundational requirements for past recorded
recollection had been met.32 °5 It rejected Patterson's claim that since

McKay's grand jury testimony occurred ten months after the conversation had taken place, the matter had not been fresh in McKay's mind at
the time he testified.3 20 6 The court stated that "freshness," under this
document may only be received as evidence when, after reviewing it, the witness still cannot
recall the facts so as to state them from memory. 667 F.2d at 1301 (citing Vicksburg &
Meridian R.R. v. O'Brien, 119 U.S. 99 (1886)).
3197. 667 F.2d at 1301.
3198. Id. at 1302. The court noted that the absence of a showing that the witness had
insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately at trial would encourage
the use of statements prepared for purposes of litigation under the supervision of attorneys
or investigators. See FED. R. EvID. 803(5) advisory committee notes; United States v.
Judon, 567 F.2d 1289, 1294 (5th Cir. 1978). It further noted that this is exactly what happened in Felix-Jerez, in that an investigator had prepared a statement for the express purpose of prosecuting the defendant. 667 F.2d at 1302.
3199. 678 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 219 (1982).
3200. Id. at 780. See United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62, 67 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1001 (1967).
3201. 678 F.2d at 776-77.
3202. Id. at 777.
3203. Id.
3204. Id. at 777-79.
3205. Id. at 780. See United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981).
3206. 678 F.2d at 779. The Patterson court admitted, however, that this was a close case,
not only because of the ten month lapse between the conversation and McKay's testimony,
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exception, has traditionally been determined on a "case-by-case basis
giving consideration to all pertinent aspects including the lapse of
time," 3207 and that broad discretion is granted to the trial judge. 320 8 The
court also rejected Patterson's claim that McKay's statements to the
grand jury did not accurately reflect his knowledge at that time, stating
that the trial court's questioning of McKay was sufficient to elicit the
necessary information regarding the accuracy of his statement.320 9
The court finally held that even if the trial court had abused its
discretion in admitting the grand jury testimony, Patterson suffered no
prejudice because the same testimony was admitted into evidence without objection
through the testimony of a detective and an FBI
10
agent.

32

It appears from these two cases that the Ninth Circuit will give the
trial court broad discretion in applying the recorded recollection exception unless there has been clear abuse in failing to meet the foundational requirements. Such broad discretion may be allowed in order to
prevent witnesses who have been given immunity from conveniently
forgetting their testimony at the time of trial.
iii. state-of-mind
Rule 803(3) provides in part that a statement of the declarant's
then existing state of mind, such as intent or plan, is not excluded by
the hearsay rule.3 21I The Ninth Circuit has upheld the use of a state-

ment of intent, offered under the state of mind exception, as proof that
the declarant planned to do some future act.3212
but because McKay had been angry with Patterson when he testified, and he had answered
the prosecutor's and trial judge's questions equivocally. Id.
3207. Id. (quoting United States v. Senak, 527 F.2d 129, 141 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 907 (1976) (pre-federal rules case)).
3208. 678 F.2d at 779; see United States v. Williams, 571 F.2d 344, 348-50 (6th Cir.) (no
abuse of discretion to admit under Rule 803(5) a witness's statement to a federal agent relating a conversation which took place six months earlier), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978).
3209. 678 F.2d at 780.
3210. Id. at 780 n.6.
3211. FED. R. EvID. 803(3) provides that a statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule
when it is:
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or
hysical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and
odily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification
or terms of declarant's will.
3212. United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 374-80 (9th Cir. 1976) (applying Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1891), before Federal Rules of Evidence were in
effect), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977). In Pheaster, a kidnap victim had stated shortly
before he disappeared that he planned to meet the defendant. The Ninth Circuit found that
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3 21 3 the Ninth Circuit held that
In United States v. Astorga-Torres,
a statement made by the defendants' alleged co-conspirator to a DEA

agent that he planned to bring guards to their next drug transaction
was properly admitted under Rule 803(3).3214 The court stated that evi-

dence of intent can be considered by the jury in determining whether

the declarant subsequently performed the intended act. 321 5 It concluded that the statement was properly admitted, not as proof that the
declarant brought the guards with him, or that the defendants were
3 2 16
those guards, but as evidence that he had the intent to do SO.
iv.

statements against penal interest

Rule 804(b)(3) concerns declarations against interest, another exception to the hearsay rule.3 217 This exception allows a statement which
has been made by an unavailable declarant and is adverse to his own

interest to be admitted into evidence, because it is assumed that a person would not make a damaging statement against himself unless it
were true.3218 The Federal Rules of Evidence expressly include state-

ments against penal interest as a hearsay exception, but require that
there be corroborating circumstances which indicate the trustworthithe statement was reliable and properly within the state of mind exception even though
offered as proof of both the conduct of the declarant and the defendant. 544 F.2d at 374-80.
See LOUISELL, supra note 3033, § 442 at 562-63.
3213. 682 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 455 (1982).
3214. Id. at 1335. Notably, a divided Ninth Circuit had decided this case three months
earlier and concluded that this same statement was erroneously admitted as a co-conspirator's statement because it was made prior to the established existence of a conspiracy.
United States v. Astorga-Torres, Nos. 81-1063, 81-1064, slip op. at 1187-88 (9th Cir., March
15, 1982). The majority had found that the admission of this statement into evidence was
prejudicial and therefore reversable error. Id. Judge Kennedy, in his dissent, agreed that
the statement was inadmissible as a co-conspirator's statement, but decided that it was a
harmless error. Id. at 1189 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The new decision allowed the court to
affirm two counts which it had previously reversed.
3215. 682 F.2d at 1335-36 (citing United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840, 842-44 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978); United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 374-80 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977)).
3216. 682 F.2d at 1336.
3217. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) provides that a statement will not be excluded from evidence if the declarant is unavailable as a witness, and if the statement at the time of its
making was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject him or her to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him
or her against another, that a reasonable person in that position would not have made the
statement unless he or she believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the defendant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
3218. 4 WEINST N, supra note 3025, 804(b)(3)[01], at 804-90.
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ness of the statements.3 2 19 The admission of statements against penal

interest is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.322°
In United States v. Poland,3 2 2 ' the Ninth Circuit found no abuse of

discretion by the trial judge in refusing to admit the testimony of a
private investigator regarding statements made by a convicted felon
which the defendants claimed would exculpate them.3 22 2 The felon,
Sylvia Brown, had been brought to the trial at the defendants' request,

but she had invoked her fifth amendment privilege. The defendants
then offered the testimony of Vance, a private investigator, who could
relate what Brown had told him about the robbery and kidnapping
charged against the defendants. 3223 The defendants claimed that
Brown's statements to Vance-that she had observed a meeting where
the crime had been planned and that she knew two of the six people at

this meeting-were admissible because they would inculpate Brown
'3224
and were thus "against interest.
The Ninth Circuit first determined that Brown's statements were

not relevant because they did not exculpate the defendants. 3225 The
court further stated that even if Brown's statements were relevant, they

did not solidly inculpate her;3226 there was also an absence of corroboration, and other evidence showed further untrustworthiness.3 2 27
3219. United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 693 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840
(1978); see FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3).
3220. United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840
(1978).
3221. 659 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981).
3222. Id. at 895.
3223. Id. at 894.
3224. Id.
3225. Id. The court noted that Brown was not present when the crimes were committed,
and that it was possible that the defendants were among the four planners she did not know.

Id.
3226. Id. at 895 (citing United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1978)). The
court noted that Brown's statement was that of an observer, not a participant. 659 F.2d at
895.
3227. 659 F.2d at 895. The court found that Brown's statements, rather than being spontaneous, were made over a year and a half after the crime. In addition, the statements were
not made to a close friend, relative, or someone to whom the admission of a crime would be
natural, but to a private investigator hired by the defendants. The court noted that Brown's
statement to Vance was her third different version of the crime, and the details upon which
the defendants relied could have been learned from the news media. Finally, the court
stated that Brown was known to be a drug addict, with a bad criminal record and psychiatric
problems. Id.

1984]

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

v. former testimony
Another hearsay exception is the former testimony of a declarant
who is unavailable as a witness. Rule 804(b)(1) allows admission of
former testimony in a criminal trial if the defendant had a previous
opportunity to examine the witness and had a similar motive at that
time.3 228 In United States v. Poland,3 229 the defendants argued for reversal because the trial court admitted as "former testimony" the transcript of a hearing on a motion to suppress an in-court
identification. 3230 At this hearing, William Acker had testified that he
and his wife saw one of the defendants at the scene of the crime and
that he had identified that defendant at a line-up; he then had been
cross-examined by the defendants' attorney. 323 I The motion to suppress was denied and the line-up was found to be fair. Acker died
before trial.3 23 2
The Ninth Circuit found that the motive for defense cross-examination would have been the same at the hearing and at trial.3 233 The
Poland court stated that the central question at the hearing was
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was
reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive,3 23 4
and that this gave the defense a strong motive to question the reliability
of this witness. Therefore, the court held that the admission of Acker's
recorded "former testimony" was proper.3 23 5
7.

Rebuttal

The admissibility of rebuttal evidence is within the sound discretion of the district court and is not reviewable absent an abuse of discretion.323 6 Rebuttal evidence may be admitted, not only under the
Federal Rules of Evidence,32 37 but also under the theory of "opening
3228. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1) provides that testimony given by a witness at a hearing or in
a deposition is a hearsay exception when the declarant is unavailable as a witness and if the
party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony by direct, cross or redirect examination.
3229. 659 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981).

3230. Id. at 895.
3231. Id.
3232. Id.
3233. Id. at 896.
3234. Id. (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972)).
3235. 659 F.2d at 896.
3236. United States v. Perez, 491 F.2d 167, 173 (9th Cir.), cert deniedsub nom. Lombera v.
United States, 419 U.S. 858 (1974).
3237. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
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the door," also known as the doctrine of curative admissibility.3 238
The doctrine of curative admissibility permits the exploration in
rebuttal of testimony which is not admissible on direct, because the
other party has in effect opened the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence. 32 39 The doctrine is based on the necessity of removing
prejudice.32 ° Thus, evidence may be introduced under this doctrine
for impeachment purposes or in the interests of truth.3241 The Ninth
Circuit has recently decided several cases concerning the admissibility
of rebuttal evidence on the basis of the interests of truth.
In UnitedStates v. Mniz,324 2 the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder of a fellow prison inmate and of
conveyance of a weapon within a federal correctional institution. On
appeal, Muniz argued that the trial court erred in allowing the Government to cross-examine him concerning his silence during two incidents
of contact with prison officials which occurred after the assault, but
prior to his arrest for the assault.32 43 Muniz also argued that the Government impermissibly relied on his silence during closing argument as
well. 32 " The Government contended that Muniz's counsel opened the
door concerning his silence by statements made in opening argument
and on direct examination of Muniz himself.324
The Ninth Circuit found that Muniz's counsel had opened the
door to the Government's inquiry on cross-examination. The court
stated that because defense counsel had made statements and had ques.tioned Muniz about his response to certain prison officials' inquiries
after the assault, full development of the subject by the Government
was warranted. 246 Thus, the court held that the trial court did not err
in permitting this particular cross-examination of Muniz or the refer3247
ence to his silence in closing argument.
In United States v. Doe,3248 the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to import heroin and other related substantive offenses. On direct examination, the Government asked Richard Roe, a courier for the
3238.
3239.
3240.
3241.
3242.
3243.
3244.
3245.
3246.
3247.
3248.

See generally 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 15 (3d ed. 1940).
United States v. Winston, 447 F.2d 1236, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1239.
684 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 637-38.
Id. at 637.
Id. at 638-39.
Id. at 639.
Id.
656 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
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importation scheme, whether he had made any arrangements for his
subsequent contact with Doe's wife during a certain conversation he
had with her.324 9 On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to
elicit another portion of this conversation in order to show that Doe
knew nothing about his wife's drug-related activities. The defense argued that this cross-examination was within the scope of the direct; that
the Government had "opened the door" with respect to the particular
32 0
conversation in question.
The Ninth Circuit found that because Roe's answer to the Government's question did not implicate Doe, and the testimony Doe sought
to elicit on cross-examination was unrelated to Roe's direct testimony,
the defense cross-examination did not serve to correct a misleading impression left by selective questioning on direct. Therefore, the court
held that the evidence was not admissible under the doctrine of cura3251
tive admissibility.
In United States v. Armstrong,3252 the defendant was convicted of
various federal frauds involving the solicitation of advance fees for
loan guarantee agreements. During trial, Armstrong offered into evidence a letter of one of his clients. On appeal, Armstrong argued that it
was error to allow the Government to rebut the letter with the details of
3253
the underlying transaction.
The Ninth Circuit held that the rebuttal evidence was admissible
because it placed the letter in its proper context so as not to mislead the
jury.325 4 The court noted that the details of the transaction were admissible even though the particular context had no bearing on Armstrong's
state of mind.32 55
These decisions demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit will admit rebuttal evidence under the curative admissibility doctrine provided the
other party has "opened the door" to this evidence so that its admission
is necessary to avoid misleading the jury. Where rebuttal evidence is
not required to correct a misleading impression created on direct, however, the Ninth Circuit will not apply the curative admissibility doc3249. Id. at 412.
3250. Id.
3251. Id. (citing United States v. Childs, 598 F.2d 169, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (rebuttal evidence admissible only to the extent necessary to combat evidence in chief); United States v.
Winston, 447 F.2d 1236, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
3252. 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
3253. Id. at 1336.
3254. Id.
3255. Id.
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trine, even if both the cross and direct examination explore the same
general subject matter.
8. Closing argument restrictions
In United States v. Bramble,325 6 the defendant was convicted of
distributing cocaine and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute.
On appeal, Bramble argued that the trial court erred in restricting his
counsel during closing argument from arguing that the Government
had failed to produce evidence of any prior drug dealings by Bramble
3257
or evidence that Bramble lived the life of a drug dealer.
The Ninth Circuit did not determine if the restrictions placed on
defense counsel's closing argument were too strict, but held that even if
they were, the error was harmless. 3258 The court noted that the drug
transaction was completely voluntary and was that of a large scale
seller. Thus, even if defense counsel had presented the proposed argument, it would not have helped Bramble.325 9
9. Telecommunications
Under federal law it is permissible for a person acting under color
of law to intercept telecommunications when one of the parties has
consented. 3260 During this survey period, the Ninth Circuit considered
two cases in which defendants objected to the admission of tape-recorded telephone conversations. In both cases, an informant allegedly
consented to the taping.
In UnitedStates v. Sanford,326 ' the defendant agreed in a recorded
telephone conversation to meet with Leroy Jones, an informant for the
Secret Service. Upon his return from this meeting, Jones handed Secret Service agents twenty counterfeit one hundred dollar bills which
Sanford had allegedly given him.3262 At trial, an agent testified that
Jones knew the conversation was being recorded. Cross-examination
of Jones elicited testimony that he had agreed to cooperate with the
3256. 680 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 493 (1982).
3257. Id. at 592.
3258. Id. at 593.
3259. Id.
3260. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1976) provides that "[i]t shall not be unlawful under this
chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication,
where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception."
3261. 673 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1982).
3262. Id. at 1071. Sanford was convicted of possessing and concealing counterfeit notes in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1976), and of transfer and delivery of such notes in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 473 (1976). 673 F.2d at 1071.
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Government only after having been arrested for possession of counter-

feit notes.3 263 On appeal, Sanford argued that the district court erred in
finding that Jones had consented to the recording.32 64

The Ninth Circuit stated that the issue in this case was solely one
of consent, not of voluntariness. It held that the trial court's finding of
consent was not clearly erroneous, 326 5 because to establish consent it is
ordinarily sufficient to show that the informant engaged in the conversation knowing that it was being taped.3 26 6
In United States v. Kaiser,3267 defendant House argued that taperecorded conversations in which he discussed his drug-related activities
were inadmissible on the ground that they were made in violation of

Washington state law, 3268 prohibiting recordings absent the consent of
all parties or a court order. 3269 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argu-

ment,3270 stating that "wiretap evidence obtained in violation of neither
the Constitution nor federal law is admissible in federal courts, even
'3271
though obtained in violation of state law.
These decisions indicate that, regardless of state law, the Ninth

Circuit will admit evidence of a tape-recorded conversation where only
one party to the conversation has consented to the taping. Furthermore, that party need only have been advised that his conversation
would be recorded to overcome a "lack of consent" defense by another

party.
10.
In United States v.

Fourth amendment violations
o70res, 32 72 the defendant was convicted of pos-

sessing a firearm as a convicted felon. On appeal, Flores contested the
3263. Id.
3264. Id. at 1071-72.
3265. Id. at 1072. For a discussion of the application of the clearly erroneous standard of
review, see United States v. Brandon, 633 F.2d 773, 776 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208,212 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 52425 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. deniedsub nom.Reeve v. United States, 435 U.S. 914 (1978); United
States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 85 (9th Cir. 1962) (en banc).
3266. 673 F.2d at 1072 (citing United States v. Glickman, 604 F.2d 625, 634 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1080 (1980)).
3267. 660 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. deniedsub nom. House v. United States, 455 U.S.
956 (1982). House was convicted of conspiring to possess and distribute heroin. Id. at 728.
3268. Id. at 734. WASH. RaV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030.
3269. 660 F.2d at 734.
3270. Id. at 734-35 (citing United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1164-65 n.4 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. deniedsub nom. Carbone v. United States, 450 U.S. 916 (1981); United States v.
Keen, 508 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975)).
3271. 660 F.2d at 734 (quoting United States v. Keen, 508 F.2d at 989).
3272. 679 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 798 (1983).
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Government's introduction into evidence of an administrative claim
letter written by his attorney, which alleged that Flores' fourth amend-

ment rights had been violated by an illegal search of his apartment and
by the wrongful seizure of his guns. The letter also admitted Flores'
possession of these guns.3 273 lores argued that, under Simmons v.
United States,3 27 4 the letter should have been excluded from evidence
because the Government created a "difficult choice" for him of choos-

ing between vindicating his fourth amendment rights and refusing to
32 7 5
incriminate himself.

The Ninth Circuit rejected Flores' argument, finding that it was
not necessary to.have admitted possession of the guns before seeking to
vindicate the illegal search.3276 The court emphasized that Flores and

his attorney had voluntarily mailed the letter, thus knowingly creating
their own dilemma.327 7 Therefore, the court held that there was no

error in admitting the letter into evidence at Flores' trial.3278
G. Jury Instructions

A judge is under an obligation to instruct the jury on the law involved in a case. The jury is then theoretically able to perform its func-

tion of applying the law to the facts to determine whether the evidence

justifies one verdict or another. 3279 The jury, however, must be in-

structed in language they can understand if they are to successfully perform this task.3280 Instructions that are concrete and specific are easier
to understand than those that are couched in generalizations. 328' The
Ninth Circuit has recently considered a series of cases in which defendants have argued that the trial court erred in refusing to give certain
3273. Id. at 177. The letter was sent to the City of San Jose claiming monetary damages
for alleged violations by the police.
3274. 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (defendant's testimony given in support of motion to suppress evidence under fourth amendment cannot later be admitted against him at trial; defendant should not be forced to make an election between two important rights).
3275. 679 F.2d at 177.
3276. Id. at 177-78 (citing United States v. Dohm, 597 F.2d 535, 543-44 (5th Cir. 1979)).
3277. 679 F.2d at 178. The court stated that it found no "'intolerable tension between
constitutional rights,"' id. (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 211 (1971)), nor
could it say that "'a constitutional right [had] been burdened impermissibly.
'
679
F.2d at 178 (quoting Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980)).
3278. 679 F.2d at 178.
3279. R. NIELAND, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: A CRITICAL LOOK AT A MODERN
MOVEMENT TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEM 1 (1979).

3280. Id
3281. REPORT

OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER COMMITTEE TO STUDY CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 79 (1982).
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jury instructions, or in giving instructions which were inadequate under

the circumstances of the case.
1. Entitlement to jury instructions
a. content
The trial court is not required to give jury instructions in the exact
language requested, even if the requested instructions correctly state

the law.3282 It is enough that the charge adequately and correctly covers the substance of the requested instructions.3 28 3 The trial judge's

language or formulation of the charge is therefore reversible only for
3284

an abuse of discretion.
In United States v. Tham,3285 the defendant was convicted of embezzling union assets and of making false entries in union records.

Tham appealed the trial court's refusal to read specific union bylaws or
to instruct the jury about specific provisions contained in the bylaws.3286 The Ninth Circuit held that the instructions given by the trial
judge adequately covered Tham's theory of the case by instructing the
jury that it could consider the applicable provisions of the union bylaws. 32 7 The court further held that it was not an abuse of discretion
to refuse to read the specific bylaws to the jury.32
In United States v. Gere,3 289 the defendant was convicted of offenses in connection with the arson of the building that housed his two
businesses. 32 90 Investigators determined that the fire had been "set" for
3282. Sanseverino v. United States, 321 F.2d 714, 717 (10th Cir. 1963).
3283. United States v. Hurd, 642 F.2d 1179, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Semaan, 594 F.2d 1215, 1217 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979); United States v.
Fontenot, 483 F.2d 315, 322-23 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Alexander, 415 F.2d 1352,
1358 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1014 (1970).
3284. United States v. James, 576 F.2d 223, 227 (9th Cir. 1978).
3285. 665 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1981).
3286. Id at 857-58. Tham argued that his good faith belief that the expenditures were for
the benefit of the union was established by his adherence to the union's bylaws.
3287. Id at 858. The district judge gave the following pertinent instructions to the jury:
[Tihe Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did
not have a good faith belief that the union funds were spent for the benefit of the
union ....
In evaluating the defendant's intent, you may consider whether or not he acted in good faith under the applicable provisions of the. . . bylaws of local 856,
which are in evidence before you.
Id
3288. Id (citing United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1252 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.denied,
442 U.S. 909 (1979)).
3289. 662 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1981).
3290. Id at 1292.
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delayed ignition from outside the building, and one of the witnesses at
the trial testified that Gere had asked him if he "knew of someone who
could make a fire." 329 1 On appeal, Gere argued that this witness had
thought he was testifying under immunity from prosecution, and that

the trial court had therefore abused its discretion in not giving verbatim
a proposed immune witness instruction.32 9 2
The Ninth Circuit rejected Gere's contention, recognizing that a

trial judge has wide latitude in framing instructions so long as they
fairly and adequately cover the issues presented.3 29 3 The court noted

that although the instruction might have been better framed, the substance of Gere's proposed instruction had been given to the jury, and
the trial court did not, therefore, abuse its discretion.3 29 4
In United States v. Abushi,32 95 the defendants were convicted of
conspiring to defraud the Government through the illegal acquisition

and redemption of food stamp coupons.

Defendants Ghanem and

Awad owned a liquor store which was investigated for illegal food
stamp trafficking 3296 by special agents of the Agriculture Department.
During the course of this investigation, agents made several food stamp

sales to Ghanem and Awad, and later to Ghanem and defendant Shuman.3297 Agents also sold food stamps to defendant Abushi on five
separate occasions. 3298 The agents then arranged for Abushi, Ghanem,
and another to meet with them, after leading each to believe that he
was to be the sole purchaser of over $100,000 worth of food stamps.

However, during the meeting, the three agreed to purchase the stamps
jointly. When Ghanem and Abushi paid their share, they were then
3299

arrested.

3291. Id at 1292-93.
3292. Id at 1295. Gere also contended that the court by its own motion should have given
an accomplice instruction in reference to the testimony of two witnesses. Id The Ninth
Circuit disagreed, stating that when an accomplice instruction is not requested, it does not
constitute plain error to fail to give one sua sponte. Id (citing DeCarlo v. United States, 442
F.2d 237, 240-41 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1019 (1970)).
3293. 662 F.2d at 1295.
3294. Id The trial court instructed the jury to view the witness' testimony with suspicion if
it found that the witness believed himself immunized; it then interjected language suggesting
that the witness could be equated to other witnesses who said they believed they would not
be prosecuted. Gere argued that this interjection made the instruction ambiguous. d
3295. 682 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1982).
3296. The term "illegal food stamp trafficking" refers to the transfer of food stamps
outside the guidelines of the Food Stamp Act of 1977. Id at 1291 n.1.
3297. Id at 1291-92.
3298. Id at 1292.
3299. Id at 1292-93. Although the third person agreed to the joint purchase, he never
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On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court had mis-

stated the law of multiple conspiracies, and that the trial judge's omission of the last full paragraph of their proposed instruction on multiple
conspiracy left the jury with the erroneous impression that the conspiracy charged in the indictment was broad enough to include any con-

spiracy proven. 3300 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating
that the instructions on multiple conspiracy, taken as a whole, were

consistent with the law of the circuit and were not a misstatement.33 °1
The court further stated that one of the instructions given to the jury,
when viewed in the context of the overall charge, had essentially the

same effect as the omitted paragraph of the defendants' proposed instructions.3 30 2 Accordingly, the court held that the jury had been properly instructed on the evidence necessary to find the defendants guilty
330 3
of the conspiracy charged in the indictment.
The defendants also argued that the trial court erred in its entrapment instructions. They first claimed that the instructions as given
eliminated any consideration by the jury as to whether Ghanem and

Awad were entrapped when government agents appealed to Ghanem's
returned. Ghanem stated that "'the other party couldn't get his money together."' The
court did not mention the circumstances surrounding Shuman's arrest.
3300. Id at 1298-99. The defendant's proposed instruction was based on that used in
United States v. Bailey, 607 F.2d 237, 243 n.14 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934
(1980). The instruction in Bailey was as follows:
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy described in Count
I did in fact exist between at least two of the defendants, then you must determine
which, if any, of the other defendants were members of that conspiracy.
A conspiracy may vary in its membership from time to time and may include
two or more separate agreements among its members provided that the participants in the separate agreements are joined together by their knowledge of the
essential features and scope of the overall conspiracy and by their common goal.
Where the participants in separate agreements are not so joined, they are not members of a single, overall conspiracy, even though the separate agreements may have
participants in common and may have similar goals.
The paragraph which the trial judge in Abushi omitted, stated that "[i]f you find that a
particular defendant may have been a member of another conspiracy but was not a member
of the conspiracy described in Count I then you must acquit that defendant of the crime
charged in Count I." 682 F.2d at 1298 n.5 (citing United States v. Bailey, 607 F.2d 237, 243
n.14 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980)).
3301. 682 F.2d at 1299.
3302. Id This instruction stated that:
If you find some were involved in a conspiracy, and some were involved in a
totally separate conspiracy, it then would be proper for you to find the first group
guilty, and the second group not guilty, because the mere fact that they have been
involved in a second conspiracy by themselves does not mean that they were involved in the conspiracy charged in the indictment.
Id
3303. Id at 1300.

LOYOLA

OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

known weakness-overseas charities. 3 ' The trial court had stated
that "charitable motives are highly desirable, but robbing a bank to
support your favorite charity obviously isn't looked upon favorably by
the law."3305 The Ninth Circuit held that this statement was made in
an effort to distinguish between motive and intent and was not directed
toward the issue of entrapment. 3 o° The court stated that even if the
jury misunderstood this statement as applying to entrapment, there was
no evidence in the record that this was prejudicial.30 7
The defendants in Abushi next claimed that the trial court had
failed to inform the jury that the Government had the burden to prove
predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt. The Ninth Circuit held
that, considering the entrapment instructions in their entirety, it appeared that the jury was properly informed that the burden of proof
rested upon the prosecution. 33 08 The court noted that the trial court
was not required to reiterate the reasonable doubt standard in every
paragraph of its entrapment instructions. 330 9 The defendants additionally argued that certain of the trial judge's statements concerning the
propriety of the Government's investigation were prejudicial and diverted the jury's attention from the question of predisposition. Although the Ninth Circuit agreed that these comments were
extraneous, 3310 the court held that the defendant was not prejudiced by
the comments. 3 1 ' It stated that the judge's statements could hardly be
perceived as a stamp of approval because he later specifically instructed
.the jury to decide whether the Government's conduct had been appropriate. This latter instruction, rather than prejudicing the defendant,
interposed an additional obstacle to conviction. 31 2 The court further
noted that the trial judge had ended his discussion of the propriety of
the Government's action with the statement: "'Even if you decide
[that the Government's conduct] was appropriate. . . you must then
decide. . . was this the unwary criminal, or was it the unwary innocent
3304. Id at 1301.
3305. Id
3306. Id
3307. Id
3308. Id
3309. Id (citing United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 84 (5th Cir. 1979); Notaro v. United
States, 363 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966)).
3310. 682 F.2d at 1301-02. The trial judge had commented that the Government may
permissibly afford the opportunity and facilities for the commission of a crime and may
employ artifice and stratagem in the process. The court stated that this instruction was not
inconsistent with the law. Id (citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1932)).
3311. 682 F.2d at 1302.
3312. Id
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on whom the government brought its investigative techniques to
bear?' "3313 The Ninth Circuit felt that this made clear to the jury that

regardless of whether the Government acted properly, the jury still had
to decide whether the defendants were predisposed to commit the
charged offense.331 4
The defendants' final claim was that the trial judge failed to com-

ply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30.3315 They argued that
the ultimate instructions on multiple conspiracy and entrapment were
significantly different from the instructions which the court initially indicated it would deliver, and that this prejudiced their cases.33 16
The Ninth Circuit, however, reiterated that the jury had been

properly instructed on the law of entrapment and multiple conspiracies.33 17 It held that nothing in the record indicated that counsel was
misled by the district court's indication of the instructions it would deliver to the jury, or that Rule 30 was otherwise violated.3 3 18
In UnitedStates v. Wilder,3 3 19 the defendant, an admitted tax pro-

tester, was convicted of refusing to report his 1975 income. On appeal,
he argued that the jury instructions applied incorrect legal standards,

ex post facto laws by applying
and offended the prohibition against
3320
present law to his past offense.
The Ninth Circuit held that Wilder's arguments were frivolous.33 21

In affirming his conviction, the court stated that the case relied upon by
the trial court in formulating its instructions did not represent a radical,
sufficient to implicate the ex
unforeseeable departure from prior 3law
322
post facto clause of the Constitution.
3313. Id
3314. Id
3315. Id FED. R. CRM. P. 30 provides in part that:
[A]ny party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law
The court shall inform counsel of its proposed
as set forth in the requests. ...
action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury, but the court shall
instruct the jury after the arguments are completed.
3316. 682 F.2d at 1302.
3317. Id at 1302-03.
3318. Id at 1303.
3319. 680 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1982).
3320. Id at 60.
3321. Id
3322. Id The trial court had used United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980), to formulate its instructions. The Neff court held that the fifth
amendment did not provide a valid defense in a prosecution for willful failure to file income
tax returns, since questions asked of the defendant on the tax form did not of themselves
suggest that the response would be incriminating. Id at 1238. The Neff court also noted
that the defendant's "refusal to complete the forms was motivated by a desire to protest
taxes, rather than a fear of self-incrimination." Id at 1240.
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These decisions demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit will review

jury instructions as a whole. It therefore affords the trial judge substantial latitude in tailoring instructions, as long as they adequately cover
the defendant's theory of the case.3323
b.

addict-witness

If a witness is a heroin addict, an addict-witness instruction is appropriate.3324 Such an instruction, however, is unnecessary in several
situations, such as when the addiction is disputed, 325 when the defense
the addiction,3 32 6 or when
adequately cross-examines the witness about
3327

another cautionary instruction is given.

In United States v. Ochoa-Sanchez,3 32 8 the defendant was con-

victed of illegally importing and possessing a controlled substance with
the intent to distribute. At trial, an informant witness testified that he
had been addicted to heroin, but claimed that he had not used the drug

for four weeks. 3329 On appeal, Ochoa-Sanchez claimed that the trial
court had erred by refusing to instruct the jury concerning its evaluation of the testimony of the addict. 3330 The Ninth Circuit, however,
held that the trial court had not abused its discretion by refusing the

requested instructions because present addiction had not been established, defense counsel had vigorously cross-examined the informant

about his drug use,3331 and the trial judge had given other cautionary
instructions.3332
3323. See United States v. James, 576 F.2d 223, 226-27 (9th Cir. 1978).
3324. Guam v. Dela Rosa, 644 F.2d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bernard,
625 F.2d 854, 858-59 (9th Cir. 1980).
3325. United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1034 (1980).
3326. United States v. Hoppe, 645 F.2d 630, 633 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 849
(1981) (citing United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1034 (1980) (witness' addiction in dispute, cross examination gave jury opportunity to
evaluate the testimony)).
3327. United States v. Tousant, 619 F.2d 810, 812 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally United
States v. Hoppe, 645 F.2d 630, 633 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 849 (1981).
3328. 676 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 219 (1982).
3329. Id at 1289.
3330. Id
3331. Id Defense counsel also had the witness show the needle marks on his arm to the
jury.
3332. Id (citing United States v. Tousant, 619 F.2d 810, 812 (9th Cir. 1980) (jury told to
consider witness' potential prejudice against defendant due to status as an immunized
witness)).
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c. missing witness
A missing witness instruction informs the jury that, if it is peculiarly within the power of either the prosecution or the defense to produce a material witness, failure to call that witness allows the jury to
draw an inference that his testimony would be unfavorable to that
party.33 33 A missing witness instruction is proper only if "from all circumstances an inference of unfavorable testimony from an absent wit3334
ness is a natural and reasonable one.
In United States v. Bramble,3 3 5 the defendant was convicted of
possessing with intent to distribute and of distributing cocaine. He admitted the sale, which was made to an agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration. Bramble argued, however, that he had been entrapped, stating that the only reason he had sold the cocaine was to stop
repeated phone calls made to him by an informant working with the
DEA.333 6 Prior to trial, the prosecution told defense counsel that the
informant was available for the defense to call if it so desired. Defense
counsel then interviewed the informant, but decided not to call him as
a witness. 3 33 7 At the conclusion of the trial, however, defense counsel
requested a missing witness instruction, which the court refused.3 3 8
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court had correctly
refused the instruction. 3339 The court noted that defense counsel had
told the witness that his presence was not desired at trial and then had
attempted to use the witness' absence to Bramble's advantage. The
court stated that an inference of unfavorable testimony in this case
would neither be natural nor reasonable. 33 4 The court held that a
missing witness instruction under these circumstances would have mis3333. One such instruction, taken from 1 DEvTT & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE
reads in part:
the prosecution or the defense to produce a
witness who could give material testimony on an issue in the case, failure to call
that witness may give rise to an inference that his testimony would be unfavorable
to that party ....
The jury will always bear in mind that the law never imposes on a defendant
in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any
evidence.
3334. United States v. Long, 533 F.2d 505, 509 (9th Cir.) (citing Burgess v. United States,
440 F.2d 226, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976)).
3335. 680 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 493 (1982).
3336. Id. at 591.
3337. Id
3338. Id
3339. Id at 592.
3340. Id.
AND INSTRUCTIONS § 17.19 (3d ed. 1977),
If it is. . .within the power of either
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led the jury, and accordingly affirmed the conviction.3341
d

multiple conspiracy

If it is possible for the jury to find that multiple conspiracies ex3 342
isted, the court should instruct the jury with respect to this finding.
Conversely, a request for instructions on multiple conspiracy is properly rejected if there is no evidence in the case to support such a
43
33

theory.
In United States v. Williams,3 34 the defendant was convicted of

conspiring to collect a debt by extortionate means. On appeal, Williams contended that because the trier of fact could have found that his
co-conspirator was involved in a conspiracy separate from the one alleged against Williams, the trial judge erred in refusing to give the jury
a requested instruction on multiple conspiracy. 3345 The Ninth Circuit
held that the trial judge properly refused the jury instruction. 3346 The

court stated that there can only be a conspiracy if there is an agreement
between two or more persons, 3347 and here there was no evidence that
the co-conspirator's actions
were the result of an agreement between
334 8

him and another party.
In United States v. Kaiser,3 34 9 five defendants were convicted of

conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute heroin.
On appeal, defendants Schafer and Remsing contended that the trial
court erred in refusing to give their requested multiple conspiracy instruction.3350 Testimony at trial indicated that defendants House and

Schafer had obtained heroin from Remsing, and that they later sold the
3341. Id
3342. United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 518 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing United States v.
Perry, 550 F.2d 524, 533 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977)).
3343. United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1230 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839
(1976) (citing States v. Noah, 475 F.2d 688, 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1095 (1973)).
See also United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 199
(3d Cir. 1970) (because the record could support a finding of no more than a single continuing conspiracy, multiple conspiracy instructions properly refused by trial court).
court).
3344. 668 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1982).
3345. Id at 1071.
3346. Id
3347. Id (citing United States v. Andreen, 628 F.2d 1236, 1248 (9th Cir. 1980)).
3348. 668 F.2d at 1071. The court noted that although a jury could have reasonably concluded from the evidence that Williams' co-conspirator, Marcheselli, attempted to obtain
additional money from the loan sharking as an independent undertaking, there was no evidence of conspiracy between Marcheselli and a third party. Id
3349. 660 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1121 (1982).
3350. Id at 730.
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heroin to an undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration.33 5' Additionally, in separate transactions, defendants Acosta and
Kaiser sold heroin to an informant working with the DEA.33 52 The
Ninth Circuit held that since no evidence of multiple conspiracies was
presented, 3353 it was therefore proper to refuse the requested
instructions.33 54
These decisions demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit will not require a trial judge to instruct the jury on the issue of multiple conspiracy unless some evidence is presented to enable the jury to find that
multiple conspiracies existed.
e. defenses
A defendant is entitled to have the jury consider any theory of
defense which is supported by law and has some foundation in the evidence, even though such evidence may be weak or of doubtful credibility.3355 However, it is the settled law of the Ninth Circuit that the trial
judge has the duty of determining whether the elements of the defense
present an issue of fact for the jury.33 56
In United States v. Shapiro,3357 defendants Howard and Shapiro
were convicted of conspiring to possess and possessing cocaine with
intent to distribute. The conviction was based upon an incident in
which they and Shapiro's husband agreed to and then delivered a
quantity of cocaine to undercover agents of the DEA. 335 s At trial, Shapiro proffered a defense of duress, alleging that her husband had
threatened her, and had told her that their lives were in danger unless
they engaged in the transaction.33 5 9 Shapiro and Howard also proffered a defense of entrapment, contending that there was sufficient evi.dence of Government inducement to place the issue of entrapment
3351. Id at 729.
3352. Id Remsing and Schafer argued that the Government had proved multiple conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy charged. However, the Government was unable to tie
the sales by Acosta and Kaiser either to each other or to Remsing because of the evidentiary
rulings. Id at 731.
3353. Id at 730.
3354. Id
3355. United States ex rel. Peery v. Sielaff, 615 F.2d 402, 403 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 940 (1980); United States v. Lehman, 468 F.2d 93, 108 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 409
U.S. 967 (1972).
3356. United States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d 731, 738 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Glaeser,
550 F.2d 483, 487 (9th Cir. 1977).
3357. 669 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1982).
3358. Id at 595.
3359. Id at 596.
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before the36jury.336 ° The trial court refused to instruct the jury on both
defenses.

3

1

The Ninth Circuit first stated that to establish a defense of duress,

a defendant must show that: (1) she was under an immediate threat of
death or serious injury; (2) she had a well grounded fear that the threat
would be carried out; and (3) she had no reasonable opportunity to
escape. 3362 It then determined that Shapiro had offered no evidence of
the immediacy of the threatened harm3 363 or of the lack of a reasonable
opportunity to escape.3 364 It therefore held that Shapiro's offer of proof

court had been
was insufficient as a matter of law, and that the 33trial
65
correct in refusing to instruct the jury on duress.

The Ninth Circuit then turned to the issue of entrapment and determined that because Shapiro offered no evidence that she was en-

trapped, it would only consider the issue with respect to Howard. 3366 It

stated that an entrapment instruction is appropriate when the defend-

ant offers some evidence of inducement or persuasion by a government
agent, and some evidence contradicting the Government's showing of
predisposition. 33 67 Because Howard was unable to do either, it held

court was correct in refusing an entrapment
that the trial
3368
instruction.

In UnitedStates v. Fleishman,3369the defendants were convicted of
drug-related offenses. Defendant Fleishman had been introduced to a
3360. Id at 598.
3361. Id at 596-97.
3362. Id at 596 (citing United States v. Gordon, 526 F.2d 406, 407 (9th Cir. 1975)).
3363. 669 F.2d at 596 & n.3. Shapiro's counsel never stated that anyone threatened Shapiro with immediate bodily harm. Assertions that Shapiro's husband had said that "their"
lives were in danger indicated that the alleged threat came from third persons. Evidence in
the record showed, however, that the Shapiros were alone in their apartment prior to the
cocaine transaction; thus, no one was present to enforce the threat. Id
3364. Id at 596-97 & n.4. The record showed that Shapiro lived in a multi-unit apartment
building, had a working telephone, and went outside alone to meet the undercover agents.
She could, therefore, have locked the door to her apartment and called the police, gone to a
neighboring apartment for help, or simply left the building without going to meet the waiting agents. Id
3365. Id at 596-97.
3366. Id at 597. In fact, the undercover officer testified that he did not even know initially
if Shapiro was involved in the drug transaction. Further, Shapiro had no standing to litigate
whether Howard was entrapped since the Ninth Circuit does not recognize a concept of
derivative entrapment. Id at 597-98 (citing United States v. Glaeser, 550 F.2d 483, 486 n.2
(9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Castanon, 453 F.2d 932, 934 n.l (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 922 (1972); Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944, 947-48 (9th Cir. 1968)).
3367. 669 F.2d at 598.
3368. Id
3369. 684 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 464 (1982).
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DEA agent by a paid informant. At this meeting, Fleishman offered to
sell the agent ten pounds of cocaine, and indicated that he had partners
in the deal.3 370 Several conversations ensued concerning money and
chemical analysis of the drugs, and the parties agreed upon a meeting
place for the sale. 337 1 After counting the money brought by the DEA
agent, Fleishman left the room of the Pacifica Hotel where they had
met, and was observed by another DEA agent speaking with defendants Green and Combs in the lobby. Fleishman then returned to the
room, and told the agent that his partners were reluctant to make the
deal.3 372 The agent insisted on the deal going through, and Fleishman
once more left the room. He was observed going to a nearby Ramada
Inn, but returned within fifteen minutes to tell the waiting agent that
only a part of the cocaine would be delivered, the rest to follow if the
first transaction went smoothly. 3373 Fleishman returned once more to
the Ramada Inn and came back to the Pacifica with 480 grams of co3 374
caine, whereupon he was arrested.
On appeal, Fleishman argued that it was error for the trial court to
have refused his proposed entrapment instruction.3 37 5 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that in reviewing a defendant's conviction, the proper focus is on the defendant's disposition to commit the
crime rather than on the character of the government agent's actions. 3 76 The court noted that there was no evidence to suggest that
the defendant was initially unwilling to commit the crime, and that
"'[m]ere assistance by government agents in the commission of a crime
• ..is insufficient to raise the issue of entrapment.' "3377 It therefore
3370. Id at 1332.
3371. Id. at 1333.
3372. Id
3373. Id
3374. Id at 1333-34.
3375. Id at 1342. Additionally, Green argued that the trial court erred in rejecting his
proposed jury instructions regarding the Government's burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Rather than giving the requested instruction, which was taken from 1 DEvITr &
BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 11.14 (3d ed. 1977), the court

gave a modified version of that instruction. The Ninth Circuit held that this did not constitute reversible error, since instructions need not be given in the precise language requested
by the defendant so long as the instruction as a whole adequately covers the theory of the
defense. Id at 1341-42. See supra notes 3282-84 and accompanying text.
3376. Id at 1342 (citing United States v. Shapiro, 669 F.2d 593, 597 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendant's lack of predisposition is crux of entrapment defense); United States v. Diggs, 649
F.2d 731, 738 (9th Cir.) (evidence must suggest defendant was initially unwilling to commit
crime), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 970 (1981)).
3377. 684 F.2d at 1342 (quoting United States v. Ratcliffe, 550 F.2d 431, 434 (9th Cir.
1976)).
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held that Fleishman's criminal predisposition 3378 eliminated entrapment as a potential defense.3379
The above cases support the general proposition that if the defendant fails to sustain his initial burden of presenting evidence to support
his theory of defense, the court must not instruct the jury on the defense. This principle is consistent with prior rulings of the Ninth Circuit 3380 as well as other circuits. 3381 Therefore, it is error for the court
to instruct upon a defense if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of
law.3382 In such cases, the trial court is correct in both excluding the
evidence3383 and in refusing jury instructions on that defense.3384
f

lesser included offenses

The Supreme Court has recently considered whether due process
requires that a jury be instructed on a lesser included offense when the
defendant's own evidence negates the possibility that such an instruction might have been warranted.
In Hopper v. Evans,3385 Evans was convicted of murder in Ala3378. Fleishman had bragged of his experience in counting large amounts of money, informed agents that he had engaged in a large amount of narcotics dealing, and demonstrated his familiarity with prices and the means of supplying narcotics. 684 F.2d at 1343.
3379. Id
3380. United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1979) (right to such instruction
exists when supported by the law and the evidence), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980); United
States v. Wright, 593 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1979) (defendant is entitled to jury instructions on a
legitimate theory of defense if there is evidence before the jury to support it); United States
v. Winn, 577 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant entitled to instruction on defense theory
only if supported by law and has some foundation in evidence); United States v. Nevitt, 563
F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant entitled to instruction if record contains evidentiary
support for theory), af'd,595 F.2d 1230, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979).
3381. United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 (1981)
(instruction proper if defense theory has some foundation in the evidence, however tenuous); United States ex rel. Means v. Solem, 646 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1980) (defendant entitled
to instruction on theory of case if there is evidence to support it); United States v. Prazak,
623 F.2d 152 (10th Cir.) (no instruction required on defendant's theory of defense when
there is no support for it in the evidence or the law), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 880 (1980); United
States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir.) (defendant's "theory of the case" must have foundation in evidence and legal support), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979); United States v.
Cullen, 454 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1971) (defense theory must have both legal and evidentiary
support before jury will be instructed upon defense).
3382. See United States v. Glaeser, 550 F.2d 483, 487 (9th Cir. 1977) (court justified in
ruling against entrapment as a matter of law when no jury could reasonably doubt defendant was predisposed to commit crime).
3383. Id
3384. See United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 386-88 (7th Cir. 1976) (when defendant
failed to present evidence to support defense, court did not err in withdrawing the defense
from the jury's consideration), cer. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
3385. 456 U.S. 605 (1982).
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bama following a crime spree spanning seven states. Fully advised of
his constitutional rights, Evans signed a detailed written confession,
and later admitted his guilt at trial.3 38 6 He told the jury he felt no
remorse and would return to a life of crime if permitted. He then asked
3387
the jury for the death sentence.

Pursuant to a state statute, which was subsequently invalidated, 33 88
the jury was precluded from considering lesser included offenses in a
capital case, leaving the jury with only two options. It could either
convict Evans and sentence him to death, or it could return a verdict of
not guilty. The jury returned a verdict of guilty in less than fifteen
minutes.3 3 89
After trial, Evans decided that he did not want to be executed. He
appealed on the ground that he had been convicted and sentenced

under a statute which unconstitutionally precluded jury consideration
of lesser included offenses. The district court denied Evans' habeas
corpus petition.33 90 Subsequently, in Beck v. Alabama,3 the Supreme
Court held that in a capital case, due process requires that the jury be

permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included non-capital
offense, provided that the evidence supports such a verdict. 3392 The
Fifth Circuit, relying on Beck, reversed the district court's denial of
33 93

relief.

The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, stating that the
Beck holding applied only in cases where there was evidence which, if
believed, could reasonably have led to a verdict of guilt of a lesser included offense. 33 94 The Court rejected Evans' contention that the jury
3386. Id at 607.
3387. Id at 607-08.
3388. ALA. CODE § 13-11-2(a)(2) (1975) (invalidated in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625
(1980)).
3389. 456 U.S. at 608.
3390. Id at 609 (citing Evans v. Britton, 472 F. Supp. 707, 711-12 (S.D. Ala. 1979)).
3391. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
3392. Id at 637. In Beck, the defendant claimed that while he was attempting to tie up a
robbery victim, his accomplice unexpectedly struck and killed the man. The State conceded
that, except for the preclusion clause, Beck would have been entitled to an instruction on the
lesser included, non-capital offense of felony murder. Id at 629-30.
3393. 456 U.S. at 609-10 (citing Evans v. Britton, 628 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1980), modfed,
639 F.2d 221 (1981)). The Fifth Circuit placed great emphasis on the Supreme Court's
statement in Beck that "in every case" the preclusion clause introduces a level of uncertainty
to the proceedings. 628 F.2d at 401, modfled, 639 F.2d at 223-24. The Supreme Court in
Evans, however, stated that its decision in Beck only applied to "every case" where the
evidence would have supported a guilty verdict of a lesser included non-capital offense. 456
U.S. at 610.
3394. Id The Supreme Court held that the Beck ruling requires that a lesser included
offense instruction be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction. 456 U.S.
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could have convicted him of a non-capital offense, stating that a conviction of this offense was warranted only when there was no evidence
of an intent to kill. 3395 Because the evidence in Evans' case not only
supported the claim that Evans intended to kill the victim, but affirmatively negated any claim that he did not intend to do so, the Court
concluded that no jury could reasonably have convicted Evans of any
lesser offense.33 96 It therefore held that an instruction on the lesser offense of unintentional killing was not warranted, and that the Alabama
preclusion clause did not prejudice the defendant in any way.
The underlying rationale of the Evans decision is that due process
requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given only when
the evidence warrants such an instruction. The lower courts have construed this decision narrowly. They have interpreted it as stating in
due process language the well-settled rule that when the evidence does
not provide a rational basis for a jury to find the elements necessary to
support a lesser included offense instruction, the trial court may properly decline to give such an instruction. 339 The Evans decision does
not represent a newly recognized constitutional right,3399 nor does it
at 611. Otherwise, arbitrary and capricious results could occur, such as the defendant being
convicted of a lesser offense when the evidence warranted a conviction of first degree murder. Id (citing Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334 (1976) (plurality opinion)). The
Court stated that giving a lesser included offense instruction only when the evidence warrants it channels the jury's discretion so that it may convict a defendant of any crime fairly
supported by the evidence. 456 U.S. at 611.
3395. ALA. CODE § 13-1-70 (1975) makes a "homicide. . . committed in the perpetration
of, or attempt to perpetrate any.. . robbery" a non-capital offense. However, because a
conviction is warranted under this section only when a defendant lacks intent to kill, it was
unavailable to Evans because of his testimony at trial that he intentionally killed his victim.
456 U.S. at 612-13.
3396. 456 U.S. at 613.
3397. Id at 613-14. Evans had argued that the mere existence of the preclusion clause had
"infected" his trial, necessitating retrial and possible admission of evidence of some lesser
included offense. The Court, although recognizing the possible validity of such an argument
in another factual situation, stated that Evans' confession and plea of guilty to capital murder prevented him from successfully maintaining this argument. Id. Cf. Beck v. Alabama,
447 U.S. 625 (1980), in which the Court concluded that a jury might have convicted Beck,
but also might have rejected capital punishment if it believed Beck's testimony that he was
guilty of only felony murder. See supra note 3392.
3398. See United States v. Neiss, 684 F.2d 570, 571 (8th Cir. 1982) (trial court may properly exclude instruction which does not have rational basis in the evidence); United States v.
Elk, 658 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1981) (defendant not entitled to lesser-included offense
instruction unless evidence provides a rational basis upon which jury could find him guilty
of the lesser but not guilty of the greater offense).
3399. Look v. Amaral, 546 F. Supp. 858, 859 (D. Mass. 1982) (for many years courts have
recognized jury must be instructed concerning lesser included offenses if there exists a rational basis for such a charge).
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create a new limitation on the right of a defendant to a lesser included
offense instruction.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the Evans decision was
unanimous to the extent that it held lesser included offense instructions
unnecessary when the defendant's own evidence would prevent a reasonable jury from finding him guilty of the lesser offense but not guilty
of the greater. 3400 It is safe to assume, therefore, that the rationale underlying Evans will not be questioned in the near future.
The Ninth Circuit has held that a defendant is entitled to a lesser
included offense instruction if. (1) a lesser included offense is identified
within the charged offense; and (2) a rational jury could find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense but not guilty of the greater
offense.3 4°" In United States v. Skinner,3 4 2 the court found that the
second prong of this test was not met. 34 03 Defendant Skinner was convicted of first degree murder. At trial, he admitted to shooting the victim,-but argued that the shooting was in self-defense. 34° The trial judge
gave instructions covering first and second degree murder, voluntary
manslaughter, and self-defense, but refused to give an instruction on
involuntary manslaughter.3 °5 Skinner assigned this as error, arguing
that the shooting was unintentional because it was a lawful act of selfdefense done in an unlawful manner due to Skinner's use of excessive
3406
force in defending himself.
The Ninth Circuit, however, stated that although such an "imperfect self-defense" theory could reduce an intentional killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter, it could not support a conviction of
involuntary manslaughter because a killing committed in self-defense
is always intentional. 3407 The court therefore held that because no rational jury could acquit Skinner of the intentional offenses and then
convict him of the unintentional offense of involuntary manslaughter,
he was not entitled to the requested involuntary manslaughter
3400. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in part and dissented in part. Their dissent was based upon their belief that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. 456 U.S. at 614. (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
3401. United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 1980).
3402. 667 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1982).
3403. Id at 1309.
3404. I.d
3405. Id
3406. Id at 1310.
3407. Id (citing ToRcr, WHARTON'S C~iMNrNA. LAW § 165 (14th ed. 1979); LAFAVE AND
SCOTT, CRIMNAL LAW §§ 53, 77 (lst ed. 1972)).
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instruction.3 4 °8
In United States v. Skeet,340 9 the defendant was convicted of assault resulting in serious bodily harm. Skeet had engaged in an argument with his brother Robert and Robert's common-law wife. Skeet
took out a gun and fired a shot between the two. Robert then tried to
grab the pistol, but Skeet moved back and appeared to stumble. At this
point, the gun went off again, and Robert was hit in the neck.3 41 0
On appeal, Skeet contended that the jury could have found from
the evidence that there were two separate assaults: the first when a shot
went between Robert and his wife, and the second when the shot was
fired which struck and injured Robert.34 11 Only the second assault
would permit a conviction of the charge as set out in the indictment,
and Skeet asserted that this second shot was accidental.3 41 2 Therefore,
Skeet argued that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser

included offense of assault and that the instruction to the jury that "fear
on the part of
the victim is not an essential element of the crime" was
3
erroneous.

341

In reversing the trial court's decision, the Ninth Circuit stated that
because the jury could have found that the shot fired between Robert

and his wife constituted only a simple assault, an instruction on this
lesser included offense should have been given.34 14 Accordingly, the
court concluded that the jury should have been charged on the ele3408. 667 F.2d at 1310. Skinner also disputed the trial judge's phrasing of several instructions, but the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the general proposition that jury instructions need not
be given in the precise language requested by the defendant. Id (citing United States v.
Lee, 589 F.2d 980, 985 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 969 (1979)). The court held that the
"[t]rial judge's instructions, given in clear and understandable language, contained the same
points as Skinner's requested instructions." 667 F.2d at 1310.
3409. 665 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1982).
3410. Id. at 984.
3411. Id at 986.
3412. Id
3413. Id Assault consists of "a threat to inflict injury upon the person of another which,
when coupled with an apparent present ability, causes a reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm." United States v. Dupree, 544 F.2d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir. 1976); see United
States v. Rizzo, 409 F.2d 400, 403 (9th Cir. 1969) (assault committed by putting another in
apprehension of harm, whether or not actor intends to inflict harm). However, the crime of
assault resulting in serious bodily harm requires only that there have been a willful infliction
of injury. United States v. Dupree, 544 F.2d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 1976); see United States v.
Bell, 505 F.2d 539, 541 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1974). In Bell, the court distinguished between two types of assault: attempted battery and putting the victim in reasonable apprehension of harm. Apprehension on the part of the victim is not an essential
element of an assault involving an attempted battery.
3414. 665 F.2d at 987.
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ments and definition of each assault.341 5 It stated that the trial court's
instruction concerning the lack of necessity of fear on the part of the
victim was incorrect, since simple assault requires "a reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm.13 4 16 Because of these errors, the
341 7
court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.
In United States v. Mni, 341 8 the defendant was convicted of assaulting a fellow prison inmate with intent to commit murder. The victim had been stabbed repeatedly with a knife as he lay asleep in his
cell. On appeal, Muniz cited as error the trial court's refusal to give a
requested instruction that would have allowed the jury to find Muniz
guilty of the lesser included offense of assault with a dangerous weapon
with intent to do bodily harm.34 19
At trial, the Government had relied upon the viciousness of the
attack and the severity of the wounds the victim suffered to establish
the requisite intent to commit murder. Muniz's defense, however, had
not been based on a lack of intent to commit murder, but rather on the
contention that he was not the assailant. 3420 The trial judge had concluded that, based on the evidence, no rational jury could find that
whoever had attacked the victim had done so with the intent "merely"
to commit bodily harm rather than with the intent to commit
murder. 42
After reviewing the elements which are necessary for a defendant
to be entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense,34 22 the
Ninth Circuit stated that the only issue in the case relating to a lesser
included offense was whether Muniz had established that a rational
jury could have found him guilty of the lesser offense and not guilty of
the greater.34 23 The court noted that in determining the answer to this
3424
question, the court must look to the evidence in the case before it.
3415. Id
3416. Id at 986.
3417. Id at 987.
3418. 684 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982).
3419. Id at 636.
3420. Id
3421. Id
3422. Id See supra note 124 and accompanying text. The court noted that 18 U.S.C.
§ 113(c) (assault with intent to commit bodily harm) may be a lesser included offense of
§ 113(a) (assault with intent to commit murder), for which Muniz was convicted. See
United States v. Stolarz, 550 F.2d 488, 491 (9th Cir.) (instruction on lesser included offense
of assault with intent to commit bodily harm held to be appropriate), cert.denied, 434 U.S.
851 (1977).
3423. 684 F.2d at 637.
3424. Id (citing United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 1980)).
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Having done so, the court affirmed the trial court's refusal to give the
lesser included instruction.3 4 25

These cases demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit will allow a defendant a lesser included offense instruction if the jury could have rationally found that not all of the elements of the greater offense had
been proved, but that all of the elements of the lesser included offense
had been proved. 34 26 Thus, if the evidence is capable of more than one

reasonable interpretation, the lesser included offense instruction should
be given.3427
2.

Clarity as to burden of proof

In criminal cases, the Government is required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime. Accordingly, an
instruction which shifts the burden of proof to the defendant on any of
these elements is erroneous.3428
3 42 9 the defendant had been
In United States v. Dearmore,
con-

victed of conspiring to attempt bank robbery and attempted bank robbery. At trial, Dearmore supplied sufficient evidence to the court to
support his defense of entrapment, 3430 and therefore his request for an
instruction on entrapment was granted.343 ' On appeal, Dearmore contended that the trial court had failed to make clear in its instructions to
the jury that the Government had the duty of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Dearmore had not been entrapped.3432
The Ninth Circuit held that although the trial court had correctly
3425. 684 F.2d at 637. The court distinguished United States v. Stolarz, 550 F.2d 488 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1977), because the Stolarz court did not consider the severity of the victim's injuries, but simply mentioned that the victim had been stabbed. Id at
490. The Stolarz court based intent to impose harm on statements attributed to the defendant rather than on the severity of the victim's injuries. This distinction is important because
the Muniz court found the severity and the extent of the victim's injuries to be dispositive of
intent.
3426. See also Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965) (lesser included offense
instruction proper only where greater offense requires jury to find a disputed factual element
which is not requisite for conviction of the lesser included offense).
3427. See also United States v. Crutchfield, 547 F.2d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant
must show that evidence justifies giving of lesser-included offense instruction).
3428. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (recognizing the critical role that the burden
of proof plays in a criminal proceeding).
3429. 672 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1982).
3430. Id at 740. Dearmore was introduced by a police informant to two federal agents
posing as potential accomplices. The agents subsequently supplied a getaway vehicle and
money for disguises, and accompanied Dearmore to the bank on the morning the robbery
was planned to take place. Id at 739.
3431. Id at 740.
3432. Id.
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defined entrapment and correctly stated that the Government had to
prove that Dearmore had not been entrapped, the jury instructions

given did not clearly inform the jury of the requisite quantum of
proof.3 433 Accordingly, the court held that the instructions were not
3 434
adequate, and it reversed Dearmore's conviction.

This case demonstrates the Ninth Circuit's recognition that due
process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
"every fact necessary to constitute the crime."34' 35 Thus, any instruction
which shifts the burden of proof to the defendant on an essential ele-

ment of a crime is error.
3. Curative jury instructions
a. instructionsto disregard

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that although curative instructions are not always effective,3 43 6 the court must assume that the jury
followed the curative instruction. 3437 Instructions to disregard evidence
or to accept it for a limited purpose are best given when the testimony
is being introduced, since it is useless and prejudicial to permit the ju-

rors to digest the evidence for improper purposes for several days
before telling them to disregard it.34 38 The trial judge, however, is in

the best position to determine the probable impact of the evidence on
the jury, and his determination will not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion.34 39
In United States v. Sanford, 4 the defendant was convicted of

possessing, concealing, transferring, and delivering counterfeit Federal
Reserve notes. At trial, counsel for the Government prompted the key
3433. Id at 740-41 (citing United States v. Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051, 1054-55 & n.3
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923 (1976); Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169, 174-76
(9th Cir. 1966) (prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has
not been entrapped once there is sufficient evidence of entrapment)).
3434. 672 F.2d at 741. See also United States v. Alston, 551 F.2d 315, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(defendant entitled to specific instructions on burden of proof); United States v. Ambrose,
483 F.2d 742, 753 (6th Cir. 1973) (jury must be told that the Government has the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped).
3435. Gibson v. Spalding, 665 F.2d at 867 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
3436. United States v. Johnson, 618 F.2d 60, 62 (9th Cir. 1980).
3437. Id at 62; United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1074 (1979); United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1366 (9th Cir. 1978).
3438. R. McBRIDE, THE ART OF INSTRUCTING THE JURY 43 (1969).
3439. United States v. Bagley, 641 F.2d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 942
(1981); United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 777 (9th Cir. 1980).
3440. 673 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1982).
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prosecution witness to reveal that he had a heart condition. 344 1 The
trial judge, in the presence of the jury, ruled the testimony irrelevant
and excluded it, but only after he had initially let in the evidence. 3 " 2
He then reaffirmed the exclusion of the evidence
by telling the jury to
344 3
disregard any evidence stricken by the court.
The Ninth Circuit stated that the forcefulness of the instruction
and the conviction with which it is given must be weighed against the
danger of prejudice generated by the evidence. 34 " It then held that the
two instructions given by the trial judge clearly outweighed any minor
prejudice that may have been caused by disclosure of the witness' heart
condition.3 " 5
In United States v. Muniz,3 4 6 the defendant was convicted of assaulting a fellow prison inmate with intent to commit murder. At trial,
the Government attempted to question Muniz about his silence following the assault, even though Muniz had been given Miranda warnings. 3" 7 Defense counsel objected to this line of questioning. After the
objection, the court recessed for lunch. When the trial resumed, the
court, at the Government's request, instructed the jury to disregard the
questioning concerning Muniz's prior silence. 3 "8
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected Muniz's claim that he had
been prejudiced by the prosecution's line of questioning. The court
noted that the trial judge, in instructing the jury to disregard the five
minutes of questioning occurring directly before the recess, had not
highlighted the question. Additionally, Muniz had not been required
to answer the question. 3 4 9 This, combined with the Government's failure to refer to the question in closing argument, rendered any error in
3441. Id at 1071.
3442. Id at 1072.
3443. Id.
3444. Id The court relied on United States v. Johnson, 618 F.2d 60, 62 (9th Cir. 1980). See
also United States v. Metz, 625 F.2d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 1980) (court's instructions to jury
were sufficient to remove any prejudice to defendant); United States v. Taylor, 603 F.2d 732,
735-36 (8th Cir.) (court's instructions, viewed in totality, were sufficient to cure any error in
the introduction of evidence), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 982 (1979); United States v. Eng, 241
F.2d 157, 160-61 (2d Cir. 1957) (judge's comments following belated instructions to jury
removed all force from those curative instructions).
3445. 673 F.2d at 1072. The court noted that the prosecution's witness, Jones, had agreed
to cooperate with the Government only after his own arrest. The jury was made aware of
this by testimony during the course of the trial, and the Ninth Circuit stated that such a
witness is not likely to arouse as much sympathy as the victim of a crime. Id
3446. 684 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982).
3447. Id at 637.
3448. Id
3449. Id at 637-38.
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the question itself harmless. 3450
In UnitedStates v. Spawr OpticalResearch,Inc.,
two individual
defendants and their family-owned corporation were convicted of unlicensed export of laser mirrors to the Soviet Union. On the first day of
jury deliberations, one of the national networks broadcasted an interview conducted three months earlier in which one of the prosecutors
spoke generally about the Government's investigations into export violations.345 2 Although neither the Spawrs nor laser mirror sales were
mentioned, the network juxtaposed the interview with a film showing
the Spawrs leaving the courthouse.34 53
On appeal, the Spawrs claimed that they were prejudiced by this
national broadcast.3 4 54 The Ninth Circuit disagreed. The court noted
that the prosecutor informed the trial judge of the existence of the interview early in the proceedings, and also of the date of the broadcast
as soon as he learned it.3 455 The trial judge thereupon considered various alternatives 3456 before deciding to instruct the jury not to watch any
news program on the particular television channel or to talk to anyone
who might have.34 57 The Ninth Circuit held that, absent a showing to
the contrary, it must assume that the jury followed the trial court's instructions, 3458 and therefore affirmed the defendants' convictions.
These cases show that the Ninth Circuit will rarely consider a jury
unable to follow an instruction to disregard evidence. Instead, it will
weigh the forcefulness with which an instruction is given against the
prejudice to the defendant from the evidence, and it will usually conclude that the jury followed the trial court's instructions.
3450. Id at 638.
3451. 685 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1875 (1983).
3452. Id. at 1082.
3453. Id
3454. Id The Spawrs also contended that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to
equate value of the lasers with the selling price in deciding whether they had misrepresented
facts in Shippers Export declarations. Id at 1083. The Ninth Circuit rejected this claim,
because the export regulations expressly equated value with the selling price when the goods
were already sold upon shipping. Id See 15 C.F.R. § 30.7(q)(1) (1976). Additionally, one
of the Spawrs' former employees testified that the value of the laser mirrors had been intentionally understated in order to evade the export restrictions. 685 F.2d at 1083.
3455. Id at 1082.
3456. The alternatives considered included sequestration of the jury. Id
3457. Id
3458. Id (citing Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1968) (jury is
presumed to have conscientiously observed limiting instructions given by the court)).
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limiting evidentiary instructions

Evidence may be admissible for one purpose even though it is
inadmissible for another. 345 9 However, the trial court is not required to
give a limiting instruction to the jury unless counsel requests one.3460
In United States v. Tham, 341 the defendant was convicted of embezzling union assets and of making false entries in union records. At

trial, the jury requested the court to reread the testimony by Tham's
witness, a labor lawyer who had participated in drafting the union bylaws.3 462 The Government then requested additional instructions,
which the trial court granted, to the effect that although the jury was
entitled to rehear the testimony, it should follow the court's instructions

concerning the law, and not the witness' exposition of the law. 3463 The
Ninth Circuit rejected Tham's argument that the instruction implicitly
discredited the witness' testimony. The court followed general legal
principles which provide that the decision to give additional instruc-

tions rests with the discretion of the trial judge.34 "
In United States v. Regner,34 65 the defendant was convicted of mail

fraud. At trial, the Government was permitted, over Regner's objections, to inquire into Regner's prior claims for insurance benefits. The
3459. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), but f Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109
(1967). In Spencer, the Court held that evidence of past convictions, accompanied by an
instruction that such matters not be taken into account in determining the defendant's guilt
under the current offense, was not unconstitutional under the due process clause despite
possible collateral prejudice to the defendant. 385 U.S. at 564. In Burgett, the Court held
that under the circumstances of the case, evidence of prior convictions was inherently prejudicial, and that instructions did not render the constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 389 U.S. at 115.
3460. FED. R. EVID. 105 provides that "[w]hen evidence which is admissible as to one
party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is
admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct
the jury accordingly." See United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 904 (1978). In Drebin, the defendants contended that the court's failure to
give a limiting instruction was error. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that
the defendants had waived their objection by not requesting a limiting instruction at the
time the evidence was introduced. Id
3461. 665 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982).
3462. Id at 858.
3463. Id
3464. Id (citing United States v. Collom, 614 F.2d 624, 631 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 923 (1980)). The Ninth Circuit is not alone in taking this position. See, e.g.,
United States v. Andrew, 666 F.2d 915, 922 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Braverman, 522
F.2d 218, 224 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975); United States v. Jackson, 482 F.2d
1167, 1177 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1159 (1974); United States v. Gordon, 455
F.2d 398, 402 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 970 (1972); United States v. Wharton, 433
F.2d 451, 454 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
3465. 677 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 220 (1982).
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trial court admitted the inquiry for the limited purpose of rebutting
Regner's testimony on direct examination that he lacked knowledge of
how to file insurance claims.3" 6 6 Regner claimed on appeal that the

trial court erred in not giving an immediate instruction to the jury informing it of the limited admissibility, for credibility
purposes, of evi34 67

dence concerning Regner's prior insurance claims.

The Ninth Circuit first noted that Regner's counsel had not requested a limiting instruction during the trial but had only requested

that the record reflect that the evidence was being introduced for a limited purpose."6 s It then determined that Regner had failed to demon-

strate any prejudice because of the court's failure to give a limiting
instruction. 341 9 Finally, the court stated that Regner's guilt was established by evidence independent of the evidence of prior insurance

claims. 3470 Therefore, it held that any347failure
to give a limiting instruc1
tion did not constitute "plain error.
In United States v. Skinner,34 7 2 the defendant was convicted of first
degree murder. At trial, a Government witness testified on cross-examination that Skinner had once pulled a gun on him. 4 Skinner argued
that the trial court had abused its discretion by refusing to strike the
3474
testimony, or by failing to give a limiting instruction.

The Ninth Circuit stated that, although curative instructions
3466. Id at 756.
3467. Id at 757.
3468. Id
3469. Id The trial judge in open court had declared that "[t]he matter is material because
of the defendant's earlier testimony about seeming lack of knowledge of filing insurance
claims, and only for that purpose am I allowing it in." The Ninth Circuit interpreted this as
a limiting admonition, and stated that it served to weaken Regner's claim of prejudice. Id
3470. Id
3471. Id Under most circumstances, an appellate court will not consider a claim of error
based on the jury instructions, or lack thereof, in the absence of an objection at trial. Singer
v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 38 (1965). However, FED. R. CGlM. P. 52(b) provides that
"[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not
brought to the attention of the court." See United States v. Pariente, 558 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Roach, 321 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1963); Trussell v. United States, 278 F.2d
478 (6th Cir. 1960).
The power of reversal should be exercised only when it appears that an error may have
affected in a substantial degree the rights of the accused, and when essential to prevent a
miscarriage ofjustice. A conviction will not be disturbed on appeal when an examination of
"all four comers" of the record reveals that the error was not prejudicial. See United States
v. Johnson, 401 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1968) (per curiam); White v. United States, 394 F.2d 49
(9th Cir. 1968); Wall v. United States, 384 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1967); Johnson v. United
States, 362 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1966).
3472. 667 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
3473. Id at 1310.
3474. Id
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should be given when evidence is improperly admitted, 34 " the improper testimony in this case was neither the product of Government
misconduct nor developed through direct questioning by the Government.3476 The court also pointed out that defense counsel had called
another witness who explained and mitigated Skinner's actions. 3477 Finally, it noted that since the motion for a limiting instruction was made
later in the trial, an admonition to the jury only would have emphasized the testimony sought to be limited. 3478 The court held that these
circumstances justified the trial court's refusal to strike the testimony or
to give a limiting instruction.3479
In United States v. Gere,348 0 the defendant was charged with con-

spiring to commit mail fraud. At trial, the judge conditionally admitted evidence of Gere's alleged co-conspirator's statements with an
instruction that the jury was not to consider the statements until a conspiracy had been found beyond a reasonable doubt. 34 1 A no conspiracy finding was later made, but the trial judge failed to instruct the jury
to ignore the specific items of testimony conditionally admitted. Gere
contended on appeal that the trial judge's omission constituted plain
error.

34 82

The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that although
such an instruction should have been given, there was other evidence
legitimately before the jury which duplicated the conditionally admitted evidence.3 48 3 The court therefore held that failure to instruct the
jury to ignore the conditionally admitted evidence did not amount to
plain error.3484
3 48 5 the defendants were conIn United States v. Astorga-Torres,

victed of conspiring to distribute heroin. At trial, a co-conspirator testi3475. Id (citing United States v. Johnson, 618 F.2d 60, 62 (9th Cir. 1980)).
3476. 667 F.2d at 1310 (citing United States v. Green, 648 F.2d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Aims Back, 588 F.2d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1979)).
3477. 667 F.2d at 1310.
3478. Id The court apparently desired to avoid having to place undue emphasis on a
minor bit of evidence before the jury, despite its holding that the jury will be assumed to
follow curative instructions. See United States v. Johnson, 618 F.2d 60, 62 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1978), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 1074
(1979); United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1366 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom.
Mitchell v. United States, 439 U.S. 1068 (1979).
3479. 667 F.2d at 1310.
3480. 662 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1981).
3481. Id at 1294.
3482. Id at 1293.
3483. Id at 1295.
3484. Id
3485. 682 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 455 (1982).
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fled concerning drug sales and statements made prior to the existence

of any conspiracy between himself and the defendants. 3486 The defendants contended that the co-conspirator's testimony was inadmissible
hearsay. 348 7 The trial court, however, ruled that the co-conspirator's
statements were admissible, not as a narrative of facts or as proof that
he actually acted as he intended, but as evidence that he had the intent
8
of so doing.

348

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision that the testi-

mony was admissible, holding that an appropriate limiting instruction
had been given. The court stated that the testimony was properly admitted as evidence of intent, from which inferences as to intent could
properly be drawn by the jury.34 89
These cases demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit will rarely consider

that the trial court's failure to give a limiting instruction constitutes
plain error. Instead, the court will consider factors such as the failure

of defense counsel to request a limiting instruction, the absence of any
misconduct on the Government's part in generating the improper evidence, and the existence of independent evidence of the defendant's
guilt which sufficiently outweighs any prejudice to the defendant from

improper evidence.
4.

Review of jury instructions in the context of the case
a. harmless error

It is a well-accepted principle of law that a single instruction to the
jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the

context of the overall charge. 3490 Although an instruction may have
3486. Id at 1335.
3487. Id.
3488. Id at 1336-37. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295-96 (1892);
FED. R. Evm. 803. Such evidence may be considered by the jury in determining whether
the declarant subsequently performed the intended act. See United States v. Pheaster, 544
F.2d 353, 374-80 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977) (applying Hillmon before
Federal Rules of Evidence were in effect); United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840, 842-44
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978).
3489. 682 F.2d at 1336. The court also considered whether the trial court erred in its instruction that if the jury found that a conspiracy existed between Astorga-Torres and the coconspirator, it could consider the statements "for all purposes." Id Astorga-Torres argued
that the record was devoid of any evidence from which it could be concluded that a conspiracy existed at the time his co-conspirator made the statements in question. Id Because the
trial court's limiting instruction probably only served to inform the jury that the co-conspirator's testimony was not entitled to conclusive weight as proof of anything, the Ninth Circuit
held that, even if one accepted arguendo the defendants' claim of error, such error was not
prejudicial. Id at 1336-37.
3490. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973); United States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

been improper, this is not reversible error when the evidence of guilt is
strong and other proper instructions are given.3491
InMcCGuinn v. Crist,3492 the warden of the Montana State Penitentiary appealed the district court's decision to grant McGuinn's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus after McGuinn had been convicted of committing deliberate homicide by shooting a person four times in the
head.3493 McGuinn objected to a jury instruction which stated that
"[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary acts," and the district court held that the contested jury
instruction was violative of McGuinn's due process rights.34 94
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, stating that no reasonable juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, on the evidence presented, that McGuinn voluntarily committed homicide
without also inferring beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed
these acts knowingly and purposely.34 9 5 It further stated that because
McGuinn's defense was an alibi rather than lack of intent to commit
homicide, the issue of intent in this case was undisputed, and an erroneous instruction with respect to an undisputed issue is harmless error.3496 The court therefore held that the jury instruction, although
3497
incorrect, constituted harmless error.
In United States v. Eden,34 9 8 the defendant was convicted of em-

bezzling and converting federal student loan funds, and concealing material facts from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
On appeal, Eden argued that the district judge had given an incomplete
instruction as to the definition of conversion, and that the instruction
471, 479 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1000 (1981); Davis v. McAllister, 631 F.2d
1256, 1260 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 907 (1981); United States v. Federbush, 625
F.2d 246, 255 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285, 289 (10th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 750 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977).
3491. Pool v. United States, 260 F.2d 57, 66 (9th Cir. 1958).
3492. 657 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982).
3493. Id at 1107.
3494. Id at 1107-08. This same instruction had been disapproved in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 525-27 (1979).
3495. 657 F.2d at 1108. The evidence presented to the jury revealed that the victim was
shot at close range, negating any reasonable possibility that the homicide occurred because
of recklessness or negligence. It also revealed that McGuinn was placed near the scene of
the crime and had the means to commit the crime. Additionally, McGuinn was impeached
on topics closely related to his activities surrounding the crime. Id
3496. Id See Mason v. Balkcom, 487 F. Supp. 554, 559 (M.D. Ga. 1980), rev'd, 669 F.2d
222 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1260 (1983). In reversing Mason's conviction, the
Fifth Circuit held that his intent was a disputed issue in the case, and therefore any error
could not be said to be harmless.
3497. 657 F.2d at 1108.
3498. 659 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982).
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negated the Government's burden of proving specific intent.34 99
The Ninth Circuit recognized that the instruction on conversion,
standing alone, was inaccurate, but it also recognized that jury instructions must be reviewed in the context of the entire trial in order to
make a proper inquiry as to their adequacy.35°° It noted that, prior to
defining conversion, the trial court had charged the jury that the Government must necessarily show beyond a reasonable doubt that "'the
defendant acted knowingly, willfully and with the intent to appropriate
the money .... ",3101 Because the instructions as a whole were not
misleading, and fairly and adequately instructed the jury as to the definition of conversion, the court held that any error in the instruction on
conversion was cured when viewed along with the other
instructions. 5 °2
'

In United States v. Federico,"' the defendant was convicted of

conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine, possessing cocaine with
intent to distribute, and possessing cocaine. At trial, hearsay evidence
was admitted against Federico under the co-conspirator hearsay exception. 35 The trial judge instructed the jury that it could consider the
co-conspirator's statements only if it found that a conspiracy had been
shown beyond a reasonable doubt through independent evidence.350 5
On appeal, Federico argued that the instruction was incorrect.
The Ninth Circuit agreed, despite the fact that the instruction stemmed
from an earlier decision of the circuit.3 5° The court stated that the trial
court's use of the instruction was unnecessary under the prior decision,
and probably not correct. 35 0 7 However, the court held this to be harm3499. Id. at 1378. The instruction in this case had been taken from § 16.01 of DEVITT &
(3d ed. 1977), and was founded
on Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). Morissette, however, merely recited
examples of conversion, and the instruction drawn from these sources failed to clearly state
the applicable principles; the court therefore concluded that the instruction used in Eden
should be avoided in future cases. 659 F.2d at 1378-79.
3500. 659 F.2d at 1379 (citing United States v. Federbush, 625 F.2d 246, 255 (9th Cir.
1980); Stoker v. United States, 587 F.2d 438, 440 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. James, 576
F.2d 223, 226-27 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Pallan, 571 F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 911 (1978)).
3501. 659 F.2d at 1380.
3502. Id
3503. 658 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981).
3504. Id at 1342.
3505. I1d at 1342 n.6.
3506. Id (citing Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 737 (9th Cir. 1963) (trial judge
determines the admissibility of co-conspirator's statements), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953
(1964)).
3507. 658 F.2d at 1342 n.6.
BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS

LOYO.,L

OF LOS 4NGELES LAW.REVIEW

[Vol.
17
[

less error since the instruction, "if anything," favored the defendant.35 "
In United States v. Wolters, 5 0 9 the defendant was convicted of
failing to file an income tax return. Wolters contended that he was

prejudiced by a jury instruction which stated that "'the law presumes
that the signature of a partner on a partnership tax return is an authorized signature on behalf of the partnership."' Wolter's argument was
that such an instruction unconstitutionally relieved the Government

from having to prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. 510
The Ninth Circuit first stated that the use of such a presumption
does not necessarily require reversal since the instruction must be considered in the context of the overall charge.35 ' It then noted that the
district judge told the jury in at least four separate instructions that the
Government must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jury was under a duty to consider the instructions as a whole. 5 12 The court stated that the instruction under attack
was specifically authorized by the provisions of 26 U.S.C. section

6063, 35 1 and it therefore held that14the instruction did not so prejudice
35
Wolters as to require a reversal.
In United States v. Williams,

5

the defendant was convicted of

making false statements in the acquisition of firearms. When purchasing guns on five separate occasions, Williams had answered "no" to the

question of whether he had ever been convicted of a crime punishable
3508. Id The court also noted that the instruction as well as the judge's comments indicated that the judge realized he had to make the initial determination of whether a conspiracy had been shown. Id (citing United States v. Vargas-Rios, 607 F.2d 831, 837 (9th Cir.
1979)). Furthermore, the record showed that the trial judge found a prima facie case of
conspiracy. 642 F.2d at 1342 n.6 (citing United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1198 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979)).
3509. 656 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1981).
3510. Id at 525. Cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Ulster County Court v.
Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
3511. 656 F.2d at 526.
3512. Id
3513. 26 U.S.C. § 6063 provides that a partnership's tax return shall be signed by one of
the partners, and that such signing is prima facie evidence that that partner is authorized to
sign the return on behalf of the partnership. Cases involving 26 U.S.C. § 6064, which provides for the same type of presumption, have been interpreted as not confining this presumption to civil cases. See United States v. Cashio, 420 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1007 (1970); United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969).
3514. 656 F.2d at 526. The court also stated that because the evidence at trial, entirely
aside from the presumption mentioned in the instruction, showed beyond a reasonable
doubt that a partnership existed, the instruction would be harmless under FED. R. CRIM. P.
52(a). Id
3515. 685 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1982).
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by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, despite having been so
convicted.3516 Williams claimed that when purchasing the guns, he had
not actually read the questions because he was relying on his parole
officer's statement that he could own a gun after five years from his
prison release if he were to answer "no" to all questions on the
purchase form.35 17 On appeal, Williams contended that the trial court
had erred in instructing the jury that "'[t]he defendant also acts knowingly if he acts with reckless disregard for truthfulness. "Recklessly"
means wantonly, with indifference to consequences.' "3518
The Ninth Circuit held that the instruction was erroneous because
reckless conduct alone is not sufficient to constitute knowing conduct.3519 It affirmed Williams' conviction, however, because of his failure to object to the instruction at trial.35 20 The court stated that if no
objection is made to an instruction at trial, an appellate court will reverse only if it was plain error to have given the instruction.35 2' It concluded that, because Williams' story of reckless conduct was not
believable, it was highly improbable that the erroneous instruction on
reckless conduct affected the verdict. Accordingly, the court held that
the instruction given did not constitute plain error.3522
In United States v. Patterson,3523 the defendant was convicted of

receiving stolen property and of conspiring to transport stolen motor
vehicles in interstate commerce. Three forklifts had been stolen in Cal3516. Id at 320-21.
3517. Id Purchasers are required to fill out a questionnaire (ATF Form 4473) for every
firearm that they purchase.
3518. Id at 321. The instruction further stated that "[i]f a person makes a representation
without knowing whether it is true or not, or makes it without regard to its truth or falsity or
to its possible consequences, he may be found to have made the representation recklessly."
Id
3519. Id (citing United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 699 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976)).
3520. FED. R. CiuM. P. 30 provides in pertinent part that "[n]o party may assign as error
any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the
grounds of his objection."
3521. 685 F.2d at 321. "Plain error exists only if it is highly probable that the error materially affected the verdict." Id (quoting United States v. Segna, 555 F.2d 226, 231 (9th Cir.
1977)). See FED. R. CalM. P. 52(b), supra note 3471.
3522. 685 F.2d at 321. Williams contended that the trial court erred by failing to instruct
the jury that specific intent was necessary to convict under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (making
false statements in the acquisition of firearms). The Ninth Circuit rejected this claim, holding that the Government need only show that the defendant had made a statement known to
be false and not that he knew he was violating the law. 685 F.2d at 321 (citing United States
v. Cochran, 546 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Beebe, 467 F.2d 222 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 904 (1974)).
3523. 678 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 219 (1982).
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ifornia and eventually recovered in Nevada. The Government charged

that Patterson had purchased the forklifts from two co-defendants.
The three were brought to trial. The jury found Patterson guilty, but
acquitted his two co-defendants. 5 24

On appeal, Patterson contended that the jury instructions given at
trial had been contradictory on the issue of intent.3525 The Ninth Circuit noted, however, that defense counsel had neither objected to the
instructions at trial, nor had he requested additional instructions on the

issue of intent.3526 The court held that in the absence of a showing that
Patterson's substantial rights were affected, it was not required to consider objections to the instructions for the first time on appeal.3527

Therefore, the court affirmed the conviction as to the issue of jury
instructions.3 5 28
In United States v. Gilman,3529 the defendants, partners in a mail
order business that distributed sexually explicit magazines and
brochures, were convicted of mailing obscene material and of conspiracy.3530 On appeal, they argued that errors in certain jury instructions
required reversal. 353 1 However, the Ninth Circuit rejected this claim
because the defendants had failed to object to the instructions at trial,
and because they had failed to demonstrate that the instructions as
given had substantially affected their rights.35 32
These cases show that the Ninth Circuit consistently rules that jury
instructions must be reviewed in the context of the entire case in order
to make a proper inquiry as to their adequacy. On appeal, an errone3524. Id at 777.
3525. Id at 781.
3526. Id.
3527. Id (citing United States v. Alvarez, 469 F.2d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 1972)). See also
notes 3520-21 supra. The court stated that the objections made would be meritless if considered because the instructions, considered in whole, adequately explained the issue of intent.
678 F.2d at 781.
3528. Id
3529. 684 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1982).
3530. Id at 617.
3531. Specifically, the defendants objected to the court's instruction on prurient interest,
contending that the Government "failed to produce any evidence of a clearly defined sexual
group to which the material would appeal." Id at 621. The Ninth Circuit rejected this
contention, stating that "'the exhibits themselves sufficiently guided the jury'" as to the
prurient appeal of the material. Id (quoting Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 303
(1978)). The defendants also contended that the failure to explicitly exclude children from
the definition of community was erroneous. The Ninth Circuit dismissed this contention,
stating that although children are not to be included as part of the definition of community,
684 F.2d at 621 (citing Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 296-97 (1978)), children were
not required to be excluded from the definition. 684 F.2d at 621.
3532. Id at 620-21.
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ous instruction will not necessitate reversal unless it constitutes plain
error.3533 Because the circuit defines plain error as "a highly prejudicial error affecting substantial rights,"3534 it will reverse a criminal conviction because of plain error "[o]nly in exceptional situations. 3535
b. prejudicialerror

In United States v. Astorga-Yorres,3 53 6 the defendants were convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin, possessing with intent to distribute heroin, assaulting federal agents with a deadly weapon, and
carrying a firearm during the commission of a federal narcotics felony.
The defendants, accompanied by a co-conspirator, traveled to a motel
where undercover Drug Enforcement Administration agents had arranged for a sale of fifteen ounces of heroin. 3537 The co-conspirator

was arrested after making a sale of seven ounces of heroin, and agents
then went to the defendants' cabin to arrest them. After a brief gun
battle, the defendants surrendered, and the DEA agents had the room's
septic tank pumped out on the suspicion that heroin had been flushed
down the toilet. This search resulted in the recovery of several condoms, one of which contained heroin.3538
The Government's theory of the case was that the defendants were
in actual possession of the eight ounces of heroin not found to be in
their co-conspirator's possession. However, the trial court instructed
the jury that it need only find that the defendants were in constructive
possession of the seven ounces of heroin possessed by their co-conspirator in order to find them guilty of possessing heroin with intent to
distribute.3539
The Ninth Circuit stated that this instruction required the jury to
find only that the defendants knew, or should have known, that their
co-conspirator had heroin he planned to sell. The instruction therefore
3533. See also United States v. Perez, 491 F.2d 167, 173 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
858 (1974).
3534. United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979
(1979).
3535. United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 1980).
3536. 682 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 455 (1983).
3537. Id at 1333.
3538. Id at 1333-34.
3539. Id at 1337. The couridrew this instruction from United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d
697 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976), where it was held to be appropriate under circumstances in which the defendant had deliberately closed his eyes to the apparent facts. The Ninth Circuit subsequently limited the appropriateness of the Jewell
instruction to like circumstances. United States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838, 841 (9th Cir. 1980).
See also United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1977).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

invited the jury to find the defendants in constructive possession of heroin if it was unable to conclude that the defendants had been in actual
possession of heroin.3 54 Such an outcome would be inconsistent with
previous Ninth Circuit decisions, 3 4 1 and the court held that because
the Government's case was "not without its elements of doubt," the
trial court's error in instructing the jury as to constructive possession
was "far from harmless." 35 42 It therefore reversed the defendants' convictions relating to the heroin possession.3 54 3
In United States v. Nicholson,3 4 the defendant was convicted of
conspiring to possess and import marijuana with intent to distribute.
Nicholson had provided an alleged co-conspirator with $20,000 for him
to invest in a "business venture" which he promised Nicholson would
yield a high rate of return.35 4 5 At trial, Nicholson testified that he initially did not inquire into the nature of the business venture, and that
when he later asked whether the venture was a drug deal, he received a
35 4 6
negative response.
In instructing the jury on the knowledge element of the conspiracy
charges, the trial judge stated that deliberate avoidance of knowledge
that there was a high probability that the invested money would be
used in a drug scheme was the equivalent of actual knowledge. 5 4 7
Nicholson argued that this instruction should not have been given in
his case because there was no evidence that he consciously avoided
35 48
learning the truth.
The Ninth Circuit rejected Nicholson's argument, noting that
Nicholson had known of the co-conspirator's history of drug dealing,
and that any reasonable person would have inquired extensively into
the nature of the proposed business venture before investing
$20,000. 3 1 4 9 The court then held that the circumstances presented were
precisely those where an instruction as to deliberate ignorance was ap355 1
propriate, 35 50 and it affirmed the conviction.
3540. 682 F.2d at 1337.
3541. United States v. Batimana, 623 F.2d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir.) (mere proximity, presence,
or association with the person who does control the drugs is insufficient to support a finding
of possession), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1038 (1980).
3542. 682 F.2d at 1337.
3543. Id.
3544. 677 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1982).
3545. Id at 707-08.
3546. Id at 708.
3547. See supra note 3539.
3548. 677 F.2d at 710.
3549. I.d at 710-11.
3550. Id at 711. There had been testimony from several co-conspirators that such "delib-
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In United States v. Jones,5 5 2 the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder. Jones had attacked the victim in a
prison cell where they were both in custody and had stabbed the victim
five times. Jones' defense was that he had not intended to kill the victim but to merely "teach him a lesson." 355 3 At trial, the court instructed
the jury that a requisite element for conviction of the offense was the
intent to commit murder. 5 5 a It then instructed the jury that murder
was an unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.
The trial judge defined malice aforethought as either an intent to take
the life of another or an intent to act willfully in callous and wanton
3 5
disregard of the consequences to human life.
On appeal, Jones argued that although the instructions correctly
noted that a requisite element of the crime was an intent to murder, this
became misleading when coupled with the court's subsequent instruction defining the separate offense of murder outside the context of assault with intent to commit murder.3 55 6 The Ninth Circuit agreed, and
held that the intent to act in wanton disregard of the consequences to
human life is less than the specific intent to kill necessary for a conviction of assault with intent to commit murder.3557 The Ninth Circuit
stated that the instruction could not have been harmless because the
jury may have believed Jones' story and found no intent to kill, but
may have found him guilty because it determined that his attack
amounted to reckless and wanton conduct. 355 8 The court therefore reversed the conviction. 5 9
erate avoidance" was an established practice in the illegal drug business. The court stated
that "[t]o not give a Jewell instruction in this case would allow the 'money men' financing
drug importation and distribution to escape liability by the simple expedient of not asking
questions about how their money is to be used." Id
3551. Id
3552. 681 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1982).
3553. Id at 611.
3554. Id This instruction merely repeated the statutory language in 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)
(1976).
3555. 681 F.2d at 611. See infra note 3559.
3556. Id Conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (assault with intent to commit murder) requires a specific intent to kill the victim. Acting with malice by committing a reckless and
wanton act without intending to kill the victim is not sufficient for conviction.
3557. Id (citing People v. Johnson, 3XCal. 3d 444, 637 P.2d 676, 179 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1981);
People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981); People v.
Martinez, 105 Cal. App. 3d 938, 165 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1980); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 573,
578 (2d ed. 1969)).
3558. 681 F.2d at 612.
3559. Id In dissent, Judge Goodwin stated that it was his opinion that the error, if any, in
the instructions complained of was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. He felt that this
case was an inappropriate one for the Ninth Circuit to reverse simply so that the court could
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These cases demonstrate that, in the Ninth Circuit, where the
proof of guilt is strong, a relatively minor error may not necessarily
justify a reversal. In a close case, however, the same mistake could
seriously prejudice the defendant's case, necessitating a reversal of the
conviction.356o
c.

the Allen charge

The term "Allen charge" is the name for a class of supplemental
jury instructions given when jurors are apparently deadlocked. 35 61
These instructions advise deadlocked jurors to reconsider their opinions in light of each other's arguments with a disposition
to be con35 6z
vinced, especially considering the majority's viewpoint.
In United States v. Hooton,3 56 3 the defendant was convicted of

dealing in firearms without a federal license. At trial, following six
days of evidence and argument, the jury spent two full days deliberating, twice asking for further instructions. 35 4 At the end of the second
day, the jury announced that it was deadlocked. The next morning, the
trial judge delivered an Allen charge. On appeal, Hooton argued that
the use of the Allen charge was coercive.3565
The Ninth Circuit stated that four factors were important in determining whether the use of an4llen charge was coercive: (1) the form
of the instruction; (2) the period of deliberation following the charge;
(3) the total time of jury deliberations; and (4) the indicia of coercive
pressure upon the jury.3566 The court then determined that the first
three factors supported the use of the Allen charge in this case. The
Ninth Circuit stated that the trial court had used a standard charge,3567
the verdict was not returned until the afternoon although the charge
was given in the morning, and the jury did not reach a verdict until the
third day of deliberations following a six day trial.3568 The court furadopt California's approved jury instructions. Accordingly, he would affirm the conviction.
Id (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
3560. See also Johnson v. United States, 424 F.2d 537, 537 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
3561. The name derives from the first Supreme Court approval of such an instruction in
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896).
3562. 164 U.S. at 501.
3563. 662 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1981).
3564. Id at 636.
3565. Id
3566. Id (citing United States v. Beattie, 613 F.2d 762, 765-66 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 982 (1980)).
3567. The charge used was taken from 1 E. DEviTr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY
PRACMTCE AND INSTRUrCTONS § 18.14 (3d ed. 1977).
3568. 662 F.2d at 637. The factor of the total time of jury deliberations is of questionable
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ther determined that there was no evidence in the record of coercion.3" 6 9 The Ninth Circuit therefore held that the trial judge had not
abused his discretion in giving the Allen charge.3 57 °
In UnitedStates v. Armstrong,357 1 the defendants were convicted of

various federal fraud offenses involving soliciting advance fees for loan
guarantee agreements. In his initial charge to the jury, the judge gave a
modified Allen charge.35 72 On the seventh day of deliberations, the
trial judge reminded the jury of his initial instructions, although in a
milder form. 7 3 On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court

had impermissibly Allen-charged the jury twice, and that the first
charge was deficient because it did not instruct the majority to reexamine its views in light of those of the minority. 3 5 7 4

The Ninth Circuit first stated that the initial instruction was only a

mild form of the traditional Allen charge, since it did not refer to the
expense involved in the trial or to the need for a new trial in the case of
a deadlock. 3575 It also noted its recent determination that Allen-type

charges given during the initial instructions are inherently less coercive

than those given after a jury has pronounced itself deadlocked. 35 76 The

court therefore held that under the circumstances, the initial charge was
not impermissibly coercive.35 7 7

The Ninth Circuit then rejected the defendants' argument that the
second charge was improper. It stated that although the circuit has a
per se rule against repeating an Allen charge to the jury,3578 the second
value, however, since no matter how long the jury deliberates, a strongly worded Allen
charge could still be very coercive.
3569. Id The trial judge was aware only of a deadlock, he did not know how the jury
stood, and he gave the charge only once, avoiding coercive deadlines and threats.
3570. Id The court distinguished United States v. Contreras, 463 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1972),
where the trial court gave the jury an Allen charge after nearly eight hours of deliberation
but prior to any indication in the record that the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The
court stated that, unlike Contreras,Hoolon did not involve a premature Allen charge. 662
F.2d at 636.
3571. 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
3572. Id at 1333-34.
3573. Id at 1334-35.
3574. Id The court, however, determined that although it is the better practice to suggest
that the majority reexamine its position in light of the minority's, the absence of such reciprocal language in the mild opening instructions did not render the charge impermissibly
coercive. Id
3575. Id
3576. Id (citing United States v. Williams, 624 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1980)).
3577. 654 F.2d at 1335.
3578. Id at 1334 (citing United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978)). In Seawell, the court gave a full Allen charge after the jury
announced a deadlock. When further deliberations failed to result in a verdict, the court
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charge was merely a mild reminder of an initial instruction which itself
was a shortened, milder version of the traditionalAllen charge.35 79 The

court also emphasized that the second charge was the only one given
after the jury had reached a deadlock.358 The court therefore held that
the timing and content of the two charges rendered them less coercive
than traditional Allen charges, and concluded that giving the charges
did not constitute reversible error.3581
In UnitedStates v. Mason,3582 three defendants were convicted of
conspiring to distribute and distributing cocaine. Two of these defendants were also convicted of using firearms during the commission of a
felony. In a first trial, the jury had been unable to reach a verdict regarding these three defendants.358 3 A second jury, after deliberating
for only three hours, informed the marshal that they were having
problems reaching a verdict. The marshal related this to the trial judge
who, without informing counsel on either side of his intent, summoned
the jury and gave a modified Allen charge. 3 8 4 Each defendant's coun-

sel objected to the charge, but guilty verdicts on all counts were returned only an hour and a half after deliberations resumed. 38 5

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its rule that an Allen
charge will be upheld only if in a form not more coercive than that
approved in Allen v. United States. 35 "6 Examining the charge given in
this case, the court held that the trial judge's comments stressing the
expense of the case in terms of time, effort, and money tended to make
the charge coercive.3587 Additionally, the trial judge told the jury that
the Supreme Court had approved the Allen-type charge. 358 8 Finally,
reread the charge, and a guilty verdict was returned soon thereafter. On appeal, the trial
judge's actions were held coercive, and the Ninth Circuit ruled that it is reversible error to
twice Allen-charge a jury. Id at 1162-63.
3579. 654 F.2d at 1335.
3580. Id
3581. Id The court noted, however, that it would be better practice to utilize modified
Allen charges only once, especially in short, simple cases. Id
3582. 658 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1981).
3583. Id at 1265. The defendants in Mason had initially been tried with a fourth defendant, who had been found guilty by the first jury. Id
3584. Id.
3585. Id.
3586. Id at 1266 (citing United States v. Beattie, 613 F.2d 762, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 982 (1980); United States v. Handy, 454 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 846 (1972); Sullivan v. United States, 414 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1969)).
3587. The court noted that the interjection of fiscal concerns into jury deliberations has
long been recognized as a potential source of abuse. Id at 1266-67 (citing Peterson v.
United States, 213 F. 920 (9th Cir. 1914)).
3588. 658 F.2d at 1267. The court noted that in United States v. Kenner, 354 F.2d 780 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966), the Second Circuit affirmed a conviction where
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the trial judge failed to instruct the minority jurors not to abandon their
conscientiously held views merely to secure a verdict. 3589 Taken together, these factors were sufficient to render the trial judge's charge
impermissibly coercive. 3590
In United States v. Garner,35 9 x the defendant was convicted of wire
fraud. At trial, the judge called the jury back after several hours of
deliberation, and instructed the jurors that they should realize the time
and expense involved in the trial and should therefore endeavor to
reach a verdict.3 59 2 Garner argued on appeal that the trial court had
thereby committed reversible error since the instruction did not include
an admonition to the jurors not to surrender their honest beliefs as to
3

359
the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that there was no
evidence in the record indicating that the instruction had adversely affected the verdict in any way.35 94 It therefore held that no reversible
error had occurred.3 59 5
Although the Allen charge has been disapproved in at least three
circuits, 3596 and some states, 3597 the above cases show that the Ninth
the trial judge had similarly told the jury that the Supreme Court had sanctioned the use of
an Allen-type charge. It emphasized, however, the Second Circuit's statement that only the
trial court's contemporaneous caveat that it was not attempting to coerce minority jurors
saved the case from reversal. 658 F.2d at 1267.
3589. Id at 1267. See Sullivan v. United States, 414 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961). In Sullivan, the Ninth Circuit stated that the
judge should remind "each of the jurors of his obligation to give ultimate controlling weight
to his own conscientiously held opinion." 414 F.2d at 718. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in
Rogers stated that the judge should stress to the jurors that their verdict should not be
reached in violation of the honest conviction of any one of the jurors. 289 F.2d at 435.
3590. 658 F.2d at 1268. "The [trial] court also made several references to giving the case
'one more try', and exhorted the jury as to the desirability of a unanimous verdict." Id at
1267 n.6. The Ninth Circuit stated that the effect of such comments is hard to measure, but
that "their potential vice is that jurors may feel disapprobation if they cause a mistrial by
failing to yield to majority pressure." Id
3591. 663 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982).
3592. Id at 840.41.
3593. Id at 841. Garner argued that Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), required
an instruction admonishing the jurors not to surrender their honest and reasonable beliefs.
However, the Garner court did not readAllen as specifically requiring an admonition to the
jurors not to surrender their honest views as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 663
F.2d at 841. It determined that the instruction in the instant case was very similar to that
approved in Walsh v. United States, 371 F.2d 135, 136 (9th Cir.) (instruction was upheld
despite the trial judge's statement to the jurors to keep trying), cer. denied, 388 U.S. 915
(1967).
3594. Id (citing United States v. Beattie, 613 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
982 (1980)).
3595. 663 F.2d at 841.
3596. See, e.g., United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879, 883 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v.
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Circuit has not held Allen-type charges to be invalid per se.3598 However, it will give close scrutiny to the actual charge and the circumstances in which it was given,3599 since "even in the most acceptable
form, [the Allen charge] approaches the ultimate permissible limits to
''36°°
which a court may go.
d jury instructions on the essentialelements of the offense
In criminal cases, the court must instruct the jury on all essential
questions of law whether requested or not.360 1 It is plain error not to
360 2
instruct the jury on every essential element of the offense.
In United States v. Brooksby,36 °3 the defendant was convicted of
falsely subscribing income tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. section
7206(1). Brooksby kept books for her husband's business, but diverted
money for her own use by destroying some receipts and not entering
that amount in the daily receipt journal. The receipt journal was used
36 4
by the Brooksbys' accountant to prepare their income tax returns. 0
However, some of the money represented by the destroyed receipts was
deposited in the Brooksbys' business bank account, and this discrepancy was discovered during a routine audit by the Internal Revenue
Service.36 5 At trial, Brooksby testified that she did not know that the
daily receipt journal was used in preparing tax returns or that the returns materially understated the business receipts. She argued, therefore, that she did not willfully subscribe false returns. 3 60 6 On appeal,

she argued that the trial court had erred by giving an instruction which
Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407,
420 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
3597. See People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 852, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1977).
3598. See also United States v. Guglielmini, 598 F.2d 1149, 1151-53 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 943 (1979); United States v. Seawell, 583 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 991 (1978).
3599. See also Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965) (per curiam); United
States v. Moore, 653 F.2d 384, 390 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981); United
States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 49, 51 (5th Cir. 1976).
3600. Sullivan v. United States, 414 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1969).
3601. United States v. Musgrave, 444 F.2d 755, 764 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1023 (1973); United States v. Rybicki, 403 F.2d 599, 602-03 (6th Cir. 1968); cf.Michaud v.
United States, 350 F.2d 131, 133 (10th Cir. 1965) (faulty jury instruction held reversible
where no objection made).
3602. United States v. Schmidt, 376 F.2d 751, 753 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884
(1967). But cf. Olar v. United States, 391 F.2d 773, 775 (9th Cir. 1968) (it is not reversible
error to fail to instruct on an undisputed element of the offense).
3603. 668 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1982).
3604. Id at 1103.
3605. Id
3606. Id

1984]

CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY

did not include the term "willfully" in listing the elements of the of3 60 7
fense which had to be proven in order to find Brooksby guilty.

In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit first recognized that the word
"willful" in section 7206(1) requires more than a careless disregard for

the truth,360 8 and stated that the Supreme Court had defined the word
'360 9

to mean a "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.
Further, the Government conceded that the trial court had erred in
giving an instruction that did not include this first element of the of-

fense. 3610 However, the Government argued that by reading the indictment, the relevant statute, and two instructions on willfulness, the error
was corrected. 361 ' The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding

that notwithstanding the reading of the indictment, statute, and instructions on willfulness, the failure to instruct the jury that "willfulness"
was an essential element of the crime
prejudiced the defendant. 3612 It
361 3

therefore reversed the conviction.
In United States v. Jones,3 614 the defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting the violation of both 18 U.S.C. section 2113(a), the
general bank robbery statute, and 18 U.S.C. section 2113(e), which pro-

vides for enhanced punishment for the commission of a robbery where
a killing or kidnapping occurs. Jones had been one of four participants
3607. 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (1976) provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny person who ...
[w]ifuly... subscribes any return.. . which contains... a written declaration that it is
made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as
to every material matter.

. .

shall be guilty of a felony. .. .

3608. 668 F.2d at 1104.
3609. Id (citing United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976); United States v.
Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973)).
3610. 668 F.2d at 1104. Seesupra note 3607.
3611. 668 F.2d at 1104.
3612. Id at 1105. The defendant relied upon United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663 (6th Cir.
1977), for the proposition that omissions of an essential element cannot be cured. In Pope,
the defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute
was overturned due to the trial court's failure to instruct that intent to distribute was an
essential element of the charged crime. Id at 671.
In Brooksby, the court stated that the trial court's error was not cured by the language
in the instructions taken as a whole. 668 F.2d at 1105.
3613. Id
In United States v. Wolters, 656 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1981), the defendant was convicted
of willfully failing to file an income tax return. The defendant contended that his case was
prejudiced by the trial court's failure to define the word "willful" so as to exclude "reckless
disregard." The Ninth Circuit rejected this claim, stating that the jury was clearly instructed, and that the instructions were very similar to those approved in prior cases. Id at
525. See Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1252-53 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1123 (1975); United States v. Hawk, 497 F.2d 365, 366-69 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 419
U.S. 838 (1974).
3614. 678 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1982).
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in a bank robbery during which a guard was killed. Although Jones
did not fire the fatal shot, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in
accordance with the enhancement provisions of section 2113(e).361 5 On

appeal, Jones contended that the trial court erred in failing to instruct
the jury to determine whether he had aided and abetted the killing in

addition to aiding and abetting the actual robbery.3616
The Ninth Circuit held that the Government must show that the
defendant aided and abetted the principal in every "essential element"
of the offense.3 617 The trial court had therefore erred in failing to in-

struct that the Government had to prove not only that Jones had aided
and abetted the principal in the act of the bank robbery, but also in the
killing by the principal.3 6 18 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed

and remanded the case for either resentencing
or retrial of the entire
3619

case, at the Government's discretion.
In United States v. Eden,36 20 the defendant was convicted of em-

bezzling and converting federal student loan funds, and of concealing
material facts from the government. Eden was founder and president

of a college which participated in four separate educational programs
sponsored by the government, all of which either directly or indirectly
supplied money to students.36 2 1 When the college began to experience
cash flow problems, Eden took out a $130,000 loan which he personally
guaranteed. Subsequently, he sold the college, but the purchaser who
3615. Id at 103.
3616. Id at 105. At trial, the court had informed the jury that it needed to find three
elements: (I) that the principal willfully took from the presence or person of another money
belonging to or in the care of a bank by force, violence, or by means of intimidation; (2) that
the defendant (Jones) willfully aided and abetted the principal in committing the robbery;
and (3) that a person was killed during the commission of the robbery. Id at 106.
3617. Id at 105.
3618. Id (citing United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir.), modifled, 500 F.2d
676, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974)). In Short, the defendant acted as the principal's
getaway driver in a bank robbery. The court instructed that Short could be convicted under
§ 2133(d) (relating to robberies where an assault occurs, or a dangerous weapon or device is
used) if the evidence showed that he knew the principal was going to attempt a bank robbery
and that he did some affirmative act to attempt to help. Id at 1172. The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the trial court had failed to instruct on an essential element of the
crime, aiding and abetting the use of the weapon. Id See also United States v. Faleafine,
492 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), where the Ninth Circuit stated that subsections (d) and
(e) of § 2113 are parallel provisions. Id at 23, 25. The Fifth Circuit has stated in similar
circumstances, "[w]here a defendant is charged with aiding and abetting a crime involving
an element which enhances or aggravates the offense, there must be proof that the defendant
associated herself with and participated in both elements of the crime." United States v.
Longoria, 569 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 1978).
3619. Jones, 678 F.2d at 106.
3620. 659 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982).
3621. Id at 1377.
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was to have assumed liability for the loan failed to do so, and Eden
therefore remained personally liable.3 62 2 Eden thereupon transferred
special program accounts, consisting of money from the educational
programs, to the college's general account.3 62 3
Upon learning of plans to close the school, the college's coordinator of financial aid informed Eden that all allowable disbursements of
special program money had been made, and that all money remaining
was to be returned to the federal government. 3624 Instead of returning
the funds to the federal government, Eden drew checks on the general
account to individuals who cashed the checks and delivered the bulk of
the funds back to Eden. At trial, Eden admitted these acts, but testified
that he had used the money to pay off the loan for which he was personally liable so that the purchaser of the college would not know of
the payments.3 62 5
The trial court instructed the jury that proof that the embezzled or
converted money belonged to the United States was an essential element of the offense. 3626 However, over Eden's objection, the court further instructed that the bulk of the funds in the special program
account belonged to the government, and that only proper disbursement in compliance with regulations could legally change ownership of
the funds.3 627
On appeal, Eden argued that this instruction was erroneous because it took the issue of an essential element away from the jury. The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that "[t]he trial court's
instruction regarding the ownership of the funds appropriately narrowed the focus of the jury, but did not entirely take the issue from
[it]. "3628 The court therefore approved the instruction given by the trial
3629

court.

3622. Id.
3623. Id at 1377-78.
3624. Id at 1378.
3625. Id
3626. Id at 1380.
3627. Id
3628. Id Whether or not there had been proper disbursement of the funds, in full compliance with HEW regulations, was a factual issue left to the jury. The court stated that Eden's
reliance on United States v. Alessio, 439 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1971) was misplaced, because the
Alessio trial court had refused to allow any evidence supporting the defendant's contention
that the property at issue did not belong to the government. 659 F.2d at 1380.
3629. Id (citing United States v. Johnson, 596 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Miller, 520 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Jackson, 436 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 906 (1971)).
In United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157
(1982), the defendants were convicted of mail fraud in connection with soliciting funds for a
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These decisions demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit does not judge

a single jury instruction in artificial isolation, but considers it in the
context of the entire trial.36 30 Within this context, it is imperative that

trial courts instruct a jury correctly upon all essential elements of an
failure to so instruct will be held to be "fundaoffense charged,63 since
3 1
error."
mental
H. Misconduct of TrialJudge

A trial judge has the right and duty to directly participate in facilitating the orderly progress of a trial. Questions which aid in clarifying
a witness' testimony, in expediting examination, or in confining examination to relevant matters are proper if made in a nonprejudicial manner. A trial judge, however, may not conduct himself in such a manner
as to convey to the jury the impression that he has formed an opinion
regarding the truth of the witnesses' statements or the verdict that
should be returned.3 6 32
3 633 the Ninth Circuit considered allegaIn United States v. Poland,

tions that the trial judge had conducted himself improperly by interrupting defense counsel, by criticizing and ridiculing defense counsel
and the defendants before the jury, and by showing extreme partisan-

ship towards the prosecution. The defendants argued that the trial
judge's interventions prejudiced them to the extent that they were denied a fair and impartial trial.36 34

Upon examination of the trial judge's specific interventions, the
Ninth Circuit found no reversible error.3 635 It stated that many of the
church founded by one of the defendants. The trial court had instructed the jury that specific intent to defraud was an element of the crime of mail fraud. Id at 847 (citing Williams
v. United States, 278 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1960)). On appeal, the defendants argued that
this instruction violated their first amendment rights because it required an inquiry into the
validity of their religious beliefs. 663 F.2d at 847. The Ninth Circuit recognized that although the first amendment absolutely protects the freedom of belief, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), it does not protect fraudulent acts performed in the name of
religion. Id at 306. The court therefore approved the trial court's instruction on intent,
because it properly focused on the intent of the defendants in carrying out their program.
663 F.2d at 847.
3630. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973). See also United States v. Elksnis, 528 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1975).
3631. Accord United States v. King, 521 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1975).
3632. United States v. Pena-Garcia, 505 F.2d 964, 967 & nn.4, 5 (9th Cir. 1974).
3633. 659 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981).
3634. Id. at 886. The defendant cited 41 examples of alleged judicial trial misconduct. Id.
at 893.
3635. Id. at 893. The court stated that it was insignificant that the trial judge had interrupted defense counsel more times (907 alleged interruptions) than Government counsel
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allegations were based upon a mistaken reading of the record,3" or
upon an exaggerated reaction to perfectly normal inquiries designed to
clarify questions of counsel 3637 or testimony of witnesses. 3638 The court
admitted that the trial judge had shown irritation and had used sarcasm in some of his comments to defense counsel and the defendants,
but it found that these instances were understandable and generally
provoked by defense counsel. 36 39 Finally, the court stated that the content of the trial judge's expressions did not imply any opinion about the

credibility of the witnesses or the guilt of the defendants. 3640 The court
concluded that, even if the trial judge's conduct was error,364 1 it would
not reverse unless the judge's conduct had significantly prejudiced the

defendants. 3642 Because the evidence of guilt was so strong in this
(168 alleged interruptions). It noted that the interruptions of the defense were proper, and
that no instance was given where the judge should have admonished Government counsel
but failed to do so. Id. at 892-93.
3636. Id. at 893. The defendants alleged that when the trial judge denied defense counsel's request for a recess because of a hoarse throat, the judge "conveyed to the jury that the
attorney had tried to deceive him" about the hoarseness. The record revealed, however, that
when the request was made, the judge responded with only one word: "No." It was only
later, when the jury was not present, that the judge made any remarks about a suspicion of
deception. Id.
3637. Id. Defense counsel had asked a witness if he would ever receive "a direct oral
communication from the driver of the car." The trial judge had then asked counsel: "What
is a direct oral communication?" Although defense counsel's initial reaction was: "That's a
fair question, your Honor," he alleged on appeal that the judge's question was "an erroneous implication that defense counsel was using tricky language to put something by the
jury." On review of the record, the court found that the trial judge's question was appropriate within the context of the testimony. Id.
3638. Id. Defense counsel had asked a Government witness whether he had an opportunity to discuss the subject matter of the testimony with another Government witness before
trial, and he responded: "We had the opportunity, yes." The trial judge then questioned the
witness further and brought out that the discussion between the two witnesses took place two
and a half years before trial. By doing so, the judge negated a possible impression that the
witnesses had discussed their testimony immediately before trial. The court found that such
questioning cannot be the basis for proper criticism. Id.
3639. Id. at 893-94. For example, when defense counsel asked to approach a witness during the Government's direct examination, the trial judge replied: "God, counsel, I can't hold
you back," and then asked counsel to be seated. This was preceded, however, by the judge's
ruling that defense counsel should wait to object to the Government's examination of certain
photographs for identifying numbers until after the numbers were found. Id.
3640. Id. at 894. The court noted that the trial judge had explicitly instructed the jury not
to draw any inferences from his interruptions or admonishments about witness credibility or
the guilt or innocence of the defendants. Id.
3641. The court admitted that the displays of irritation and the use of sarcasm by a trial
judge should be avoided, particularly in criminal cases, because of the risk that an appearance of partisanship could affect the jury's attitude. Id at 894.
3642. Id. at 886. In considering whether the trial judge's interventions resulted in
prejudice, the court examined the evidence to determine if the issue of guilt was a close
one-in which case the intervention would more likely have caused prejudice-or if the
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case,3643 the court held that the verdict could not have been affected by
the trial judge's relatively minor irregularities. s 4
V.

POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS

A.

Double Jeopardy

1. Post-conviction prosecutions
The double jeopardy clause prohibits "a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction."3 "4 It also bars the division of one
conspiracy into multiple violations of the same conspiracy statute. 646
In United States v. Bendis,

4

the Ninth Circuit considered whether

one count of the defendant's indictment charged the same conspiracy
as a prior conviction and, thus, was barred by the double jeopardy
clause.
The defendants brought an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit from the District of Hawaii, after they were charged with conspiring to commit fraud between March 2, 1977, and May 2, 1977.3648 The
defendants claimed that double jeopardy prohibited these charges, because they previously had been convicted in the District of Kansas in
1977 for conspiring to transport a money order in commerce for a time
period covering June 6, 1977, to June 17, 1977.364 9 Both the Hawaii
charge and the Kansas conviction involved the same conspiracy statevidence of guilt was overwhelming-in which case the intervention would more likely have
been harmless. Id. (citing United States v. Allen, 431 F.2d 712, 713 (9th Cir. 1970)). For a
discussion of the "overwhelming-evidence test," see Bates v. Nelson, 485 F.2d 90, 93-94 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
3643. 659 F.2d at 886-92.
3644. Id. at 894. Cf. United States v. Pena-Garcia, 505 F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 1974) (trial
judge's conduct was reversible error where he continuously interrupted, cross-examined, intimidated, and threatened witness).
3645. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (citing In re Nielsen, 131 U.S.
176 (1889)).
3646. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942) (defendants made one agreement
to violate several different Internal Revenue liquor laws; the Court held that only one charge
for conspiracy was proper).
3647. 681 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 306 (1982).
3648. Id. at 563. The defendants were charged in the Hawaii indictment with one count of
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) (prohibits conspiring to cause interstate travel and wire communication in furtherance of a scheme to defraud); one count of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) (substantive crime of using wire communication in furtherance of scheme to defraud); and three
counts of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) (substantive crime of causing interstate travel in furtherance of a scheme to defraud). 681 F.2d at 563. The Hawaii indictment arose from a scheme
to defraud Hawaiian building contractors by issuing false letters of credit for a fee. 681 F.2d
at 566.
3649. 681 F.2d at 563. In the Kansas trial, the defendants were convicted of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 and § 2314 (1976). 681 F.2d at 563. The Kansas trial involved a scheme whereby the
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ute. 3 6 50 The defendants argued that the Kansas and Hawaii charges
365
arose out of the same conspiracy agreement. 1

The Ninth Circuit first pointed out that the analysis set forth in

Blockburger v. United States3652 was inapplicable here, because Bendis
involved multiple conspiracy charges under the same conspiracy statute.3653 Blockburger provided that a defendant may be prosecuted for
separate offenses which arise out of the same transaction if each offense
requires proof of a material fact not required by the other.3 654 The

Bendis court therefore applied the "factor analysis" test from Arnold v.
United States3 655 to determine whether separate conspiracies did occur.
The court considered five factors: (1) the time periods involved in the
alleged conspiracies; (2) the location at which the conspiracies were alleged to have occurred; (3) the individuals charged in each alleged con-

spiracy; (4) the acts allegedly committed; and (5) the substantive crimes
36 6
allegedly committed.
The Ninth Circuit considered the Kansas trial record and the contentions of both the Government and defendants in the uncompleted
Hawaii trial.3 6 57 The court concluded that the evidence showed that

defendants assisted a third party in obtaining and cashing a fraudulent money order. 681
F.2d at 567.
3650. 681 F.2d at 563. The statute involved was 18 U.S.C. § 371. See supra note 3648.
3651. 681 F.2d at 563.
3652. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
3653. 681 F.2d at 564-65.
3654. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. at 304. The Bendis court pointed out that the
Blockburger analysis focused on the proof offered by the government; specifically, whether
the proof for one count requires a material fact not needed under another count. However,
when the case involves the question of whether multiple conspiracy counts under the same
statute constitute the same offense, the Blockburger analysis becomes ineffective. The court
stated: "Across the board application ofBlockburger would sanction artful crafting of conspiracy charges which could permit the government to subdivide one criminal conspiracy
into multiple violations of a single statute, a result which Braverman forbids." 681 F.2d at
565. See Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. at 52-53.
Cf. United States v. Brooklier, 637 F.2d 620, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 980 (1981); United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d 1141, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1020 (1980); United States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 944 (1979). In these cases, the Blockburger test was held to apply because the government had brought charges under different conspiracy statutes in the second proceeding. The
Bendis court concluded that because this case involved the same conspiracy statute, Brooklier, Solano, and Snell were distinguishable. 681 F.2d at 565 n.4.
3655. 336 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 982 (1965) (citing Short v.
United States, 91 F.2d 614, 619-20 (4th Cir. 1937)).
3656. 681 F.2d at 565. Accord Rogers v. United States, 609 F.2d 1315, 1317-18 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Westover, 511 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1009
(1975); Sanchez v. United States, 341 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 856
(1965).
3657. 681 F.2d at 566. The Bendis court stated that this case presented a unique problem
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the conspiracies involved two different time periods, with no overlap,
that the conspiracies "implicated" different geographical areas, Hawaii
and the East Coast, and that the persons charged in the conspiracies

were different. The court also found that, while one conspiracy involved a scheme to defraud Hawaii builders, the other involved cash-

ing a fraudulent check. Finally, the court noted that the substantive
statutory violations were different in each case.3 658 Therefore, the
double jeopardy clause did not bar the Hawaii indictment.3 6 59
In United States v. Ross,3 66 ° the Ninth Circuit ruled that attempted

extortion is an offense separate from attempted bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery, even though the crimes arose out of
the same transaction. The co-defendants in Ross attempted to extort

$150,000 from a bank officer by kidnapping his wife and child. Before
they could contact the bank officer to make the demand, however, they
were arrested. 366 1 The defendants were originally charged and con-

victed of attempted bank robbery and conspiring to commit bank robbery, but the convictions were reversed because they were not the
appropriate charges. 3662 After the convictions were reversed, the government charged the defendants with attempted extortion.3 66 3

The defendants claimed that the Blockburger test precluded the
extortion charge because it arose out of the same transaction as the

earlier robbery convictions. 3664 The Ross court relied on a 1979 Ninth
Circuit decision 3665 where the same charges were in dispute, and conregarding the applicable standard of review, because the facts proposed by the Government
in the Hawaii trial had not yet been proven. Id. at 565-66. The Ninth Circuit therefore
concluded that it would not reverse the district court's denial of the defendants' motion to
dismiss unless the district court's analysis of the Government's proffered evidence was
clearly erroneous. Id. at 566.
3658. Id. at 566-68.
3659. Id. at 568.
3660. 654 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 926 (1982).
3661. Id. at 613-14.
3662. Id. at 614.
3663. Id. at 614. The defendants were charged with violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (1976), which provides in part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation
of this section shall ....
3664. 654 F.2d at 614. The Blockburger test applied here because the defendants were
challenging charges brought under separate criminal statutes. Id. See Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. at 304.
3665. United States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979). In
Snell, the defendant was first convicted of attempted extortion and conspiring to commit
bank robbery. The attempted extortion conviction was reversed because the conspiracy
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cluded that attempted extortion and attempted bank robbery are separate offenses because they require proof of different material facts.36 66
Hence the court upheld the extortion charge.3 66 7
In United States v. Von Moos, 3668 the Ninth Circuit ruled that it
was not double punishment to sentence a defendant for perjury, where
the district judge had considered the perjury in sentencing on a related
offense. Von Moos was convicted of bank robbery. 3669 During his
trial, he committed perjury. The trial judge considered the perjury
when he sentenced Von MOOS, 3 6 7 0 who was subsequently indicted for
perjury. He entered a guilty plea, but the judge closed the case, ruling

that he could not impose a sentence. 3671 The trial judge stated that a
sentence on the perjury count would constitute double punishment because Von Moos' "sentence on the bank robbery was greater than it
would have been had the perjury not been considered. '3 672 The Government appealed the district court's order.3 673

The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial judge's order, holding that
there was no double jeopardy violation. 3674 The court followed the ruling of the Fourth Circuit in a similar case 3675 where a defendant was
given a longer sentence for possessing and distributing heroin because
he perjured himself at his co-defendant's trial.3 676 The Von Moos court

held that a subsequent sentence for perjury is not double punishment,
but rather simply constitutes permissible consideration of all the factors
charge provided the exclusive remedy. Snell was subsequently charged and convicted of
attempted bank robbery. The Ninth Circuit held that the facts required to prove attempted
bank robbery are different from the facts needed to establish attempted extortion, and thus
the second trial was not barred by the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 1085.
3666. 654 F.2d at 614 & n.5.
3667. Id. at 614.
3668. 660 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

3669. Id.
3670. Id. The sentencing judge stated that he considered the perjury in two ways: "One
way on his credibility as he testified at the imposition of sentence; and the other is at the time
I imposed the sentence I considered it in evaluating what the sentence should have been."

Id.
3671. Id. at 749.
3672. Id. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717 ("the Fifth Amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy. . . protects against multiple punishments for the same offense").
3673. 660 F.2d at 749. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) provides that the government may not
appeal a final decision in a criminal case if the double jeopardy clause prohibits the appeal.
In this case the Ninth Circuit ruled that double jeopardy had not attached because Von
Moos had not begun serving a sentence on the perjury charge. 660 F.2d at 749 (citing
United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981)).
3674. 660 F.2d at 749.
3675. United States v. Wise, 603 F.2d 1101, 1107 (4th Cir. 1979).
3676. Id. at 1103.
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relevant to sentencing.3677
2. Appeals
The double jeopardy clause prohibits successive prosecutions for
the same offense after acquittal.3 678 There are, however, certain instances where the government can appeal the decision of a trial court to
dismiss proceedings against a defendant.3679 Such a situation could
arise when reversal of a dismissal would only reinstate the trial court's
verdict 36 0 or when 1the defendant was primarily responsible for the sec368
ond prosecution.
InArizona v.Manypenny 6 s2 the Ninth Circuit held that the double
jeopardy clause did not bar an appeal by the State of Arizona when the
3677. 660 F.2d at 749 (citing United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52-54 (1978) (taking
account of perjury in sentencing criminal defendants does not constitute punishment for
perjury)). See also United States v. Wise, 603 F.2d at 1106:
[Ilmprisonment must be regarded as punishment for the crime of which the defendant is formally accused and convicted. Conversely, . . . when a sentencing
judge takes into account various aspects of the defendant's background, including
other offenses committed,. . . the sentence thereby imposed does not constitute
punishment for these aspects of defendant's background.
3678. See Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1874); North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). The Pearce Court stated that "the Fifth Amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy. . . has been said to consist of three separate constitutional protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects
against multiple punishments for the same offense." 395 U.S. at 717.
3679. The authorizing federal statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976), which states in pertinent
part:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals
from a decision, judgment or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or
information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further
prosecution.
3680. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975). In Wilson, the defendant was
tried and convicted for illegally converting union funds, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 50 1(c)
(1976). The indictment was later dismissed. The United States Supreme Court ruled that it
was not a violation of the double jeopardy clause for the Government to appeal the dismissal, because a reversal on appeal would merely reinstate the trial court's verdict, and not
require a second trial. The Court stated that "a defendant has no legitimate claim to benefit
from an error of law when that error could be corrected without subjecting him to a second
trial before a second trier of fact." Id. at 345. Accord United States v. DiFrancesco, 449
U.S. 117, 130 (1980).
3681. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978). Scott was originally charged with
three counts of distributing narcotics. Two counts were dismissed by the trial judge on the
defendant's motion, and the defendant was tried and acquitted on the third count. In a five
to four decision, the United States Supreme Court held that double jeopardy is not violated
when a defendant succeeds in having charges dismissed on procedural grounds, and not as a
result of an actual trial on the merits. Id.
3682. 672 F.2d 761 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 103 S. Ct. 111 (1982).
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State sought to have an overturned guilty verdict reinstated. Manypenny, a United States Border Patrol officer, was indicted under Ari-

zona law for assault with a deadly weapon following a shooting which
occurred while he was on patrol in Pima County, Arizona.36 83 The case
was removed to federal court by the defendant, as authorized by 28
U.S.C. section 1442(a)(1). 368 4 The jury convicted Manypenny, but the

district court judge granted an acquittal on the ground that the jury
could not have found Manypenny guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.3685 On the State's appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the fed-

eral court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.3686 The United States
Supreme Court determined that there was jurisdiction, and the case
was remanded.3 68 7
On remand, the Ninth Circuit first determined that federal double

jeopardy principles did not bar the State's appeal.3688 The court followed its ruling in UnitedStates v. Rojas,3689 in which it held that there
was no double jeopardy bar to an appeal by the government to have an
3683. For a detailed discussion of the facts of the case, see Arizona v. Manypenny, 451
U.S. 232, 234-35 (1981).
3684. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1976) provides that a state criminal prosecution against an
officer of the United States, for acts under the color of his office, can be removed to the
United States district court where the action is pending.
3685. Arizona v. Manypenny, 445 F. Supp. 1123, 1128 (D. Ariz. 1977). Manypenny's trial
attorney sought acquittal on the argument that the shooting was accidental. The attorney
did not argue the defense of federal immunity as set forth in In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 54
(1890). After conviction, Manypenny moved unsuccessfully for judgment of acquittal under
Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. He then moved for a new trial under
Rule 33 and, in the alternative, an arrest of judgment under Rule 34, on the ground that
there was no federal jurisdiction. The new trial motion was never acted upon. The trial
judge then concluded that fundamental error had been committed because Manypenny's
attorney did not place the federal immunity defense before the jury. The judge consequently construed the Rule 34 motion as a Rule 29(c) motion, and granted a judgment of
acquittal. 672 F.2d at 762-63.
3686. Arizona v. Manypenny, 608 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1979). At this appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that Congress had not expressly authorized, in 28 U.S.C. § 3731, an
appeal by the State of Arizona for a case removed to federal court via 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1), and subsequently dismissed the appeal. 608 F.2d at 1199.
3687. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. at 250. The United States Supreme Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit on the basis that in such a case removal jurisdiction is derivative in form
and "neither enlarg[es] nor contract[s] the rights of the parties." Id. at 242. The Court held
that, since Arizona law would confer a right to appeal to federal court where a suit is
originally filed in state court, it would be unreasonable and unfair to hold that explicit congressional authority is required to appeal a state suit that was removed under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1). Id. at 243.
3688. 672 F.2d at 763.
3689. 554 F.2d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1977). In .Rojas, the defendant was convicted of numerous counts of tax fraud. As was Manypenny's, Rojas' verdict was set aside on a rule 29(c)
motion. The United States Supreme Court has cited Rojas for the proposition that "the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a Government appeal from a ruling in favor of the
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In Rojas, the Ninth Circuit

noted that the purpose of the double jeopardy clause is to protect an
369 1
individual from the burden and embarassment of multiple trials.

The Rojas court reasoned that this purpose is not violated when the
3 692
government appeal would not require a new trial.

The Manypenny court also determined that Arizona law did not
bar the State's appeal, because the double jeopardy principles in the
Arizona Constitution do not differ materially from federal double jeopardy principles.3693 The court consequently reversed Manypenny's acquittal, and remanded the case.
In United States v. Dahistrum,3694the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
double jeopardy clause prohibited the Government's appeal of the dismissal of the defendant's indictment because the defendant had "prac-

tically no control" over the termination of his trial.3695 The defendant
had failed to file personal income tax returns for the years 1973, 1974,
and 1975.3696 He was indicted on three counts of willful failure to file

tax returns, a violation of 26 U.S.C. section

7203.3697

At the trial, the

defendant after a guilty verdict has been entered by the trier of fact." United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980) (citing United States v. Rojas, 554 F.2d at 941)).
3690. 672 F.2d at 763 & n.5. See United States v. Rojas, 554 F.2d at 941.
3691. Id. at 941-42.
3692. Id. at 942. The Rojas court stated: "Since no further fact finding proceedings will
be necessary upon reversal and remand, the defendant's double jeopardy interests are not
implicated by the appeal." Id. at 941.
3693. 672 F.2d at 764. See State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court, 128 Ariz. 216, 221, 624
P.2d 1264, 1269 (1981). In Hyder, a defendant whose conviction for grand theft was set
aside by the trial court argued that both the Arizona and United States Constitutions barred
the State from seeking to have the verdict reinstated. In applying both Arizona and federal
law, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that Arizona double jeopardy principles were the
same as federal principles on this issue. Accord State v. Allen, 27 Ariz. App. 577, 583, 557
P.2d 176, 182 (1976).
In Manypenny, the court proceeded to rule that the district court had the authority to
rule on Manypenny's motion for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, even though seven days had passed from the date of the verdict. 672
F.2d at 765-66. The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that the trial judge erred in ruling that
Manypenny should be acquitted because the jury was not able to consider a possible immunity defense. Id. at 766. The court remanded the case so the district court could rule on the
still-pending motion for new trial. Id.
3694. 655 F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982).
3695. Id. at 975.
3696. Id. at 972. For a detailed factual background, see United States v. Dahlstrum, 493
F. Supp. 966, 967-68 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
3697. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax... or...
to make a return ...
who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax [or]
make such return ...
at the time or times required by law or regulation, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and ...
shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year or both .... "
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district court judge concluded that the IRS committed governmental
misconduct in handling Dahlstrum's case, and dismissed the indict3 698
ment with prejudice.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first considered whether the defendant had been acquitted, because the double jeopardy clause prohibits

the appeal of an acquittal verdict.3 69 9 The court applied the test from
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. ," which provides that an
acquittal occurs when the trial court makes a decision based on factual
grounds.3 70 ' In Dahlstrum, the record was unclear as to whether the
trial judge actually considered the merits of the defendant's case, or
whether the judge focused only on the issue of IRS misconduct.37 2
The Ninth Circuit therefore refused to decide whether the double jeopardy clause barred the Government's appeal on the ground that the
37 0 3
dismissal constituted an acquittal.
The court then considered whether the Government's appeal was
barred because reversal of the dismissal might result in a second prosecution that would violate the double jeopardy clause. 370 4 The Ninth
Circuit applied the test from United States v. Scott,3 70 5 in which the
United States Supreme Court stated that a subsequent prosecution does

not violate the double jeopardy clause when the defendant is primarily
responsible for having the first trial terminated on procedural or nonfactual grounds. 37°6 The Dahlstrum court noted that the defendant
3698. 493 F. Supp. at 975. District Judge Hauk ruled that the IRS agents acted improperly
because they pursued only a criminal investigation of Dahistrum, and did not seek a civil
resolution of his case. Such conduct, Hauk stated, was contrary to the guidelines the United
States Supreme Court set out for the IRS. 493 F. Supp. at 974 (citing United States v. La
Salle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 318 (1978)).
3699. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
3700. 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
3701. Id. The Supreme Court in Martin Linen stated that it is not enough for the trial
judge to state that he has made an acquittal, or that the procedure at the trial indicates that
an acquittal has been made. The Court articulated the following test for determining when
a trial judge's disposition constitutes an acquittal: "[The reviewing court] must determine
whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or
not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged." Id.
3702. 655 F.2d at 974. The district judge apparently made confficting statements. He indicated at one time that he thought the Government's evidence was insufficient, while at the
time he dismissed the case he stated: "This is not on the merits that I'm deciding this case.
It's on the question of governmental impropriety." Id.
3703. Id.
3704. Id. at 975.
3705. 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1978). See supra note 3681.
3706. Id. Accord United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976) (conviction at second
trial on drug charges proper after mistrial on defendant's motion, even though the motion
resulted from judge's decision to expel defense attorney).
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must have a "significant level of participation" in the dismissal or mistrial, either by making the motion or by arguing vigorously in favor of
the issue if raised by the judge, in order to avoid the double jeopardy
prohibition.37 7 Such voluntary action by the defendant would indicate
that his double jeopardy interests are not being harmed.370 8
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that Dahlstrum had no real control
over the district court judge's decision to dismiss the indictment. The
district court judge had questioned one of the IRS agents extensively,
while the defense asked only a few questions. The defense counsel
took no other action to persuade the trial court to dismiss the indictment.3 70 9 The Ninth Circuit determined that the minimal participation

of the defendant was not enough to conclude that he was primarily
responsible for termination of the trial.37 10 Thus, the double jeopardy

clause barred the Government's appeal.
3. Retrial
a. after mistrial

The double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial when a mistrial results from the defendant's motion. 37 11 An exception to this general rule exists, however, when the defendant's mistrial request is
3707. 655 F.2d at 975.
3708. Id.
3709. Id. The court stated: "Here, thejudge was the instigator andtheprimarymover ofthe
events that led to the dismissal of the indictment. The recordconvinces us that the hidge took
complete controlof the proceedingsandset off on a course over which appellee hadpractically
no control." Id. (emphasis in original).
3710. Id. at 976.
3711. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976) (plurality opinion) (double jeopardy did not bar retrial and conviction of defendant on drug charges when first trial resulted
in a mistrial on defendant's motion).
In contrast, when a judge orders a mistrial sua sponte, double jeopardy prohibits a
retrial unless there was a "manifest necessity" for the mistrial order. United States v. Perez,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 487 (1971) (plurality
opinion). In United States v. Hanigan, 681 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.denied, 103 S. Ct.
1189 (1983), the Ninth Circuit held that a district judge's mistrial order resulting from a jury
deadlock in the first trial did not bar a retrial. 681 F.2d at 1132. The defendant in Hanigan
was initially tried and acquitted in Arizona state court for the kidnapping, robbery, and
assault of three illegal aliens. He was subsequently tried on federal robbery charges in
federal district court. The jury deadlocked in the first federal trial, and the judge declared a
mistrial. On retrial, the defendant was convicted. 681 F.2d at 1129. In affirning the conviction the Ninth Circuit noted that double jeopardy does not bar "successive prosecutions by
different sovereigns." 681 F.2d at 1132. The court also ruled that federal prosecutors were
not equitably estopped from retrying the defendant since the defendant failed to show that
he had relied to his detriment on a material misstatement by the Government. 681 F.2d at
1132.
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caused by prosecutorial or judicial misconduct. 3 7 12 In the 1982 case of
Oregon v. Kennedy, 371 3 the United States Supreme Court narrowly interpreted this prosecutorial misconduct exception, holding that retrial is
37 14
barred only when the prosecutor intends to provoke a mistrial.

The defendant was prosecuted in Oregon state court for theft of an
oriental rug. During redirect examination of a witness, the prosecutor

made a statement which prompted the defense to request a mistrial,
which the judge granted. 371 5 The defendant was convicted on retrial.
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on double jeop-

ardy grounds, ruling that the prosecutor's misconduct constituted

"overreaching" which prejudiced the jury and forced the defendant to

request a mistrial. The Oregon Court of Appeals upheld the state trial
7 16
court's finding that the prosecutor did not intend to cause a mistrial.

The United States Supreme Court reversed the Oregon ruling, and remanded the case.37 17
Noting that the prosecutorial misconduct exception had been
"stated with less than crystal clarity," the Court examined the scope of
3712. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611. Cf. United States v. Join, 400 U.S. at 487
(double jeopardy barred retrial of defendant charged with tax fraud after trial judge improperly declared a mistrial sua sponte).
3713. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
3714. Id. at 679.
3715. Id. at 669. The prosecutor called an expert on Middle Eastern rugs as a witness.
The defense attempted to show that the witness was biased because he had filed a criminal
complaint against the defendant in the past. The complaint was never acted upon by the
police. On redirect examination the prosecutor attempted to rehabilitate the witness. At one
point the prosecutor asked:
"'PROSECUTOR: Have you ever done business with the Kennedys?
WITNESS: No, I have not. PROSECUTOR: Is that because he is a crook?"'
The defendant's mistrial motion followed. Id.
3716. Oregon v. Kennedy, 49 Or. App. 415, 619 P.2d 948, 949-50 (1980). The Oregon
Court of Appeals interpreted Jorn and Dinitz to bar retrial when the prosecution either
intends to provoke a mistrial request, or engages in overreaching or harassment. The court
stated:
[TJhe trial court found as a matter of fact that it was not the intention of the prosecutor in this case to cause a mistrial. We are bound by this finding of fact.
However, we are aware of the opinion that the prosecutor's conduct in this
case meets one of the other forbidden criteria, viz., overreaching. The comment
occurred during the redirect examination of a key witness. The prosecutor's express intent was to rehabilitate the witness, who had been impeached. However,
the commenting question went beyond rehabilitation and was, in fact, a direct personal attack on the general character of the defendant. As such, we think the prosecutor is charged with the knowledge that the comment - which we must treat as
intentional, at least in the sense that it appears it was made deliberately and after
some thought - was certain to interfere with the trial process.
Id. (citations omitted).
3717. 456 U.S. at 679.
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this exception. 3718 It acknowledged that language in its prior decisions
could be construed to bar a retrial when the prosecutor acts in bad
faith, or "overreaches," without actually intending to provoke a mistrial.371 9 However, the Court chose to interpret those cases in a narrow
light. The majority therefore ruled that the facts and circumstances in
a particular case must show that the prosecutor actually intended to
"goad" the defendant into moving for a mistrial. 3720 The Court cited

two basic reasons for this narrow interpretation of prosecutorial misconduct. First, an intent test is easier to apply than the more "amorphous" overreaching standard since it requires the court to make a
factual determination based on the record. 372 1 Second, a general overreaching test would undermine rather than protect the defendant's interests because the trial court, aware that a mistrial granted in this
situation might bar retrial, would be more likely to continue the trial
under any but the most severe circumstances.3722 Hence, because the
Oregon courts had found that the prosecutor did not intend to provoke
a mistrial, the Court ruled that double jeopardy did not bar the defend3718. Id. at 674. As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court ruled that the Oregon Court
of Appeals decision did not rest upon an adequate and independent state ground, nor did it
rest upon an intermixing of state and federal rules. d. at 670-71.
3719. Id. at 677-78 & n.8. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485:
[I]ndependent of the threat of bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecutor, the defendant has a significant interest in the decision whether or not to take the case
from the jury . . . . Thus, where circumstances develop not attributable to
prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion by the defendant for mistrial is
ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution.
In Dinitz, the Court stated:
The Double Jeopardy Clause does protect a defendant against governmental actions intended to provoke mistrial requests and thereby to subject defendants to the
substantial burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions. It bars retrials where "badfaith conduct by judge or prosecutor" . . . threatens the "[h]arassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the
prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict" the defendant.
424 U.S. at 611 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485).
3720. 456 U.S. at 676. The Court articulated the new rule as follows: "Prosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as harassment or overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on defendant's motion, therefore, does not bar retrial absent an intent on the part of the
prosecutor. . . ." Id. at 675-76.
3721. Id. The majority stated: "When it is remembered that resolution of double jeopardy questions by state trial courts are reviewable not only within the state court system
• . . the desirability of an easily applied principle is apparent." Id. at 675.
3722. Id. at 676. The Court went on to state:
If a mistrial were in fact warranted . . . the defendant could . . . successfully
appeal a judgment of conviction on the same grounds that he urged a mistrial
... . But some of the advantages secured to him by the Double Jeopardy Clause
. . . would be to a large extent lost in the process of trial to verdict, reversal on
appeal, and subsequent retrial.
Id. at 676-77.
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ant's retrial.372
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, concluded that the overreaching test

should have been preserved and stated that the majority "gratuitously
lop[ped] off a portion of the previously recognized exception." 3724 Ste-

vens disagreed with the majority's intent test for two reasons. First, he
argued that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a defendant to
prove that a prosecutor actually intended to cause a mistrial.3 72 5 Sec-

ond, Stevens pointed out that the rationale underlying the prosecutorial
misconduct exception extends beyond the majority's intent
requirement.37 2 6
Stevens went on to formulate a test for the more broad overreach-

ing exception. According to Stevens, a defendant should be entitled to
bar a retrial if he can show "intentional manipulation" by the prosecutor, inferred from objective evidence,3 72 7 which has "eliminated, or at
least substantially reduced" the probability of an acquittal.3728
b. for insufficient evidence
The double jeopardy clause does not prohibit retrial of a defendant after his conviction is reversed upon his own motion. 3729 However,
retrial is barred if the defendant's conviction has been reversed because
3723. Id. at 679.
3724. Id. at 681 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Stevens' view, the prosecutor's conduct failed
even to constitute overreaching or harrassment and, therefore, failed to meet the overreaching test. Id. For Stevens' rebuttal of the majority's reasons for applying a narrow interpretation of the prosecutorial misconduct exception, see id. at 687-88 n.22.
3725. Id. at 688 & nn.24-25.
3726. Id. at 689. For Stevens' statement of the basic rationale for the prosecutorial misconduct exception, see id. at 686. Stevens cites two situations where this rationale justifies
barring a retrial of the defendant. The prosecutor may simply intend to harass or embarrass
the defendant through misconduct, with no concern for the likelihood of mistrial or conviction. In addition, the prosecutor, not intending to provoke a mistrial, may wish to "inject
enough unfair prejudice into the trial to ensure a conviction but not so must as to cause a
reversal of that conviction." Id. at 689.
3727. Id. at 690 & n.29.
3728. Id. at 690 & n.31. Stevens further argued that this more flexible test is consistent
with the flexible guidelines that have been adopted under the "manifest necessity" exception. Id. at 690-91. See supra note 3711.
Justice Powell, in a separate concurrence, agreed with the majority's intent test. Powell
emphasized that intent should be determined from "objective facts and circumstances."
Based on the one improper question posed on redirect examination, Powell concluded that
the prosecutor did not intend to provoke a mistrial. Powell also relied on the following
information: no improper questions were asked previous to the one at issue; the prosecutor
was apparently surprised at the defendant's mistrial motion; and the prosecutor later testified that she did not intend to cause a mistrial. Id. at 680.
3729. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896).
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of insufficient evidence.3 73 °
In Tibbs v. Florida,3 7 3' the United States Supreme Court distin-

guished between a reversal based on evidentiary sufficiency and a reversal based on the weight of the evidence, ruling that the double

jeopardy clause does not bar retrial after a reversal based on the weight
of the evidence. Tibbs was convicted and sentenced to death in Florida
state court for first-degree murder and rape.373 2 On direct appeal, the

Florida Supreme Court overturned the conviction and remanded for a
new trial on the ground that "considerable doubt" existed about the

credibility of the testimony which supported Tibbs' conviction.3733 On
remand, the Florida trial court blocked a retrial on double jeopardy
grounds. This decision was reversed by the Florida Supreme Court on
a second appeal. The Florida Supreme Court ruled that Tibbs' conviction was reversed based on the weight of the evidence rather than evidentiary insufficiency, and thus the double jeopardy clause did not bar
retrial.3 734
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Florida high
court's ruling in a five to four decision. 37 35 The majority noted that the

double jeopardy considerations which support retrial following the reversal of a conviction based on evidentiary insufficiency "do not have
the same force" when a conviction is reversed on the weight of the

evidence.3736 The Court considered two bases for reversal in light of

the double jeopardy principle that a reprosecution cannot be brought
3730. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (defendant's bank robbery conviction
reversed because prosecution failed to prove defendant's sanity); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S.
19, 24 (1978) (defendant's first degree murder conviction reversed because prosecution failed
to prove all elements of first degree murder).
3731. 457 U.S. 31, 47 (1982).
3732. Id. at 35. Tibbs allegedly picked up a man and woman who were hitchhiking, shot
and killed the man, and raped the woman, who then fled and called the police. The woman,
Cynthia Nadeau, gave a description of the suspect the night of the murder. Tibbs was arrested a few days later, based on Nadeau's description. Id. at 32-33.
3733. Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 790 (Fla. 1976). The Florida Supreme Court concluded that Nadeau's testimony, which was the only evidence against Tibbs, was too unreliable to justify a guilty verdict. Id. at 791. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed Tibbs'
conviction pursuant to FLA. APP. R. 6.16(b) (current version at FLA. APP. R. 9.140(f)), which
requires the Florida high court to review a conviction for which the death sentence has been
imposed to determine if, in the interests of justice, a new trial is required.
3734. Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1121-22 (Fla. 1981). Concerned that the distinction
between reversals based on weight and sufficiency was too unmanageable, the court eliminated subsequent reversals based on evidentiary weight, stating that this "accords Florida
appellate courts their proper role in examining the sufficiency of the evidence, while leaving
questions of weight for resolution only before the trier of fact." Id. at 1125.
3735. 457 U.S. at 47.
3736. Id. at 42. See Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 44-45 n.5 (1981).
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after a verdict of acquittal.3 7 37 First the majority stated that evidence
supporting a conviction is deemed insufficient when the appellate

court, giving the prosecution the benefit of the doubt, concludes that no
reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty. 3738 The major-

ity equated such a reversal with an acquittal on the merits, which bars a
subsequent retrial.37 39 When a reversal is based on the weight of the

evidence, however, the court's focus is on the credibility of the evidence
and possible conflicts in testimony.3740 The majority stated that a reversal based on weight does not carry the authority of an acquittal, but

is rather a "disagreement" between the trial jury and the appellate

judge after a guilty verdict has been established.3 7 4 1 Second, the major-

ity noted that reversal based on the weight of the evidence gives the
defendant a second opportunity to seek a favorable judgment, and like

retrial after a defendant's successful appeal, it does not invoke double
jeopardy considerations that bar multiple prosecutions.3742
Tibbs argued that drawing a distinction between insufficient evidence and evidentiary weight would undermine the principle, stated in
Burks v. United States,3743 that retrial is barred following a reversal for

insufficient evidence. 37 " Tibbs argued that the majority's ruling in
Tibbs would encourage judges to base reversals on the weight of the

evidence. 3745 The majority found this argument unpersuasive, stating
that judges frequently distinguish between insufficient evidence and the
3737. 457 U.S. at 41. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571-72
(1977); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 666-71 (1896).
3738. 457 U.S. at 41.
3739. Id. The majority stated: "A verdict of not guilty, whether rendered by the jury or
directed by the trial judge, absolutely shields the defendant from retrial. A reversal based
on the insufficiency of the evidence has the same effect because it means that no rational
factflnder could have voted to convict the defendant." Id. (footnotes omitted). This policy
of giving finality to acquittals was one of the two double jeopardy considerations the Court
found to support the sufficiency rule from Burks and Greene. The other consideration was
that the prosecution should be prevented from harassing or "wearing down" the defendant:
"[The sufficiency rule] prevents the State from honing its trial strategies and perfecting its
evidence through successive attempts at conviction. Repeated prosecutorial sallies would
unfairly burden the defendant and create a risk of conviction through sheer governmental
perseverance." Id.
3740. Id. at 42.
3741. Id. The majority stated that: "A reversal on this ground ...
does not mean that
acquittal was the only proper verdict. Instead, the appellate court sits as a 'thirteenth juror'
and disagrees with the jury's resolution of the conflicting testimony. This difference of opinion no more signifies acquittal than does a disagreement among the jurors themselves." Id.
3742. Id. at 43. The court indicated that the defendant is actually being given a second
chance to obtain an acquittal after a jury found him guilty. Id.
3743. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
3744. Id. at 18.
3745. 457 U.S. at 44.
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weight of the evidence.374 6 Furthermore, the Court noted that the due

process clause requires that sufficient evidence exist to support a conviction, and judges are therefore prohibited from attempting to "mask"

reversals based on evidentiary insufficiency as a reversal based on the
weight of the evidence.37 47 The Court concluded that reversal of Tibbs'

conviction by the Florida Supreme Court was based on evidentiary
weight, and thus retrial was not barred by the double jeopardy clause.
Justice White, in a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun joined, challenged the majority's conclusion
that a retrial after a dismissal based on evidentiary weight does not
violate the policies which bar a retrial on insufficient evidence.37 4 8

White contended that a retrial based on the same evidence as before
"can serve no other purpose than harassment. 3749 White favored a
rule which would bar retrial when the conviction was dismissed on evidentiary grounds in general.3 75 0 In addition he commented that, after

Tibbs, appellate courts would be more inclined to reverse convictions
based on the weight of the evidence, to avoid a double jeopardy bar to
retrial.37 5 '
c.

after a plea agreement

The United States Supreme Court has held that conviction of a
lesser included offense results in the "implied acquittal" of the greater

offense, provided that the conviction represents an actual determination of some or all of the factual elements of the more serious

charge.3752 This implied acquittal thus raises a double jeopardy bar to
3746. Id. The difference between evidentiary weight and evidentiary sufficiency was explained by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1316-19 (8th Cir.
1980) (defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter upheld; conviction was based on
sufficient evidence because, reviewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict, substantial
evidence justified an inference of guilt; conviction also based on weight of evidence and new
trial therefore not required, because reviewing court's examination of all evidence did not
compel conclusion that serious miscarriage of justice occurred).
3747. 457 U.S. at 45 & n.21. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
3748. 457 U.S. at 48-49. The dissent did not characterize a dismissal based on insufficient
evidence as an "acquittal." In addition, the dissent construed both weight and sufficiency
dismissals as being in the same category: "In each instance, a reviewing court decides that,
as a matter of law, the decision of the factfinder cannot stand . . . .[When a reversal is
based on weight], [t]he fact remains that the State failed to prove the defendant guilty in
accordance with the evidentiary requirements of state law." Id. at 49.
3749. Id. at 48. The dissent assumed that the prosecution would not introduce any new
evidence at the second trial, thus making the defendant's burden exactly the same as in the
first trial.
3750. Id. at 50.
3751. Id. at 51.
3752. United States v. Green, 355 U.S. 184, 189-90 (1957) (defendant's conviction of sec-

19841

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

retrial on the greater offense. 375 3 In United States v. Barker,375 4 the

Ninth Circuit ruled that a defendant's plea of guilty to second-degree
murder did not constitute an implied acquittal of the original first-degree murder and conspiracy charges unless the judge accepts the
plea.3755 Therefore, reinstatement of the original indictment after the
guilty plea was set aside did not constitute double jeopardy.3756
Barker was indicted with four others for committing first-degree
murder and conspiring to commit murder 3757 in connection with the
death of Barker's husband in their home on Federal Aviation Authority property on Guam. 3758 The original indictment was dismissed after
Barker pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.3759 The guilty plea
was subsequently declared involuntary, due to a language barrier between Barker and the court. 3760 The trial court set aside its judgment
motion, and then
against Barker for second-degree murder on Barker's
376
vacated its dismissal of the original indictment.

'

Barker appealed the district court's denial of her motion to have
ond-degree murder constituted implied acquittal of first-degree murder where jury was
given lesser included offense instruction and implicitly found that facts did not support a
conviction for first-degree murder).
3753. Id. In Green, the defendant's conviction was reversed, and he was subsequently
retried and convicted for first-degree murder.
3754. 681 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1982).
3755. Id. at 592. The Barker court's ruling thus places the Ninth Circuit in accordance
with most other circuits on this issue. See, e.g., Klobuchir v. Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d 966,
970 (3d Cir.) (guilty plea to third-degree murder not implied acquittal to charges of firstdegree murder since court vacated the plea), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981); Hawk v.
Berkemer, 610 F.2d 445, 447 (6th Cir. 1979) (guilty plea to murder not implied acquittal of
aggravated murder, attempted murder, and aggravated burglary since plea-bargained conviction meant no determination of guilt or innocence); United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d
1170, 1174 (4th Cir. 1976) (dismissal of second and third counts after acceptance of guilty
plea on fourth count of four-count indictment did not preclude later retrial on remaining
two counts); United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
894 (1976); United States v. Anderson, 514 F.2d 583, 586-87 (7th Cir. 1975) (guilty plea to
bank robbery did not bar prosecution for armed robbery); Ward v. Page, 424 F.2d 491, 493
(10th Cir.) (guilty plea to first-degree manslaughter not a bar to conviction for first-degree
murder on retrial), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 917 (1970).
3756. 681 F.2d at 592.
3757. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976).
3758. 681 F.2d at 590. The indictment charged that Barker and a co-conspirator hired
three others to murder her husband by lethal injection. Id.
3759. Id.
3760. Id. Barker's native language was Vietnamese. At the guilty plea proceedings, the
judge had difficulty establishing whether Barker had entered a voluntary plea because she
could only speak and understand a limited amount of English. The plea was finally accepted after Barker's counsel assured the court that it was voluntary. Id.
3761. Id. Barker retained new counsel, who moved to have the plea and conviction set
aside. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
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the indictment dismissed.3 76 2 Barker argued that her plea constituted

an implied acquittal of the original charges.3763 The Ninth Circuit considered Barker's argument in light of two well-accepted double jeop-

ardy principles, and affirmed the district court.37 "
The Barker court first pointed out that the first-degree murder and

conspiracy charges did not violate the prohibition that a defendant
should not be prosecuted and tried for the same offense twice, 37 65 because Barker had not been tried for first-degree murder.3 7 66 Second,

the court concluded that the double jeopardy protection that arises
when a court actually makes a factual resolution of a charge 37 67 does
not exist when the judge merely approves a guilty plea on a lesser
charge.3768 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, in conducting a review of
a plea agreement on a lesser offense, a trial judge necessarily focuses
only on the probability of guilt as to that offense. The court declared
that the trial judge cannot properly consider the factual basis for a conviction on a greater charge in such a proceeding. 3769 Therefore, the
court upheld the indictment.
3762. 681 F.2d at 590.
3763. Id.
3764. Id. at 593.
3765. United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d at 121 (double jeopardy did not bar conviction
for aggravated bank robbery after defendant pleaded guilty to bank robbery because he was
not placed "in direct peril' of being convicted of aggravated bank robbery at time of plea).
3766. 681 F.2d at 591. The court further noted that the second proceeding was a direct
result of Barker's decision to plead guilty to second-degree murder. Id. It is not clear, however, that this is a valid rationale, considering that Barker's plea was subsequently ruled
involuntary.
3767. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 565-66, 575-76 (1977)
(acquittal of contempt charges by judge after jury deadlocked created double jeopardy bar
to reprosecution for same charge because judge's action constituted a factual determination);
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978) (double jeopardy no bar to reprosecution on
drug charges where charge originally dismissed on procedural grounds; no factual determination was made).
3768. 681 F.2d at 591-92. See United States v. Green, 355 U.S. at 190. For a discussion of
Green see supra notes 3752-53.
3769. 681 F.2d at 592 (citing Klobuchir v. Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d at 969); see also Hawk v.
Berkemer, 610 F.2d at 447.
The Ninth Circuit rejected Barker's assertion that the trial judge had an "opportunity to
consider and reject the more serious charge" because the judge had asked Barker and her
co-defendant numerous questions about the murder. 681 F.2d at 592. For a statement of
the procedures and findings required to be made in a plea proceeding, see FED. R. CRIM. P.
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4. Consecutive sentences
a. the Blockburger test
The double jeopardy clause prohibits multiple punishment for the
same offense. 3770 However, a defendant may receive cumulative punishment for multiple statutory offenses that arise out of the same act,

provided that the Supreme Court's test from Blockburger v. United
States3 771 is satisfied. The Blockburger test permits punishment for
multiple statutory offenses arising out of the same transaction if each

offense requires proof of a material fact not required by the other.3 77 2
In United States v. Sanford,3

73

the Ninth Circuit ruled that the

Blockburger test was not satisfied when the sole evidence of possession
3 7 74

of counterfeit bills consisted of the evidence of transfer of the bills.
The defendant had been convicted of possessing and concealing counand of transferring
terfeit notes, a violation of 18 U.S.C. section 472,
and delivering the same notes, a violation of 18 U.S.C. section 473.3776

He was sentenced to three and two years imprisonment respectively,
the sentences to run consecutively. There was no evidence to show that

Sanford actually had possession of the notes; instead, possession was
established through the transfer transaction.3 7 77
3770. Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873).
3771. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
3772. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. at 304. The defendant in Blockburger was
given consecutive sentences for three convictions for the sale of morphine. One count
charged the sale of ten grains of morphine which was not in its original package, a violation
of section one of the Harrison Narcotic Act. A second count charged the sale of eight grains
of morphine on the next day which was also not in its original package. The last count
charged that the sale of the eight grains was not made pursuant to a prescription, a violation
of section two of the Harrison Act. Blockburger claimed that the second and third counts
were one offense because they arose out of the same transaction. The Court ruled that they
constituted two separate offenses because each offense required proof of a fact which the
other did not: "The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which
the other does not." Id. Hence, the defendant was properly given consecutive sentences.
3773. 673 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1982).
3774. Id. at 1074.
3775. 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1976) states in pertinent part: "Whoever, with intent to defraud
• . . keeps in possession or conceals any falsely made, forged, counterfeited, or altered
obligation or other security of the United States, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both."
3776. 18 U.S.C. § 473 (1976) states in pertinent part: "Whoever. . . transfers, receives,
or delivers any false, forged, counterfeited, or altered obligation or other security of the
United States, with the intent that the same be passed, published, or used as true and genuine, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
3777. 673 F.2d at 1071.
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The court relied on a recent Ninth Circuit decision which held that

the possession and distribution of narcotics merge into one crime when
possession of narcotics is proven only through the distribution transaction.3 778 The Sanford court determined that the possession and transfer
counts similarly
merged,
9
improper.

377

and thus consecutive sentences

were

In United States v. Ching,3 78 ° the Ninth Circuit ruled that the

Blockburger test was satisfied when the defendant was given consecutive sentences on two counts for possessing unregistered firearms and
one count for possessing a firearm by a felon.3 78 ' The defendant had

pled guilty to possessing an unregistered silencer and an unregistered
pen gun, a violation of 26 U.S.C. section 5861(i),3782 and possessing a
firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C. app. section
1202(a)(1).3 7, 3 The record was unclear whether the charge for posses-

sion of a firearm by a felon was based on possession of either the pen
gun or silencer, or on possession of a third unidentified weapon.3 78 4
The court stated that even if the conviction for possessing a fire-

arm by a felon was based on possession of the pen gun or silencer, the
crime was separate and therefore consecutive sentences were

proper.37 5 Applying the Blockburger test, the court determined that
the two statutes required proof of a fact that the other did not.3 78 6 The

unregistered firearms charge required the prosecution to show that the
3778. United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316, 324 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1080 (1978). The two crimes under dispute in Oropeza were possession of heroin with intent
to distribute, and distribution of heroin. As in Sanford, the prosecution in Oropeza proved
possession on the basis of the distribution transaction alone. The Oropeza court held that
the possession and distribution crimes merged into one offense. The court pointed out that
both offenses were located in the same statutory section, and the statutes did not clearly
authorize punishment for each subsection. Therefore, the court concluded that although
Congress intended to punish the possession of heroin with intent to distribute, Congress did
not intend to "punish twice a distributor who necessarily possessed before distribution." Id.
3779. 673 F.2d at 1073-74. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and remanded the
case for resentencing.
3780. 682 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1982).
3781. Id. at 802.
3782. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i) (1976) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to
receive or possess a firearm which is not identified by a serial number .... "
3783. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1976) provides: "Any person who. . . has been convicted . . . of a felony . . . and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or
affecting commerce... any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for
not more than two years, or both."
3784. 682 F.2d at 802. If the count for possession by a felon was based on possession of a
third firearm, as the court believed it was, then each act of possession would be separate and
distinct, and a Blockburger analysis would not be required.
3785. Id.
3786. Id.
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weapons did not have serial numbers. In contrast, possession by a
felon required that the prosecution prove that Ching had a prior felony
conviction. The court ruled, therefore, that the Blockburger test was
satisfied.378 7
b. question of state statutory authorization
In two habeas corpus petitions before the Ninth Circuit, the court
was faced with the question of whether state courts could impose consecutive sentences. In Roy v. Watson,378 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed

that double jeopardy does not prohibit consecutive sentences for crimes
arising out of separate transactions, even when a state statute does not
specifically authorize consecutive sentences.378 9 In 1976 Roy was convicted in Oregon state court of theft and was given five years of probation. He subsequently violated his probation and was sentenced to five
years in prison. In 1979 Roy was convicted for escaping from prison
and was sentenced to five years imprisonment, to run consecutively
3790
with the theft sentence.
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Roy argued that because
Arizona law did not specifically authorize consecutive sentencing, the
state court violated the double jeopardy clause.37 91 Roy relied on dic3787. Id. In another case last term, the Ninth Circuit ruled that double jeopardy does not
prohibit conviction for conspiring to commit wire fraud, even though the bubstantive fraud
counts were based on vicarious liability. United States v. Saavedra, 684 F.2d 1293, 1301 (9th
Cir. 1982). The defendant in Saavedra was found vicariously liable for the acts of several
Los Angeles County Jail inmates who obtained money orders from Western Union with
fraudulently obtained credit card numbers. The defendant then picked up the money orders
and deposited them in the inmates' bank accounts. The defendant claimed that double jeopardy prohibited her conviction for the three substantive fraud counts because these convictions were based solely on the conspiracy agreement. 684 F.2d at 1301.
The court rejected this argument, ruling that the principle of vicarious liability made
conviction of the substantive counts proper, regardless of the fact that one agreement gave
rise to all four convictions. 684 F.2d at 1301.
3788. 669 F.2d 611 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982).
3789. Id. at 612-13. This rule was first stated by the Ninth Circuit in Fierro v. MacDougall, 648 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981). Fierro was sentenced to 184
years in state prison for committing eighteen separate state crimes. Fierro had not demonstrated that any of the crimes arose out of the same transaction. The Ninth Circuit disposed
of Fierro's argument that the consecutive sentences violated the double jeopardy clause by
stating that "[t]he imposition of consecutive sentences is nothing more than the imposition,
for each crime, of the sentence fixed by legislative act. Such sentencing does not constitute
usurpation of a legislative function but rather is literal compliance with that which the legislature has prescribed." Id. at 1260.
3790. 669 F.2d at 611.
3791. Id. at 612. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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turn from Whalen v. United States,37 92 which, he argued, provided that

state courts could not impose multiple punishments unless authorized
by state law.379 3 The Ninth Circuit distinguished Whalen, noting that it
involved two statutory offenses arising out of a single transaction rather
37 94
than multiple offenses violated by separate criminal acts, as in Roy.
When "the acts punished are clearly discrete," the Ninth Circuit stated,

consecutive sentences without violating
then state courts may impose
3795

the double jeopardy clause.
37 9 6 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
In Gentry v. MacDougall,

double jeopardy clause was not violated by an Arizona manslaughter
statute which authorized consecutive sentences for two deaths arising

from a single act.3797 The defendant was given consecutive sentences
after conviction in Arizona state court on two counts of vehicular manslaughter.3798 In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Gentry first argued that the Arizona manslaughter statute did not authorize

consecutive sentences for multiple deaths resulting from the same
act. 3799 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, following an Arizona state court's
interpretation of the manslaughter statute, which held that the Arizona
legislature intended to authorize consecutive sentences. 8 co
Gentry then argued that the double jeopardy clause prohibited
consecutive sentences for multiple deaths arising from a single unintentional act. 380 ' The Ninth Circuit ruled, however, that the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit the legislature from authorizing such
3792. 445 U.S. 684 (1980) (defendant convicted of rape and killing same victim in perpetration of rape could not be given consecutive sentences without express statutory authority).
3793. Id. at 690.
3794. 669 F.2d at 612. The defendant in Fierrov. MacDougallalso relied on Whalen. The
Fierro court distinguished Whalen on the same grounds. Fierro v. MacDougall, 648 F.2d at
1260.
3795. 669 F.2d at 613-14.
3796. 685 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1982).
3797. Id. at 323.
3798. Id. The deaths resulted from a traffic collision between Gentry's vehicle and a taxi
while Gentry was intoxicated. He was convicted under former ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13456(3)(a) (repealed 1978). For the state court decision, see State v. Gentry, 123 Ariz. 135,
598 P.2d 113 (1979).
3799. 685 F.2d at 323.
3800. Id. In State v. Miranda, 3 Ariz. App. 550, 416 P.2d 444 (1966), the Arizona Court of
Appeals considered former section 13-456(3)(a) and the former Arizona definition of manslaughter, "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice." ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 13-451 (repealed 1978). The Miranda court concluded that the Arizona legislature clearly
contemplated punishment for each human being killed, regardless of whether the deaths
arose from the same act. 3 Ariz. App. at 558, 416 P.2d at 452.
3801. 685 F.2d at 323.
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multiple punishment.38 °2 The court stated that any contention that sentencing under Arizona's manslaughter statute was unconstitutional
should be brought as an eighth amendment claim of cruel and unusual
punishment.380 3 Because no eighth amendment argument was made,
38 4
the court denied the habeas corpus petition.

0

5. Sentence modification
The double jeopardy clause prohibits the increase, or enhancement, of an existing sentence.380 5 In UnitedStates v. Alverson,38° the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the correction of an ambiguous sentence does
not constitute sentence enhancement.
Alverson was convicted of four counts of possessing unregistered
machine guns. 3 80 7 He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for
each count. The trial judge's instructions were so uncertain, however,
that it was not clear whether the sentences were to run consecutively or
concurrently. 3808 Three days later, the judge acknowledged that the
sentence was ambiguous. He therefore set the sentence aside and gave
instructions that the five year sentences were to run consecutively for a
maximum of twenty years.380 9
The Ninth Circuit upheld the corrected sentence, but nevertheless
criticized the trial judge's manner of sentencing. 3810 The court ruled

that correction of an illegal sentence does not violate the double jeop3802. Id. The Gentry court did not consider double jeopardy principles under the Arizona
Constitution.
3803. Id. See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82 (1955) (eighth amendment gives Congress power to authorize consecutive sentences for transporting two women at same time in
violation of Mann Act).
3804. 685 F.2d at 323.
3805. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168-69 (1977) (prosecution of defendant for auto theft
after conviction on lesser included offense ofjoyriding, where both crimes arose out of same
transaction, held impermissible as an attempt to increase sentence).
3806. 666 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1982).
3807. Id. at 344. Alverson was convicted under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1976), which states in
pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to receive or possess a firearm
which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record
3808. Id. at 347. The judge said at the original sentencing: "The sentence imposed as to
Counts 2, 3, and 4 is to run consecutively with the sentence on Count 1." In an effort to
clarify this, the judge later stated: "As to Counts 2, 3, and 4, they run consecutively with
Count 1." Id.
3809. Id.
3810. Id. at 348 n.5. The court stated:
The fact that we find the district court's correction of its original sentence
permissible does not mean that we approve of the district court's sentencing procedures in this case. A trial judge is obligated to give an intelligible sentence. Where
he or she fails to do this, speedy correction of the error may avoid the necessity of
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ardy prohibition against sentence enhancement.38 1 ' In determining
whether the ambiguous sentence was illegal, the court applied the test
that a sentence is improper if it fails to reveal with "fair certainty" what
the sentence actually is. 38 12 In this case, it was not clear from the trial

judge's original instructions whether Alverson had been sentenced to a
maximum of ten or twenty years.381 3 As a result, the court found that
the ambiguous sentence was improper; the subsequent instructions
or modifications, rather than enwere therefore permissible corrections
38 1 4
hancement of an existing sentence.
6. Resentencing
In Knapp v. Cardwell,3 s1 5 the defendants, who had been convicted

and sentenced to the death penalty before the restrictive sentencing
procedure under Arizona's capital murder statute was reinterpreted,
challenged their resentencing as a violation of the double jeopardy
clause. They had been convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced
to the death penalty under section 13-454 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, 38 16 which at that time required the sentencing judge to make a
finding as to each aggravating and mitigating factor listed in the statute.3 817 Thus, in order to impose the death penalty, the sentencing
judge had to find that at least one of the aggravating factors listed in
the statute existed at the time of the murder.38 18 The factors enumer-

ated in section 13-454 were interpreted by the Arizona Supreme Court
resentencing but it does not erase the fact that the judge has been careless and has
created unnecessary confusion and perhaps created false expectations.
Id.
3811. Id. at 348.
3812. Id. (quoting United States v. Moss, 614 F.2d 171, 175 (8th Cir. 1980) (defendant's
sentence for mail and wire fraud possibly increased twofold by dismissal of a conspiracy to
kidnap charge)). See United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363 (1926) ("Sentences in
criminal cases should reveal with fair certainty the intent of the court and exclude any serious misapprehensions by those who must execute them.").
3813. 666 F.2d at 348.
3814. Id. FED. R. CiuM. P. 35 provides: "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time ..... " See United States v. Solomon, 468 F.2d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 1972) (court had
power under Rule 35 to modify illegal sentence for United States Treasury violations because sentence was "internally contradictory"), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 986 (1973); Scarponi v.
United States, 313 F.2d 950, 953 (10th Cir. 1963) (if ambiguous sentence for prison escape
ruled illegal, modification under Rule 35 would be proper; the Tenth Circuit held that the
sentence was in fact unambiguous in light of additional statements by the sentencing court).
3815. 667 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982).
3816. Id. at 1256. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-454 (1978) (current version at ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West Supp. 1982)).
3817. Id.
3818. Id.
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in 1976 to be exclusive, so that any factor not listed could not be considered by the sentencing judge. 38 19 This interpretation was reversed

by the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Watson,382 in light of a 1978

United States Supreme Court ruling that a similar Ohio statute was

unconstitutional, because it unfairly precluded consideration of all pertinent mitigating factors.3821
The Arizona Legislature enacted a new capital murder statute in
1978,3822 codifying the ruling in Watson.3 82 3 The defendants in Knapp
subsequently were resentenced, and each was again sentenced to

death.3824 The defendants appealed a district court order vacating an
injunction 3825 that prohibited the state from carrying out the
sentences.3 826 On appeal one of the issues was whether resentencing
under Watson and the new Arizona section 13-703 subjected the defendants to double jeopardy.3 82 7

The defendants first argued that imposition of the death penalty
upon resentencing would constitute a second punishment for the same
offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause. 38 28 The defendants
based this argument on the contention that their original death

sentences were reduced to life imprisonment when Arizona's capital
murder sentencing procedure was declared unconstitutional. 3829 The
3819. State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 195-96, 560. P.2d 41, 50 (1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 915 (1977). This interpretation was affirmed in State v. Bishop, 118 Ariz. 263, 576 P.2d
122 (1978), vacated sub nom. Bishop v. Arizona, 439 U.S. 810 (1978). The decision was
reaffirmed on remand to the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Bishop, 127 Ariz. 531, 622
P.2d 478 (1980).
3820. 120 Ariz. 441,586 P.2d 1253 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924 (1979). In Watson, the
Arizona Supreme Court ruled that § 13-454(F) was unconstitutional because it prevented
consideration of mitigating factors not listed in the statute. However, the court was able to
delete the offending portion of the statute and leave the remainder in full force and effect.
Id. at 445, 586 P.2d at 1257.
3821. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). The Ohio capital murder statute in Lockett
explicitly stated that only three mitigating factors could be considered. Id. at 608.
3822. ARiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West Supp. 1982).
3823. 667 F.2d at 1257.
3824. Id. at 1263.
3825. Id. at 1257-58. The injunction was ordered in 1978, before Watson was decided and
the new section 13-703 was enacted. Id.
3826. Id. at 1257-58. After section 13-703 was enacted, the State moved to have the district
court's injunction dissolved. The district court vacated its injunction in April, 1980, and
stayed the executions pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Knapp v. Cardwell, 513 F. Supp.
4 (D. Ariz. 1980). The district court ruled that the defendants' resentencing did not violate
the double jeopardy clause. 513 F. Supp. at 14.
3827. 667 F.2d at 1258.
3828. Id. at 1263. See Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873); North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717-18 (1969).
3829. 667 F.2d at 1263-64. Defendants asserted that the Arizona Supreme Court's decision
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Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants' argument. 38 30 The court rea-

soned that because the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Watson
did not render the death penalty itself unconstitutional but rather reinterpreted only the sentencing procedure, 383 1 the defendants were placed
in the same position as a person who has had his sentence vacated for

procedural error.3 832 The court concluded that imposition of the death

penalty on resentencing after the original sentence is vacated on proce3833

dural grounds is not prohibited by the double jeopardy clause.
Relying on the 1981 Supreme Court case of Bullinglon v. Missouri,38 34 the defendants also argued that the resentencing court could
not consider aggravating factors that the first sentencing court found

did not exist, because the first sentencing court's findings constituted an

implied acquittal of those factors.38 35 In Bullington, the Supreme Court

held that the double jeopardy clause prohibited imposition of the death
penalty upon retrial where the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at the original trial.38 36 The Ninth Circuit rejected this arguin Watson declared the Arizona sentencing statute unconstitutional. Hence, their death
sentences were reduced to life imprisonment under section 10 of the Arizona Session Laws.
Section 10 provides that a defendant's death sentence is reduced to life imprisonment "[iln
the event the death penalty is held unconstitutional on final appeal." 1973 ARIZ. SESS. LAWS
§ 10, ch. 138. The Ninth Circuit held that section 10 was inapplicable, deferring to the
Arizona Supreme Court's statements in Watson that it only declared unconstitutional a portion of the sentencing procedures under former section 13-454. 667 F.2d at 1263.
The court further rejected the defendants' claim that common law compelled reduction
of their death penalty sentences to life imprisonment upon invalidation of Arizona's death
penalty law. Id. at 1264.
3830. Id.
3831. Id. See supra note 3829.
3832. Id. at 1264.
3833. Id. The court did not cite any authority for this proposition.
3834. 451 U.S. 430 (1981). In Bullington, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment after the jury ruled, in a bifurcated trial proceeding, that certain aggravating factors
were not proven to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant was granted a new trial
on his own motion. On retrial, the State again sought the death penalty. The Supreme
Court ruled that the sentencing procedures in the first trial "explicitly required" the jury to
determine whether the aggravating factors were present, and the jury's sentence of life imprisonment therefore constituted an implicit acquittal of the presence of any aggravating
factors. Id. at 444-45. Therefore, the death penalty could not be sought on retrial. Id. at
446.
3835. 667 F.2d at 1264. The court noted that the defendants did not actually claim acquittal of the death penalty, but of the aggravating factors found not to exist in the original
sentencing proceedings. The court characterized the claim as one of collateral estoppel, and
pointed out that acceptance of such an argument would mean that the appellants could
similarly be estopped from denying aggravating factors at resentencing that were found to
exist at the original sentencing. Furthermore, the defendants could be estopped from claiming the existence of mitigating circumstances not found to exist originally. Id. at n.10.
3836. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. at 446. See supra note 3834.
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ment, too, and distinguished Bullington on two grounds. First, the

court ruled that no implied acquittal can occur when, as in Knapp, the
defendants were originally sentenced to death. A harsher sentence cannot therefore be imposed on resentencing. 3837 Second, the sentencing

procedures in Bulling/on were more structured and formal than in
Knapp, so that imposition of a life sentence in Bullingon compelled the

conclusion that the absence of aggravating factors did not justify the
death penalty.38 38 The Knapp court also stated that evidence of mitigating or aggravating factors that either did not exist or were not intro3 39
duced at the original hearing could be introduced on resentencing.
Judge Adams, dissenting in part and concurring in part, stated that

he would allow reconsideration of a "narrower class" of aggravating
circumstances than the majority.3 8 4° It was his view that, upon resen-

tencing, the court should not consider aggravating circumstances which
are derived from factual evidence that could have been adduced at the

first trial. 384' Thus, the consideration of "intervening criminal convictions and other sorts of aggravating circumstances," would be allowed
because these
were not a matter of factual inquiry at the original
842
sentencing.

3

B. Appellate Review

1. Appeal by the government
Section 3731 of title 18, United States Code, establishes the gov-

ernment's right to appeal in criminal cases. 3843 The United States
3837. 667 F.2d at 1265.

3838. Id. The Knapp court also stated: "The Bullington Court indicated no intention to
overrule those cases that permit harsher resentencing where the first sentence was rendered
under a more flexible scheme involving discretionary balancing of circumstances by the sentencing body." Id. at 1265.
3839. Id.
3840. Id. at 1265 (Adams, J., dissenting).
3841. Id. at 1267-68.
3842. Id. at 1268-69. Adams' position is based on his interpretation of the principles in
Bullington and the underlying concerns of the double jeopardy clause, namely, that a defendant not be subjected to the burden of relitigating factual issues, and not be subjected to
the risk that relitigation of such issues may result in erroneous findings. Id. See Bullington
v. Missouri, 451 U.S. at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting).
3843. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) provides in part:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals
from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or
information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution. An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision
or order of a district courts [sic] suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the
return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant

LO YOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

Supreme Court has held that section 3731 allows the government to
appeal whenever the Constitution permits. 3844 There are, however,

limitations on this right to appeal: (1) the defendant cannot be placed
in jeopardy a second time;3845 (2) the appeal must be timely; 3846 and
(3) the appeal must involve a material fact in the case with significant
legal issues.38 47
In United States v. Booth,3 84 8 the Ninth Circuit held that section

3731 does not give the government the right to appeal the admission of
evidence. 3 49 The defendant had been indicted for a bank robbery involving several eyewitnesses. At trial, the district court granted a motion to admit testimony from an identification expert concerning the
general problems with eyewitness identification. The Government appealed the district court's ruling as to the admissibility of this evidence.

Without citing authority, the Ninth Circuit stated that section 3731
gives the government the right to appeal only the suppression of evidence; a trial court's decision to admit certain evidence at trial cannot
be appealed by the government.3 850

In addition, in Booth the Government invoked section 3731 to appeal the district court's order suppressing and excluding certain evi-

dence. At a pre-trial hearing, the district court had suppressed
evidence concerning:

(1) the defendant's statements to police before

being arrested; (2) eyewitness testimony of three of the five witnesses
who viewed the defendant at a "show-up" identification at the bank

shortly after the robbery; (3) a list of various gun and ammunition
stores found at a commercial establishment; and (4) the deposition of
the Government's fingerprint expert explaining why he believed no
has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or
information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of
a fact material in the proceeding.
3844. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975) (in enacting § 3731, Congress intended to remove all statutory barriers to government appeals and to allow appeals whenever the Constitution would permit). See also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. 564, 568 (1977) ("Congress has removed the statutory limitations to appeal and the
relevant inquiry turns on the reach of the Double Jeopardy Clause itself. . .
3845. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 568.
3846. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b) provides in part that "[w]hen an appeal by the government is
authorized by statute, the notice of appeal shall be filed in the district court within 30 days
after the entry of the judgment."
3847. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2 (controversy must exist before federal courts can exercise
jurisdiction). Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (in federal cases, actual controversy
must exist at each stage of appellate review).
3848. 669 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1981).
3849. Id. at 1240.
3850. Id.
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fingerprints were found on the get-away car.385 '
After the Government appealed the suppression order under secthe
tion 3731, the defendant filed in district court a motion to dismiss 3852
indictment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b).
The district court dismissed the indictment without prejudice for unnecessary delay in bringing the defendant to trial. The Government's
section 3731 appeal was then consolidated with an appeal of the dismissal order.
In determining that the district court had erred in dismissing the
indictment, the Ninth Circuit considered the three requirements for appeal under section 3731. The appeal cannot place the defendant in
jeopardy a second time or be used to delay the trial, and the evidence
suppressed must be substantial proof of a material fact in the case.3853
The court first noted that since the defendant had not yet gone to
trial, he could not possibly be placed in double jeopardy by the Gov3851. Id. at 1233. In Booth, over $32,000 was stolen from a bank. Shortly after the robbery, a policeman observed the defendant, who appeared to match a police description of
one of the perpetrators. The policeman asked the defendant if he had any identification,
what he was doing in the area, and whether he had been arrested before. The defendant
responded that he had been paroled the month before for a burglary. He was then transported to the bank for a "show-up" identification. With his hands handcuffed behind his
back, the defendant was taken before a group of witnesses, some of whom identified the
defendant as one of the robbers. The defendant was then formally arrested. Later, a vehicle
believed to be the get-away car was discovered but no fingerprints were found on the automobile. FBI agents then secured a warrant to search a store near the bank. A photograph of
the defendant, a torn sketch of the bank, and a list of ammunition stores were recovered
from the store. At a hearing after arraignment, however, the court suppressed some of this
evidence, and the Government appealed this suppression order. Id. at 1234-35.
3852. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b) states in part: "if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a
defendant to trial, the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint."
3853. 669 F.2d at 1241. The Booth court reviewed United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d
1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980), which established the
three conditions necessary for the government to appeal under section 3731.
In Loud Hawk, Oregon state police stopped two vehicles believed to contain fugitives
from United States authorities. After arresting some of the occupants of these cars, the state
issued search warrants for the vehicles. After firearms were found in one vehicle and dynamite in the other, the defendant was charged with illegal possession of these items. After
photographing the dynamite, state authorities destroyed the explosives. Pursuant to Rule
48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the district court dismissed the dynamite
charges, stating that such destruction was unlawful suppression of evidence. Furthermore,
because the Government refused to proceed with the trial until it could appeal the dismissal
order of the dynamite counts, the district court dismissed the indictment with prejudice.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit allowed the Government to reinstate the indictment as to
the dynamite charges because the conditions of section 3731 were met. With regard to the
non-dynamite charges, however, the court held that the suppressed evidence (dynamite) was
not substantial proof of a material fact. Therefore Loud Hawk held that the delay in prosecuting the non-dynamite counts was unnecessary and these counts were properly dismissed
under Rule 48(b).
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ernment's appeal.3854 The court also stated that any delay in the trial
was necessary to allow the Government to exercise its right to appeal;
the Government was not unnecessarily delaying the trial pursuant to
Rule 48(b). 38 5 In considering the third factor, the court stated that
some of the suppressed evidence would be very important in proving
the Government's case. Because the witness' testimony would be crucial in identifying the defendant as one of the robbers, the court stated
that 385
this
suppressed evidence was substantial proof of a material
6
fact.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that because all three conditions

were satisfied, the Government should have been allowed to appeal the
suppression order and therefore the district court erred in dismissing
the indictment.3857
In further interpreting the government's right to appeal under section 3731, the Ninth Circuit in UnitedStates v. Godoy,38 58 allowed the
Government to appeal the denial of a Rule 353859 motion to correct an
illegal sentence. The defendant was convicted by a jury of all counts
charged in the indictment.3860 In a special verdict, the jury also forfeited six of the defendant's properties which the defendant had acquired through the proceeds of his racketeering activities.386 ' In
sentencing the defendant, the district court ordered only four of the
properties to be forfeited. After the defendant petitioned the court to
remove the restraining order from the properties not forfeited, the Goveminent responded with a motion to correct the sentence under Rule 35
3854. 669 F.2d at 1241.
3855. Id. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d at 1150 (delay necessary for government to appeal district court's order cannot be deemed "'unnecessary' for purposes of Rule
48(b)").
3856. 669 F.2d at 1241.
3857. Id.
3858. 678 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1981).
3859. FED. R. CiuM. P. 35 provides in part that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence
... imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein.. .."
3860. 678 F.2d at 85. The indictment charged the defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1962
(1976) (racketeering activities), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) (possession and sale of methaqualone), and 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976) (forfeiture of properties due to racketeering activities). The forfeited property was: (1) the Ralph Brothers Market and Pharmacy; (2) an
unimproved lot in Ventura County; (3) commercial property in Mission Hills; (4) commercial property in Van Nuys; (5) the Whiskey Creek Nightclub; and (6) residential property in
Los Angeles. 678 F.2d at 85.
3861. 678 F.2d at 85. The Godoy court stated that the defendant had admitted that all six
properties had been acquired through racketeering activities. The defendant, however, contended that the court had no jurisdiction to hear this appeal. .d. at 87. The court disagreed,
stating that because § 3731 was intended to allow government appeals whenever constitutional, the Government in this case should be allowed to appeal the sentence. Id. See
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975).
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of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The motion was denied

and the Government appealed.3862
In holding that pursuant to section 3731 the Government had the

right to appeal a Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence,
the Godoy court followed a 1981 Ninth Circuit case which allowed the
Government to appeal a Rule 35 motion for reduction of a sentence.3 86 3
The Godoy court noted that the only restriction on the Government's
right to appeal was whether the defendant would be subject to double
jeopardy.3 8 4 Because the Government had only requested that the
jury verdict be reinstated, the defendant would not be under jeopardy a

second time.3865
Finally, in United States v. Banks,3 86 6 the Ninth Circuit held that
under section 3731 the Government had the right to appeal a district

court's order dismissing an indictment on the ground of vindictive
prosecution. After the district court dismissed a multiple count indict-

ment involving destructive device and firearm charges against defendants Ka-Mook Banks, Redner, Loud Hawk, and Dennis Banks, the
Government received a new indictment from the grand jury.3 86 7 The
3862. 678 F.2d at 85-86. In this appeal, the Government did not challenge the district
court's decision not to forfeit the Ventura property and admitted that the residential property in Los Angeles was not subject to forfeiture according to United States v. Marubeni
America Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 767, 769 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1981). 678
F.2d at 86. InMarubeniAmerica,the court stated that in enacting § 1962(a), Congress only
intended to forfeit the improper gains of criminals where they enter or operate an organization through a pattern of racketeering activity; Congress did not intend to forfeit all types of
income gained through racketeering. Thus, in Godoy, the Ninth Circuit held that the Government's appeal did not concern any issues involving those two properties.
3863. 678 F.2d at 87. In United States v. Hetrick, 644 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1980), the court
recognized the government's right under § 3731 to appeal a district court's order granting a
Rule 35 motion for reduction of a sentence. After the defendant had received a ten-year
sentence for charges of fraud and conspiracy, the district court reduced the sentence to five
years imprisonment and then further reduced the sentence to three years because the
sentences of the defendant's co-conspirators had been so reduced. Upon the Government's
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant would not be subject to double jeopardy,
and thus the Government should be allowed to appeal. The Hetrick court relied on congressional intent and the Supreme Court's language in United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. at 568 (authorizing government appeals whenever constitutional). Clearly, the
Godoy court was following the precedent already established in Hetrick.
3864. 678 F.2d at 87.
3865. Id.
3866. 682 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 755 (1983).
3867. Id. at 843. Ka-Mook Banks, Russ Redner, Kenneth Moses Loud Hawk, and Dennis
Banks were charged with firearms violations relating to their arrest in November 1975. Id.
For a discussion of the many facts leading to this appeal, see United States v. Loud Hawk,
628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
After the district judge granted a motion to suppress secondary evidence relating to the
explosive violations, the Government appealed the order and requested a continuance since
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new indictment charged all defendants with two new destructive device

counts and also charged Ka-Mook Banks with a new count of receiving
firearms while under indictment for a felony.38 68 On the defendants'
motion to dismiss the new indictment, the district court denied the motions for vindictive prosecutions as to defendants Redner, Loud Hawk,
and Dennis Banks.3 869 These defendants appealed the denial of their
motions and the Ninth Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction to

review the district court's order refusing to dismiss the indictment on
the ground of vindictive prosecution. 38 70 The district court, however,

granted Ka-Mook Bank's motion to dismiss for vindictive

prosecution.3 87 '
The Government appealed under section 373 1,3872 contending that
only the added new charge should have been dismissed.3 8 73 The Ninth
Circuit held that section 3731 gives the court of appeals jurisdiction to

review the Government's appeal of an order dismissing an indictment

due to vindictive prosecution.38 74 Thus, turning to the merits of the
appeal, the Banks court held that the dismissal of the indictment was
erroneous; all but the added count was ordered reinstated against KaMook Banks.387 5
the trial was only one month away. The court denied the Government's motion and when
the Government answered not ready on the day of the trial, the judge dismissed the indictment with prejudice. On appeal of the dismissal pursuant to § 3731, the Ninth Circuit stated
that the district court failed to warn the Government that the indictment would be dismissed
if it failed to proceed to trial. 628 F.2d at 1150. The case was remanded for further consideration. Id. at 1151.
On remand, the district court held that the firearms counts could not be reinstated. As a
result, the Government requested and obtained new indictments against the defendants.
These new indictments were the subject of the second appeal. See supra note 3853.
3868. 682 F.2d at 844.
3869. Id. In denying the defendants' motions to discuss the new indictment, the district
judge stated that the new destructive device counts were added through the "'independent
judgment of subsequent prosecutors... 'and therefore the district court did not find an
appearance of vindictiveness. Id.
3870. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) the court does not
have jurisdiction to review an order denying a motion to dismiss due to vindictive prosecution. See United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263 (1982) (per curiam)
(motion to dismiss for vindictive prosecution not appealable since not within collateral order
exception of 1291).
3871. 682 F.2d at 844. The district court stated that "the Government had failed to dispel
the appearance of vindictiveness created by the addition of the new firearms count against
[Ka-Mook Banks]." Id.
3872. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) provides in part that "[i]n a criminal case an appeal by the
United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a[n] . . . order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information as to any one or more counts ..
3873. 682 F.2d at 844.
3874. Id.
3875. Id. at 846. The Banks court stated that in order to prove vindictive prosecution the
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2. Finality
Section 1291 of title 28, United States Code, authorizes "appeals
3876 The Ninth Cirfrom all final decision of the district courts ..
cuit has recently interpreted the final judgment rule upon appeal of a

pretrial order disqualifying counsel, a new trial order, a sentencing order, and three other orders denying various motions by defendants.

87 7

a. pretrialorder disqualfying counsel
In UnitedStates v. Greger,38 7 the Ninth Circuit held that a pretrial

order disqualifying the defendant's counsel was not a final decision and
therefore unappealable under section 1291. In Greger, the defendant
refused to waive his sixth amendment right to conflict-free representation and the defendant's counsel refused to ask his other clients, who
were potential witnesses against the defendant, to waive their attorney-

client privileges. The district court disqualified the defendant's counsel
and the defendant appealed the pretrial order.
In this case of first impression,3 879 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether an order disqualifying counsel was a final decision within the
collateral order doctrine.3 88 ° According to the Supreme Court, an order is a final decision within the collateral order doctrine if the decision
defendant must show that there exists a reasonable likelihood that the prosecution "'would
not have occurred but for hostility or a punitive animus towards the defendant because he
has exercised his specific legal rights."' Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. GallegosCuriel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1982)). The Ninth Circuit stated that there was insufficient evidence to find that the Government's acts would not have occurred but for the Government's hostility towards the defendant, Ka-Mook Banks; in fact, the district court had
found no evidence that the Government had acted vindictively. 682 F.2d at 846. Because
the Government was forced to obtain a re-indictment against defendants, the Ninth Circuit
stated that a legitimate reason existed to reconsider the indictment and to recharge the defendants. Thus, the Banks court held that the district court's order dismissing all counts
against Ka-Mook Banks was error, the court reinstated the counts against Banks except for
the added charge.
3876. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
3877. The three other cases concerned: (I) the appeal of a pretrial order denying defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) an order denying defendant's motion to unseal an affidavit or, in the alternative, to return seized property; and (3) an
order denying defendant's motion to dismiss because of selective prosecution. See infra
notes 3913-31 and accompanying text.
3878. 657 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1891 (1983).
3879. The Greger court noted that there are very few cases dealing with an order disqualifying counsel. The majority of cases involve a court's order denying a motion to disqualify
counsel. Id. at 1110. Further, most of the cases dealing with such orders are civil rather
than criminal cases.
3880. Id. In Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,546 (1949), the Supreme
Court held that a "small class" of orders are final decisions and appealable under § 1291.
These orders must determine issues collateral to the litigation.
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determines rights collateral to those asserted in the action, even if the
decision does not end the litigation.388 The order, however, "'must
conclusively determine ...an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable...
after a final judgment.'"3882

In determining whether the collateral order doctrine applies to a
pretrial order disqualifying counsel, the Greger court relied on Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risord.3 8 83 The Firestone Court held that

an order denying a motion to dismiss counsel in the context of a civil
suit was not a final decision and consequently unappealable under section 1291.3884

The Greger court followed the reasoning of Firestone. Although
Greger was a criminal rather than a civil case,3885 the Ninth Circuit
stated that the collateral order doctrine does not apply to a pretrial order disqualifying counsel.3886
Further, although the Firestone Court did not specifically discuss
whether an order granting the disqualification of counsel was appealable, the Greger court held that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Fire3881. Id.
3882. 657 F.2d at 1110 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 462, 468 (1978)).
See, e.g., Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (order denying defendant's claim
that an impending trial will place him in jeopardy a second time appealable); Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1, 18 (1951) (order denying motion to reduce bail appealable); United States v.
Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971) (pretrial discovery orders appealable); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978) (pretrial order denying motion to dismiss indictment due to
alleged violation of defendant's right to speedy trial unappealable).
3883. 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
3884. Id. at 379. In Firestone, the defendant corporation moved to disqualify plaintiffs
counsel from product liability suits because the plaintiff's attorney also represented the defendant's insurer. The district court denied the motion and the defendant appealed. The
Court in Firestone stated that if the Eighth Circuit reviews the pretrial order after trial and
determines that the order was improper, the circuit court could simply remedy the situation
by ordering a retrial. Id. at 378. Thus, the Court held that an order denying a motion to
disqualify counsel was not a final rejection of a claim where denial of immediate appeal
would render review impossible. The Firestone Court therefore held that a pretrial order
denying a motion to disqualify counsel was not within the collateral order doctrine exception to the final decision rule of § 1291; the order was accordingly held unappealable. Id. at
379.
3885. The Greger court stated that the collateral order exception in allowing appeals
before trial should be more strictly applied in criminal trials since the need to avoid the
delays and disruptions of immediate appeals is especially important in a criminal trial. 657
F.2d at 1112.
3886. Id. (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. at 657; DiBella v. United States, 369
U.S. 121, 126 (1962) (final judgment rule in federal appellate practice is especially important
in criminal prosecutions)).
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stone was nonetheless applicable to the facts in Greger.38 87 The Ninth
Circuit stated that if the defendant is not convicted, there will be no

need to appeal the disqualification order, thereby avoiding the time
and expense of the appeal altogether. In addition, the Greger court

stated that if the defendant is found guilty, there is no reason why the
harm to the defendant cannot be completely vindicated on appeal if the
order is found to be erroneous.3 888 The court noted that if the order is
held to be improper, the court will presume that the defendant has been
prejudiced by the order.38 8 9 Thus, since the pretrial order will be com-

pletely reviewable after trial without prejudice to the defendant, the
Ninth Circuit held that this pretrial order is not a final decision under
the collateral order doctrine.3 89
The Greger court also considered whether extraordinary relief is
available before final judgment by means of a petition for writ of man-

damus under 28 U.S.C. section 165 1.3891 The remedy of mandamus,
however, is only to be used in exceptional circumstances where, for

instance, a lower court's order is clearly wrong as a matter of law, or
the damage to the petitioner will be severe if the extraordinary relief is
not granted.8 92 In considering the district court's order, the Greger
3887. 657 F.2d at 1112.
3888. Id. at 1113.
3889. Id. (citing Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 722 (9th Cir. 1981) (prejudice presumed if
one can show that the district court denied the defendant his sixth amendment right to counsel)). Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298, 302 (9th Cir. 1961), also held that where the
defendant was deprived of a right to choose his own counsel, prejudice was assumed. In
Releford, the defendant was convicted of violating the White Slave Traffic Act. The defendant's attorney, however, could not attend the trial. Despite the defendant's objections, the
district court insisted that an attorney sharing an office with defendant's attorney must proceed with the case. The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the district
court's order to continue the trial was improper. The court in Releford stated that even
though the defendant could not show that he had been damaged by the second attorney, the
court presumed that he had been prejudiced, and the case was remanded. Id.
3890. 657 F.2d at 1113. The Greger court also stated that any delay in the trial due to prejudgment appeals should be discouraged. Id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that just because
the trial may have been delayed once due to the disqualification of counsel does not mean
that the litigation may be delayed again through an appeal of the order. Id. Since the
Greger court stated that any delay of a criminal trial can be quite damaging, appeals which
prolong the litigation should be avoided at all costs.
3891. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976) provides in part that all federal courts "may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law."
3892. 657 F.2d at 1114 (citing Bauman v. United States, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir.
1977)). Bauman established guidelines for allowing mandamus review. The court in Greger
relied on the Bauman test which stated that in order to obtain extraordinary relief through a
writ of mandamus, the following factors should be considered: (I) the party seeking the writ
has no other adequate means to attain the desired relief; (2) the petitioner will be prejudiced
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court first noted that the order seemed to be consistent with current

Ninth Circuit law." 93 Furthermore, the court concluded that since relief may be attained through other means and the defendant will not be

prejudiced or damaged if appeal is permitted only after the trial, the
defendant is not entitled to a writ of mandamus. The Greger court also

stated that the pretrial order did not seem to raise any new or important issues.3

94

Thus, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendant's petition

for writ of mandamus, holding that the order was not proper for extraordinary review.
b. new trial order

In United States v. Dior,389 1 the Ninth Circuit determined that a
new trial order was not a final decision and thus not appealable before
retrial. After the defendant was found guilty of smuggling merchandise into the United States, the district court granted the defendant's

posttrial motion for a new trial. The Government appealed the new
trial order. The Ninth Circuit stated that under section 1291, the Government can only appeal a district court's final decision. 3 96 The court

added that a decision is final "only 'when it terminates the litigation
The court reasoned that
• . .on the merits of the case . . . .,3897
since a new trial order does not determine guilt or innocence the order
is not a final decision. Therefore, the Government cannot appeal such
orders.389 8

in a way not correctable on appeal; (3) the district court's order raises new and important
problems, or issues of law of first impression.
3893. 657 F.2d at 1114-15 (citing United States v. Morando, 628 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1980)
(without refusing to waive attorney-client privilege, an attorney who represents both defendant and witness should have been allowed to withdraw; Ninth Circuit held that defendant's
sixth amendment rights were violated by forcing him to go to trial with an attorney who had
conflicting loyalties); Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1967) (when
trial court advised of possibility of attorney's conflict of interest, court should not allow joint
representation to continue unless the court obtains knowing and intentional waiver from
each defendant affected)).
3894. 657 F.2d at 1115.
3895. 671 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1982).
3896. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides in part: "[t]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States. ..."
3897. 671 F.2d at 354 (quoting Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518 (1956)). The Dior
court noted that the Government did not argue that the new trial is appealable as a collateral
order exception of the final decision rule articulated in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In Cohen, the Court stated that orders which do not terminate
the litigation may still be appealable if the orders determine issues separable from the litigation which are effectively unreviewable after a final judgment. Id. at 546-47. See supra
notes 3880-81 and accompanying text.
3898. 671 F.2d at 354. In this case of first impression, the Dior court first looked to civil
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In response to the Government's argument that 18 U.S.C. section

3731 authorizes the Government to appeal a new trial order before retrial,38 99 the Dior court considered the relationship between section
3731 and section 1291. Relying on a recent Supreme Court deci-

sion,39c ° the Dior court stated that in order to appeal a district court's
order, the Government must show: (1) that the interlocutory appeal is

constitutional (section 3731 requirement); and (2) that the appeal concerns an order which is a final decision under section 1291.3901 The
Ninth Circuit noted that Congress did not intend to abolish the final
cases in the Ninth Circuit which held that new trial orders are not appealable until after the
new trial. See, e.g., DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 838 (9th Cir.
1963) (in stockholder's derivative action, new trial order to set aside jury verdict not reviewable until after second trial since order is considered interlocutory); Gilliland v. Lyons, 278
F.2d 56, 58 (9th Cir. 1960) (in defamation action, plaintift's motion for new trial filed within
statutory period and granted by district court not appealable since not a "final" order under
§ 1291); United States v. Hayes, 172 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1949) (new trial order in eminent
domain action not appealable without showing abuse of discretion); Long v. Davis, 169 F.2d
982, 983 (9th Cir. 1948) (order for new trial not a final decision under § 1291).
The Dior court also relied on criminal cases of other circuits. In United States v.
Hitchmon, 602 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1979), the court held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 the
Government could not appeal an interlocutory judgment such as an order for a retrial. Id.
at 692. The court in Hitchmon ordered a new trial on the grounds that new evidence had
been discovered. The Fifth Circuit stated that the order was not a final determination of
guilt or innocence. Thus, the Hitchmon court held that an order for new trial is unappealable since such orders are considered interlocutory judgments and not final decisions under
§ 1291. Id. at 691-92.
Further, in United States v. Alberti, 568 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1977), the court held that the
Government could not appeal an order granting a new trial. InAlberti, the court stated that
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) governs the right to appeal a criminal conviction. Id. at 620. The
court in Alberti stated, however, that although § 3731 intended to allow appeals whenever
the Constitution permits (see United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975)), § 3731 does
not authorize appeals for a retrial order. Id. at 620-21. TheAlberti court stated that because
a new trial order does not determine guilt or innocence, the order fails to come under the
express requirement of § 3731 which allows appeals from an "order dismissing an indictment
... ." 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (emphasis added). Thus, the Aiberti court held that a new trial
order is not appealable by the Government. 568 F.2d at 621.
3899. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) provides in part that: "In a criminal case an appeal by the
United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment or order of a district
court dismissing an indictment or information as to any one or more counts ....
3900. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232 (1981). After defendant's guilty verdict was
overturned by the district court due to an immunity defense, the State appealed under
§ 1291. Id. at 237. In allowing the State to appeal, the United States Supreme Court stated
that only a litigant "armed with a final judgment. . . is entitled to take an appeal." Id. at
244. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens emphasized that "[t]here is a distinction between a court's power to accept an appeal [a § 3731 issue] and an executive's power to prosecute an appeal [a § 1291 issue]." Id. at 250 (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, without fulfilling
both statutory requirements, it appears an appeal by the Government will not be allowed.
3901. 671 F.2d at 355.
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decision rule of section 1291 by enacting section 3731.3902 Because an
order granting a retrial is not a final decision under section 1291, the
Dior court held that the Government cannot appeal this order.3 90 3
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the Government's suggestion that
new trial orders and suppression orders should be treated similarly.
The court stated that, unlike new trial orders, suppression orders are
often only reviewable before trial.3 9 4 If the defendant is acquitted, the
Government will be unable to have the suppression order reversed and
the case remanded. 390 5 Thus while suppression orders are appealable
before trial, new trial orders are not.3 9 ° 6
c. sentencing order
In United States v. Von Moos, 390 7 the Ninth Circuit held that the
district court's sentencing order was a final decision and therefore appealable under section 1291. Von Moos committed perjury during a
bank robbery trial, which resulted in his being convicted and sentenced
on the bank robbery charge. The judge in that trial noted, however,
that he considered the perjury charge when sentencing Von Moos for
the robbery conviction. Von Moos subsequently was indicted for and
plead guilty to perjuring himself at the robbery trial.390 8 The district
court before which Von Moos came for sentencing ruled that it was
without authority to sentence Von Moos on the perjury charge because
the robbery sentence was "' greater than it would have been had the
perjury not been considered.' "3909 The Government appealed this
order.
In holding that the district court's sentencing order on the perjury
charge was a final decision, the Ninth Circuit set forth the Supreme
3902. Id.
3903. Id. at 357.
3904. Id. at 356. Because of the double jeopardy clause, if the defendant is acquitted, the
Government would be unable to prosecute the defendant a second time even if the suppression order is reversed. U.S. CONST.amend. V. See generally Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 793-98 (1969).
3905. If a new trial order is not appealable until the second trial, however, any error in
granting the order can be completely rectified by the circuit court without harm to the Govemnment. The Ninth Circuit can simply reverse the new trial order and reinstate the original
verdict. 671 F.2d at 356.
3906. Id. Congress, however, has allowed suppression order appeals only when the government can show the appeal was not for purposes of delay and that the evidence suppressed
is necessary to prove a material fact. .d.
3907. 660 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
3908. Id.
3909. Id. at 749.
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Court's test for determining when a judgment is final. 39 10 The Supreme
Court stated that a decision is final if the litigation has ended on its
merits and the district court "'leaves nothing to be done but to enforce
by execution what has been determined.' ",3911 In refusing to sentence
Von Moos specifically on the perjury charge, the district court had disposed of the case. The Ninth Circuit stressed that even though the district court's sentencing order was not a formal judgment, the case was
still closed.3 912 As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that the sentencing

order was a final decision and thus appealable.
d

other

In United States v. Atwell,391 3 the Ninth Circuit held that the final
decision rule prohibits the appeal of a denial of a motion to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants, Navy personnel
who were charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of the Assimilative Crimes Act,3 9 14 were granted a motion to dis-

miss for lack of jurisdiction by a magistrate. 3915 The district court
reversed the magistrate's order and denied defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants then appealed.39 16

In determining that the denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not immediately appealable, the
court relied on another recent Ninth Circuit decision.3 9 17 The Atwell
3910. Id. (citing Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212-13 (1937)). In Berman the
defendant was convicted of mail fraud and conspiracy and was sentenced. After sentencing,
the defendant appealed the sentence order. The Supreme Court stated that the sentence
order was a final determination of the merits of the charge. Therefore, since the imposition
of the sentence was a final judgment, the Berman court held that the defendant could appeal
the sentence order.
3911. Id. at 213 (quoting St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S.R.R. v. Southern Express, 108 U.S.
24, 28-29 (1883)).
3912. 660 F.2d at 749 (citing Unitel States v. United States District Court, 601 F.2d 379,
380 (9th Cir. 1978) (to be reviewed, an order must be independent and complete)).
3913. 681 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1982).
3914. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) (assimilating CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152(a) (West Supp. 1983)).
Section 13 provides in pertinent part that anyone with federal jurisdiction who "is guilty of
any act or omission which. . . would be punishable if committed. .. within the jurisdiction of the State. . . shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment."
3915. 681 F.2d at 594. The defendants contended that only the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1976), was applicable to them. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 911
(1976) (prohibiting the operation of a vehicle while drunk).
3916. Id. In this action the Government also appealed pursuant to R.P. FOR TRIAL OF
MINOR OFFENSES BEFORE U.S. MAGISTRATES 7(a).
3917. Id. (citing United States v. Layton, 645 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 972 (1981)). In Layton, defendant was indicted, inter alia, for conpsiracy to murder a
United States Congressman as well as aiding and abetting the murder of a Congressman.
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court stated that since the guilt or innocence of the defendant had not
been determined at the time of the appeal, there was no final decision
under section 1291.3918 The Ninth Circuit also held that the final decision rule is not satisfied when the district court merely renders a judgment when sitting as an appellate court. Even though the district
court's decision reversed the magistrate's ruling, the determination of
the district court was still an intermediate decision and thus not appeal3919
able under section 129 1.
In Offices of Lakeside Non-Ferrous Metals, Inc. v.

United

States,3 920

the Ninth Circuit held that the district court's order denying
the defendant's motion to unseal an affidavit or, in the alternative, to
return seized property, was unappealable. Pursuant to a search warrant, Internal Revenue Service agents had seized books and records
from the defendant's business offices and held these documents for over
eleven months. After the district court denied the defendant's motion
to either unseal the affidavit which supported the search warrant or to
return the seized goods, the defendant appealed. 392' The Ninth Circuit

assumed that the defendant's motion was essentially a motion for the
return of seized documents. 392 2 Thus, the court determined that the

order was appealable, seemingly holding that denial of the defendant's
Defendant appealed an order denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Layton court outlined a three-part test for deciding whether
pretrial orders are appealable. First, the party's claim must be completely, formally, and
finally rejected by the trial court. 645 F.2d at 683 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). Second, the claim must be wholly collateral to and separable from the issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant. 645 F.2d at 683 (citing Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977)). Finally, the claim must be grounded on a right
which will probably be irreparably lost if the appeal is not permitted. 645 F.2d at 683 (citing
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. at 546). The Ninth Circuit stated that the
defendant clearly failed to meet the third requirement. The court in Layton stated that the
defendant's claim that the federal court must have subject matter jurisdiction over the case is
not a right that must be upheld before trial if the right is to be preserved. Since the defendant's pending claim could be fully vindicated by a post-judgment appeal, the Layton court
stated that a ruling before trial was unnecessary. Thus, the court in Layton held that the
motion to dismiss was not a final decision and therefore unappealable.
3918. 681 F.2d at 594 (citing United States v. Dior, 671 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1982) (sentence
is final judgment in criminal cases)). Since the defendants had not been sentenced in Atwell,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that a final decision had not been rendered pursuant to § 1291.
3919. 681 F.2d at 594.
3920. 679 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1982).
3921. Id. at 779. On the Government's summary judgment motion, the district court dismissed the defendant's civil suit for damages and injunctive relief due to the alleged illegal
search and seizure of the property. The Government had shown that the search was legal
and the IRS agents acted in good faith. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at
780.
3922. Id. at 779. The court did not explain the basis for this assumption.
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motion for the return of seized documents was a final decision under
section 1291.3923
The Ninth Circuit stated that to the extent that the defendant's
motion had requested suppression of the evidence, however, the order
was unappealable.3 92 4 Then, without discussing whether the order was
a suppression order, the court allowed the appeal and remanded the

case, stating that in reviewing the defendant's motion, the district court
interest in secrecy against the defendshould balance the government's 3925
of property.

ant's temporary loss

3923. Id. The court cited VonderAhe v. Howland, 508 F.2d 364, 368 (9th Cir. 1974), for
the rule that an order denying a motion for return of documents was appealable. In VonderAhe, IRS agents searched the VonderAhes' offices and home and confiscated numerous documents. The VonderAhes then brought a civil suit seeking return of the property and
requesting suppression of the goods as evidence in any subsequent criminal proceedings.
The district court denied the VonderAhes' requests and granted the Government's motion to
dismiss. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that so long as no criminal action was pending, an order denying a request for return of seized goods was the final resolution of the
dispute between the Government and the VonderAhes. Thus, the VonderAhe court held
that this order was a final decision under § 1291. Id. at 368. As a result, VonderAhe stands
for the proposition that an order dismissing a motion for the return of documents is appealable where there is no criminal proceeding in existence. See Goodman v. United States, 369
F.2d 166, 167-68 (9th Cir. 1966) (suppression order unappealable, but order denying defendant's request for copies of documents after originals were returned, appealable as a final
decision under § 1291). Seealso United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971) (immediate
review of denial of motion for return of seized property available if no criminal proceeding
pending); DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1962) (appeal allowed only if motion for return of property in no way tied to criminal proceeding).
3924. 679 F.2d at 779. In Shea v. Gabriel, 520 F.2d 879, 880-81 (1st Cir. 1975), the First
Circuit held that denial of suppression orders are not immediately appealable. In Shea,
federal agents had seized, pursuant to a warrant, a number of items relating to gambling
activity. The defendant filed a complaint, requesting return of the seized property and an
order suppressing the evidence. The district court denied relief and the defendant appealed.
The First Circuit stated that as long as criminal proceedings have not commenced, there is
no need to suppress any evidence. Id. at 881. The court also noted that if criminal charges
were filed against Shea and he was ultimately convicted, "there will be an adequate chance
for appellate review after the district court imposes sentence." Id. The Shea court, however, did allow an appeal of defendant's motion for the return of property. Thus, the First
Circuit distinguished between suppression orders (unappealable) and orders requesting the
return of goods (appealable). See Dibella v. United States 369 U.S. at 131-32 (suppression
orders unappealable since only a step in criminal case before trial; motions for return of
property appealable if no criminal action in esse); Meier v. Keller, 521 F.2d 548, 556 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976) (where presentment had been made to grand
jury at time complaint filed for return of property, criminal case deemed in esse, and order
denying request for suppression of evidence and return or property unappealable); Coury v.
United States, 426 F.2d 1354, 1355 (6th Cir. 1970) (motion requesting suppression of evidence unappealable, but where no criminal charges filed, motion to return seized property
appealable).
3925. 679 F.2d at 780. The court stated that even though the defendant did not show
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Overruling a recent Ninth Circuit decision, 3926 the court in United
States v. Sasway,3 92 7 held that a pretrial order denying the defendant's
motion to dismiss the indictment because of selective prosecution was
not appealable. Sasway relied on the Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co. ,3928 which stated that pretrial orders denying a motion to dismiss because of vindictive prosecution were unappealable under section 1291.3929 The Sasway court
extended the Hollywood Motor rule to selective 'prosecution dismissal
orders, stating that selective and vindictive prosecution claims should
"much hardship to it by reason of the seizure. . . " the success of this motion should be
determined by a balancing test. Id. (citing Shea v. Gabriel, 520 F.2d at 882).
The Shea court noted that in order to succeed, the defendant must also show that the
seizure was illegal under FED. R. CriM. P. 41(e). 520 F.2d at 882. See Advisory Comm.
Note, 56 F.R.D. 143, 170 (1972). The Lakeside court, however, failed to discuss the importance of showing that the seizure was illegal under Rule 41(e).
Finally, the Lakewise court warned that since the Government has all of its evidence
under seal, there is a tendency to delay rather than expedite proceedings against the defendant. 679 F.2d at 780. Thus, the Ninth Circuit stated that even if the district court decides
not to unseal the affidavits on remand, the trial court should still continue to exercise its
power to protect the defendant's rights and ensure that the Government proceed to prosecute with diligence. Id.
3926. United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863 (1980).
In Griffin, the court extended the collateral order doctrine as applied in Abney v. United
States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). The collateral order doctrine allows appeals of orders which
determine issues collateral to the litigation; these orders must be practically unreviewable
after a final judgment. The Grffin court stated that a claim of vindictive prosecution, like an
Abney double jeopardy claim, concerns a right to be free from prosecution, not just free
from subsequent conviction. 617 F.2d at 1345. Thus, the Griffin court stated that the defendant's motion which seeks to limit prosecutorial discretion should be appealable before
trial. Id. at 1347.
3927. 686 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
3928. 458 U.S. 263 (1982) (per curiam).
3929. The Supreme Court in Hollywood Motor held that a pretrial order denying a motion
to dismiss an indictment because of vindictive prosecution is not appealable under § 1291.
In Hollwood Motor, the defendants were originally indicted for conspiracy to defraud the
United States, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and for smuggling goods in the United States,
a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545. After a change of venue, the defendants were indicted for the
original two counts and for four more counts of making false statements to customs officers
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 542. The defendants moved to dismiss the counts on the ground
that the charges manifested prosecutorial vindictiveness. The motion was denied. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court's denial of the motion was appealable
under § 1291. In reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court stated that the
right asserted by the defendant is not a right that must be upheld before trial if it is to be
protected at all. 458 U.S. at 270. The Court added that for a district court's order to be
appealable under § 1291, the claim must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from the
final decision. Id. The Court concluded that denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss for
vindictive prosecution was a claim which could be reviewed after trial and thus was unappealable at this time.
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be treated similarly. 393 0 Thus the court in Sasway held that a motion to
dismiss because of selective prosecution was unappealable.393 '
3. Abney appeals
In Abney v. UnitedStates,3 932 the Supreme Court held that a defendant could appeal a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss an
indictment on a claim of double jeopardy under 28 U.S.C. section
129 1.3933
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Bendis,3 934 considered the

allocation of the burden of persuasion and the burden of producing
evidence in an Abney appeal. The defendants were convicted of conspiracy in Kansas. When the defendants were subsequently indicted in
Hawaii for similar conspiracy charges, they filed a motion to dismiss
claiming that the charges were barred by the double jeopardy clause.
The district court denied the motion and the defendants appealed.
The Ninth Circuit first determined that the court had jurisdiction
as to the defendants' Abney appeal. 3935 The Bendis court then consid3930. 686 F.2d at 748.
3931. Id.
3932. 431 U.S. 351 (1977). InAbney, the defendants were found guilty of conspiracy and
attempting to obstruct interstate commerce by means of extortion. The defendants challenged the charges, contending that this single count improperly charged two separate
crimes. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ordered a new trial and requested the
Government to choose between the conspiracy count and the attempt charge. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the new trial would expose them
to double jeopardy and the first trial failed to charge an offense. The district court denied
the motion and the defendants appealed. Id. at 653-55. The Supreme Court held that a
pretrial order to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds was appealable by the
defendants because the order was a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Id. at 662. See infra note 3933. Although the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment is
not "final" in the sense that it does not end the criminal proceeding, the Abney Court stated
that such a denial is the final determination of the defendants' double jeopardy claim. The
Supreme Court recognized that in a double jeopardy claim, the defendant is not contesting a
possible conviction, but rather he is questioning the Government's authority to bring him to
trial. Id. at 659. The Court stated that because the double jeopardy clause protects a person
from being subjected to two trials, the defendants' exposure to the second trial must be
reviewable before the second trial occurs. Thus, the Supreme Court stated that this interlocutory appeal is essential to protect the defendants' fifth amendment guarantee against
double jeopardy. Id. at 662.
3933. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides in part: "[t]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States .
3934. 681 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 306 (1982).
3935. Id. at 562. The Bendis court stated that since this appeal is a claim that the pending
trial will destroy the defendants' rights against double jeopardy, this appeal is allowed under
Abney v. United States. See supra note 3932 and accompanying text. The Bendis court,
however, did not review other non-Abney appeals. The court held that at this time the
defendants could not appeal their rights to a speedy trial nor could they challenge an order
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ered who had the burden of establishing that the two conspiracies con-

stituted the same offense within the meaning of the double jeopardy
clause.39 36 The court stated that although it was the defendants' burden of showing that the two conspiracies charged were the same, since
the second trial had not yet occurred, the Government was in the better
position to determine what would be proved at the second trial.39 37
Therefore, the court determined that the burden ofpersuasion rests on
the defendant in anAbney appeal; but once the defendant has made a

"non-frivolous showing that an indictment charges the same offense
," then the Government has the burden ofproducing evidence that
the two offenses are not the same.39 38 Applying these principles, the
Bendis court affirmed the district judge's denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the Government had carried its burden of
producing evidence of two separate conspiracies.39 39

This burden allocation differs from that of other circuits which
shift the burden of persuasion to the government after the defendant
has made a non-frivolous showing of a double jeopardy violation.39 40

The Bendis court, however, noted that the practical effect of placing the
shift the burden
burden of producing evidence on the government is to3941
of persuasion from the defendant to the government.

denying a motion to dismiss the indictment due to the alleged unfair presentation of evidence to the grand jury. The Bendis court stated that the right to an interlocutory appeal is
extremely limited. In this case, only the order dismissing the double jeopardy claim was
appealable. Id. at 569.
3936. Id. at 564. The court added that in order to maintain a double jeopardy claim, the
Hawaii prosecution under count one and the Kansas conspiracy charge "must be indistinguishable 'in law and in fact."' Id. at 563 (quoting Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338,
342 (1911)). In Bendis, the court noted that both counts were charged under the same federal conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976)). 681 F.2d at 563.
3937. Id. at 564. See Sanchez v. United States, 341 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 856 (1965). In Sanchez, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant has the burden
of persuasion and the burden of producing evidence to show that the two trials concern the
same illegality. Id. In Sanchez, however, both trials had already occurred. Id. The court
in Bendis distinguished the present case from Sanchez on the grounds that since the second
trial has not yet taken place in Bendis, it would be unfair to place the entire burden of
producing evidence on the defendant.
3938. 681 F.2d at 564. The Bends court stated that as an evidentiary concept, in order to
prove that the two charges are identical, the burden of producing evidence shifts to the
Government, but the burden of persuasion always remains with the defendant. Id. See also
J. WIGMORF, EVIDENCE § 2489 (3d ed. 1940).
3939. 681 F.2d at 564.
3940. Id. at 564 & n.2. United States v. Castro, 629 F.2d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 1980)
(Fairchild, C.J., concurring) ("sufficient showing by the defendant shifts the burden to the
State"); United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 331-32 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 986 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975).
3941. 681 F.2d at 564.
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C. Sentencing
1. Information in determining a sentence

A sentence is generally tailored, within statutory limits, to the individual defendant and to the particular circumstances of the offense.3 942

As a result, sentencing judges are given broad discretion concerning the
type and source of information they can properly consider in determining a sentence.3 943 Nevertheless, a judge's discretion regarding sentenc-

ing information is not absolute, and certain constraints have been

imposed to prevent any abuse of discretion.3 9 " In several recent cases,

the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have addressed
issues concerning information used in determining sentences.3 9 45
In United States v. Williams,
the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the trial judge had abused his sentencing discretion by relying
on unproven allegations of criminal conduct contained in the defendant's presentence report.3947 Williams was convicted of conspiracy 3948
3942. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 24748 (1949).
3943. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
at 247 (capital case; "Highly relevant-if not essential--to [the sentencing judge's] selection
of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning
the defendant's life and characteristics."); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (capital case); United States v. Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 1979) (capital case).
3944. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 446 (sentence may not be based on
prior convictions obtained in violation of sixth amendment right to appointed counsel set
forth in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741
(1948) (sentence based on materially false or unreliable information which defendant had no
opportunity to rebut will not stand); United States v. Wolfson, 634 F.2d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir.
1980) (resentencing required when judge received confidential ex parte memo from prosecutor regarding defendant's sentence); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir.
1971) (sentence based on questionable information in presentence report is prohibited), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972).
3945. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410 (1982)
(per curiam); United States v. Williams, 668 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Alverson, 666 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 464 (1982); United States v. Ching, 682 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1982).
In United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., the Ninth Circuit considered whether the
district court judge abused his sentencing discretion by failing to consider mitigating factors.
677 F.2d 785, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1982). Mitsubishi, however, did present evidence of mitigating factors, which the judge considered and found unpersuasive. Id at 787.
The Ninth Circuit reiterated the general rule concerning a sentencing judge's broad
discretion, and summarily concluded that it would not disturb the sentence because it was
within the statutory limit. Id at 787. Although not clarified by the court, the underlying
claim in Mitsubishi centers more on the weight the judge accorded the mitigating evidence,
rather than on whether he considered it.
3946. 668 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1982).
3947. Id at 1071.
3948. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
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and loansharking, 3949 arising out of a loan he arranged to be made for a
friend by two other individuals. The trial court sentenced Williams to
two five-year prison terms on two counts, to be served concurrently,
and to three years' probation on a third count.3950 1The Ninth Circuit
395
reversed the convictions and remanded the case.
In reversing the convictions, the court also considered the validity
of the sentence imposed by the trial judge. Williams' presentence report inaccurately presented the basis for reversal of a prior assault conviction, and implied that Williams had contracted to murder the assault
victims.

3952

Before sentencing, the judge denied Williams' motion for a

continuance to obtain the state court records which would disprove the
allegations in the presentence report.3953
The Ninth Circuit noted that although unconvicted criminal acts
may be considered during sentencing, 3954 reliance on materially false or
misleading information results in a violation of a defendant's due process rights.3955 Consequently, the court held that the trial judge had
abused his discretion because he had not only denied Williams an opportunity to correct the inaccurate statements in the presentence report,
but had also relied on these statements in determining the sentence.3956
In United States v. Aiverson,3 95 7 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether an ex parte communication between the sentencing judge and
a government agent prior to final sentencing justified resentencing by a
different judge. In a meeting subsequent to Alverson's sentencing, the
judge and a federal agent discussed the fact that Alverson was a suspect
in a pending homicide investigation. 395 8 Afterwards, because of an am-

biguity in the sentence, the judge made a correction resulting in the
imposition of the harshest possible sentence. 3959 Alverson appealed his
3949. 18 U.S.C. § 894 (1976).
3950. 668 F.2d at 1071-72.
3951. I1d at 1073. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the trial court had committed prejudicial
error in restricting the defense's impeachment of a key government witness. Id at 1069.
3952. Id at 1071. The presentence report stated that the only basis for reversal of the
assault charge was the violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial. The report also stated
that defendant had not appealed any factual issues regarding the assault charge. Id at 1071
n.17.
3953. Id at 1071.
3954. Id at 1072 (citing United States v. Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 1979)).
3955. Id at 1072 (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948); United States v.
Lasky, 592 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1979)).
3956. 668 F.2d at 1072 & n.19.
3957. 666 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1982).
3958. Id at 348.
3959. Id at 344. Alverson was convicted of four counts of possessing unregistered
machine guns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1976). The judge sentenced him to five
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corrected sentence on the ground that the ex parte communication
3960
prior to sentencing required resentencing.

Notwithstanding the fact that the homicide investigation information was conveyed to the judge in the presentence report, and the fact

that the judge had disclaimed reliance on that information prior to the
original sentencing, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. 3961 The Ninth Circuit held that an ex parte communication bearing on the sentence, between the judge and a party whose interests are
3962
directly adverse to the defendant's interests, requires resentencing.

In reaching its decision, the Alverson court relied primarily on
United States v.Wolfson.3963 In Wolfson, the Ninth Circuit held that

"it is improper for the prosecution to make, or for the court to receive
from the prosecution, an ex parte communication bearing on the sentence. ' 3964 The Government sought to distinguish Wolfson on three
grounds; however, the Ninth Circuit found each unpersuasive.3 9 65
The court does not discuss the fact that Alverson was not informed

of the ex parte communication, and was therefore not afforded an opportunity to rebut its implications. However, in light of other Ninth
years on each count, the sentences on counts two, three, and four to run consecutively with
the sentence on count one. Later, the judge corrected the ambiguity in the sentence, imposig "five years on each count, with each sentence to run consecutively." 666 F.2d at 344
(emphasis added).
3960. Id at 348.
3961. Id at 350.
3962. Id
3963. 634 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1980). The prosecutor in Wolson had submitted a confidential report to the judge concerning the case which recommended a certain sentence. The
judge refused to disclose the information in the report to defense counsel, and subsequently
imposed the recommended sentence. Id at 1221.
3964. Id at 1221 (citations omitted). The Wofson court stressed that its result was justified because the report was secret, and contained a sentence recommendation by a party
adverse to the defendant. Id at 1222.
3965. 666 F.2d at 349. The Government first argued that the ex parte communication in
Wolfson came from the prosecutor. The Ninth Circuit found this distinction insignificant
since the interests of both the prosecutor and the government agent were adverse to the
defendant's interests. Id Secondly, the Government contended that Alverson had not been
prejudiced because the presentence report contained substantially the same information as
the ex parte communication. At the original sentencing, the trial judge had expressly disclaimed reliance on the homicide investigation information in the presentence report; nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the prior disclaimer to the ex parte
communication. Id Finally, the Government relied on United States v. Dubrofsky, in
which the court refused to require resentencing even though the trial judge had considered a
derogatory report undisclosed to the defendant. 581 F.2d 208, 215 (9th Cir. 1978). The
Ninth Circuit, however, distinguished Dubrofsky, noting that the judge had expressly stated
his reasons for nondisclosure, and had cited other factors weighing as heavily as the ex parte
report. 666 F.2d at 349.
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Circuit decisions in similar cases, it appears that resentencing was justified primarily because Alverson was not given a chance to defend
against charges in the report, and because the evidence revealed that
greater weight on the ex parte report in
the judge placed a relatively
3966
determining the sentence.

An examination of other circuits which have considered this issue
reveals a general adherence to the proposition that resentencing is justified where: (1) an ex parte communication is made to the judge by an
adverse party; (2) the judge substantially relies on the information in
determining the sentence; and (3) the judge does not disclose the inforand does not afford him an opportunity to
mation to the defendant
3967
rebut the information.
In United States v. Fieishman,396 1 defendants argued that their

sentences were improper because the district judge had expressly considered their prior, uncounseled Mexican convictions for drug-related
offenses. Defendants Fleishman, Combs and Green were convicted for
selling cocaine to an undercover government agent in a hotel near the
Los Angeles International Airport.3 96 9
3966. Id; see United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d at 215 (resentencing not required when
sentencing judge stated that report from probation department weighed no more heavily
than other factors, and that reason for nondisclosure was that disclosure may result in aborting ongoing government investigations); Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1359-60
(9th Cir. 1978) (resentencing not required when there was no indication that presentence
report was basis for imposing sentence, and when defense counsel had the opportunity to
rebut the allegations in the report); United States v. Perri, 513 F.2d 572, 573 n.1 (9th Cir.
1975) (resentencing required where prosecutor submitted ex parte report to judge which
judge refused to disclose to defense counsel, and upon which judge based the imposition of
the maximum sentence).
3967. See, e.g., United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 70 (5th Cir. 1975) (resentencing required where prosecutor submitted ex parte memo to judge, which had not been introduced
at trial; nothing indicated that defendant knew of memo, although there also was no proof
that judge ever saw the memo); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1229 (2d Cir. 1973)
(resentencing required where prosecutor submitted ex parte memo to judge who disclosed it
to defense counsel, but refused counsel's request for an opportunity to rebut its contentions),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974). Cf. United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1121 (7th
Cir.) (resentencing not required where judge stated that ex parte memo from prosecutor was
only considered with respect to bail, and court found that residual effects of memo would
not prejudice defendant), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970); Hailer v. Robins, 409 F.2d 857,
860 (1st Cir. 1969) (resentencing not required even though judge accepted truth of ex parte
statement by prosecutor, where prosecutor was later allowed to make same statement in
court and case was remanded only for an evidentiary hearing).
3968. 684 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 464 (1982).
3969. Id at 1332. Fleishman was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute, and
distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976), and of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute and distributing cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976).
Combs and Green were convicted of the above two offenses, and of aiding and abetting the
possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1976). The
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Defendants relied on United States v. Tucker,39 70 where the
Supreme Court held that resentencing was required when the original
sentence had been based on prior uncounseled convictions obtained in
violation of Gideon v. Wainwright.397 1 The Government responded that
Tucker did not apply,39 72 and, alternatively, argued that defendants
had waived any objections to the collateral use of their Mexican convictions, because they had been transferred into the custody of the

United States pursuant to the Treaty on the Execution of Penal
Sentences between the United States and Mexico.

3

The Treaty pro-

vides for the transfer and execution of sentences in one country, where
the sentences were imposed by courts in another country. The Treaty
requires that the prisoner voluntarily consent to the transfer.3 9 74

The district court held that defendants' waiver of their rights to
challenge the validity of their Mexican convictions disposed of their
3 97 6
in
Tucker claim. 397 5 The district court relied on Rosado v. Civiletti,
defendviolate
not
did
which the Second Circuit held that the Treaty

ants' due process rights because they had voluntarily and intelligently
waived their rights to challenge their Mexican convictions in the
United States.39 77
defendants were sentenced to six years' imprisonment on each of the convictions, to be
served concurrently, and were also ordered to serve special parole terms of at least three
years on the non-conspiracy counts. 684 F.2d at 1332.
3970. 404 U.S. 443, 448-49 (1972) (defendant's sentence for armed bank robbery improperly enhanced on the basis of prior convictions where trial judge was not aware that the
prior convictions were unconstitutional because defendant was not represented by counsel).
3971. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Combs and Green moved to have the Mexican convictions
excluded. Fleishman, 684 F.2d at 1344. Fleishman, who had waived any objection to the
use of his Mexican conviction for sentencing purposes, now argued that the waiver was
conditioned upon the trial judge's finding that his Mexican conviction was valid. The Ninth
Circuit refused to accept this argument. Id at 1344 n.17.
3972. 684 F.2d at 1344. The Government claimed that the underlying policy reasons for
the Tucker rule were inapplicable here. Id
3973. Id Article V, paragraph 6 of the Treaty provides:
The fact that an offender has been transferred under the provisions of this Treaty
shall not prejudice his civil rights in the Receiving State in any way beyond those
ways in which the fact of his conviction in the Transferring State by itself effects
such prejudice under the laws of the Receiving State or any State thereof.
Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, United States-Mexico, art. V,
para. 6, 28 U.S.T. 7399, 7406, T.I.A.S. No. 8718.
3974. Id at art. IV, para. 2 which provides:
If the Authority of the Transferring State finds the transfer of an offender appropriate, and if the offender gives his express consent for his transfer, said Authority
shall transmit a request for transfer, through diplomatic channels, to the Authority
of the Receiving State.
3975. 684 F.2d at 1344.
3976. 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980).
3977. 621 F.2d at 1191-92.
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The Ninth Circuit, however, found that the district court's reliance
on Rosado was misplaced, 3978 and held that defendants' waiver of their

right to challenge the validity of their Mexican convictions does not bar
them from challenging the collateraluse of those convictions in unrelated domestic proceedings. 3979 As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that
Tucker was applicable,3 980 but concluded that resentencing was not re-

quired because the defendants had not met Tucker's three requirements. 398 A successful challenge under Tucker requires the defendant

to show: (1) the prior conviction was obtained in violation of Gideon v.
Wainwright; (2) the sentencing judge mistakenly believed the prior
conviction was valid; and (3) the judge enhanced defendant's sentence

on the basis of the prior unconstitutional conviction.3982 The Ninth
Circuit found that the district court was not under a mistaken belief
that the Mexican convictions were valid because defendants had informed the court that the convictions were imposed without the benefit
of counsel.39 83 Moreover, the record indicated that the judge had en-

hanced defendants' sentences because of their prior involvement with
narcotics, which is a permissible consideration for sentencing
purposes.3 98 4
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the Government's suggestion that
the court exercise restraint because a finding that the defendants could
attack the collateral use of Mexican convictions could adversely affect

foreign relations with Mexico.3985 The court stated that the terms of
the Treaty had been satisfied when defendants served the remainder of
their Mexican sentences in the United States; hence, the Treaty had
been complied with.398 6 In addition, the court held that the Treaty did
3978. The Fleishman court stated that neither Rosado nor Pfeifer v. United States Bureau
of Prisons, 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 908 (1980), had interpreted Article
VI of the Treaty to bar challenges to the collateral consequences of Mexican convictions in
unrelated proceedings. Fleishman, 684 F.2d at 1345. The court stated that defendants did
not seek to challenge their convictions, but only to exclude their use at trial and for purposes
of sentencing. Id
3979. Id
3980. Id at 1346.
3981. Id
3982. Id (citing Owens v. Cardwell, 628 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir. 1980); Farrow v. United
States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1345 (9th Cir. 1978)).
3983. Fleishman, 684 F.2d at 1346. Defendants Combs and Green also told the court that
they were subjected to torture and inhumane treatment by Mexican authorities, and were
coerced into signing confessions. Id at 1345 n.21.
3984. Id at 1346 (citing Serapo v. United States, 595 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Wondrack, 578 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1978); Gelfuso v. Bell, 590 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1978)).
3985. Fleishman, 684 F.2d at 1345 & n.23.
3986. Id at 1345.
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not address the issue of the collateral use of foreign convictions in unrelated domestic proceedings.3 98 7
In United States v. Ching,39 88 the defendant contended that his

sentence3989 was invalid because it was based on materially false and
unreliable information contained in the Government's sentencing
memorandum.3 99 ° The Ninth Circuit stated that defendant's claim
would succeed if he established that the information was "'false or unreliable, and . . . demonstrably made the basis for the sentence.' ,3991

Finding that the trial judge had specifically disclaimed reliance on the
murder allegations and other unverified statements by unidentified informers, the court held that the defendant had not met the second
prong of the test.3992 Moreover, the court found that the trial court's
disclaimer was substantially supported by the record, and therefore refused to disturb the sentence.3 993
In capital punishment cases, the eighth and fourteenth amendments require a sentencing court to consider the character and record
of the individual defendant, as well as the circumstances surrounding
the offense.39 94 In Lockett v. Ohio, 9 the United States Supreme
Court held that a state may not place limitations on the relevant miti-

gating evidence a sentencer may consider in capital cases.3996 In Ed3987. Id at 1346.
3988. 682 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1982).
3989. Defendant pled guilty to possessing an unregistered silencer and an unregistered pen
gun in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (i) (1976), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in
violation of 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1976) and possessing heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976). 682 F.2d at 800.
3990. 682 F.2d at 801. The memo included: (1) affidavits of law enforcement officers;
(2) an account of Ching's sixteen-year involvement in crime; (3) Ching's statements regarding possession of firearms and narcotics addiction; (4) a report of the number of firearms,
ammunition and narcotics paraphernalia found at Ching's home; and (5) statements by unidentified informants. Id
3991. Id (quoting United States v. Lee, 648 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1981); Farrow v.
United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1359 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc)).
3992. 682 F.2d at 801.
3993. Id at 802. The Ninth Circuit noted that the sentence was well below the statutory
maximum and did not include the $55,000 permissible fine. The trial judge had expressly
based the sentence on the type of firearms involved, Ching's reacquisition of firearms, and
on the fact that his heroin addiction enabled him to understand the seriousness of the distribution charge. Id
3994. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (mandatory death penalty for
first-degree murder violates eighth and fourteenth amendments).
3995. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (Ohio death penalty provided that once defendant is convicted
of aggravated murder, death penalty was mandatory unless at least one of three mitigating
circumstances was proven by a preponderance of the evidence).
3996. Id at 605.
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dings v. Oklahoma, 7 the Supreme Court applied the Lockett rule and
reversed a death sentence because the Oklahoma courts had refused to
consider relevant,
mitigating evidence concerning the defendant's per3998
sonal history.
The defendant, a minor, was convicted of first-degree murder for
killing a police officer. At the sentencing hearing, the defendant offered
mitigating evidence of a troubled family history and emotional
problems. The judge concluded that, as a matter of law, he could not
consider the defendant's troubled background.3 9 99 The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that mitigating evidence
other than the defendant's youth was irrelevant "because ' it4 did not
tend to provide a legal excuse from criminal responsibility. 000
The Supreme Court concluded that the limitations placed by both
Oklahoma courts on the mitigating evidence they could consider violated the Lockett rule. The Court held that, although a sentencing
court may determine the weight to be accorded relevant mitigating evidence, a sentencer may not refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any
such evidence." ° The Court found that the evidence of defendant's
personal background was relevant, and remanded the case, directing
the state court to weigh the mitigating evidence against the aggravating
circumstances proven by the State.4° 2
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger argued that the
3997. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). The Court did not decide whether the eighth amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who was 16 years old when the
offense was committed. Id at 110 n.5.
3998. Id at 117.
3999. Id at 109. The trial judge considered defendant's age as the only mitigating factor.
At sentencing the State had alleged that the three aggravating circumstances in the statute
were present: "that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that the crime
was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, and that there was
a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Id at 106-07 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(4), (5),
and (7) (1980)). Finding that the three aggravating circumstances outweighed defendant's
age, the judge imposed the death penalty. 455 U.S. at 109.
4000. 455 U.S. at 113. The appellate court stated that defendant satisfied the test for criminal responsibility because he knew right from wrong. Id
4001. Id at 113-15. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stated his view that the
death penalty is prohibited by the eighth and fourteenth amendments as constituting cruel
and unusual punishment. Id at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). In another concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized that when an ambiguity exists concerning the mitigating
evidence the lower court actually considered, a remand for resentencing is required under
Lockett and Woodson to ensure that the death penalty was not erroneously imposed. Id at
118-19 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
4002. Id at 117.
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Oklahoma state courts had not violated Lockett. 4° 3 He suggested that
the majority had mischaracterized the facts in order to reach its result.4" 4 The Chief Justice pointed out that the trial judge had heard
appellate court had
extensive evidence of mitigating factors, and the
4 5
independently examined this evidence as well. 00
Although statements by both Oklahoma courts regarding the evidence were ambiguous, the Chief Justice felt the majority could have
reasonably concluded that the judges found the aggravating factors
Since the weight accorded to the
outweighed the mitigating factors.'
evidence is within the trial judge's discretion, and both courts had
found the mitigating circumstances insufficient to outweigh the aggravating factors, the Chief Justice questioned whether remand would be
useful.4 7 It appears that the majority was concerned with the defendant's youth and mental instability, and wanted to be certain that the
mitigating factors were actually considered before the death penalty
was imposed. 4°°8
In Zant v. Stephens," 9 the United States Supreme Court was
asked to consider whether a reviewing court may sustain a death sentence based on a number of aggravating factors, after it finds that one
of the aggravating factors is invalid.40 10 The defendant in Zant was
convicted of murder. After finding that three aggravating circumstances had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury imposed
the death penalty. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the
sentence, although it set aside the second aggravating circumstance
found by the jury. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial
of the defendant's habeas corpus petition to the extent that it left the
death penalty intact, and remanded the case. The State subsequently
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.4 °1
4003. Id at 128 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice pointed out that, in contrast
to the Ohio statute involved in Lockett, the Oklahoma death penalty required the sentencer
to consider any mitigating evidence proffered by the defendant. Accordingly, defendant
presented substantial mitigating evidence and no contention was made that the sentencing
provisions were inconsistent with Lockett. Id at 122-23.
4004. Id at 123-26.
4005. Id at 124-25.
4006. Id
4007. Id at 127. The Chief Justice would have decided the case on the issue for which the
Court granted certiorari, whether the eighth and fourteenth amendments prohibit imposing
the death penalty on a defendant who was 16 years old when he committed the offense, and
would have affirmed the judgment. Id at 128.
4008. See id at 115 n.ll & 116.
4009. 456 U.S. 410 (1982) (per curiam).
4010. Id at 414.
4011. Id at 411-13.
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The Georgia Supreme Court asserted that state law clearly provided that, when a jury finds two or more aggravating circumstances,' 1 the invalidity of one factor does not invalidate the death
sentence.4 °13 Conceding that the state law was indeed clear, the
Supreme Court nevertheless found that the premises underlying the
rule were uncertain.401 4 The Court refused to speculate as to the state
law premises because they were relevant to defendant's constitutional
challenge.40 1 5 Therefore, the Court invoked the Georgia certification

statute40 16 in order for the Georgia court to clarify the state law.40 17
In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that certification was unnecessary because a clarification of the Georgia law would not remedy
the constitutional infirmity in defendant's sentence.40 18 Justice Marshall noted that the use of aggravating circumstances guides a jury in
its sentencing deliberations, thus fortifying the constitutional validity of
the sentence. 4°1 9 Consequently, Justice Marshall argued that if an aggravating circumstance is itself unconstitutional, the death sentence
cannot be constitutionally imposed.' ° In addition, Justice Marshall
contended that to affirm the sentence on the basis of the remaining two
aggravating factors would be to speculate that the jury would have imposed the death penalty even in the absence of the unconstitutional
instruction.4°" Justice Marshall claimed that, in effect, the Court
would be substituting its judgment for that of the jury, a step which the
4012. In Zant, the jury found the following aggravating circumstances: (I) the murder was
committed by a person who had previously been convicted of a capital felony; (2) the offender had a substantial history of serious assault convictions; and (3) the murder was committed by one who had escaped from the lawful custody of a peace officer or from a place of
lawful confinement. Id at 412-13 (citations omitted).
4013. Id at 414 (citing Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 599, 261 S.E.2d 349, 358 (1979), cer.
denied, 445 U.S. 938 (1980)).
4014. 456 U.S. at 414-15.
4015. Id at 416.
4016. Id GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4536(a) (1981) provides in part:
When it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States. . . that there are
involved in any proceeding before it questions or propositions of the laws of this
State which are determinative of said cause and there are no clear controlling
precedents in the appellate court decisions of this State, such Federal appellate
court may certify such questions or propositions of the laws of Georgia to this court
for instructions concerning such questions or propositions.
4017. 456 U.S. at 416-17.
4018. Id at 417 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall would find that the death penalty violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments as cruel and unusual punishment under
all circumstances. Id at 417-18.
4019. Id at 420.
4020. Id at 423.
4021. Id
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Court has consistently refrained from taking. 4

22

Finally, Justice Marshall rejected the argument that, once a jury
finds an aggravating circumstance, it can consider any other aggravat-

ing or mitigating evidence in determining whether the penalty should
be imposed. 4 23 Justice Marshall stated that this view would strip away

the guidelines which protect against an arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty.40 24 In any event, the dissent stated that this interpretation of the Georgia death penalty could not cure the unconstitutional

jury instructions here because nothing indicated the jury knew they
could disregard the aggravating factors when deciding whether to im-

pose the death penalty. 40 25

In a separate dissent,40 26 Justice Powell indicated that he would
remand the case to the Georgia Supreme Court to decide: (1) whether

resentencing by a jury is required; and (2) whether the Georgia
Supreme Court has the authority to find that an instruction was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.40 2 7

2. Allocution statements
It is the duty of the prosecutor to inform the court of all material
facts which bear on the defendant's punishment, including information

favorable to the defendant. 4 28 The judge, in turn, must listen to and
consider evidence offered in mitigation of punishment. 4 2 9
In United States v. Doe,4° 3° the Ninth Circuit considered whether
resentencing was required because the trial judge had denied the gov4022. Id
4023. Id at 424-25. Georgia argued that finding an aggravating circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt would permit the jury to consider the death penalty; however, the State
argued, the jury could consider any other evidence in deciding whether the death penalty
should be imposed. Id at 424.
4024. Id at 428.
4025. Id at 427.
4026. Id at 428 (Powell, J., dissenting).
4027. Id at 429.
4028. United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 818 (2d Cir. 1970) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution")). Cf. Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (violation of due process occurs when state-allows false
-"
evidence to go uncorrected).
4029. United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d at 819 (sentence vacated where, in conjunction
with other sentencing irregularities, judge refused to listen to evidence of defendant's cooperation with police officials).
4030. 655 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1981).
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emnment's right to allocute prior sentencing.4° 3 I At his sentencing hearing, Doe had offered evidence indicating that he had cooperated with
Drug Enforcement Administration agents by identifying two principal
drug dealers. 4 0 32 The trial judge not only disbelieved Doe's evidence,

but also denied the prosecutor's request to make an allocution stateto Rule 32(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
ment pursuant
4 33
Procedure.

0

On appeal, Doe contended that, as a result of this denial, his due
process right to a fair sentencing hearing had been violated, and that
his sentence was based on misinformation.4 34 Acknowledging the
prosecutor's obligation under Rule 32(a)(1), the Government argued
that Doe, nevertheless, had not been prejudiced because the prosecutor's statements would probably have been disfavorable to Doe.40 35
The Ninth Circuit held that the sentencing judge should have allowed
the prosecutor to make his statement.40 36 The court reasoned that, although it was possible that the Government's information would have
contradicted Doe's mitigating evidence, it was equally possible that the
Government would have corroborated Doe's statements. 0 37 Because
the trial judge had disbelieved Doe's mitigating claims and denied the
Government's right to allocute, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case
for resentencing. 4°38
3. Multiple sentences
In determining whether multiple sentences were intended by Congress, either for simultaneous convictions under multiple statutes or for
simultaneous convictions for multiple violations of a single statute, the
judiciary must consider the language of the statute, its legislative history, and the overall statutory scheme. 4 0 39 In two recent cases, the
4031. Id at 927.
4032. Doe had been convicted of possessing heroin with intent to distribute and importing
heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1976). 655 F.2d at 922. Doe was given consecutive sentences of eight years for possession and seven years for importation. Id at 924.
4033. Id at 927-28. FED. R. CruM. P. 32(a)(1) provides:
Before imposing sentence, the court ihall afford counsel an opportunity to speak on
behalf of the defendant and shall address the defendant personally and ask him if
he wishes to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment. The attorney for the government shall have an
equivalent opportunity to speak to the court.
4034. 655 F.2d at 927.
4035. Id at 928.
4036. Id at 928-29.
4037. Id at 928.
4038. Id at 928-29.
4039. Brown v. United States, 623 F.2d 54, 57 (9th Cir. 1980) (construing congressional
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Ninth Circuit was required to determine congressional intent regarding

multiple sentences.
In United States v. Wia,4°4 the court interpreted the relationship

between 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(1) 4° 1 and 18 U.S.C. section

1202(a)(1). 4042 Although a jury had indicted Wiga for multiple counts

under both section 922(g)(1) and section 1202(a)(1) for transporting a
shotgun and possessing a revolver, the district court dismissed all but

one count and sentenced Wiga to two years in prison for possessing a
revolver in violation of section 1202(a)(1).
On appeal, the Government offered three theories for reinstating

some of the vacated counts.

°3

The Government first argued that the

court could have sentenced Wiga to one count under each statute, in-

creasing the sentence to seven years.4044 Alternatively, the court could
have sentenced Wiga to one count under section 922(g)(1) which provided for a five-year prison sentence.4 ° 5 Examining both sentencing
theories together, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the district court could
have sentenced Wiga under section 1202(a)(1) for one of the firearm

violations and under section 922(g)(1) for the other firearm violation.4°46 Relying on Fifth Circuit 4 " 7 and District of Columbia Cir-

cuit 4°4

authority, however, the Ninth Circuit held that if the

Government proceeds under both statutes and convictions are rendered
intent to authorize cumulative sentences for two false statements on one document in connection with purchase of firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (1976)).
4040. 662 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982).
4041. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1976) provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. . . to ship or transport any firearm. . . in interstate
. . . commerce."
4042. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1976) (emphasis added) provides in part:
(a) Any person who(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony. . . and who receives, possesses, or transports
in commerce.., any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
for not more than two years, or both.
4043. 662 F.2d at 1334. Each possession count under section 1202(a)(1) was punishable by
a maximum of two years imprisonment. Each transportation count under § 922(g)(1) was
punishable by a maximum of five years imprisonment. Id at 1333-34. The government
agreed that Wiga could not be convicted for transporting and possessing the same firearms
here, and agreed that Wiga could not be convicted for "simultaneous transportation of multiple weapons." Id at 1334.
4044. Id
4045. Id
4046. Id at 1335.
4047. United States v. Larson, 625 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1980).
4048. United States v. Girst, 636 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir.), modmfed on rehg', 645 F.2d 1014
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
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under both, the court has discretion to decide under which conviction
the defendant should be sentenced. 40 4 9 The court agreed with the Fifth

and District of Columbia Circuits that the defendant could be senthat both stattenced under either statute but not both,40 50 reasoning
40 5

utes prohibit fundamentally equivalent conduct.

'

The Ninth Circuit then considered the Government's third argument concerning whether multiple sentences could be imposed for the

simultaneous possession of weapons in violation of section
1202(a)(1). 411 2 The Government contended that Wiga should be convicted and sentenced for each firearm simultaneously possessed because they had been acquired at different times and places.40 53 In
accordance with other circuits, 4 0 54 the Ninth Circuit adopted the general rule that under section 1202(a)(1) only one offense is charged regardless of the number of weapons possessed, unless the firearms were

stored or acquired at different times and places.40 55 In Wiga, the facts
strongly suggested that the weapons were acquired at different times

and places; thus placing the case within the exception to the general
rule.40 56 In justifying its conclusion that each firearm was a separate
unit of prosecution, the court accepted the interpretation of congressional intent advanced by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Bullock.4 0 5 7 The Bullock court noted that section 1202(a)(1) was enacted

to deter separate instances of receipt and possession of firearms by convicted felons in order to prevent covert accumulations of weapons.0 5
4049. 662 F.2d at 1335.
4050. See supra notes 4047 and 4048.
4051. 662 F.2d at 1335.
4052. Id at 1336.
4053. Id
4054. See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, 615 F.2d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir.) (multiple sentences
for simultaneous possession of firearms when ex-felon had acquired and stored weapons at
different times and places), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 957 (1980); United States v. Rosenbarger,
536 F.2d 715, 721 (6th Cir. 1976) (multiple convictions and sentences vacated when ex-felon
had possessed three firearms at same time and place), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977);
United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665, 670 (8th Cir. 1975) (multiple sentences improper
when ex-felon convicted on four counts of possessing firearms, yet had possessed weapons at
same time and place); United States v. Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861, 870 (7th Cir.) (two counts for
possessing firearms combined when possession occurred at same time and place), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975).
4055. 662 F.2d at 1336-37.
4056. Id at 1337. The court noted that the evidence indicated the shotgun was acquired
on April 14, 1978 in iowa, while the revolver was acquired on December 18, 1978 in Nebraska. Id
4057. 615 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1980).
4058. Id at 1085-86.
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In United States v. Alverson,4°s the Ninth Circuit considered
whether Congress had authorized separate sentences for each of several
firearms simultaneously possessed at the same place in violation of 26

U.S.C. section 5861(d).4 ° 6 Alverson was convicted on four counts of
possessing unregistered machine guns, and given consecutive sentences
of five years imprisonment on each count. The defendant contended

that multiple sentences were impermissible because there was only one
act of possession. 4 0 61 The court rejected this argument, holding instead

that section 5861(d) was an unambiguous expression of congressional
intent to authorize separate punishment for each firearm possessed.4 °

2

In determining that each firearm was a separate unit of prosecution, the
court examined both the language of section 5861(d) ace3 and the overall
statutory scheme.4°64 Applying similar methodologies and rationales,
both the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have adopted the same interpretation
of section 5861(d).4 6 5
4. The concurrent sentence doctrine
Under the concurrent sentence doctrine, an appellate court may

decline to review a conviction on one count of a multiple count conviction when concurrent sentences were imposed, one count was reviewed
and affirmed, and no adverse collateral consequences result to the de-

fendant.4 °6 6 Since the 1969 United States Supreme Court decision in
4059. 666 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1982).
4060. Id at 346. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1976) (emphasis added) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person. . . (d) to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him
in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record ..
4061. 666 F.2d at 346.
4062. Id at 347.
4063. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) states "it shall be unlawful for any person. . . to receive or
possess a firearm. . . ." Compare Brown v. United States, 623 F.2d 54, 58 (9th Cir. 1980)
("any" in 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) does not indicate clear congressional intent for imposing
multiple sentences for each making of a false statement) with Sanders v. United States, 441
F.2d 412, 414-15 (10th Cir.) ("a" in 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) evidences clear congressional intent
that each firearm constitute a separate unit of prosecution), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846 (1971).
4064. 666 F.2d at 347. As part of a statutory scheme for enforcing the transfer tax provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 5811 (1976), § 5861(d) is a valid exercise of Congress' power to tax.
Under § 5811 a tax is imposed on each firearm transferred. Therefore, each instance of
possession of an unregistered firearm deprives the government of tax revenue. Consequently, authorizing separate punishment for each firearm encourages payment of the tax.
Aiverson, 666 F.2d at 347 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
4065. United States v. Tarrant, 460 F.2d 701,704 (simultaneous possession of five unregistered firearms constituted five separate offenses under § 5861(d)); Sanders v. United States,
441 F.2d at 414-15 (multiple sentences for two counts of simultaneous possession of two
unregistered firearms in violation of § 5861(d); lenity principle not applied).
4066. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943); see, e.g., United States v. Ford,
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the status of the concurrent sentence doctrine

has been uncertain. Although the Benton Court held that the doctrine
does not bar judicial review of multiple convictions when concurrent
sentences have been imposed, it questioned the doctrine's continued
usefulness."

8

Nevertheless, in two subsequent cases the Supreme

Court summarily invoked the concurrent sentence doctrine without discussing the impact of Benton."

The Ninth Circuit frequently applies the concurrent sentence doctrine; however, recent cases illustrate the inconsistency in its application. In two recent cases, the Ninth Circuit applied the doctrine
mechanically without discussing the various legal consequences that
the court considered, if any, in concluding that no adverse collateral
consequences would result. 4 70 For example, in United States v. Kaiser,40 71 defendant Remsing was convicted on multiple counts for possessing and distributing heroin. After reviewing and affirming count
XIII of the indictment, the court invoked the concurrent sentence doctrine to affirm defendant's conviction on count X without review. The

court specifically found that no adverse effects would result from the
additional conviction.4

72

However, the court offered no explanation

for this finding.
In another recent case, the Ninth Circuit expressly analyzed a possible adverse consequence which could result from affirming a conviction without review, and concluded that the defendant would not suffer
, undesirable effects from application of the doctrine. In United States v.
632 F.2d 1354, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981); United States v.
Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962 (1979).
4067. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Benton was tried for larceny and burglary. He was acquitted of
larceny, but convicted of burglary. After error in the-selection of the grand and petit juries,
Benton was given, and accepted, the option of being retried. Benton was convicted of both
larceny and burglary on retrial, and given concurrent sentences. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to hear Benton's double jeopardy claim, but applied the concurrent sentence doctrine first to determine whether the doctrine would prevent the Court from hearing
the double joepardy claim. _d at 787. After noting courts' haphazard application of the
doctrine and the possible harmful consequences to the defendant, the Court concluded that
the doctrine may have continued validity as a rule of judicial convenience, but would not
bar review of multiple convictions when concurrent sentences had been imposed. Id at 791.
In dicta, the Court further declared that adverse collateral consequences usually result from
criminal convictions. Id at 790 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55 (1968)).
4068. Benton, 395 U.S. at 791.
4069. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 848 n.16 (1973).
4070. United States v. Barker, 675 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Kaiser, 660
F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1121 (1982).
4071. 660 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1121 (1982).
4072. Id at 732.
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L6pps,4 °73 the court declined to review a felony conviction for receipt of
firearms by a felon where the sentence ran concurrently with those of
two other affirmed convictions. 4 74 The court examined the effect of
the conviction on the defendant's offense severity rating for parole purposes, and concluded that affirming the conviction would not increase
the time served before parole. 4 75
In United States v. Fogarty,4 7 6 the Ninth Circuit once again

mechanically applied the doctrine without determining whether adverse collateral consequences would result. The Fogarty court declined
to review a constitutional claim on one count of a multiple count conviction on which a concurrent sentence had been imposed.4 °7 7 The
court justified its decision on the basis that the defendant had failed to
would be different
show that the collateral consequences of his40 sentence
78
if the charges in question were dismissed.

In contrast, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the concurrent senCallihan was sentenced
tence doctrine in UnitedStates v. Callihan.4
to two consecutive three-year terms for convictions of wire fraud and
transporting fraudulently obtained credit cards. The defendant was
convicted of eight additional counts and given sentences to run concurrently with each consecutive sentence. After reversing the transportation conviction, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the concurrent
sentence doctrine to affirm those counts which had been concurrent to
the transportation count.40 80 The court reasoned that the doctrine was

inapplicable because reversal of the transportation count resulted in a
reduction of the total sentence from six to three years.4°81
In United States v. Barker,40 82 the Ninth Circuit summarily af4073. 659 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1981).
4074. Lipps was convicted on three counts of being a felon in receipt of a firearm shipped
in interstate commerce, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (1976). He was sentenced to
three concurrent five-year sentences. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction after a review of only two counts. 659 F.2d at 963.
4075. 659 F.2d at 962-63. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1982).
4076. 663 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1981).
4077. Id at 930. Fogarty was convicted of three counts of mailing obscene matter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976), and three counts of violating the Sexual Exploitation of
Children Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (Supp. V 1981). He was sentenced to probation. The sentencing court did not specifically state the counts upon which the probation was imposed.
Fogarty claimed that § 1461 was unconstitutionally overbroad, and moved to have the
§ 1461 convictions dismissed. 663 F.2d at 930.
4078. 663 F.2d at 930.
4079. 666 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1982).
4080. Id at 424.
4081. Id (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. at 791).
4082. 675 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1982).
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firmed Barker's conviction for making false statements to the Immigra-

tion and Naturalization Service 4083 after it affirmed his conviction on
five other counts of the six-count indictment.4 8 4 Barker was sentenced
to six concurrent one-year sentences after he assaulted an INS Border

Patrol agent, an undercover federal officer. 4085 The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction on five of the counts. Barker also challenged his

conviction on the false statements count, but the court refused to 40over86
turn the conviction, relying on the concurrent sentence doctrine.

In a concurring opinion Judge Reinhardt criticized the use of the
concurrent sentence doctrine in two respects: (1) the defendant may in
fact suffer adverse consequences if his conviction is not reviewed; and
(2) the government has never clearly identified its interests in having
defendants' convictions affirmed in this matter.40 87 Although he did

not advocate abandoning the doctrine, Judge Reinhardt suggested that
its continued use could be justified only if the government's interest is
identified, if that interest outweighs the value of judicial review of the
conviction, and if the defendant in fact suffers no adverse effects. 40 88
Accordingly, Judge Reinhardt advocated adopting an approach similar
to that of the District of Columbia in United States v. Hooper.4 °8 9 The

Hooper rule provides that a conviction on a doubtful count, whose sentence runs concurrently to a valid count, should be vacated unless and
until a practical public interest justifies reinstating the conviction.40

90

Recent cases reflect the Ninth Circuit's ad hoc application of the
concurrent sentence doctrine. Generally, the Ninth Circuit has either
invoked the doctrine, apparently without considering adverse collateral
consequences, 40 9 ' or has summarily concluded that no adverse effects
4083. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
4084. 675 F.2d at 1059.
4085. Id at 1056-57. Barker was convicted of two counts of assaulting a Federal officer in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1976), one count of deprivation of civil rights in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1976), one count of making false statements to the INS in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (1976), and two counts of perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976). 675
F.2d at 1056-57.
4086. 675 F.2d at 1059.
4087. Id at 1061 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Judge Reinhardt stated that:
If it is truly of no consequence to the defendant that his conviction on an additional offense stands, why is it of consequence to the government that the conviction be affirmed? If the conviction is of no significance whatsoever, what is our
purpose in upholding it? On the other hand, if the conviction has any significance
at all, it would seem that the defendant has a right to have it reviewed on appeal.
Id at 1060.
4088. Id at 1061.
4089. 432 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
4090. Id at 606 & n.8.
4091. See United States v. Jabara, 618 F.2d 1319, 1329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856
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exist.4°92 The Ninth Circuit has occasionally divulged what specific
collateral consequences it considered in determining whether the doctrine was applicable. 4°93 In the more recent cases the court seems to be
making specific findings regarding collateral consequences, even
though these opinions still do not clarify which factors are being considered in deciding whether the rule applies. 0 94
The Fifth Circuit, like the Ninth, regularly invokes the concurrent
sentence doctrine. 4° 95 On the other hand, the District of Columbia Circuit strongly supports the Hooper approach.4 96 The Ninth Circuit, after applying the Hooper rule in 1971 in United States v. Fishbein,4 °97
apparently discarded it. However, vigorous concurring opinions advocating adoption of an approach similar to Hooper in two very recent
cases in the Ninth and Fifth Circuits may indicate a trend toward the
future demise of the concurrent sentence doctrine in these circuits. 4°98
The Seventh Circuit, since Benton, has rejected the doctrine outright.4 99 However, the Fourth Circuit, after similarly disapproving of
(1980); United States v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985, 992 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016
(1980); United States v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246, 1252 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 855
(1979).
4092. United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962
(1979); United States v. Young Buffalo, 591 F.2d 506, 512-13 (9th Cir.), cert.denied, 441 U.S.
950 (1979); United States v. Walls, 577 F.2d 690, 699 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893
(1978).
4093. See United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354, 1370 n.16 (9th Cir. 1980) (adverse legal
consequences would result from felony conviction regardless of court's decision on any
count it declined to review), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981); United States v. Valenzuela,
596 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir.) (affirming sentences running concurrent to life term without
possibility of suspension, probation, or parole would not adversely affect defendant because
life term will remain regardless), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979); United States v.
Magdaleno-Aguirre, 590 F.2d 814, 815 (1979) (adverse collateral effects would result from
affirming an unreviewed felony conviction when misdemeanor conviction affirmed and
sentences ran concurrently).
4094. See United States v. Barker, 675 F.2d at 1059; United States v. Fogarty, 663 F.2d at
930; United States v. Kaiser, 660 F.2d at 732. But cf United States v. Lipps, 659 F.2d at 963
(offense severity rating for parole purposes considered in determining that application of
concurrent sentence doctrine would not lead to adverse collateral consequences).
4095. See United States v. MacPherson, 664 F.2d 69, 74 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Robbins, 623 F.2d 418, 420-21 (5th Cir. 1980).
4096. See United States v. Bush, 659 F.2d 163, 167-68 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v.
Durant, 648 F.2d 747, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
4097. United States v. Fishbein, 446 F.2d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1019 (1972).
4098. United States v. Barker, 675 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Warren, 612
F.2d 887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980).
4099. See Crovedi v. United States, 517 F.2d 541, 550 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972).
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the doctrine,4 100 recently resurrected it in a 1980 case.4 10 ' In a recent

opinion, the Second Circuit thoroughly analyzed the viability of the
rule, and concluded that applying the doctrine with the required degree
of care counteracted any gain in judicial efficiency and convenience

which might have resulted from refusing to review the conviction.410 2
The Second Circuit continues to invoke the doctrine, although

infrequently.4103
If application of the concurrent sentence doctrine is to continue,
the following questions must be resolved: (1) whether a mere possibility of adverse collateral effects is sufficient to render the doctrine inapplicable, or whether there must be a substantial risk of adverse effects;
and (2) whether the burden of proof is on the defendant or the govern-

ment to show the existence or nonexistence of adverse collateral legal
consequences. 4 10 A uniform policy is necessary to promote a consistent, fair, and effective application of the concurrent sentence doctrine.
5.

Consecutive sentences

Absent legislative authority to the contrary, it is improper for a
court to impose consecutive sentences for related offenses arising from
a single criminal event when all the elements necessary to prove one
offense are also essential in proving another violation.4 10 5 Consecutive

sentences, however, may be imposed for multiple offenses arising from
separate criminal transactions.4 1°
4100. Close v. United States, 450 F.2d 152, 155 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1068
(1972).
4101. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1980) (Close v.
United States limited the application of the concurrent sentence doctrine to situations where
no substantial risk of adverse collateral consequences exists if defendant's conviction is affirmed without review), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1004 (1982).
4102. United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952, 959-60 (2d Cir. 1980).
4103. Id; United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 361 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Wishart, 582 F.2d 236, 242 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 987 (1978).
4104. United States v. Warren, 612 F.2d 887, 895-96 (Roney, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980).
4105. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693 (1980). In Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299 (1932), the Court announced a rule for determining congressional intent to
impose cumulative punishment when a single criminal transaction violates more than one
statutory offense. The Blockburger test provides that separately punishable offenses were
intended if proof of one violation requires an element not necessary to prove the other violation(s). 284 U.S. at 304. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977) (applying Blockburger
test, Court determined that joyriding and auto theft merged into one offense for punishment
purposes thus prohibiting consecutive sentences).
4106. Fierro v. MacDougall, 648 F.2d 1259, 1260 (9th Cir.) (state court has power to impose consecutive sentences for separately committed crimes without express legislative au-
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In UnitedStates v. Sanford,4 107 the defendant questioned whether
consecutive sentences could be imposed for a single criminal incident

that violated two statutory provisions.

l0

Sanford was convicted and

given consecutive sentences for possessing counterfeit notes in violation

of 18 U.S.C. section 472 and for the transfer of the notes in violation of
18 U.S.C. section 473. However, the only evidence offered to prove

that Sanford had possessed the notes was the testimony that he had
transferred them. Without evidence of a prior possession of the notes,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the possession and transfer counts

merged into one offense under the principles of Blockburger v. United
States.4 0 9 As a result, the court held that consecutive sentences were
improper. 1 o
The Sanford court relied on United States v. Oropeza,4 1 1 where

the court held that the offenses of possession and distribution of heroin
merged into one offense under the Blockburger test when the only evi-

dence of possession consisted of proof of the distribution transaction.4 1 2 Although other circuits offer support for the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Oropeza,4113 the Fifth Circuit treats possession and distribution as separate offenses justifying consecutive sentences.41 4
The Ninth Circuit, in Roy v. Watson, 1

5

considered whether a

state court could impose consecutive sentences for two separate crimes
thority), cert. denied,454 U.S. 933 (1981). See United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363
(1926) (consecutive sentences for three separate drug sales).
4107. 673 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1982).
4108. Id at 1073-74.
4109. Id See supra note 4105 and accompanying text.
4110. 673 F.2d at 1073.
4111. 564 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
4112. Id at 324 (Congress intended to punish one who intended to distribute even though
distribution did not occur rather than twice punish a distributor who necessarily possessed
drug before transfer).
4113. See, e.g, United States v. Curry, 512 F.2d 1299, 1305-06 (4th Cir.) (when single drug
sale was proof of both possession and distribution, crimes merged, rendering consecutive
sentences improper, gravamen of each offense is distribution of controlled substance), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975); United States v. Atkinson, 512 F.2d 1235, 1240 (4th Cir. 1975).
Cf. United States v. Stevens, 521 F.2d 334, 337 n.2 (6th Cir. 1975) (concurrentsentences for
heroin possession and distribution vacated because based on a single sale; although one
crime was not lesser included offense and crimes did not merge, multiple sentences improper); United States v. Howard, 507 F.2d 559, 563 (8th Cir. 1974) (concurrentsentence for
possession arising from same facts as distribution charge vacated because possession was
lesser included offense).
4114. United States v. Horsley, 519 F.2d 1264, 1265-66 (5th Cir. 1975) (separate convictions for possession and distribution of hashish oil; possession offense was complete upon
receipt of drug, while transfer offense required proof of delivery to third party), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 944 (1976).
4115. 669 F.2d 611 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982).
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absent statutory authority.4116 Roy had been sentenced to a five-year
prison term for violating probation. Three years later, he was convicted of escape and sentenced to another five-year term to run consecutively to the original term. On appeal of the dismissal of his habeas
corpus petition, Roy argued that the Oregon state court exceeded its
constitutional authority when it imposed a consecutive sentence for his
escape conviction, because Oregon no longer had a statute permitting
consecutive sentences.41 17
The court rejected Roy's contention, adopting the reasoning in
Fierro v. McDougall,41 1 a recent Ninth Circuit decision.4 19 The court
distinguished Roy's sentence from consecutive sentences that are imposed for multiple offenses arising from a single criminal transaction.412 0 Roy had received consecutive sentences for two distinct
crimes committed at different times.4 12 1 The court concluded that no

statutory authority was required to impose consecutive sentences because Oregon courts were already vested with the power to impose cu4116. Id at 612.
4117. Id at 612-13. Roy based this argument on dicta in Whalen v. United States, 445
U.S. 684 (1980). The Whalen Court suggested that, although state courts were not bound by
the doctrine of separation of powers, due process may bar a state court from punishing
criminal acts except as authorized by state law. Id at 689-90 n.4. Oregon had a statute
specifically authorizing consecutive sentences, but it was repealed in 1961. 669 F.2d at 61213.
4118. 648 F.2d 1259, 1260 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981). The Roy court stated that Fierrowas dispositive of Roy's argument because in Fierro a state prisoner unsuccessfully advanced the identical argument in reliance on the same dicta in Whalen, 445 U.S. 689-90 n.4., and on the
Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
However, the Fierro court distinguished Whalen and Wylie because they involved related crimes arising from a single criminal incident, whereas Fierro was given cumulative
sentences for eighteen different crimes ranging from armed rape to auto theft. The Fierro
court reasoned that imposing consecutive sentences for separate criminal acts was nothing
more than faithful compliance with the legislative mandate to punish each of these crimes.
648 F.2d at 1260.
4119. 669 F.2d at 612-13.
4120. The Roy court distinguished Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980) on the
same basis as did the Fierro court. In Whalen, the defendant was convicted of rape and
killing in the perpetration of rape, and was given consecutive sentences of twenty years to
life for first-degree murder and fifteen years to life for rape. 445 U.S. at 689. The Supreme
Court considered whether imposing consecutive sentences for the two crimes violated federal statutory and criminal law. The Whalen Court interpreted a District of Columbia statute which provided that the imposition of consecutive sentences be governed by the
Blockburger test. Applying this test, the Court concluded that consecutive sentences were
improper and thus violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy and the
doctrine of separation of powers. Id at 693-95.
4121. 669 F.2d at 612.
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mulative punishment for offenses arising from distinct criminal acts.4 122
4 1 23 the Ninth
In Gentry v. MacDougall,
Circuit considered whether
consecutive sentences could be imposed for two violations of a single
statute arising from one criminal act, absent specific statutory language.41 24 Gentry was convicted and given consecutive sentences for
killing two people in a taxi which Gentry hit while intoxicated. On
petition for writ of habeas corpus, Gentry contended that consecutive
sentences for multiple deaths resulting from a single act of drunk driving were not authorized because the Arizona manslaughter statute4 125
did not specifically provide for multiple sentences. Following state
law, 41 26 the Ninth Circuit concluded that by defining manslaughter as
"the unlawful killing of a human being," the Arizona legislature intended to authorize multiple sentences for vehicular manslaughter.4 2 7
On this basis, the Ninth Circuit held that consecutive sentences were
proper.41 28

6.
In

Enhancement

UnitedStates v. Jones,1 2 9

the defendant was convicted under 18

4122. Id at 612-13. The Roy court noted that in State v. Jones, 250 Or. 59, 61, 440 P.2d
371, 372 (1968), the Oregon Supreme Court held that the power to impose consecutive
sentences on the separately committed crimes of burglary and robbery was an inherent judicial power.
Although the specific issue decided in Roy has only recently been reviewed by the
Ninth Circuit, the court's conclusion appears consistent with prior Ninth Circuit precedent
and also coincides with Fifth Circuit authority. See Gaines v. Ricketts, 554 F.2d 1346, 1347
(5th Cir. 1977) (consecutive sentences for armed robbery and assault were proper when each
crime occurred on a different day and involved separate victims); Burchett v. Cardwell, 493
F.2d 492, 494 (9th Cir.) (defendant convicted and sentenced for assault with intent to rape,
kidnapping, and statutory rape; consecutive sentences permitted under Arizona law), cer.
denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); Ramirez v. Arizona, 437 F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 1971) (defendant convicted of grand theft and sentenced consecutively to a prior sentence on a different
crime; imposition of consecutive sentences was a matter of state policy which raises no federal questions).
4123. 685 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1982).
4124. Id at 323 n.2.
4125. Gentry was convicted of two counts of vehicular manslaughter pursuant to Aasz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-456(3)(a) (current version at AMz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1102
(1978).
4126. The Ninth Circuit relied on State v. Miranda, 3 Ariz. App. 550, 558, 416 P.2d 444,
452 (1966) where the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed consecutive sentences, pursuant to
the same statute, for multiple deaths resulting from a single act of drunk driving. The court
stated that the statute defining manslaughter as the "unlawful killing of a human being
without malice" had to be read in conjunction with the vehicular manslaughter statute,
thereby allowing multiple sentences. Id at 557-58, 416 P.2d at 451-52. 685 F.2d at 323.
4127. 685 F.2d at 323.
4128. Id
4129. 678 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1982).
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U.S.C. section 2113(a) 4 130 as an accomplice to a bank robbery during
which a security guard was shot and killed.4 13 1 Although the defendant
did not fire the fatal shot, he was sentenced to life imprisonment under
section 2113(e), 4 132 an enhancement provision.
On appeal, the defendant argued that an accomplice could not be
subject to enhanced punishment for aggravated bank robbery.4 13 3 The
Ninth Circuit rejected defendant's contention, holding that 18 U.S.C.
providing that any person who aids or abets a crime
section 2,
against the United States is punishable as a principal, applies to the

entire criminal code.4135
However, the court reversed the conviction because the jury had
been improperly instructed.4 36 Relying on cases interpreting section
2113(d), 4 137 a parallel enhancement provision, the Ninth Circuit held
4130. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976) provides in part:
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to
take, from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other
thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association; or
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings
and loan association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit
union, or as a savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank,
credit union, or in such savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof,
so used, any felony affecting such bank, credit union, or such savings and loan
association and in violation of any statute of the United States, or any larcenyShall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both.
(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined
in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy
the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
(e) Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section, or in avoiding or attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of such offense, or in
freeing himself or attempting to free himself from arrest or confinement for such
offense, kills any person, or forces any person to accompany him without the consent of such person, shall be imprisoned not less than ten years, or punished by
death if the verdict of the jury shall so direct.
4131. 678 F.2d at 103.
4132. See supra note 4129.
4133. 678 F.2d at 103.
4134. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1976) provides that: "Whoever commits an offense against the
United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is
punishable as a principal."
4135. 678 F.2d at 105.
4136. Id at 106.
4137. Id at 105. The Ninth Circuit relied on United States v. Jones, 592 F.2d 1038 (9th
Cir.) (section 2113(d) conviction reversed because evidence insufficient to show that accomplice knew principal was armed), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 951 (1979) and United States v.
Short, 493 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.) (jury instruction that defendant could be found guilty as an
accomplice to bank robbery with a dangerous weapon even if defendant did not know that
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that the jury must find the defendant aided and abetted both the robbery and the killing in order to be subject to enhanced punishment
under section 2113(e). 4 138 The trial judge had failed to instruct the jury
to determine whether Jones had aided and abetted the killing.4 13 9 Consequently, the court remanded the case for resentencing, or at the Gov-

ernment's option, retrial. 44
7. Resentencing
Generally, resentencing of a defendant, when required, is done by
the original sentencing judge. 4 14 1 However, the courts have recognized

certain "unusual circumstances" which make resentencing by a new
judge appropriate. 4"42 In United States v. Alverson, 4" 43 and United
principal was armed, was reversible error), modNred, 500 F.2d 676, cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1000 (1974).
4138. 678 F.2d at 105.
4139. Id at 106.
4140. Id The Ninth Circuit's position here finds substantial support in the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 2. See legislative history of UNITED STATES CODE-AMENDMENT OF
CERTAIN TITLES, S. REP. No. 1020, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 2, reprintedin 1951 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2578, 2583 ("This section is intended to clarify and make certain the
intent to punish aiders and abettors regardless of the fact that they may be incapable of
committing the specific violation which they are charged to have aided and abetted.").
Additionally, the First, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have reached similar conclusions on
both issues. See, e.g., United States v. May, 625 F.2d 186, 194 (8th Cir. 1980) ("[S]ection
2(b), like section 2(a), 'is applicable to the entire criminal code.' "); United States v.
Longoria, 569 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 1978) (conviction for aiding and abetting possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute reversed where evidence insufficient to prove intent);
United States v. Sanborn, 563 F.2d 488, 490 (1st Cir. 1977) (conviction for aiding and abetting armed robbery vacated because trial court failed to instruct jury on Government's burden to show that defendant had notice that dangerous weapon would be used); United States
v. Rector, 538 F.2d 223, 225 (8th Cir. 1976) (court held that one who aids and abets both
commission of bank robbery and kidnapping is liable as a principal under § 2113(e)), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 963 (1979); United States v. Bullock, 451 F.2d 884, 888 (5th Cir. 1971) (one
indicted as a principal for receiving, concealing, and retaining United States property valued
in excess of one hundred dollars is punishable as a principal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2 on
evidence establishing that he merely aided and abetted the crime).
4141. United States v. Larios, 640 F.2d 938, 943-44 (9th Cir. 1981) (reassignment proper
when sentencing judge acted unreasonably in refusing to read case transcripts before imposing sentence).
4142. Id at 943-44. See, e.g., United States v. Larios, 640 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1981)
(reassignment when sentencing judge acted unreasonably in refusing to read case transcripts
before imposing sentence); United States v. Ferguson, 624 F.2d 81, 82-83 (9th Cir. 1980)
(reassignment proper after sentencing judge refused to consider any mitigating circumstances before reimposing maximum sentence); United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 9-10 (2d
Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (reassignment proper if judge would have difficulty rejecting previously expressed views or findings, advisable to preserve appearance ofjustice if not outweighed by judicial waste or duplication); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1231 (2d
Cir. 1973) (reassignment required when judge improperly denied counsel's request to rebut
ex parte memo before sentencing), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974). See also United States

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

States v. Doe,4 1" the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a
different judge should resentence the defendant.

In Alverson, the trial judge had corrected an ambiguity in the defendant's sentence for possessing unregistered machine guns. The correction was made, however, after the judge had discussed Alverson's

role as a suspect in a pending homicide investigation with a government agent. After holding that the ex parte communication between
the judge and government agent required resentencing,4 145 the Ninth
Circuit remanded the case to a diferent judge for resentencing.4 146 In
determining whether to reassign the case to a different judge, the Alverson court considered three factors: (1) whether the original judge could

reasonably be expected to discount previously expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous; (2) whether reassignment would preserve the appearance of fairness; and (3) whether reassignment would

result in a waste or duplication of effort that would outweigh any gain
in preserving the appearance of justice.4 14 7 The court found that reas-

signment was appropriate because the case was not complex and, in
view of the improper ex parte communication, fairness could best be
preserved by reassignment.4 148

In Doe, the trial judge had denied the Government the right to
allocute, pursuant to Rule 32(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 4 149 before sentencing Doe for importation and possession of
v. Wardlaw, 576 F.2d 932, 939 (lst Cir. 1978) (resentencing by new judge after original
judge had imposed maximum sentence on youthful first-offenders in order to make examples of them); United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 529 (3d Cir. 1973) (resentencing by
new judge ordered when sentencing judge used fixed sentencing policy in draft evasion cases
which bordered on personal bias), ef United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir.
1979) (case remanded to original judge because original sentence was fair and motion to
modify sentence only involved resolution of plea agreement); United States v. Howard, 506
F.2d 865, 866 (5th Cir. 1975) (remanded to same court when potentially prejudicial error
involved only juror's statements to otherjurors). But see Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d
139, 148 (8th Cir. 1973) (resentencing by same judge even though maximum prison sentence
was imposed as a matter of policy on young Jehovah's Witness who refused induction into
the military); Mawson v. United States, 463 F.2d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1972) (resentencing by new
judge to preserve appearance of fairness, although original judge's error resulted only from
parties' neglect to inform judge of plea agreement).
4143. 666 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1982).
4144. 655 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1981).
4145. 666 F.2d at 346.
4146. Id at 349-50.
4147. Id at 349 (quoting United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1979)).
4148. 666 F.2d at 350.
4149. The Government has a duty to provide the sentencing court with all facts material to
a defendant's punishment. This includes any evidence of mitigating circumstances. United
States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 819 (2d Cir. 1970). See Allocution statements for a thorough discussion.
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heroin with intent to distribute. The trial judge had refused to believe

statements made by Doe regarding his cooperation with government
agents, which had been offered in mitigation of punishment.4 150 After

holding that the prosecutor should have been allowed to make an allocution statement in order to corroborate or contradict Doe's state-

ments, 4151 the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing by a
new judge.4 152
In determining to reassign the case to a new judge, the Doe court
applied the three factors considered in Alverson. Considering the first
reassignment factor, the court concluded that the trial judge's error in

denying the Government an opportunity to allocute and the trial
judge's adamant rejection of Doe's mitigating claims would have an
effect on resentencing by the same judge.4 15 3

In addition, the court

noted that the duplication of efforts caused by a new judge conducting
the resentencing would be outweighed by the preservation of an appearance of fairness.41 5 4

8. Judge's prejudice
When a sentencing judge is unable to impartially perform his
functions because of personal bias or prejudice toward the defendant,

an adverse party or the crime itself, disqualification of that judge is

proper.41 55 Showings of ethnic, 41 56 political, 4 15 7 or otherwise personal
bias may be sufficient to require the judge's recusal. On the other hand,
4150. 655 F.2d at 928 & n.13.
4151. Id at 928-29.
4152. Id at 929.
4153. Id (citing United States v. Ferguson, 624 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir. 1980) (reassignment
proper where original sentencing judge created the sentencing error when he refused to consider mitigating circumstances)).
4154. 655 F.2d at 929.
4155. See generaly Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 35 (1921) (interpreting Judicial
Code § 21 (Jan. 1, 1912), (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1976)) which was designed to
ensure impartiality in judicial proceedings, as well as to preserve the appearance of fairness);
Ex Parte American Steel Barrel Co. & Seaman, 230 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1913) (interpreting Judicial Code § 21 (Jan. 1, 1912) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1976))).
There are two statutes which set forth the conditions for disqualification of a sentencing
judge. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1976) states in pertinent part:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a
timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has
a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party,
such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to
hear such proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) states in pertinent part: "(a) Any
justice, judge, or magistrate. . . of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also disqual-
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evidence of prior adverse rulings or comments by the judge,4158 of the
judge's background or associations,4159 or of a judge's admonishment
of the defendant4"6" generally does not justify disqualification.
In UnitedStates v. Allen,4161 the Ninth Circuit examined the suffi-

ciency of the defendants' claims that the sentencing judge was
4 163

prejudiced. 4

62

Three defendants convicted of conspiracy to possess

and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, 41 " moved the
41 65
sentencing judge to disqualify himself because of personal bias.
The defendants claimed that the judge's remark during sentencing that
"importing marijuana was a very serious crime that had a 'cancer'-like
effect on society, ' 416 6 revealed an impermissible personal prejudice requiring recusal under 28 U.S.C. section 455(a). 4 167 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that the judge was merely reiterating congressional sentiment and that the judge's comment did not evidence the type of ethnic,
ify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party...."
The Ninth Circuit has stated that the decisions interpreting the "personal bias or
prejudice" language of§ 144 are controlling in interpreting § 455(b)(1). See United States v.
Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980). Moreover, § 455(b)(1) merely provides a specific
example of when a judge's impartiality may be questioned pursuant to § 455(a). Id Therefore, decisions interpreting § 455(b)(1) also control in the interpretation of 455(a) when a
request for disqualification is based on bias or prejudice. Id
4156. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. at 36 (judge's anti-German-American statements in
general and specific references to defendants of German descent showed sufficient bias to
require judge's disqualification).
4157. Connelly v. United States, 191 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1951) (judge's belief that defendant was a communist and that Communist Party was an illegal conspiracy to overthrow
the government was clear case of personal bias).
4158. United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 738-39 (9th Cir.) (judge's prior adverse rulings and ill-advised comment that he would never believe defendant did not show personal
bias), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1978).
4159. Price v. Johnston, 125 F.2d 806, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1942) (judge's association with a
bank in vicinity of bank allegedly robbed by defendant was insufficient to show personal
bias).
4160. United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d at 869 (judge's statement to defendant that his defense was frivolous was insufficient showing of bias because it was a correct characterization
of the defense).
4161. 675 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1980).
4162. Id at 1385-86.
4163. Id at 1379. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976).
4164. 675 F.2d at 1379. 21 U.S.C. § 841(9)(1) (1976).
4165. Id at 1385.
4166. Id
4167. See supra note 4155. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1002-03 (5th Cir.
1981) (for disqualification under § 455, the alleged bias must stem from an extra-judicial
source unless such pervasive bias is revealed in "otherwise judicial conduct as would constitute bias against a party") (quoting David v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976)).
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political, or personal bias that requires disqualification. 4168
The defendants also claimed that the sentencing judge was
prejudiced because he exhibited an impermissibly mechanical view of
sentencing.4 169 In rejecting this contention, the court noted that not
only were all the sentences within the statutory limit, 4 170 but the judge
had imposed sentences ranging from five to ten years for each defendant.4 17 1 The Ninth Circuit failed to find evidence that the judge ap-

plied an automatic sentencing policy or used sentencing to further an
objective unrelated to the defendants' conduct. 4 172
Sentencing determinations are within the broad discretion of the
sentencing judge. 4 173 Thus, sentences within statutory limits are generally not reviewable,4174 unless circumstances indicate that the judge has
abused his discretion. 41 75 The Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed its ad4168. 675 F.2d at 1385. The posture taken by the Ninth Circuit in Allen is consistent with
that taken by the United States Supreme Court, other circuits and prior Ninth Circuit decisions. See supra notes 4156-61. These courts, while attempting to preserve the appearance
of fairness, still require a more ingrained bias than a mere objection to certain persons or
their conduct. Southerland v. Irons, 628 F.2d 978, 980 (6th Cir. 1980) (judge's actions in
pending or prior litigation involving defendant not grounds for disqualification under 28
U.S.C. § 455(a)); United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 881-82 (9th Cir.) (judge's advice at
social gathering against accepting charitable contribution from defendant because he ran a
house of prostitution was insufficient showing of personal bias to require recusal), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 529 (3d Cir.) (factual
allegations of prejudice against draft-dodgers as a class sufficient to require recusal), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 911 (1973).
4169. 675 F.2d at 1385.
4170. Id. at 1386. Although the rule is well-established that a sentence within legal limits
is not reviewable, limited review is available when a judge refuses to exercise sentencing
discretion. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443 (1974).
4171. 675 F.2d at 1385-86. Dorszynski, 418 U.S. at 443 (section 5010(d) of Federal Youth
Corrections Act intended to comport with traditional sentencing discretion vested in trial
judge).
4172. 675 F.2d at 1386. The Allen court distinguished two cases that the defendants offered in support of their mechanical sentencing claim. In United States v. Thompson, 483
F.2d 527, 528-29 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 911 (1973), the judge had a policy of sentencing all draft evaders to thirty months in prison. In United States v. Wardlaw, 576 F.2d
932, 938-39 (Ist Cir. 1978), the judge imposed two and one-half times the requested sentence
on first-offenders in a drug-smuggling case simply to set an example. The Allen court considered these cases too extreme to offer any support to the defendants' claims. 675 F.2d at
1386.
4173. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). In Tucker, the Supreme Court
stated: "[A] judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broid in scope, largely unlimited
either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may
come." (citations omitted).
4174. Id at 447 (citing Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)).
4175. See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736,741 (1948) (sentence based on materially
false information violated due process); United States v. Capriola, 537 F.2d 319, 321 (9th
Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (remand required where harsher sentence possibly imposed because
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herence to these general sentencing principles.4 1 76

9. Federal Youth Corrections Act
The Federal Youth Corrections Act4 177 ("YCA") was designed to

increase sentencing alternatives available to federal district judges who
deal with young offenders and who the court determines would benefit
4 17 8
from special rehabilitative treatment.

In Ralston v. Robinson4

179

the United States Supreme Court con-

sidered whether a youth offender may be required to serve the remaindefendant exercised his right to trial); Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 147-48 (8th
Cir. 1973) (judge's policy to sentence all draft evaders to maximum term evidenced an abuse
of discretion).
4176. In United States v. Wilder, 680 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), the defendant
was convicted for tax evasion. Wilder, who employed numerous tactics to delay and frustrate the proceedings, was given the maximum sentence of one year imprisonment and a
$10,000 fine. In rejecting Wilder's claim that the court abused its sentencing discretion, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence and imposed an additional penalty. Id at 61. The court
reasoned that the sentence was within statutory limits, and that Wilder's actions justified the
maximum penalty. Id
In United States v. Cain, 685 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1982), Cain argued that his sentence
was excessive in light of his background. Id at 327. Cain, convicted and sentenced for bank
robbery pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) & 4205 (1976), was given a ten-year prison sentence. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence because it fell within the statutory limit and
Cain advanced no other theory justifying reversal. Id
In United States v. Gilman, 684 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1982), the defendants contended that
their sentences were excessive. The defendants were each convicted and sentenced for seven
counts of mailing obscene matter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976), and one count of
conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). Noting the seriousness of the offense, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentences because they were within statutory limits and thus generally unreviewable. Id at 622.
In United States v. Garrett, 680 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1982), the defendants contended that
they were denied equal protection because they were sentenced more severely than their codefendant. The defendants had both been convicted on two counts of conspiring to possess
narcotics with intent to distribute and nine counts of possessing and distributing narcotics in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 & 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. They were given a reduced
sentence of nine years imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently; their co-defendant,
convicted on eight counts, received concurrent sentences of five years imprisonment on each
count and a special twenty-five year parole term. The court found three flaws in the defendants' equal protection argument: (1) the defendants were convicted on more counts than
their co-defendant; (2) the defendants were more culpable than their co-defendant; and
(3) sentencing determinations generally rest with the sentencing judge. Id at 652. Addressing the third flaw, the court noted that the imposition of disparate sentences on co-defendants does not in itself indicate an abuse of sentencing discretion when the defendants'
sentences are within statutory limits. Id
4177. Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976).
4178. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433, 444 (1974) (YCA requires an express
finding that youthful offender will not benefit from YCA treatment before judge can sentence defendant outside of the Act).
4179. 454 U.S. 201 (1981).
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der of a YCA sentence as an adult after receiving a consecutive adult

sentence on a felony charge. 4 180 The youth had been sentenced to ten

years' imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. section 5010(c), 4 8 1 after pleading
guilty to a charge of second-degree murder. As prescribed by 18
U.S.C. section 5011, the sentence contemplated rehabilitative treatment
and separation from adult offenders.4 18 2 While incarcerated, the defendant was found guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon on a fed-

eral officer, and was given a consecutive ten-year adult sentence. The
district court explicitly found that the defendant would not benefit

from further YCA treatment, and recommended transfer to a more secure institution.4 18 3 After defendant received a second consecutive
adult sentence on a felony charge,4 184 the Bureau of Prisons reclassified

the defendant as an adult offender pursuant to prison

policy.4 18 5

Defendant petitioned for habeas corpus relief. Affirming the district court's grant of the writ, the Seventh Circuit held that the YCA
prohibits a subsequent sentencing judge from reevaluating a YCA sentence even if the second judge explicitly finds the defendant will no
longer benefit from YCA treatment. 8 6
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that a judge
may modify the essential treatment terms of a YCA sentence when the
4180. Id at 203.
4181. Id 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1976) provides in part:
If the court shall find that the youth offender may not be able to derive maximum
benefit from treatment by the Commission prior to the expiration of six years from
the date of conviction it may. . . sentence the youth offender to the custody of the
Attorney General for treatment and supervision . . . for any further period that
may be authorized by law for the offense. . . or until discharged by the Commission as provided in section 5017(d) ....
4182. 454 U.S. at 204. 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976) provides in part:
Committed youth offenders not conditionally released shall undergo treatment in
institutions .

. . ,

including training schools, hospitals, farms, forestry and other

camps, and other agencies that will provide the essential varieties of treatment
....
Insofar as practical, such institutions and agencies shall be used only for
treatment of committed youth offenders, and such youth offenders shall be segregated from other offenders ....
4183. 454 U.S. at 204. The judge later reduced defendant's sentence to 66 months, to run
consecutively to the YCA sentence. 1d
4184. While still serving his original YCA sentence, defendant pled guilty to a second
charge of assault on a federal officer and was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) to a
consecutive adult sentence of one year and one day. 454 U.S. at 204.
4185. 454 U.S. at 204-05. The policy defined a YCA inmate as "'any inmate sentenced
under 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b), (c), or (e) who is not also sentenced to a concurrentor consecutive
adult term."' Id at 205 (emphasis in original).
4186. 454 U.S. at 205. The Seventh Circuit also rejected the Government's contention that
the YCA authorized the Bureau of Prisons to modify the treatment terms of a YCA sentence
if the offender has also received a consecutive or concurrent adult felony sentence. Id The
Supreme Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit. Id at 211-12.
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defendant has received a consecutive adult sentence, and the judge
finds that continued YCA treatment would be of no benefit. 418 7 The
Court reasoned that conviction of a second offense while serving a

YCA sentence implicitly raises the question whether continued YCA
treatment will be beneficial. 4 88 Noting that 18 U.S.C. section
5010(d) 4 18 9

permits a second sentencing judge to make a "no benefit"

finding respecting a subsequent sentence, the Court concluded that the
section implicitly authorizes a judge to reevaluate continued YCA
treatment for the unexpired YCA term as well. 4 19 0 The Court emphasized that the YCA does not authorize prison officials to independently
determine that continued YCA treatment would be futile.4 19'

In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell objected to the restrictions
the majority opinion would place on prison officials' authority over
confinement conditions in certain cases.4 19 2 In view of defendant's
adult sentences and the "no benefit" findings of two district courts, Jus-

tice Powell concluded that prison officials were authorized to treat defendant as an adult offender.4 93
The dissent agreed with the majority's conclusion that the Bureau

of Prisons has no authority under the Act to terminate YCA treatment.41 94 However, the dissent suggested that permitting a second sen-

tencing judge to convert the remainder of a final YCA sentence into an
adult sentence would violate the double jeopardy clause. 419 5 In any

case, the dissent concluded, a judge is prohibited from enhancing a
final sentence in the absence of specific congressional authority.4 19 6
4187. Id at 217.
4188. Id at 213-14.
4189. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1976) provides: "If the court shall find that the youth offender
will not derive benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence the youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision."
4190. 454 U.S. at 213-14.
4191. Id at 214, 219 n.11. Basic treatment for defendants committed under section
5010(b) or (c) consists of rehabilitative care and separation from adult prisoners. 18 U.S.C.
§ 5011 (1976). Under § 5017, the Commission is authorized to conditionally release a YCA
inmate under certain conditions, thereby terminating YCA treatment.
4192. 454 U.S. at 221 (Powell, J., concurring).
4193. Id at 222. Justice Powell reasoned that the Bureau of Prisons was bound by the
district court's recommendation to transfer defendant to a more secure facility. Id at 223.
Noting that the YCA requires segregation from adult offenders "insofar as practical," Jusice Powell would defer to the prison officials' determination that segregation was no longer
practical. Id
4194. Id at 225-26 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent recognized, however, that
prison officials can opt for early termination of YCA confinement under 18 U.S.C. section
5017 (1976), thus allowing a consecutive adult sentence to begin. 454 U.S. at 227.
4195. Id at 224 & n.3.
4196. Id at 224. The dissent stated that an adult sentence is more severe than a YCA
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Responding to the majority's contention that certain YCA sections do

specifically provide for adult treatment during an unexpired YCA
term, the dissent noted that these sections did not contemplate a case
where the defendant continued to be incarcerated on the basis of the
original YCA sentence.41 9 7
In United States v. Smith,4 19 8 the Ninth Circuit considered whether

the YCA authorizes the imposition of a suspended sentence together
with probation on the condition that the defendant serve a brief jail

term ("split sentence"). In these consolidated appeals, both defendants
contested the validity of the split sentences4 199 they had received under
18 U.S.C. section 5010(a),4 2 ° ° which permits a court to place the de-

fendant on probation if it finds the defendant does not need commitment. The Government contended that the YCA incorporates the

general probation statute, 18 U.S.C. section 3651,4201 which expressly
permits split sentences.4 2 °2 The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that by
virtue of 18 U.S.C. section 5023(a),4 2 °3 which provides that the YCA
sentence. In light of the common law rule prohibiting a judge from enhancing a final sentence, the dissent concluded that express congressional authority was required before a
judge could disregard this rule. Id at 223-24.
4197. Id at 228-29. Pursuant to § 5010(a), a judge may impose an adult sentence on a
defendant who has committed an adult offense while on probation. The statute also allows
the judge to impose an adult sentence concurrent with a YCA term. Moreover, a defendant
who commits a crime while on conditional release pursuant to § 5017 may receive an adult
sentence to begin immediately. Id at 228 n.9.
4198. 683 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 740 (1983).
4199. Smith was sentenced to five years imprisonment for embezzlement. The sentence
provided that, on the condition that Smith spent 45 days in a jail-type setting, the remainder
of the sentence would be suspended and Smith would be placed on five years probation.
Arthur was sentenced to three years imprisonment for stealing two bicycles on an Indian
reservation. Arthur's sentence also provided for a suspended sentence and five years probation on the condition that he serve thirty days in a jail-type setting. Neither sentence specified separation from adult offenders. 683 F.2d at 1237.
4200. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1976) provides that: "If the court is of the opinion that the
youth offender does not need commitment, it may suspend the imposition or execution of
sentence and place the youth offender on probation."
4201. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death
or life imprisonment, if the maximum punishment provided for such offense is
more than six months, any court having jurisdiction ... may impose a sentence in
excess of six months and provide that the defendant be confined in a jail-type institution or a treatment institution for a period not exceeding six months and that the
execution of the remainder of the sentence be suspended and the defendant placed
on probation ....
4202. 683 F.2d at 1237.
4203. 18 U.S.C. § 5023(a) (1976) states that:
Nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the power of any court to suspend the
imposition or execution of any sentence and place a youth offender on probation or
be construed in any wise to amend, repeal, or affect the provisions of chapter 231 of
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shall not affect the provisions of the probation statute, the YCA incorporates section 3651, including any subsequent amendments such as
the split sentence provision. 2 ' Noting several persuasive arguments
against its conclusion,42 5 the Ninth Circuit nevertheless found that the
broad language of section 5023(a), as well as the rehabilitative goals of
the YCA,favored a result
expanding rather than restricting the court's
420 6
sentencing alternatives.

The Ninth Circuit also held that youth offenders receiving split
sentences must be segregated from adult offenders, and, where possible,
incarcerated in separate institutions.42 0 v The dissent argued that section 5010(a) prohibited commitment if the court granted probation. 420 8
Assuming the majority's premise that section 5023(a) did not specifically incorporate section 3651 in 1950, the dissent nevertheless concluded that Congress merely intended to preserve the power to grant
full probation which existed in 1950, not to limit the YCA by unknown
future amendments in the probation statutes. 420 9 The dissent stated

that the YCA provides for only three sentencing alternatives:
(1) straight probation; (2) treatment and supervision; and (3) sentencing
this title or the Act of June 25, 1910 . . . as amended . . . both relative to
probation.
4204. 683 F.2d at 1238-40. The court noted that the general probation statute in effect
when § 5023(a) was enacted in 1950 did not contain the split sentence provision. As a result,
the court was confronted with the issue of whether 5023(a) specifically incorporated 3651 as
it existed in 1950, or whether 5023(a) was also meant to adopt subsequent amendments to
3651. Id at 1238.
4205. Id First of all, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court's holding in
Durst v. United States suggested that the YCA specifically incorporated § 3651 as it existed
in 1950. 434 U.S. 542, 549 (1978). The Durst court stated that "§ 5023(a), incorporates by
reference the authority conferred under the general probation statute." Id The Court further declared that § 5023(a) was intended to "'preserve to sentencing judges their powers
under the general probation statute."' Id at 551. Furthermore, the Durst Court relied on
express legislative history in holding thatflnes or restitution may be imposed as a condition
of probation under the YCA. Id at 552-53. In Smith, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that the
imposition of split sentences is not expressly mentioned in the Act's legislative history. 683
F.2d at 1238. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit noted that the imposition of a fixed jail term was
contrary to the sentencing scheme of § 5010, which provides for indeterminate sentences.
Finally, a literal reading of § 5010(a) suggests a judge may impose probation only if the
youth does not need commitment. 683 F.2d at 1238-39.
4206. Id at 1239-40.
4207. Id at 1242. The trial court failed to specify segregation for each defendant. Considering the overall scheme and purpose of the YCA, the Ninth Circuit found that youths given
probation under § 5010(a) are in effect receiving YCA rehabilitative treatment. Id at 1241.
As a result, youths receiving split sentences should receive the segregation which Congress
determined necessary for successful rehabilitation. Id
4208. 1d at 1243 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
4209. Id at 1247. The dissent was concerned that allowing split sentences would ensure
the incarceration of youthful offenders even if they were entitled to probation. Id at 1245.

19841

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

under another applicable penalty provision. As the trial judges here
imposed a sentence outside these options, the dissent would invalidate
the sentence.4 21
In UnitedStates v. Glenn, 4211 the Ninth Circuit considered whether

a district court may impose a lengthier sentence for a misdemeanor, by
sentencing a youth offender under the YCA, than the offender could
have received if sentenced as an adult.42 12 Glenn received three con-

current sentences 4213 under 18 U.S.C. section

5010(b) 421 4

which pro-

vides for treatment and supervision until released by the parole

commission pursuant to section

5018(c). 42 15

Section 5017(c) essentially

permits incarceration for a maximum of four years, after which the de-

fendant must be conditionally released. The maximum adult sentences
defendant could have received on counts II and

1114216

were one year

and six months in prison, respectively. Defendant claimed that the imposition of an indeterminate sentence under the YCA violated his due
process and equal protection rights.4 21 7

The Ninth Circuit, bound by its decision in United States v.
Amidon, 421 8 decided defendant's claim on statutory grounds. 421 9 In
Amidon, the court held that the Federal Magistrate Act of 19794220 pro-

hibited a district court from imposing a longer prison sentence on a1
422
misdemeanant under the YCA than it could impose on an adult.
4210. Id at 1249-50.
4211. 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982).
4212. Id at 1274.
4213. Glenn was convicted of one count of possessing marijuana with intent to sell, one
count of possessing PCP and one count of driving under the influence of drugs. Id at 1271.
4214. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) (1976) provides in part:
If the court shall find that a convicted person is a youthful offender, and the offense
is punishable by imprisonment. . . , the courts may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody
of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision. . . until discharged by the
Commission as provided in section 5017(c) ....
4215. 18 U.S.C. § 5017(c) (1976) provides in part: "A youth offender committed under
§ 5010(b)... shall be released conditionally under supervision on or before the expiration
of four years from the date of his conviction and shall be discharged unconditionally on or
before six years from the date of his conviction."
4216. 667 F.2d at 1274. See supra note 4213.
4217. 667 F.2d at 1274.
4218. 627 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying Federal Magistrate Act to district court
judges sentencing offenders under the YCA).
4219. 667 F.2d at 1274.
4220. Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g) (Supp. V 1981) provides in part:
The magistrate may, in a case involving a youth offender, . . . impose sentence
.... except that- (1) the magistrate may not sentence the youth offender to the
custody of the Attorney General. . . for a period in excess of 1 year for conviction
of a misdemeanor or 6 months for conviction of a petty offense. ...
4221. 627 F.2d at 1027.
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The Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by the Government's argument

that Glenn's YCA sentence was nevertheless proper because he could
have received a maximum adult sentence in excess of six years if con-

secutive sentences had been imposed.4222 Applying the Amidon rule,
the Glenn court found the sentences on counts II and III excessive, and
4223
ordered them reduced.
In UnitedStates v. Luckey,4 22 4 the Ninth Circuit reached a similar

conclusion. Defendant had been convicted of felony bank larceny

225

and sentenced under 18 U.S.C. section 5010(b) 4226 until discharged

pursuant to section 5017(C).4 22 7 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found the
evidence sufficient to support a misdemeanor charge for theft, but insufficient to support the felony conviction. Consequently, the court reversed the felony conviction. 4228 The maximum sentence on the
misdemeanor charge was one year in prison. Relying on the Amidon
court's interpretation of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979,4229 the

Ninth Circuit vacated the YCA sentence and remanded for
resentencing.4 23 °

10. Major Crimes Act
Indian tribes have retained exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute and
sentence a member of their tribe for crimes committed against another
Indian on Indian land.4 23 ' The Major Crimes Act (MCA),4 23 2 how-

ever, constitutes an exception to this rule by conferring jurisdiction on
4222. 667 F.2d at 1274-75 n.2. The maximum adult sentence on count I was five years
imprisonment and two years parole. Imposing consecutive sentences would have resulted in
a maximum of six and one-half years imprisonment; six months more than the maximum
YCA sentence under § 5017(c).
4223. Id at 1274-75.
4224. 655 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1981).
4225. Id at 204. Defendant was convicted of one count of bank larceny in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1976) for stealing a blank dividend check and cashing it. Id at 204.
4226. See supra note 4214.
4227. See supra note 4215.
4228. 655 F.2d at 205.
4229. Id at 205-06. See supra note 4220.
4230. 655 F.2d at 206.
4231. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 325-26 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 637
F.2d 1224, 1231 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2
(1977)).
4232. The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976), provides in part:
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or
other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder,
manslaughter,
kidnapthe
has not attained
who
ping, rape, carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife,
age of sixteen years, assault with intent to commit rape, incest, assault with intent
to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious
bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny within the Indian country,

19841

CRIMINAL LAW SU/R VEY

federal courts to prosecute and sentence Indians for certain enumerated
offenses committed on Indian land.42 3 3
In United States v. Bowman,42 34 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether a federal court has jurisdiction to enter judgment and sentence
an Indian on a lesser included offense, not expressly enumerated in the
Major Crimes Act, after the defendant has requested and received a

jury instruction for that offense.4235 Bowman, an Indian, was originally
charged with assault resulting in serious bodily injury to another Indian, an enumerated offense under the Act. The district court granted
Bowman's request for a jury instruction on the lesser included offense

of assault by striking, beating, or wounding, a crime not enumerated in
the Act. Bowman was convicted and sentenced for the lesser offense.
On appeal, Bowman contended that the district court lacked juris4236
diction to sentence him for a crime not specifically listed in the Act.
In rejecting Bowman's argument, the Ninth Circuit relied primarily on
Keeble v. United States423 7 in which the United States Supreme Court
held that an Indian charged in federal court for an offense enumerated

in the Act is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense, if
the evidence warrants it. 42 38 The Ninth Circuit recognized that Keeble
shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other persons committing any
of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
4233. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 205-06 (1973); United States v. Johnson, 637
F.2d at 1244.
4234. 679 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1204 (1983).
4235. Id at 799. The Eighth Circuit considered this precise issue on similar facts in Feicia
v. United States, 495 F.2d 353, 355 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849 (1974). The Felicia
court concluded that Keeble could be interpreted to mean that a federal court had power to
instruct on a lesser included offense, but that the court did not have jurisdiction to convict
and sentence the defendant for that offense. See also United States v. John, 587 F.2d 683,
688 (5th Cir.) (adopted Felicia holding and rationale to uphold sentencing jurisdiction over
lesser included offense), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 925 (1979).
4236. 679 F.2d at 799.
4237. 412 U.S. 205 (1973). In Keeble, an Indian had been convicted of assault with intent
to commit serious bodily injury on another Indian on an Indian reservation, a federal crime
under the Major Crimes Act. Keeble had requested and been denied a jury instruction on
the lesser included offense of simple assault. On appeal, the Government claimed that the
Act was intended only as a narrow intrusion into Indian affairs, thus prohibiting an instruction on any crime not specifically enumerated in the Act. Id at 209. The Supreme Court
rejected this contention, recognizing that the Government's interpretation would result in
depriving Indians of procedural rights guaranteed to non-Indian defendants. Id at 212. In
support of this conclusion the Court cited § 3242 of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3242 (1976), which
provides that Indians "'shall be tried in the same courts, andin the same manner, as are all
other persons committing any of the above crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States."' Id (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court emphasized it was not extending the Act into jurisdictional areas reserved to the tribes, but merely affording Indians
procedural protections to which any other defendant was entitled. Id at 214.
4238. Id at 208, 214.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

did not expressly address whether the court had jurisdiction to convict
and sentence the defendant. 4239 Nevertheless, the court concluded that
to the Keeble holding;4240

this interpretation was an inevitable corollary

an extension which the court felt compelled to reach in the absence of

any contrary indication by the Supreme Court. 424' The Ninth Circuit
further reasoned that adopting Bowman's position would mean that a
federal court having jurisdiction to hear the case, must nonetheless release an Indian convicted by the jury on a lesser included offense because of lack of jurisdiction to enter judgment and sentence.42 4 2

Although asserting that there was more than ample support to uphold jurisdiction over lesser included offenses under the MCA,42 43 the
Bowman court reluctantly reached this conclusion. 42 " The court was

concerned that the Keeble holding, drawn to its logical conclusion in
Bowman, directly conflicted with Congress' intent to confer only lim-

ited jurisdictional power to federal courts over the Indian nations.4245
The court specifically noted that allowing a jury instruction on a lesser

included offense could lead the prosecution to "'overcharge'" under
the Act in order to ensure conviction and sentencing for a lesser inindirectly accomcluded offense.424 6 As a result, a prosecutor could
accomplish directly.4247

plish that which he could not

4239. 679 F.2d at 799.
4240. Id The dissent in Keeble, in fact, interpreted the majority opinion to mean that the
federal courts had jurisdiction to sentence the defendant on a lesser included offense once he
had been granted the instruction and had been convicted on the lesser offense. 412 U.S. at
217 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have focused on the Keeble
dissent's interpretation of the majority opinion as the natural extension of the majority opinion. See United States v. John, 587 F.2d at 688; Felicia v. United States, 495 F.2d at 355.
4241. 679 F.2d at 799.
4242. Id
4243. Id The Bowman court found three bases of support: (1) the fact that the Supreme
Court in Keeble would have been aware of the jurisdictional implications of its holding;
(2) Justice Stewart's dissent in Keeble interpreting the majority opinion; and (3) the Keeble
majority's emphasis on parity of treatment in view of section 3242 of the Act. Id at 799-800.
4244. Id at 800.
4245. Id The enactment of the Major Crimes Act was Congress' response to the Supreme
Court's holding in Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). Keeble v. United States, 412
U.S. at 209. The Crow Court held that a federal court did not have jurisdiction to prosecute
and sentence an Indian for the murder of another Indian on Indian land. Id at 209 (interpreting Crow, 109 U.S. at 556). The Court stated that Indian tribes retained exclusive jurisdiction to punish their members in the absence of congressional mandate to the contrary.
Id at 209-10. In response, the Major Crimes Act, enacted in 1885, was designed to confer
"'[a] carefully limited intrusion of federal power into the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of
the Indian tribes to punish Indians for crimes committed on Indian land.'" United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 325 n.22 (quoting United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 643 n.1).
4246. 679 F.2d at 800 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
4247. Pursuant to the principle of mutuality, allowing the defendant to request an instruc-
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In a dissenting opinion, Judge Henderson

248

argued that Indian

tribal courts retained exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by
Indians against other Indians on Indian land unless Congress or the

Supreme Court, interpreting
a Congressional act, expressly extin4249
guished such jurisdiction.
Concluding that neither the Act, nor the Court's holding in Keeble

constitute an express removal of tribal jurisdiction over lesser included
offenses not specified in the Act, Judge Henderson rejected the majority's holding.42 5 °
D. Probation
The Federal Probation Act 425 I authorizes a trial court, in certain

criminal proceedings, to suspend a defendant's sentence and impose
probation conditions.4 25 2 The probation term cannot exceed five

years.4253 The Ninth Circuit requires that probation conditions be reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and the protec-

tion of the public.4254 If the probationer violates the terms of his
tion for a lesser included offense would open the door for the prosecutor to request the same
instruction because the defendant's right to invoke the doctrine only extends as far as the
prosecutor's right to do so. See, e.g., Kelly v. United States, 370 F.2d 227, 229 (D.C. Cir.
1966). The Bowman court noted that this approach would allow the Government to charge
an Indian for an enumerated offense to ensure punishment for a lesser included offense. 679
F.2d at 800. Had the Government attempted to charge the defendant with the lesser offense
originally, the Major Crimes Act would not have applied to confer jurisdiction. In effect, the
doctrine of mutuality together with the Bowman holding would expand federal jurisdiction
under the Act. Id The Bowman court, however, declined to reach this issue. Id
4248. 679 F.2d at 800 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
4249. Id at 801.
4250. Id at 803.
4251. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656 (1976).
4252. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976) provides in part:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by
death or life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the
United States when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the
public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the imposition
or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best.
The period of probation, together with any extension thereof, shall not exceed
five years.
4253. Id
4254. See, e.g., Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1980) (probation
terms not reasonable when defendant convicted of fraud against government was required
to forfeit all assets and work for charity full time for three years without pay); United States
v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (probation condition that
required defendant, who was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute, to
submit to search at any time violated purposes of Federal Probation Act).
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probation he may be arrested and the supervising court may revoke
probation and reimpose the suspended prison sentence. 4 255

1. Maximum time limits
In two decisions in 1982,4256 the Ninth Circuit applied the "presumption of concurrency" principle4257 to determine when the probation periods of two criminal defendants commenced. In each case, the
court held that the statutory five-year period had expired.
In United States v. Adair,4258 the Ninth Circuit reversed a probation revocation order, ruling that the defendant's five-year probation
term had expired. Adair pleaded guilty to four counts of an indictment.425 9 On January 20, 1976, Adair was sentenced to three years in
prison and fined $5,000 on each of the first three counts, and was given
five years probation on the last count. 4260 The sentencing court stated
that the prison sentences were to run concurrently, but did not specify
whether the probation term was to run concurrently with or consecutively to the prison terms.42 6 ' On February 10, 1981, three years after
Adair was released from prison, the government initiated revocation
proceedings, charging that Adair violated the terms of the 1976 probation order. The district court revoked Adair's probation, sentenced him
to three years in prison, and fined him $5,000.4262

4255. 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1976) provides in part:
At any time within the probation period, the probation officer may for cause
arrest the probationer wherever found, without a warrant. At any time within the
probation period,. . . the court for the district in which the probationer is being
supervised. . . may issue a warrant for his arrest for violation of probation occurring during the probation period.
As speedily as possible after arrest the probationer shall be taken before the
court for the district having jurisdiction over him. Thereupon the court may revoke the probation and require him to serve the sentence imposed, or any lesser
sentence, and, if imposition of sentence was suspended, may impose any sentence
which might originally have been imposed.
4256. United States v. Rodriguez, 682 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Adair, 681
F.2d 1150 (9th Cir. 1982).
4257. See Martinez v. Nagle, 53 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1931); Puccinelli v. United States,
5 F.2d 6, 7 (9th Cir. 1925). For articulation of the concurrency presumption in other circuits,
see Schurmann v. United States, 658 F.2d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Wenger,
457 F.2d 1082, 1083-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972); Borum v. United States,
409 F.2d 433, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 916 (1969); Gaddis v. United
States, 280 F.2d 334, 336 (6th Cir. 1960).
4258. 681 F.2d 1150 (9th Cir. 1982).
4259. Id at 1151.
4260. Id
4261. Id
4262. Id
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In reversing the district court's order, the Ninth Circuit first noted
that the 1976 sentencing order did not clearly state when the probation
term was to commence, or how it was to run in relation to the prison
terms. 4263 The court then presumed that the district court intended that

Adair's probation term would commence on the date of sentencing and
would run concurrently with any period of imprisonment imposed on

the remaining counts; it thereby extended the presumption of concurrency principle to situations in which a prison sentence and a probation
term, rather than only different prison sentences, are imposed for different crimes. 42 4 The Ninth Circuit stated that if a sentencing court
does not wish for this concurrency presumption to apply, it must explicitly state when the probation term is to commence.4 265 Finally, the
Adair court pointed out that the fact that Adair was incarcerated for

two years did not prevent the probation term from running during that
4266
time because a defendant may be on probation while he is in prison.
The Ninth Circuit concluded, therefore, that Adair's probation term
expired on January 20, 1981, and that the district court did not have
4267
jurisdiction to revoke his probation.
In UnitedStates v. Rodriguez,4 268 the Ninth Circuit similarly ruled
that a district judge did not have jurisdiction to revoke the probation of
a convicted bank robber because the five-year maximum probationary
4263. Id (citing United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363 (1926) ("[s]entences in
criminal cases should reveal with fair certainty the intent of the court and exclude any serious misapprehensions by those who must execute them.")).
4264. 681 F.2d at 1151-52. The court followed the principle set forth in Puccinelli v.
United States, 5 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1925), in which the Ninth Circuit ruled that prison
sentences for convictions or guilty pleas on more than one count are presumed to run concurrently in the absence of "some definite, specific provision that the sentences shall run
consecutively, specifying the order of sequence." Id at 7. Accord, Martinez v. Nagle, 53
F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1931) (court's order of two one-year prison sentences for violation of
Harrison Narcotic Act and Jones-Miller Act can be reasonably construed to mean that
sentences were intended to run concurrently).
4265. 681 F.2d at 1151 n.3. The court stated:
For example, a probationary sentence could specify that the period of probation
shall be consecutive to the confinement portion of the sentence served on a remaining count or counts or that the period of probation shall be consecutive to the
sentence imposed on a remaining count or counts including any parole or other
supervision time.
Id
4266. Id at 1152. See Bums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 223 (1932) (principles of
Federal Probation Act support conclusion that a defendant is under probationary supervision while incarcerated for another crime); Green v. United States, 298 F.2d 230, 232-33 (9th
Cir. 1961).
4267. 681 F.2d at 1152. See supra note 4255.
4268. 682 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1982).
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period had expired.4 269 Rodriguez pleaded guilty to bank robbery in
1973. On October 1, 1973, he was sentenced to twelve years in federal
prison. The prison sentence was suspended, and Rodriguez was instead required to serve six months in a jail-type institution and be
placed on probation for five years.427°
Rodriguez violated his probation in 1975 and 1978.4271 His prison
sentence was reinstated both times, but the sentences were later modified and Rodriguez again was placed on probation. At the probation
hearing on the 1978 violation Rodriguez consented to the "extension"
of his five-year probation term.4272 A third probation violation occurred in January, 1982. At the hearing on the 1982 violation, Rodriguez claimed that the court did not have jurisdiction to issue a bench
warrant for his arrest and revoke his probation, asserting that the fiveyear period had expired.4273
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Rodriguez' probation
sentence commenced at the October 1973 sentencing, and that the fiveyear maximum term had therefore expired.4274 The court ruled that
Rodriguez "came under probationary supervision" when he began his
stay at the jail-type institution. 4275 The Ninth Circuit applied the con-

currency presumption, analogizing Rodriguez' "split" sentence of six
months in an institution and five-year probation term to a situation in
which a prison sentence and probation term are given for separate
crimes, 4276 and determined that the sentencing court intended for probation to begin when Rodriguez started treatment at the institution.4277
The court found that the five-year probation period was tolled for 407
days while Rodriguez was incarcerated for the three probation viola4269. Id at 828.
4270. Id
4271. Id Rodriguez first violated his probation in October 1975. The district court revoked probation and reinstated his twelve-year prison sentence. In December 1975, the defendant's sentence was modified, and probation was reimposed. Rodriguez again violated
his probation, in December 1978, and the district court revoked probation and reinstated the
prison term. As with the 1975 revocation the sentence was later modified, and, in March
1979, Rodriguez was again put on probation. Id
4272. Id
4273. Id
4274. Id at 829-30.
4275. Id at 829.
4276. Id (citing United States v. Adair, 681 F.2d 1150 (9th Cir. 1982)).
4277. 682 F.2d at 829. After applying this presumption, the court also noted that the sentencing judge stated that probation would end in September 1978 or five years after the
sentencing date. Hence, it appeared that the judge clearly intended that the probation term
run for the six months that Rodriguez spent in the jail-type institution. Id
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tions.4 27 8 Nevertheless, even after this tolling period was considered,
the five-year maximum period was exceeded by approximately one

year.
The Rodriguez court also ruled that Rodriguez' consent to the probation extension was invalid. 427 9 The court pointed out that such an

extension cannot realistically be considered voluntary when the alternative upon refusal is incarceration. 42 0

2. Probation conditions
In United States v. Margala,4 28 l the Ninth Circuit addressed the

reasonableness of the probation conditions of a defendant convicted of
securities and mail fraud.4 28 2 Margala had been involved in a complex

plan designed to force public stockholders out of a corporation, of
which Margala was president.428 3 As part of Margala's probation, the
district judge required first that Margala forfeit the retirement pension

benefits he received from the corporation, second that Margala relinquish all the stocks he acquired from his involvement in the corpora-

tion, and third that the corporation cancel Margala's loan
obligations.428 4 Margala argued that these conditions were impermissi4278. Id at 829-30. A probationer is not considered to be under probationary supervision
for the time he spends in custody for probation violations. See United States v. Workman,
617 F.2d 48, 51 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Lancer, 508 F.2d 719, 733 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 989 (1975)).
4279. 682 F.2d at 830.
4280. Id The court stated: "The government concedes that the defendant's 'consent' cannot be used to make an illegal extension legal. It is all too easy to get a defendant to consent
to such an extension when the alternative, if consent is not given, is a prison term." Id For
a discussion of the issue of consent to probation conditions in general, see United States v.
Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (191/8).
4281. 662 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1981).
4282. Id at 627.
4283. Id at 624. Margala was general manager of a small bookkeeping firm (CBS&A).
When CBS&A encountered financial difficulty, Margala and others used this instability to
acquire CBS&A stock for personal investment purposes. CBS&A stockholders were sent
erroneous statements, through the mails, of the company's condition. Margala and others
then used CBS&A stock to form two new corporations, with Margala as president of both.
The parties then conducted a series of mergers and stock transfers, which resulted in underpaying the public shareholders of one corporation, leaving them with only one percent of
the holdings. Margala was convicted of three counts of securities fraud, in violation of 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and twelve counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1976). 662 F.2d at 623. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) provides criminal sanctions where any manipulative or deceptive device is used in the purchase of securities. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 provides
criminal sanctions where the mails are used for "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses ..
4284. 662 F.2d at 627.
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ble because they were strictly punitive and excessively harsh.42 85

In upholding the probation terms, the court applied the Ninth Circuit rule that probation terms must be reasonably related to the rehabilitative purpose of probation.2 8 6 The court pointed out that this

standard is flexible and that the decision of the trial judge should be
afforded deference, particularly when the means of accomplishing rehabilitation are so uncertain.4 28 7 Here, Margala failed to show that his
probation terms were not rehabilitative, and the court allowed them to

stand.4288 In response to Margala's claim that the probation terms were
unreasonably harsh, the court found that Margala failed to show that
their harshness was not justified by their rehabilitative effect.42 89
In United States v. Romero,4290 the Ninth Circuit considered the
validity of a probation condition that prohibited the defendant from

associating with anyone involved with drugs. Upon pleading guilty to
being an accessory after the fact to distributing heroin, the defendant

was sentenced to 179 days in custody and three and one-half years of
probation.42 9' One of the conditions of the defendant's probation was

that he "not associate with any person who has been convicted of any
offense involving drugs, nor. . . any person who uses, sells, or in any
other manner is unlawfully involved with any drugs. 4 292 The Ninth

Circuit applied the reasonableness standard and concluded that the defendant's probation condition was reasonably related to the goals of
rehabilitation and protection of the public.42 93
4285. Id
4286. Id See supra note 4254 and accompanying text.
4287. 662 F.2d at 627.
4288. Id The court pointed out that Margala acquired stocks and other benefits after the
public shareholders were defrauded. Under these circumstances, rehabilitation could be accomplished by the probation terms. The court stated that "[t]he sentencing judge may have
decided, for example, that it would be therapeutic for Margala to sever remaining ties with
BHC." Id at 627.
4289. Id See Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1980). In Higdon, the
Ninth Circuit pointed out that the trial judge had information on the defendant's "physical,
psychological, and financial condition." With these facts at hand, the trial judge should
have imposed conditions that were properly balanced to achieve rehabilitation, but not to
harm the defendant so much that he "resents" the conditions and becomes apt to violate the
probation. Id In Margala, the Ninth Circuit indicated that the defendant would need to
show that he would be financially "ruined." 662 F.2d at 627.
4290. 676 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1982).
4291. Id at 406.
4292. Id
4293. Id at 407. Probation conditions that restrict the defendant's associations or movements often are included in an individual's probation order. See, e.g., United States v.
Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1981) (demonstrators convicted of illegal entry upon Navy
property prohibited from coming within 250 feet of Navy base); United States v. Furukawa,
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The defendant argued that the probationary terms were too broad

because they would result in the violation of his probation by his un4294
knowing association with people who were involved with drugs.
The court ruled that the defendant's argument was premature, stating

that such a due process claim is properly raised only after probation

has been revoked. 4295 The court noted that the broad language of a

probation order can be remedied by further explanation by the court or
the probation officer.4 296 Furthermore, a probationer's claim that pro-

invalidate probation
bation conditions are vague may not necessarily
4297
grounds.
narrow
on
based
is
revocation which
In United States v. Mitsubishi InternationalCorp. ,4298 the Ninth
596 F.2d 921, 922 (9th Cir. 1979) (probationer convicted of illegal gambling required to
associate with "law abiding" persons and not with known gamblers); Malone v. United
States, 502 F.2d 554, 555 (9th Cir. 1974) (defendant convicted of gun-running to Irish
Republicans in Great Britain prohibited from associating with persons involved in Irish
Republican organizations), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975).
4294. 676 F.2d at 407.
4295. Id A defendant has a constitutional right to be informed of probation conditions
which prohibit non-criminal acts. If he is not so informed, revocation of his probation will
deprive him of liberty without due process of law. See, e.g., United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d
840, 843 (9th Cir. 1977) (revocation of defendant's probation proper when defendant engaged in gun-running after trial judge warned him such activity would lead to revocation),
cert. denied,436 U.S. 959 (1978); United States v. Foster, 500 F.2d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1974)
(probation revocation violated due process when defendant not informed of requirement
that he report to probation officer). Additionally, a probationer who does not appeal his
unsuccessful attempt to modify a probation order is not precluded from making such a challenge later, at the time of probation revocation. See Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d at
900; United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923
(1978).
Requiring that a due process claim not be asserted until after probation revocation
proceedings have commenced could arguably affect the defendant's ability to have the probation order struck down. Once a district court has ruled that revocation was proper, the
appellate court will apply the abuse of discretion standard of review. This could result in a
probation condition that might have been struck down after it was imposed being upheld in
a revocation proceeding.
4296. 676 F.2d at 407. The court declared:
In addition to the bare words of the probation condition, the probationer may be
guided by the further definition, explanations, or instructions of the district court
and the probation officer. . . . [A]ny generality in the -language of the probation
condition may be cured by appropriate notice, or may not invalidate revocation on
narrower grounds ....
Id
4297. Id See United States v. Jeffers, 573 F.2d 1074, 1075 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
(probation order deemed by court as overly broad did not invalidate a narrow exercise of
order by probation officer); United States v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1976)
(broad probation order authorizing search at any time of day or night by any law enforcement officer did not invalidate search of probationer's home in daytime by his probation
officer).
4298. 677 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Circuit examined the probation terms of corporate criminal defendants. The defendants pleaded guilty to violating federal railroad
freight tariff regulations. 429 9 In lieu of paying the maximum fine of
$20,000 per count, the defendants were given the option of paying
$1,000 per count in addition to fulfilling the terms of probation. The
probation order required, among other things, that each defendant loan
a corporate executive to the National Alliance for Business for one year
to assist in the development of a Community Alliance Program for ExOffenders (CAPE), and that each defendant contribute $10,000 per offense to the CAPE program.43

In affirming these probation conditions, the Ninth Circuit refused
to consider the defendant's objections that the probation conditions
were more punitive than the maximum fines. 4 30 ' Rather, the court acknowledged the problem of designing probation terms for corporate
criminal defendants. 430 2 The Ninth Circuit compared the sentencing
process for individual defendants and corporate defendants and concluded that a stricter standard of review should be applied when reviewing the probation conditions of an individual defendant.430 3 The
court placed special emphasis on the fact that corporate defendants,
unlike individuals, are never faced with the possibility of incarceration
for criminal acts. 4 3°0 An individual will almost certainly accept "arguably impermissible" probation conditions in order to avoid going to
prison; the corporate defendant, on the other hand, has an actual alternative because it can elect to pay the fines or accept the probation
conditions.43 o5
4299. The Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 11903 and 11915 (Supp. V 1981), prohibits a corporation from paying less than the required tariff rates for rail shipments. Mitsubishi International Corporation pleaded guilty to nine of twenty-seven counts, Union Pacific Railroad to
five of eighteen counts, and Burlington Northern, Inc. to three of nine counts. 677 F.2d at
786.
4300. 677 F.2d at 787. The probation order also required that the defendants obey all
local, state, and federal laws. The maximum fines imposed by the court totaled $180,000 for
Mitsubishi, $100,000 for Union Pacific, and $60,000 for Burlington Northern. The amount
required to fulfill probation, however, was only $1,000 per count, and an additional $90,000
for Mitsubishi, $50,000 for Union Pacific, and $30,000 for Burlington Northern.
4301. Id at 788.
4302. Id
4303. I1d The court stated that the probation sentence of an individual defendant should
be "subject to careful review." Id On the other hand, when corporate defendants are involved, the court may merely inquire whether the fines imposed under probation fall within
the statutory limits. Id at 789.
4304. Id at 788. An individual convicted of the same crime as the corporate defendants in
Mitsubishi could be sentenced to two years in prison, in addition to the $20,000 fine. 49
U.S.C. § 11903 (Supp. V 1981).
4305. 677 F.2d at 788-89.
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In response to the defendants' contention that the probation terms
were more punitive than the maximum fines, the Mitsubishi court
found that the fines were within the statutory limits. 430 6 In addition,
the court pointed out that if the defendants thought the probation conditions were more punitive than the fines, they had the option to pay
the fines.4 307
It appears that both the district court and the Ninth Circuit were
aware that the probation terms were fairly harsh. However, they recognized that some corporate defendants can "afford" to violate laws because the penalties they face have no deterrent effect.4308 In response to
this situation, some courts have attempted to form what the Ninth Cir430 9
cuit termed "unique and creative terms of probation."
In United States v. Wolters,43 1 ° the Ninth Circuit held that a probation condition requiring the probationer to file past and future tax
returns is not a violation of the probationer's fifth amendment rights.
The defendant had failed to file a federal income tax return for 1973, a
violation of 26 U.S.C. section 7203,4311 claiming that to do so would
have violated his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. The
defendant was convicted and his probation order required that he file
all past and future tax returns. On appeal, the defendant claimed that
such a probation condition violated his fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination.

4312

The Ninth Circuit dismissed the defendant's argument, ruling that
"unless there is something peculiarly incriminating" about the defendant's refusal to file an income tax return, no right to refuse on the basis
of self-incrimination exists. Similarly, filing a tax return is not, of itself,
an incriminating act. 43 13 The court noted that there must be some spe4 314
cific indication that the act could lead to self-incrimination.
4306. Id at 788.
4307. Id at 789.
4308. Id at 788. The court noted the trial court's concern that large corporate defendants
could "just write a check and walk away." Id
4309. Id This creativity, of course, must not result in an overall increase of the maximum
sentence. Cf United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 R2d 58, 61 (7th Cir. 1972) (oil
company convicted of discharging oil into navigable waters given unreasonable probation
term which required defendant to create a program to handle oil spillage).
4310. 656 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1981).
4311. Id at 524. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "[a]ny person required under this title to. . .make a return.., who willfully fails to... make such return
...shall... be guilty of a misdemeanor."
4312. 656 F.2d at 524.
4313. Id at 525.
4314. Id The Wolters court relied on the Ninth Circuit ruling in United States v. Pierce,
561 F.2d at 741. In Pierce, the Ninth Circuit ruled that fifth amendment protection is per-
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the Ninth Circuit upheld a restitu-

tion order when the defendant consented to the amount to be repaid.
Phillips was charged with twenty-six counts of mail fraud43 16 and the
use of a fictitious scheme to defraud.43 17 Phillips entered guilty pleas
on three of the twenty-six counts. He was sentenced to two concurrent

one-year prison terms on the first two counts, placed on five years probation on the third count, and ordered to make $6,000 restitution.4 31 8

The three counts on which Phillips entered guilty pleas did not indicate
how much money he obtained from each crime.43 19 Phillips argued
that the restitution order was invalid because it required him to make

restitution for counts upon which conviction was not obtained, a violation of section 3651 of the Federal Probation Act. 4320 The trial court
disagreed with the defendant's argument.4 32 1
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling. 322 The court

acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit prohibits a sentencing court from
ordering restitution as a probation condition for amounts upon which a
conviction has not been obtained.4323 The Phillips court, however,
viewed section 3651 of the Federal Probation Act broadly to allow a
mitted in reference to specific questions, not in a "blanket refusal to answer any questions."
Id
4315. 679 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1982).
4316. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
4317. 18 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976). Phillips allegedly registered fictitious businesses in California, Nevada, and Washington, and then obtained unemployment benefit checks for nonexistent employees. 679 F.2d at 193.
4318. 679 F.2d at 193.
4319. Id at 194. At the guilty plea proceedings, Phillips agreed with the trial judge's proposal that the probation department could set restitution, and that the department would not
be bound by any amounts set forth in the indictments on the three counts. The department
then set restitution at $6,000. After the sentencing, Phillips signed a stipulation agreeing to
pay the sum in monthly payments of $100. Id The dismissed counts of the indictment
apparently indicated that Phillips had obtained $1,856 for acts contained in the dismissed
counts. Id at 193 n.l. The probation report, however, indicated that he received $59,195
from the overall scheme. Id at 193.
4320. Id at 194. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976) provides that a defendant "[m]ay be required to
make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the
offensefor which conviction was had." (emphasis added).
4321. 679 F.2d at 194.
4322. Id
4323. Id (citing Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir.) (defendant
charged with defrauding seventeen veterans could only be ordered to make restitution to six
veterans because convictions were only obtained on six counts of indictment), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 891 (1950)). See also United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002, 1007-08 & n.10 (3d
Cir. 1977) (sentencing court could only order restitution of amount for which defendant was
indicted and convicted; left open was the question of permissibility of restitution order to
which defendant consents even though the amount exceeds that mentioned in the count to
which guilty plea has been entered).
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defendant's consent to restitution in a plea agreement, even though the
counts in the plea agreement do not specify a definite monetary
amount. The court found that, as long as the plea agreement is "fully
explored in open court" and the defendant signs the restitution agreement, the defendant should be bound by that agreement. 4324 The un-

derlying rehabilitative purpose of probation and restitution would be
complyseverely undermined if a defendant could be allowed to avoid4325

ing with a restitution order to which he voluntarily consents.

In addition, the Philips court approved the district court's broad
interpretation of the term "offense" in section 3651. The district court

analogized the offense of mail fraud to a continuing conspiracy to defraud, concluding that a defendant could be ordered to make restitu-

for losses caused from the entire scheme, not just one isolated
tion4326
act.

These cases demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit will defer to a dis-

trict court's determination regarding probation conditions, provided
the conditions imposed appear reasonably related to the rehabilitative
4324. 679 F.2d at 194.
4325. Id at 195. The Phiifps court adopted the reasoning of the district court in United
States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1981). In McLaughlin, a defendant was
ordered to make restitution for the entire amount mentioned in a five-count embezzlement
indictment where the defendant entered a guilty plea on one count and agreed to pay the full
amount. In considering the defendant's claim that the restitution order violated the Federal
Probation Act, the McLaughlin court stated:
First, plea-bargaining in situations involving multicount indictments would be
severely restricted. If a defendant could not consent to make restitution for the
actual loss caused by his or her conduct relating to the indictment, and have such
be a condition of any probation he or she might receive, then the government
would have little reason to dismiss indictment counts in order to limit a defendant's
potential period of incarceration. More importantly, however, it would frustrate
the rehabilitation goals of the probation system . . . . The primary purpose of
restitution as a condition of probation is to foster, in a direct way, a defendant's
acceptance of responsibility for his or her unlawful actions. To permit a defendant
who freely admits his or her guilt, and the amount of loss caused thereby, to avoid
making the aggrieved party at least economically whole is intolerable from a societal perspective.
512 F. Supp. at 912.
4326. 679 F.2d at 195. The Ninth Circuit relied on the reasoning of the Second Circuit in
United States v. Tiler, 602 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1979). The Tiler court upheld a restitution order
which was issued after the defendants entered a guilty plea on one conspiracy count in a
thirteen count indictment, but where the trial court ordered defendants to make restitution
for the amount of money lost from the entire conspiracy. Id at 34. See also United States v.
Landay, 513 F.2d 306, 308 (5th Cir. 1975) (defendant convicted of three counts of securities
forgery ordered to make restitution of all money listed in civil consent judgment even
though amount was greater than that mentioned in three criminal counts); United States v.
Taylor, 305 F.2d 183, 187 (4th Cir. 1962) (defendant convicted of tax fraud for 1956 and
1957 properly ordered to pay restitution for taxes not paid from 1952 to 1960 because defendant admitted such liability), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894 (1962).

LOYOL

OF LOS ANGELES LA

REVIEW

Vo 17
[Vol.

principles of the Federal Probation Act, and do not violate federal constitutional principles and statutory requirements. Furthermore, it appears that the Ninth Circuit will conduct a less rigorous review of the
probation conditions of corporate criminal defendants, allowing a
fairly large degree of flexibility to district courts handling such cases.
3.

Juveniles

In UnitedStates v. Gonzalez-Cerantes,4327 the Ninth Circuit interpreted the language of 18 U.S.C. section 5037(b),43 28 which governs the
probation terms of juvenile offenders. In Gonzalez-Cervantes two defendants were adjudged juvenile delinquents 4329 because they were
held to have illegally entered the United States. 4 330 The district court
sentenced one defendant to one year of probation, while the other defendant received a probation term of approximately four years, until he
4 33 1
reached twenty-one years of age.
The sentencing statute for juvenile delinquents provides that probation shall not last beyond the juvenile's twenty-first birthday and not
exceed the maximum term for an adult convicted of the same offense.4 332 The defendants urged the court to find that the phrase "maximum term" means the maximum prison term of an adult. Because an
adult can be imprisoned for only six months 4 33 3 for illegal entry, the
defendants argued that the maximum probation sentence for a juvenile
was only six months.4334 The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants'
contention, stating that the "plain meaning" of section 5037 is that a
juvenile could be given a probation term no greater than the maximum
probation term for an adult, which in this situation is five years.4 335
Similarly, a juvenile's term of imprisonment could be no greater than
4327. 668 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1981).
4328. 18 U.S.C. § 5037(b) (1976) states in pertinent part: "Probation. . . shall not extend
beyond the juvenile's twenty-first birthday or the maximum term which could have been
imposed on an adult convicted of the same offense, whichever is sooner. .. "
4329. 668 F.2d at 1075. A juvenile is adjudged delinquent if he violates a law "which
would have been a crime if committed by an adult." 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1976).
4330. 668 F.2d at 1075. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1976) provides: "Any alien who (1) enters the
United States at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers, or
(2) eludes examination or inspection by immigration officers, or (3) obtains entry into the
United States by a willfully false or misleading representation.
misdemeanor. .. ."

4331.
4332.
4333.
4334.
4335.

688 F.2d at 1075.

Id at 1076. 18 U.S.C. § 5037 (1976).
8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1976). See supra note 4330.
668 F.2d at 1076.
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976).

. .

shall.

. .

be guilty of a
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6
the prison term of an adult.4 33

E

Habeas Corpus
1. Grounds for the writ
The Supreme Court has held that limited review should be exercised by the federal judiciary under a writ of habeas corpus when reviewing the state fact finding process. 4337 Nevertheless, the Court has

acknowledged that habeas corpus relief is available when trial proceedings are so fundamentally unfair that there is a violation of the Constitution.4338 The cases show that defendants will assert a variety of
constitutional violations as grounds for obtaining habeas relief. These
grounds include: denial of peremptory challenges as an essential element of the right to trial by jury, voluntariness of confessions, and
proper use of presentence reports. Often, such assertions are part of an
effort to show that a defendant's sixth amendment rights were violated
by ineffective representation of counsel.4 33 9 In several recent Ninth
4336. 668 F.2d at 1076. The court further found that both juveniles were properly tried
before district court judges rather than magistrates, even though both consented under Magistrate Rule 2(c) to a magistrate trial. Id at 1075-76. The magistrates assigned to the
juveniles' cases both declined to hear them, and transferred them to district court. The defendants contended that once consent under Rule 2(c) was given, magistrate jurisdiction was
mandatory. Id at 1075. The Ninth Circuit held that Rule 2(c) only applied to criminal
proceedings, and since proceedings against juvenile delinquents are civil in nature, Rule 2(c)
was not applicable here. Id. at 1076.
In separate concurrences, Judges Boochever and Thompson expressed the view that it
was unnecessary for the Ninth Circuit to consider whether a juvenile delinquent has the
right to insist on a hearing before a magistrate. Id at 1078-79. Judge Thompson pointed
out that a magistrate's authority to hear a case is controlled entirely by the district courts
under 18 U.S.C. § 3401() and therefore, the district court has discretion to order a trial in a
district court, regardless of whether the juvenile consents to have a magistrate hear the case.
668 F.2d at 1079.
In a similar decision later in the term, the Ninth Circuit followed Gonzalez-Cervantes,
ruling that a sixteen-year-old boy also adjudged delinquent for illegal entry was properly
given three years probation under 18 U.S.C. § 5037(b). United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 683
F.2d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 822 (1983). In LopezGarcia, the juvenile raised the identical argument addressed in Gonzalez-Cervantes, that his
probation term could last only as long as the maximum period for incarceration of an adult.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the contention, ruling that Gonzalez-Cervantes controlled. 683
F.2d at 1229.
4337. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
4338. Id. at 544-45.
4339. The sixth amendment of the United Stajes Constitution provides in part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
Whether right to counsel is demanded under the sixth amendment or the due process
clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendments, the representation by counsel must be effective
and competent. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (defendants
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Circuit decisions, the dimensions of these rights were considered in re-

lation to petitions for the habeas writ.
In Hines v. Enomoto,434 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered a section 2254 petition which claimed several grounds
for relief.434 1 Most important, in the court's opinion, was the issue
raised by the failure of defendant's trial attorney to exercise all available peremptory challenges.4 34 2 The court discussed the "'widely held

belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by
jury.' -4341 Because the denial of peremptories was viewed by the court
as a potential hindrance to the fairness of the trial, it held that the petitioner stated a claim for federal habeas relief.4344 In doing so, the court
facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (sixth amendment guarantee made obligatory upon
the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586
F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (persons accused of crime must be afforded reasonably
competent and effective representation), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). In McMann, Justice White enunciated the standard that criminal defendants are "entitled to the effective
assistance of... counsel acting... within the range of competence demanded of attorneys
in criminal cases." 397 U.S. at 771. Recognizing that an infinite variety of factual situations
arise in this context, Justice White concluded, "Beyond this we think the matter, for the most
part, should be left to the good sense and discretion of the trial courts." Id.
4340. 658 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1981).
4341. The defendant was convicted in the state court on charges of kidnapping for the
purpose of robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and attempted robbery. His habeas petitions were denied at the state level and his section 2254 petition was denied by the district
court. The defendant raised the following issues on appeal:
(1) Denial of his right to exercise allof the peremptory challenges to which he
was entitled under California law;
(2) Ineffective assistance of counsel;
(3) Subornation of perjury;
(4) The sufficiency of the evidence to prove intent to rob;
(5) The refusal to provide him with a free preliminary hearing transcript on his
state appeal;
(6) Violation of his right to self-representation on appeal; and
(7) The dismissal of his federal habeas petition without an evidentiary hearing.
658 F.2d at 670-71.
4342. Id. at 671. The record indicated that the trial court restricted defendant's counsel to
13 of a possible 26 peremptory challenges. It was unclear whether the failure of counsel to
object to the cutoff was deliberate or inadvertent. Hence, the court of appeals remanded the
case for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the attorney's reason for failing to object. Id.
at 674.
4343. Id. at 672 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (denial or impairment of the peremptory right is reversible error)).
4344. 658 F.2d at 672. The dissenting argument is persuasive. Id. at 677 (Norris, J., dissenting). It points out that while peremptory challenges are important, they are neither constitutionally guaranteed nor required. Id. at 678. Moreover, the dissent argues that if the
majority could find a state requirement of 10 peremptory challenges constitutionally acceptable, then what is the failing in petitioner's receipt of 13 peremptories in the instant case. Id.
at 679.
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rejected the only case that dealt with the same question. 4345
The "presumption of correctness" of state factual determinations

held to be crucial in Sumner v. Mata, was acknowledged in Fritchie v.

McCarthy.4 34 6 In Fritchie, the defendant claimed that he was deprived
of his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because
the public defender representing him failed to present a defense on the
basis of diminished capacity. 4347 There was significant evidence to
show that Fritchie had serious psychological problems. The murder
was particularly malicious and the defendant had a history of chronic
schizophrenia. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit rejected the petition,
finding that defendant's counsel made a tactical choice to attempt to
persuade the jury that another party had perpetrated the murder. 4348
According to counsel, the diminished capacity defense would have undermined this strategy. 4349 The Fritchie court held that this choice,

"was not so unreasonable as to constitute denial of a constitutional

435 0
right to effective assistance of counsel."

In cases involving the issue of ineffective representation of counsel,
there must be a showing that the defendant suffered prejudice as a re4345. Id. at 672. Workman v. Cardwell, 471 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 932 (1973). The Workman court affirmed the district court in its holding that limitations on the number of peremptory challenges are a matter of state law and thus, not
grounds for habeas relief. The Hines court said that it could not agree with any suggestion
in Workman that denial of the right to exercise a full allotment of challenges can never be
recognized as a ground for federal habeas relief. Hines, 658 F.2d at 672.
4346. 664 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1981). In considering Fritchie's contention that his murder
confession was involuntary and thus inadmissible, the Ninth Circuit cited Sumner v. Mata,
449 U.S. 539 (1981), and emphasized the limited scope of review permitted by the habeas
petition. FRitchie, 664 F.2d at 213. Fritchie's petition did not allege any wrongdoing by
police in obtaining the confession. He claimed it was involuntary because it was made while
he was insane. An extensive pretrial suppression hearing was held where the state court
found that the confession was made voluntarily. The Ninth Circuit found that the judgment
was supported by the record. Id. at 214.
4347. Id. at 210.
4348. Id. at 215.
4349. Id.
4350. Id. (citations omitted). The Frichie court applied the standard enunciated by the
Ninth Circuit in Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 974 (1979). In Cooper, the rule was established that a state conviction may be
invalidated through federal habeas corpus upon a finding that the defendant was deprived
of a reasonably effective and competent representation and that he was prejudiced thereby.
In Fritchie, the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant's counsel was a "vigorous and thorough advocate" and that he had fully studied the diminished capacity defense while choosing a defense strategy. Fritchie, 664 F.2d at 214. See also United States v. Stem, 519 F.2d
521, 524 (9th Cir.) (counsel's failure to raise insanity defense was not inadequate representation where primary defense was based on theory of reliance on advice of tax attorney), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975).
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4352
suit of the attorney's actions. 4 35 1 The decision in Cooks v. Spalding

affirmed this requirement. The defendant's attorney waived his right to
a twelve-person jury, instead requesting a six-person jury.4 35 3 After the
guilty verdict, the defendant claimed that he was denied due process by

the attorney's decision.4354 The Ninth Circuit found that waiver of a
twelve-person jury does not constitute a "fundamentally unfair
trial. ' 4355 The court pointed out that such a decision is a tactical one
since there are 6 both advantages and disadvantages associated with a

smaller jury.

435

Another Ninth Circuit case, Brown v. United States, 4357 presented

a more complex set of circumstances. In Brown, the defendant sought
to have his sentence vacated under 28 U.S.C. section 22554358 on the

ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the defendant
asserted that unknown to him, his trial attorney had been simultaneously representing a DEA agent who had testified against him at trial.
Both the district and appeals courts found an insufficient showing of
the case for further
prejudice, 4359 but the Supreme Court remanded
0
Sulivan.436
v.
Cuyler
of
light
in
consideration
4351. The leading Supreme Court case on point is Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970) (counsel's failure to object to admission of evidence ruled harmless error; dismissal of
defendant's habeas petition for lack of prejudice). See CoopervFjtzharris, 586 F.2d 1325,
1331 (9th Cir. 1978) (counsel's failure to move to suppress fruits of warrantless searches not
prejudicial), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979).
4352. 660 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1026 (1982).
4353. Id. at 739.
4354. Id.
4355. Id. The Cooks court referred to United States ex rel. Burnett v. Illinois, 619 F.2d
668, 673 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 880 (1980). In Burnett, the Seventh Circuit held
that counsel's waiver of a 12-person jury did not constitute an arbitrary or fundamentally
unfair trial. Thus, the Ninth Circuit found no deprivation of due process in the instant case.
4356. 660 F.2d at 740. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229-39 (1978) (reduction in
jury size from six to five threatens sixth and fourteenth amendment rights).
4357. 665 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1982).
4358. Section 2255 provides in part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.
4359. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). Brown v. United States, 665 F.2d at 272.
4360. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). In Cuyler, the Court determined at the outset that the Third
Circuit did not exceed the proper scope of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) when it rejected
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's conclusion that two defense lawyers had not undertaken
multiple representation. This determination was reached because the state court's conclusion was a mixed determination of law and fact not covered by § 2254(d), which provides
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On a second appeal, the Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish the
"actual prejudice" test from the inquiry required by Cuyler.43 61 The
test, as stated in Cuyler, is whether the conflict of interest adversely
affected the performance of Brown's attorney. The Brown court was
concerned about distractions from the focus required by a Cuyler inquiry; namely, whether there is any adverse impact on counsel's performance resulting from a conflict of interest.4 3 62 The Ninth Circuit
remanded the case to give the trial judge the opportunity to determine
whether defense counsel's conflict of interest had a detrimental effect
on his performance.4 36 3
There was a finding of prejudice to the defendant in United States
v. Donn 43 1 where counsel failed to show his client a presentence report.43 65 This omission was significant because the defendant's allegathat a state court's determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue shall be
presumed to be correct.
In Brown, the district judge on remand found that conflict of interest did exist but that
under the circumstances of the case, it did not adversely affect counsel's performance. 665
F.2d at 272. The Ninth Circuit applied the actual prejudice standard, observing that the
"government's incriminating evidence in this case was massive." Id. Apparently, the sufficiency of the government's case caused the court to view the conflict of interest as relatively
inconsequential.
4361. Id. at 272. The "actual prejudice" test was formulated in Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586
F.2d at 1331. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel's errors alone are not
sufficient. Relief will be granted only if it appears that defendant was prejudiced by his
attorney's conduct.
4362. Id. The concurring opinion in Brown helps shed light on the Ninth Circuit's concerns. In finding that the conflict of interest did not adversely affect counsel's performance,
the district judge apparently placed too much emphasis on the strength of the prosecution's
case and allowed that factor to enter into his determination regarding defense counsel's performance. The concurring opinion stated: "To satisfy Cuyler, the district court must determine whether the appellant's attorney refrained from a more vigorous cross-examination of
the D.E.A. agent because of his divided loyalties, and, if so, whether the appellant's representation would have benefited even marginally from a more aggressive cross-examination."
Id. at 273. Thus, the Brown court recognized that Cuy/er required a different inquiry than
the "actual prejudice" test of Cooper v. Fitzharris;Brown v. United States, 665 F.2d at 272.
4363. Id. at 272-73. See United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 938 (1980). During defendant Hearst's defense, trial counsel F. Lee Bailey contracted
to write a book about the trial, thus raising questions of potential or actual conflict of interest. The district court denied a hearing on the merits on the grounds that Bailey's tactical
decisions were reasonable. The Ninth Circuit reversed and required the district court to
apply the Cuyler test to the facts. The Hearst court stated that: "We read [Cuyler v.] Sullivan to define an actual, as opposed to a potential, conflict as one which in fact adversely
affects the lawyer's performance." Id. at 1194.
4364. 661 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981).
4365. Defendant Donn also asserted that ineffective assistance of counsel consisted of
counsel's failure to fully discuss the merits of the case with Donn, inadequate investigation
of the case, and not informing Donn that intoxication might be a defense. The court suggested that the claims could be meritorious and were thus worthy of a factual determination.
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tions and supporting documentation on appeal suggested that the
presentence report was inaccurate and misleading.4366 Moreover, the
court felt there was insufficient evidence on the record to show petitioner's motion to be without merit. Since the district court had not
even acknowledged that the defendant had raised the ineffective assistance issue, the case was remanded for a hearing on defendant's
claim.4367
2. Exhaustion of state remedies
It has long been held by the Supreme Court that the "exhaustion
doctrine" in habeas corpus proceedings requires that federal courts not
consider a claim until the state courts have had an opportunity to act.
In ExparleHawk,43 6 8 the Court reiterated that comity was the basis for
the exhaustion doctrine by stating that "it is a principle controlling all
habeas corpus petitions to the federal courts, that those courts will interfere with the administration of justice in the state courts only 'in rare
cases where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown
to exist.' ,,4369 None of the early cases, however, applied the exhaustion
doctrine to habeas petitions containing both exhausted and
unexhausted claims.
In Rose v. Lundy,43 7 ° the United States Supreme Court adopted
the total exhaustion rule, requiring a federal district court to dismiss a
petition for writ of habeas corpus when it contains claims that have not
been exhausted in the state courts. 437 ' At issue in the petition were
charges of prosecutorial misconduct. However, the district court considered instances of misconduct that were never challenged in the state
courts or raised in the habeas petition itself. The court, in granting the
writ, concluded that the defendant did not receive a fair trial because
his sixth amendment rights were violated and the jury was "poisoned"
by the prosecutorial misconduct. This judgment was affirmed by the
4366. 661 F.2d at 824.
4367. Id. at 825.
4368. 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944).
4369. Id. at 117.
4370. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
4371. Id. at 522. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court for Parts I, II, III-A,
III-B, and IV. She also authored 11-C and concluded that the total exhaustion rule would
not impair the prisoner's interest in obtaining speedy federal relief. The prisoner can always
amend the petition to delete the unexhausted claims, rather than return to state court to
exhaust all his claims. However, this involves the risk of forfeiting consideration of his
unexhausted claims in federal court. Id. at 520. Only Justices Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist joined this portion of her opinion.
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Sixth Circuit.4372
In response to the petitioner's arguments, the Supreme Court considered the parameters of the "exhaustion doctrine. ' 4373 In doing so,
the Court pointed out that 28 U.S.C. section 2254, which codified the
exhaustion doctrine, does not directly address the problem of mixed

petitions, petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted
claims. 4 3 7 4 Moreover, the Court pointed to the division among the circuits on the issue.4 375

The Court opted for strict enforcement of the exhaustion requirement holding that a district court must dismiss habeas petitions con-

taining both exhausted and unexhausted claims.43 76

The Court

reasoned that such an approach would protect the state court's role in
enforcement of federal law and clarify federal review of habeas
petitions.4 377
4372. Id. at 513. Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit specifically rejected
the State's argument that the district court should have dismissed the petition because it
included both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Id.
4373. The "exhaustion doctrine" has its roots as far back as ExparteRoyall, 117 U.S. 241
(1886). In that case the Court held that federal courts should not consider a habeas corpus
claim until after state courts have an opportunity to act. As it developed, the doctrine provided that state remedies should be exhausted before federal courts could intervene. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 17-19 (1925).
4374. 455 U.S. at 516. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State Court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the state ...."
4375. 455 U.S. at 513-14 & n.5. The Court mentioned that the Ninth Circuit has adopted a
"total exhaustion" rule which requires district courts to dismiss every habeas corpus petition
that contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims. See Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807,
808-10 (9th Cir. 1976). This position was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit in Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 355-60 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). "A majority of the Courts of Appeals, however, have permitted the District Courts to review the exhausted claims in a mixed
petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims." Id. (citing Katz v. King, 627
F.2d 568, 574 (1st Cir. 1980); Cameron v. Fastoff, 543 F.2d 971, 976 (2d Cir. 1976); United
States ex rel. Trantino v. Hatrack, 563 F.2d 86, 91-95 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
928 (1978); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th Cir. 1969); Meeks v. Jago,
548 F.2d 134,137 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977); Brown v. Wisconsin State
Dep't of Public Welfare, 457 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 862 (1972); Tyler
v. Swenson, 483 F.2d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 1973); Whiteley v. Meacham, 416 F.2d 36, 39 (10th
Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 401 U.S. 560 (1971)).
4376. Rose, 455 U.S. at 522.
4377. Id. at 520. Indeed, the Court observed that the exhaustion doctrine is designed primarily to protect the state court's role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings. The Court pointed out that a total exhaustion rule
encourages state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those
courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error. Moreover, the Court
reasoned that to the extent that total exhaustion reduces piecemeal litigation, both the courts
and the prisoners should benefit. Id. at 520-21.
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun expressed his concern
that the total exhaustion rule would operate as a trap for the uneducated pro se prisoner-applicant and that it would tend to increase,
rather than alleviate the caseload burdens on both state and federal
4378
courts.
Justice White agreed with Justice Blackmun in that he
would not require a "mixed" petition to be dismissed in its entirety.
Both Justices felt the trial judge should rule on the exhausted claims
unless they are intertwined with unexhausted claims which must be
dismissed.4379
Harmony between the state and federal systems is often an objective in the decision-making of the federal courts. A federal judge
should ordinarily avoid acting in a precipitious manner when the trial
4378. Id. at 522.
4379. Id. at 531, 538. There was a significant split on the Court regarding disposition of
this case. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from Part III-C of the plurality's opinion. Id. at 532 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He objected to the plurality's view
expressed in Part III-C that a habeas petitioner must risk forfeiture of his unexhausted
claims in federal court if he decides to proceed only with his exhausted claims and sets aside
his unexhausted claims. Id. at 532-33. Justice Brennan also felt that the issue of successive
petitions addressed by the Court in III-C should have been reserved because it was not
among the questions presented by the petitioner. Id. at 533-34.
Justice Stevens also dissented in a separate opinion. Id. at 538 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Although he wrote that the district judge exceeded the proper restraints on the scope of
collateral review of state court judgments, he opined that the Court failed to correct the
error. Id. at 538-39. Justice Stevens found the rule adopted by the Court inflexible and
mechanical. Id. at 542-46. He preferred to allow district judges to exercise discretion to
determine whether the presence of an unexhausted claim in a habeas corpus application
makes it inappropriate to consider the merits of a properly pleaded exhausted claim. Id. at
547-48. Moreover, he felt tfid "total exhaustion" rule adopted by the Court demeaned "the
high office of the great writ." Id. at 549. He considered the procedural history of a habeas
claim to be secondary compared to the issues related to the alleged constitutional violation.
Id. at 548.
Ultimately, Justices O'Connor, Powell, Burger, and Rehnquist favored adoption of the
"total exhaustion" rule. Justice Blackmun, while concurring in the judgment, disagreed with
the Court's analysis. He supported the view of eight of the courts of appeals-that a district
court may review the exhausted claims of a mixed petition. Id. at 522. Thus, he rejected the
"total exhaustion" approach. Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed with employment of
the "total exhaustion" rule, but concluded that when a prisoner's "mixed" habeas petition is
dismissed without any review of its claims on the merits, and the prisoner later brings a
second petition based on the previously unexhausted claims that had earlier been refused a
hearing, then that second petition cannot be dismissed, absent obvious indications of abuse.
Id. at 537-38. Justice White agreed with Justice Brennan, but also indicated his agreement
with Justice Blackmun's view that a "mixed" petition should not be dismissed in its entirety.
Id. at 538.
Justice Stevens considered the Court's adoption of the "total exhaustion" rule as an
"adventure in unnecessary lawmaking." Id. at 539. He was particularly concerned that any
unexhausted claim asserted in a habeas petition-no matter how frivolous-could require
postponement of relief on a meritorious exhausted claim. Id. at 542.
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court record is unclear. This principle is illustrated in Davis v. Morri. 438 0 In that case, the defendant challenged the state trial court's de-

nial of self-representation three years before this right was guaranteed
in Farettav. Caif/ornia. 43 8 Because the record was unclear on the rea-

sons why the trial judge denied the defendant's motion to represent
himself, the Ninth Circuit recommended that the district court should

vacate its order denying habeas relief.43 2 Moreover, the court remanded the case to "afford the state the opportunity for a hearing as to

the reasons that
led [the trial judge] to deny Davis' motions to represent
438 3
'

himself."

When claims are not exhausted at the state level, the district court

must determine whether there was cause for and prejudice from the
failure to raise them in state court.4 384 This was the holding of the
Ninth Circuit in Matias v. Oshiro.4385 In Matias, the defendant added
several grounds, not considered in state court, to his federal habeas pe-

tition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.4386 The Ninth Circuit
determined that the district court properly found that state law pre4 387
cluded the availability of proceedings to raise the additional claims.

Nevertheless, the court said that once this was found, the district court
4380. 657 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981).
4381. Id. at 1105; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); see also infra note 4393.
Davis was convicted in California of two counts of first degree murder and one count of
conspiracy to commit murder and robbery. At the outset of his trial he asked to represent
himself. The trial judge concluded that Davis was not authorized to waive his constitutional
right to representation by counsel. This was the accepted view until Faretta which was
decided while Davis' appeal was pending. The court of appeal summarily denied relief on
the issue stating that Farellahad been held to be nonretroactive by the California Supreme
Court. See People v. McDaniel, 16 Cal. 3d 156, 545 P.2d 843, 127 Cal. Rptr. 467, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 847 (1976). The conviction was affirmed by the state courts.
Davis filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in district court. He contended that
even if Farettawas not retroactive, the law of the Ninth Circuit guaranteed the right to selfrepresentation even before Faretta. The writ was denied and Davis appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.
4382. 657 F.2d at 1106.
4383. Id. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit refused "to address the broader constitutional
question of the retroactivity of Faretta."
4384. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Cause and prejudice is the general
standard governing failure to raise particular issues in state proceedings.
4385. 683 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1982).
4386. Id. at 319. The defendant was convicted of rape by the Hawaiian courts. He sought
federal habeas relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Several new grounds were
added that were not pled in the state courts. The district court held that the ineffective
assistance claim had not been exhausted in the state courts as to the new grounds, and therefore dismissed the petition on those grounds. On the other claims, the district court denied
the petition on the merits. The only issue before the Ninth Circuit concerned the new ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
4387. Id. at 321.
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should have explored the possibilities of whether Matias' failure to

raise the additional grounds in earlier state proceedings was excused
under the cause and prejudice standard.43 8 If either of these elements

were found lacking on remand, the district court could again dismiss
the petition.43 89
3.

Effect of state court findings

In habeas corpus actions a presumption of correctness is applied to
state court factual determinations unless one of the conditions enumerated in 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) exists. 4390 The state court determina4388. Id. See supra note 4384.
4389. 683 F.2d at 321. The court observed that Matias' state remedies were "exhausted."
Thus, his petition did not present issues under the "total exhaustion" rule of Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509 (1982). The only question on remand was whether Matias' failure to use state
remedies previously available was excused.
4390. In Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981), the Supreme Court stated that a federal court exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction must presume the correctness of state court
factual determinations. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, vacated and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which had granted to a
defendant a habeas corpus writ because it determined that the Ninth Circuit improperly
ignored statutory requirements in its analysis of the defendant's challenge to his state-court
murder conviction. Petitioner, the California Attorney General, asserted that in reaching its
decision the Ninth Circuit "failed to observe certain limitations on its authority specifically
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)." Id. at 544. The failure of the Ninth Circuit even to refer
in its opinion to § 2254(d), which requires in habeas corpus actions deference by a federal
court to the factual determinations made by a state court, was discussed at length and with
evident distress by the Court. Id. at 547-49.
Section 2254(d) provides:
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a
State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the
writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written
finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be
presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise
appear, or the respondent shall admit(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State
court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State
court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over
the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation
of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the
State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing
in the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the
State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in
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tion must be made after a hearing on the merits and evidenced by a
reliable and adequate written finding. If none of the statutory factors

exist, then the petitioner has the burden of establishing by convincing
4 391
evidence that the state court's factual determination was erroneous.

The Ninth Circuit has applied this rule, espoused by the United States
Supreme Court in Sumner v. Maa,43 92 in several instances.
However, this should not suggest that federal courts are unduly

limited in hearing petitions for habeas writs. In recent cases, the Ninth
Circuit has considered whether a writ may properly issue where a de-

fendant has requested to represent himself, but the request is
denied.43 93
In Maxwell v. Sumner,43 94 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court ruling that the state trial court erred in denying Maxwell's motion
to proceed in propria persona. The district court reviewed the state

court transcript and found nothing to support the state court's determination that Maxwell's behavior caused him to forfeit his right of selfrepresentation.4 3 95 Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court
439 6
decision to grant a writ of habeas corpus.
which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a
consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual
determination is not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due
proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or
more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7),
inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph
numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole,
does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the
applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the
State court was erroneous.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976). See, e.g., Fritchie v. McCarthy, 664 F.2d 208, 213 (9th Cir.
1981); Brewer v. Raines, 670 F.2d 117, 120 (9th Cir. 1982).
4391. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
4392. 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
4393. These decisions were made in light of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In
that case, the Court ruled that the state may not constitutionally deprive a defendant of his
right "personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage." Id. at
834. The Court held that the state court erred in requiring a defendant to accept a public
defender against his will. Id. at 836. By doing this, the court deprived him of his "constitutional right to conduct his own defense." Id.
4394. 673 F.2d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 313 (1982).
4395. Id. at 1033. The district court stated that there was no indication in the record as to
what actions caused the state trial court to deny Maxwell's pro se request. Id. at 1035.
Moreover, there was no evidence that the request would result in undue delay or that the
request was untimely. Id. at 1036.
4396. Id.
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Rhinehart v. Gunn4 39 7 also involved whether the state court fairly
denied the defendant's right to self-representation. However, this case
also involved a question of fact related to whether Rhinehart's request

was for self-representation or for representation by private counsel.
There was some confusion in the record whether Rhinehart's request
was "unequivocal." 4398 The case was remanded to afford the state

judge the opportunity to conduct a hearing on the reasons why he denied Rhinehart's request for self-representation.43 9 9

In considering a petition for habeas corpus, a federal district court
will review the state court record to determine if the writ is justified.
The Ninth Circuit, in Brewer v. Raines,44 °° could find nothing during its
review of the record to overcome the presumption of correctness. 441 In
Brewer, the petitioner based his constitutional claim on the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment."0 2 The court, however, held that

the petitioner waived his right by his voluntary absence from the
trial."4 3 Moreover, because the defendant was knowingly and volunta4397. 661 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1981).
4398. Id. at 739. The defendant was convicted on two counts of murder. On appeal
Rhinehart claimed that he had been improperly denied the right to self-representation. The
California Supreme Court affirmed but reduced the sentence to life imprisonment.
Rhinehart renewed his appeal by filing an application for a writ of habeas corpus,
which was subsequently denied by the state high court. He based his argument on the then
recently-decided United States Supreme Court decision in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
"806 (1975).
Months later, Rhinehart brought his case to the district court. That court found that the
motion by Rhinehart was really one for private counsel rather than an attorney from the
public defenders' office. 661 F.2d at 739. On appeal, another panel of the Ninth Circuit, in
Rhinehart v. Gunn, 598 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1979), remanded to the district court for a determination of whether Rhinehart's demand was "unequivocal." On remand, the district judge
found that such an "unequivocal" demand had been made. Moreover, he found that the
Faretta decision was applicable to state as well as federal prisoners. 661 F.2d at 739. On
appeal, the state contended that Rhinehart's demand was not "unequivocal" and that state
remedies were not exhausted. Id. The Ninth Circuit was in doubt as to whether Rhinehart
wanted private counsel or if he wanted to represent himself. Id. The court cited Sumner v.
Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981), and the United States Supreme Court's concern for the
maintenance of due regard for state court findings of fact in ruling that the district court
should afford an opportunity to the state court to rule on this question. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court. Id. at 740.
4399. Id. at 739.
4400. 670 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1982).
4401. Id. at 120. The Ninth Circuit again applied the Sumner v. Mata rule which grants to
federal courts only a limited scope of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Id.
4402. Id. at 118. Brewer was arraigned for armed robbery, informed of his trial date and
subsequently released on bond. However, after his release he disappeared. Consequently,
his trial and sentencing took place inabsentia. Id. at 117-18.
4403. Id. at 119. In Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892), the United States
Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment guarantees the
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rily absent, the court was not precluded from holding the trial.4 "°4 The
Ninth Circuit found no indication of error in the state court's determination that Brewer's absence was voluntary.440
In Fitchie v. McCarthy,44° the state trial court's determination of

the voluntariness of the defendant's confession was fairly supported by
the record. The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant failed to meet
be
his burden of proving the state court's finding of voluntariness to
440 7
erroneous, and affirmed the denial of the habeas corpus petition.
Federal courts are required to accord a presumption of correctness
to findings of historical fact by the state courts, but they are not required to do so where there are mixed questions of law and fact.
Where the basic historical facts of a case also give rise to questions of
law, the application of legal principles to such facts is open to collateral
attack in federal court."0° In either event, the federal court must hold
an independent hearing to review the state court record; this was the
holding in Pierrev. Thompson.4 4

9

The controversy in Pierre concerned

10

The Ninth Circuit held that the district
a broken plea agreement."
judge correctly decided that it was within the state court's discretion to
decide which remedy should be applied for the broken plea agreement. 441 However, it remanded the case because the district court
failed to examine the record of the state trial court in reaching its decidefendant's right to be present at every stage of his trial. However, under certain circumstances a trial may proceed in the defendant's absence. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
4404. 670 F.2d at 119. The court also noted that whether the defendant's absence began
before or after trial commenced made no difference. Id.
4405. Id. at 120.
4406. 664 F.2d 208, 214 (9th Cir. 1981).
4407. Id. at 213. Fritchie claimed that his murder confession was involuntary because it
was made while he was insane. Id. at 212. He admitted there was no coercion involved. Id.
There was an extensive pretrial suppression hearing which focused on the defendant's
mental state at the time of the confession. Id. at 213. There were no allegations of improper
conduct by the Florida police in obtaining the confession. Id. at 212. Thus, the central issue
concerned whether Fritchie's mental health precluded his confession from being the "'product of any meaningful act of volition."' Id. at 213 (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199, 211 (1960)).
4408. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 (1980). Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
403-04 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 193 n.3 (1972).
4409. 666 F.2d 424, 427-28 (9th Cir. 1982).
4410. Id. at 426. The defendant pled guilty to robbery pursuant to an agreement whereby
the prosecutor agreed to dismiss allegations that, at the time of the robberies, the defendant
was armed. There was no dispute that the guilty plea was entered with the understanding
that under the agreement the defendant would not be subjected to a mandatory minimum
prison sentence. Nevertheless, the trial court recited in the judgment and sentence that appellant was armed at the time of each offense. The sentence was prescribed according to this
finding. Id.
4411. Id. at 427.
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sion to deny the petition for habeas corpus. 44 12 Because the district

court in Pierre had been faced with a determination of whether the
defendant's modified sentence was within the terms of the plea agree-

ment, which entailed application of a constitutional standard to historical facts, the Ninth Circuit held that it was a mixed question of law and
the subject of an independent determination by the
fact and properly
44 3
court.
federal
Where material facts are not adequately developed in state court,
no deference is warranted in a federal habeas proceeding. 44 14 This rule

was applied by the Ninth Circuit in Fritz v. Spalding,44"'5 in which the
defendant asserted his Faretta right to self-representation immediately
prior to the beginning of trial proceedings.44 6 The Ninth Circuit ruled

that a motion to proceed pro se is timely if made before the jury is
4412. Id. at 427-28. "[I]t must be kept in mind that this is only a presumption and in order
to review the factual determination and apply the presumption, a review of the record of
state courts or an independent hearing by the district court is required." Id. at 427.
4413. .d. at 428. The constitutional right which formed the basis of the defendant's petition for habeas corpus was established in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971),
which held that a criminal defendant is deprived of a constitutional right if the prosecutor in
a plea bargain agreement does not keep his promise. In Santobello, the Court said: "The
ultimate relief to which petitioner is entitled we leave to the discretion of the state court
" In other cases it has been said that the defendant may be allowed to withdraw his
...
plea, United States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1975); Grant v. State of Wisconsin, 450 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Wis. 1978), or the broken plea bargain may be specifically enforced, Bercheny v. Johnson, 633 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1980). Even though these remedies are
available, the question remains whether the district court should rely upon the finding of the
state appellate court or whether the relief awarded to the defendant is adequate. Indeed,
that was the issue in Pierre. The Ninth Circuit held that the district judge was correct in his
determination that it was within the state court's discretion to decide which remedy should
be awarded. 666 F.2d at 427.
4414. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(3), 2254(d)(6) (1976).
4415. 682 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1982).
4416. Id. at 784. Fritz was charged by the state of Washington with armed robbery. .d. at
783. He jumped bail but was rearrested over a year later. Id. Four days before the scheduled trial, Fritz's attorney moved to withdraw as counsel on the grounds that he and his
client could not agree on a defense strategy. Id. The motion was granted, a public defender
was appointed, and the trial was rescheduled. Id. Thirty days before the second trial, Fritz
moved to represent himself, asserting that the public defender and not begun to prepare a
defense. Id. After meeting with his attorney, Fritz withdrew the motion. Id. On the morning of the afternoon trial, the public defender moved to withdraw as counsel and to allow
Fritz to represent himself. Id. He cited fundamental differences in strategy as the reason for
the motion.The trial judge denied the motion on the ground that Fritz was not competent to
act as his own counsel. Id. at 784. The Washington Court of Appeals held that Fritz was
competent, but affirmed denial of his motion on the ground that it was a delaying tactic. Id.
Fritz then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus and moved for an evidentiary hearing. Id.
A federal magistrate concluded that the motion on the morning of trial was untimely because it would have resulted in delay, and decided that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. Id. The district court adopted the magistrate's findings and denied habeas relief. Id.
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empaneled, unless it is shown to be a tactic to cause delay.441 7 Since
Fritz's motion was made on the morning of an afternoon trial, the court
found it timely as a matter of law.4418 Moreover, the court ruled that
the district court should conduct an evidentiary hearing as to whether
Fritz's motion was a tactic to delay the start of trial.4419 The court held
that delay per se is not a sufficient ground for denying the right to selfrepresentation." 2 °
4. Independent state grounds
In Wainwright v. Sykes, 42 ' the Supreme Court held that a state
prisoner's failure to assert a constitutional claim in the state trial court
barred the defendant from litigating that claim in a section 2254 habeas
corpus proceeding" 22 absent a showing of cause for actual prejudice
resulting from defendant's waiver." 23 Since the Sykes decision, numerous cases have considered its practical applicability to specific circumstances. The inquiry on appeal will usually involve a
determination of whether the defendant proffered his constitutional
claim in the state courts and, if not, whether the principles articulated
in Sykes bar consideration of the claim in a federal habeas
proceeding.4424
Such an inquiry took place in Engle v. Isaac.4 25 In Isaac, three
Ohio defendants challenged the constitutionality of an Ohio jury instruction which provided that the defendant has the burden of proving
self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence." 26 However, none of
4417. Id. at 784. See Maxwell v. Sumner, 673 F.2d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
4418. 682 F.2d at 784.
4419. Id. at 786. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that any motion on the morning of trial
would cause delay, but was concerned that the defendant may have had bona fide reasons
for not asserting his right until that time. See United States v. Chapman, 553 F.2d 886, 88889 (5th Cir. 1977). The court held that there must be an affirmative showing of purpose to
secure delay for Fritz's motion in order for it to be properly denied. 682 F.2d at 784.
4420. 682 F.2d at 784.
4421. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
4422. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976) provides that:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
4423. 433 U.S. at 87.
4424. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
4425. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
4426. Id. at 121. Historically, Ohio courts have required that criminal defendants prove
self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The provisions of a new criminal code,
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (Page 1975), were interpreted by the Ohio Supreme
Court "to place only the burden of production, not the burden of persuasion, on the defend-
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the defendants had objected to the instruction when it was given at
trial." 2 7 In all three cases, the federal district courts had denied defendants' writs of habeas corpus which alleged a violation of due process on the basis of the jury instructions." 2 8
The Sixth Circuit reversed all three district court orders, 44 2 9 on the
basis of their conclusion that "Wainwright v. Sykes did not preclude
consideration of [defendant] Isaac's constitutional claims.""44 30 The
44 3 1
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the three cases.
The Court initially decided that because none of the defendants
challenged the constitutionality of the self-defense instruction at trial,
appellate consideration of the objection was barred." 32 Thus, the issue
ant." 456 U.S. at 111 (citing State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976)).
The actions before the Supreme Court involved three separate crimes. They arose because
Ohio tried and convicted these three defendants after the effective date of § 2901.05(A), but
prior to Robinson. 456 U.S. at 111-12.
It is interesting to note that two years after Robinson, the Ohio legislature again
amended its burden-of-proof law to provide in part that: "the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense, is upon the accused." Id. at 112 n.4
(emphasis omitted).
4427. Id. at 112-14. In two cases before the Supreme Court, defendants failed to challenge
the jury instructions on appeal to the state courts. They only challenged the jury instructions
upon seeking the habeas writ in federal district courts. Both district courts denied the petitions. Id. at 116.
In the third appeal, defendant Isaac relied on State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351
N.E. 2d 88 (1976), to challenge the burden-of-proof instructions. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's claim because Isaac had failed to raise this objection during
trial as required by OHIO R. CRIM. P. 30 which provides:
A party may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give any instructions
unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury.
4428. 456 U.S. at 116-18.
4429. Id. at 118.
4430. Id. (citing Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc), rev'd,456 U.S. 107
(1982)). The Sixth Circuit stated that objecting to the jury instructions at trial would have
been a futile exercise because of Ohio's consistent practice of requiring defendants to prove
affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. This situation provided adequate
cause for Isaac's waiver. Moreover, prejudice was apparent since the burden of proof is
critical to the fact-finding process. 646 F.2d at 1133-34.
As a result of the decision concerning defendant Isaac, the Sixth Circuit ordered the
district court to release the other two respondents unless the state elected to give defendants
a new trial within a reasonable time. 456 U.S. at 119 (citing Bell v. Perini, 635 F.2d 575 (6th
Cir. 1980), rev'd, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Hughes v. Engle, 642 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1980)).
4431. 451 U.S. 906 (1981).
4432. 456 U.S. at 124-25. Ohio law required contemporaneous objections to jury instructions. OHIO R. CRaM. P. 30, see supra note 4427. On this basis, the Ohio Supreme Court has
refused to entertain several appeals. See, e.g., State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364
N.E.2d 1354 (1977); State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St. 2d 112, 364 N.E.2d 1364 (1977), vacatedin
part and remanded, 438 U.S. 911 (1978).
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that occupied the Court's attention was "whether respondents may litigate, in a federal habeas proceeding, a constitutional claim that they
forfeited before the state courts."" 3 3
The defendants alleged two causes for their failure to raise their
constitutional claims at trial. First, "they could not have known at the
time of their trials that the Due Process Clause addresses the burden of
proving affirmative defenses." 3 4 Second, they contended that it
would have been futile to object to the self-defense instruction because
it was Ohio's established practice to require defendants to bear the bur-

den of proving self-defense. 4 35
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, rejected

both theories. It noted that, the mere futility of making an objection in
the state courts does not justify a failure to object at trial." 3 6 Moreover, the Court was not impressed with defendants' contention that

they were not aware of the constitutional claim." 37 Justice O'Connor

pointed to In re Wnsh?,4438 decided four-and-one-half years before

trial, as laying the basis for defendants' claim. 44 39 The Court noted
numerous decisions where other defendants relied on In re Winship in

raising constitutional claims against rules which required defendants to
bear a specific burden of proof.4 "' In the interests of comity and finality, the Court refused to accept that alleged unawareness of the objec-

tion could provide cause for a procedural default when the basis for the
constitutional claim has been established. 4 4
The significance of Engle lies in the Supreme Court's deliberate
4433. 456 U.S. at 125.
4434. Id. at 130.

4435. Id.
4436. Id.
4437. Id. at 131.

4438. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
4439. 456 U.S. at 131. In In re Winsho, the Supreme Court held that "the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Id. at 364.
4440. 456 U.S. at 131-32 & n.40.
4441. Id. at 134. Justice O'Connor's opinion aroused a stinging dissent by Justice Brennan. Concerning the Court's holding that unawareness of the constitutional claim was not a
basis for "cause" under the Sykes standard, Justice Brennan said:
The Court concludes, after several pages of tortuous reasoning, .... that respondents in the present cases did indeed have "the tools" to make their constitutional
claims. This conclusion is reached by the sheerest inference: It is based on citations to other cases in other jurisdictions, where other defendants raised other
To
claims assertedly similar to those that respondents "could" have raised ....
hold the present respondents to such a high standard of foresight is tantamount to
a complete rejection of the notion that there is a point before which a claim is so
inchoate that there is adequate "cause" for the failure to raise it.
456 U.S. at 145 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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intention to restrict exercise of the habeas writ. Justice O'Connor

placed much emphasis in her opinion on the "significant costs" of "the
Great Writ."" 2 Societal interests in the finality of a trial and the punishment of an offender suffer, in her view, through liberal allowance of
the writ." 43 To some observers, the decision may be read as an imposition of judicial values in the place of constitutional law.4 4
In Maxwell v. Sumner,"

the Ninth Circuit held the Sykes rule

inapplicable because the state courts denied Maxwell's federal claim on
the merits."
Maxwell's claim was based on the trial court's denial of
his motion to proceed in propria persona. 44 7 Relying on Faret/a v.
Caiffornia,444 the district court granted Maxwell's habeas corpus petition." On appeal, the warden of San Quentin prison argued that
Maxwell relinquished his self-representation claim by not raising the
issue on direct appeal to the California Supreme Court." 50
The Ninth Circuit distinguished this case from Sykes and its progeny because those cases involved independent and adequate state procedural grounds supporting the state court's decision." 5 In Maxwell,
the Court found that even if California had a similiar state procedural
rule, the California Supreme Court failed to apply that rule in denying
4442. Id. at 126-28.
4443. Id. at 127-28. The Court cited Justice Harlan who observed in Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) that:
[b]oth the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in insuring
that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation,
and that attention will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was free
from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in
the community.
4444. Justice Brennan reacted to Justice O'Connor's concerns by saying: "[t]he Court's
analysis is completely result-oriented, and represents a noteworthy exercise in the very judicial activism that the Court so deprecates in other contexts." Id. at 144 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
4445. 673 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 313 (1982).
4446. Id. at 1034. In Sykes, the defendant failed to challenge the admissibility of statements allegedly obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. 433 U.S. at 75. The Supreme
Court held that the defendant's failure to comply at trial with the state's contemporaneousobjection rule constituted an "independent and adequate state procedural ground" for the
state court judgment. This barred federal habeas corpus review unless there was a showing
of "cause" and "prejudice." Id. at 86-87.
4447. 673 F.2d at 1033.
4448. A defendant's sixth amendment right to self-representation was affirmed in Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), decided after Maxwell's trial.
4449. 673 F.2d at 1033.
4450. Id.
4451. Id. at 1034. The Sykes rule is based on failure to comply with state procedural rules;
it is not applicable to questions of federal law which were resolved on the merits by the state
courts. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 86-87.
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Maxwell's petition." 5 2 Finding no independent and adequate state
procedural ground for disallowing the self-representation claim, the

court held that Maxwell was entitled to federal habeas corpus
review. 4 5 3
Hines v. Enomoto445 4 involved defense counsers failure to object
during voir dire to the denial of defendant's right to exercise a full allotment of peremptory challenges. The district court rejected defend-

ant's habeas corpus petition in part because trial counsel failed to
observe California's "contemporaneous objection" rule

45

which re-

quires defense counsel to object to the conduct of peremptory challenges at trial or waive the issue." 5 6 Indeed, in Sykes, such failure was

also present, resulting in a procedural default that precluded litigation

of the alleged error in federal court." 57
The Ninth Circuit, however, regarded the denial as a ground for
federal habeas relief and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing
concerning defense counsel's reason for failing to object." 58 The Ninth
Circuit was unable to determine from the record why counsel had
failed to object. 4459 In remanding the case, the court emphasized the
narrowness of its holding.4 60 The "cause" and "prejudice" standard
4452. 673 F.2d at 1034.
4453. Id. at 1035. The Ninth Circuit based its holding on language in the California
Supreme Court's denial which suggested that it considered the merits of the petition. Id.
The Ninth Circuit stated:
Maxwell's state habeas petition was denied with a citation to In re Waltreus...
which involved a state habeas petition raising various claims of trial error. The
California Supreme Court denied the petition, stating that "'[tihese arguments
were rejected on appeal, and habeas corpus ordinarily cannot serve as a second
appeal."' 62 Cal. 2d at 225, 397 P.2d 1001, 42 Cal. Rptr. 9. Waltreus thus holds
that arguments rejected on appeal will not be reviewed again in habeas; by citing
Waltreus in its denial of Maxwell's habeas petition, the California Supreme Court
stated by clear implication that Maxwell's self-representation claim had been considered and rejected on the merits on direct appeal.
Id.
4454. 658 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1981).
4455. Id. at 670.
4456. Id. at 673.
4457. 433 U.S. at 87.
4458. 658 F.2d at 672. The Ninth Circuit stated that "a criminal defendant may not be
denied the full number of peremptory challenges available, and that any curtailment on the
exercise of challenges is reversible error." Id.
4459. Hines, 658 F.2d at 674. The Ninth Circuit observed that "[w]hen the contemporaneous objection rule is involved, the focus is upon the reason why the attorney did not object."
Id. at 673 (citing Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 377 (9th Cir. 1981)). The court stated
that the record did not clearly reflect whether Hines' failure to object was deliberate or
inadvertent, or whether he was actually satisfied with the panel as constituted. Hines, 658
F.2d at 673.
4460. 658 F.2d at 674.
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was applicable; however, the court felt it necessary to know why
coun4461
standard.
that
apply
could
it
before
trial
at
object
sel failed to
5. Federal procedural grounds barring review
44 62
Under Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
and 28 U.S.C. section 2107, 4463 a notice of appeal in a civil case must be
filed within thirty days of entry of the judgment or order from which
the appeal is taken. The purpose of the rule is "to set a definite point of
time when litigation shall be at an end.""44
When no notice of appeal and no motion for extension of time is
fied an appellant will be denied habeas corpus review. This was the
holding in Pettibone v. Cupp .4 65 In that Ninth Circuit decision, the
court rejected the habeas petitioner's appeal stating, "we have no appellate jurisdiction."'4
" 6 6 As the court pointed out, its decision was consistent with those of the other circuits." 67
4461. Id.
4462. Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides in pertinent part:
(1) In a civil case in which an appeal is permitted by law as of right from a
district court to a court of appeals the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be
filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from.
(5) The district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30
days after the expiration of the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a).
4463. 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no appeal shall bring any judgment,
order or decree in an action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature before a court of
appeals for review unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days after the entry
of such judgment, order or decree.
The district court may extend the time for appeal not exceeding thirty days from
the expiration of the original time herein prescribed, upon a showing of excusable
neglect based on failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment, order or
decree.
4464. Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1977). The
Supreme Court in Browder also recognized that "habeas corpus is a civil proceeding." Id. at
269. Thus, the rules established in FED. R. APP. PROC. 4 and 28 U.S.C. § 2107 are applicable to a habeas proceeding.
4465. 666 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Johnson v. Pulley, 685 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.
1982) (habeas corpus relief denied because notice of appeal not filed timely under Rule
4(a)(1)).
4466. 666 F.2d at 334. The Pettibone court discussed the language of FED. R. App. PROC.
4, stating: "We are bound by the language of the 1979 amendment and its clear requirement
of'motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by this Rule
4(a)."'
4467. 666 F.2d at 335 (citing Mayfield v. United States Parole Comm., 647 F.2d 1053 (10th
Cir. 1981) and Bond v. Western Auto Supply Co., 654 F.2d 302 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1130 (1981)).
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6.

Scope of review for section 2255 motions

United States v. Frady44 68 involved the issue of jury instructions.
Defendant Frady sought to vacate his sentence for murder, contending
that the jury instructions used at his trial were constitutionally defec-

tive.4 6 9 Specifically, he alleged that the instructions compelled the jury
to presume malice, thus wrongfully eliminating any possibility of a
manslaughter verdict.4470 However, he did not complain about the jury
instructions either at trial or on direct appeal. 4 71 Therefore, the
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the standard of review
found in Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applies to a collateral challenge to a criminal conviction." 72

Rule 52(b) provides: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention

of the court.""'73 This Rule provides some balance to Rule 30 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which declares in pertinent part

that "[n]o party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to con-

sider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the
grounds of his objection."' 7 4 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit invoked the "plain error" standard of Rule 52(b) in
considering and granting Frady's motion." 7 5 The Supreme Court reversed, denying Frady's motion to vacate on the ground that "the

'plain error' standard is out of place when a prisoner launches a collateral attack against a criminal conviction after society's legitimate interest inthe finality of the judgment has been perfected by the expiration
4468. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
4469. Frady brought a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) which provides in pertinent
part that:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.
4470. 456 U.S. at 158. The judge at Frady's trial improperly equated intent with malice by
stating that "a wrongful act. . . intentionally done.. . is therefore done with malice aforethought." Id. at 157-58. Later rulings determined that such instructions were erroneous.
See Belton v. United States, 382 F.2d 150 (1967); Green v. United States, 405 F.2d 1368
(1968).
4471. 456 U.S. at 162.
4472. Id. at 153-54.
4473. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
4474. FED. R. CRIM. P. 30.
4475. 456 U.S. at 158-59.
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of the time allowed
for direct review or by the affirmance of the convic' 476

tion on appeal." "
The Supreme Court held that the proper standard for review of

Frady's motion was the "cause and prejudice" standard recognized in
Wainwrightv. Sykes.4 7 7 Frady's failure to meet the burden of showing

that the errors at trial worked to his actual disadvantage required rever-

sal of the judgment." 78 In the Court's view, society's interest in the

finality of
criminal judgments outweighed any evidence of prejudice to
79
Frady.

44

7. Hearing by a federal magistrate
The district court may designate a federal magistrate to hear pre-

trial matters or conduct evidentiary hearings. 448 0 The magistrate may
then submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the
disposition. 448 1 However, before making determinations based on the
magistrate's recommendations, the district judge must review the record of the proceedings which occurred before the magistrate. Failure
4476. Id. at 164. The Supreme Court focused on the difference between a direct appeal,
where the "plain error" standard could be properly invoked, and collateral attack as utilized
by Frady under § 2255. By its terms, the "plain error" approach can be utilized only when
the error was so plain that counsel and trial judge were derelict in tolerating it. Thus, "an
error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment." United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979).
4477. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). The Court in Frady found that the petitioner failed to establish
"cause" for his failure to object to the jury instructions either at trial or on direct appeal, or
to establish "actual prejudice" resulting from the erroneous instructions. Frady, 456 U.S. at
168.
4478. Id. at 175. The Court found such strong evidence of malice in the record that there
was no justification for reversal of the conviction. Id. at 172.
4479. Id. at 164.
4480. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1976) provides in part:
Notwithstanding any provision, of the law to the contrary(A) a judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial
matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment
on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or
information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to
dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action. A
judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this subparagraph (A)
where it has been shown that the magistrate's order is clearly erroneous or contrary
to law.
(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including
evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of
fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph (A), of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging
conditions of confinement.
4481. Id.
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to conduct such review was ground for remand in Moran v. Morris."'8
Indeed, the Ninth
4483
requirement."

Circuit

considered

this

a

"threshold

In Moran, the defendant claimed that his sixth amendment right
was violated because his counsel failed to object to the use of evidence
that corroborated the testimony of an adverse witness.44 8 4 The defendant was convicted in state court on several counts of robbery, burglary,

kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit such offenses.44 85 These convictions were upheld by the state court of appeal. 4486
Moran's petition for habeas corpus was referred by the district

court to a magistrate for an evidentiary hearing.4487 The magistrate
held an extensive evidentiary hearing and ultimately recommended issuance of the writ." 88 The district court adopted verbatim the magistrate's report and recommendation. 44 89 However, the district court's

decision was apparently rendered without a transcript of the proceedings before the magistrate." 9 ° The Ninth Circuit found that this violated a threshold requirement for a de novo determination and the case
was remanded. 44 9 1 The court stated that the error at issue was more
4482. 665 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1981). Seealso Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207,209 (9th
Cir. 1979) (district court failed to conduct de novo hearing on record of proceedings before
the magistrate).
4483. Moran, 665 F.2d at 901. The Ninth Circuit expressed its dismay with the approach
of the district court in this manner.
The error is more significant than simply a failure to observe a technical statutory
requirement. The district court was in effect putting in motion the machinery to set
aside felony convictions that had been thoroughly reviewed in the state court system. To do so without strict compliance with the statutory requirement of a de
novo determination was a serious breach of the etiquette that must prevail in the
federal system if the sovereignty of the separate states is to be accorded its proper
respect. On this ground alone, the case must be remanded.

Id. at 902.
4484. Id. at 901.
4485. Id. Specifically, defendant Moran was convicted on two counts for kidnapping with
the purpose of robbery, two counts for robbery in the first degree, three counts for burglary
in the first degree and for conspiracy to commit those offenses.
4486. Id.
4487. Id. The referral was pursuant to the Federal Magistrate's Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B) (1976). See supra note 4480.
4488. 665 F.2d at 901.
4489. Id.
4490. Id. The proceedings before the magistrate were transcribed long after the district
court approved the magistrate's recommendation. It appeared that the district court referred
only to the record submitted with the habeas petition. That record included only the state
court trial transcripts. Although it was possible that the district court heard the tape recordings of the proceedings before the magistrate, counsel arguing before the Ninth Circuit assumed that this did not occur. Id.
4491. Id. The Federal Magistrate's Act provides that "[a] judge of the [district] court shall
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than a simple failure to observe a technical statutory requirement." 92
Rather, it was a "serious breach of the etiquette that must prevail in the
federal system," because the district court was in effect setting aside
felony convictions that had been thoroughly reviewed by the state
courts."

93

In the final section of the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the court indicated that factual findings by state courts should be presumed correct. 4 94 Moreover, the court indicated that section 2254(d) provided
the requisite guidance for the district court on remand." 95
8. Scope of review for magistrate's extradition order
In Valencia v. Limbs,44"96 a United States Magistrate determined
that sufficient evidence existed to extradite appellant Valencia to Mexico on charges of murder and robbery. Valencia challenged this finding by attempting to broaden the traditional scope of habeas review of
a magistrate's extradition order." 97
Habeas corpus review of an extradition order has traditionally
been limited to "a determination that there was competent evidence
supporting the finding of extraditability." 449 Valencia argued that the
United States Supreme Court decision in Jackson v. Virginia44 99 required the extradition courts to review the sufficiency of the evidence of
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings
or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (1976). See
Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1979).
4492. 665 F.2d at 902. See supra note 4483.
4493. Id.
4494. Id. at 902. The Ninth Circuit intimated that there did not appear to be any reason to
dispute the state court's factual findings. Id. at 903.
4495. Id. at 902.
4496. 655 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1981).
4497. Id. at 197-98. The usual form of review of an extradition order is limited to the
following factors:
(1) the jurisdiction of the extradition judge to conduct extradition proceedings;
(2) the jurisdiction of the extradition court over the fugitive;
(3) the force and effect of the extradition treaty;
(4) the character of the crime charged and whether it falls within the terms of
the treaty; and
(5) whether there was competent legal evidence to support a finding of extraditability. Id. at 197. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925);
Caplan v. Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1981).
In the Caplan decision, the Ninth Circuit enunciated the five factors listed above, then went
on to hold that the Government failed to meet its burden of showing that the defendant's
acts constituted crimes in either the United States or England. Id. at 1340, 1343.
4498. Valencia, 655 F.2d at 197.
4499. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
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probable cause. 45 °° However, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument,

basing its decision on the essential difference between an extradition
proceeding and a state criminal proceeding. 401 The court pointed out

that the extradition proceeding "makes no determination of guilt or
innocence. . . . It is designed only to trigger the start of criminal proceedings against an accused." 45 0 2 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the
traditional standard of whether "any evidence warrant[s] the finding
that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty" was

appropriate.450 3
9. Successive petitions
The Supreme Court in Sanders v. United States4 5 established
rules governing successive applications for federal habeas corpus and

section 2255 motions.
In formulating these rules, the court stated:
Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior

application for federal habeas corpus or [section] 2255 relief
4500. 655 F.2d at 198. Prior to Jackson, many circuits held the view that they could not
inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence in a habeas review of a state criminal conviction.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316. The previous guideline was the no-evidence doctrine of Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960). In that case, the Supreme Court found that there was
"no semblance of evidence" to justify the defendant's conviction. Id. at 205. In Jackson, the
Court widened the inquiry to provide for a determination of "whether the record evidence
could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 443 U.S. at 318.
This was because the Court perceived that the Thompson "no-evidence" rule was inadequate
to protect against misapplications of the constitutional standard of reasonable doubt. Id. at
320.
4501. Valencia attempted to apply Jackson by suggesting a parallel between the scope of
review in extradition and state criminal cases. In response, the Ninth Circuit stated that
"[n]othing in Jackson abridges the distinctions between extradition orders and state criminal
trials." 655 F.2d at 198.
The Valencia court supported its position by citing a Ninth Circuit case, Merino v.
United States Marshal, 326 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 997 (1964), which
held that the scope of review for a state court defendant was "inapposite in the field of
international extradition." Id. at 11.
4502. 655 F.2d at 198. The court also noted:
When a state prisoner petitions a federal court on habeas corpus alleging insufficient evidence existed for conviction, his guilt has already been adjudged ...
• ..Thus, the evidence necessary for extradition is of a wholly different character from that mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment to test due process in a
state criminal conviction.
Id.
4503. Id. (citing Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925) ("Competent evidence to
establish reasonable grounds is not necessarily evidence competent to convict.")).
4504. 373 U.S. 1 (1963). However, the Sanders Court pointed out that these rules are not
operative where the successive application is "shown. . .conclusively to be without merit."
In that situation, the application should be denied without hearing. Id. at 15.
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only if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior
application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits,
and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching
the merits of the subsequent application.450 5
Hence, no matter how many prior applications for federal collateral
relief a petitioner has made, if there are new grounds asserted, the writ
must be considered.450 6 Also, the writ cannot be denied if the same
ground was already presented but not decided on the merits. 50 7 In
either case the Sanders Court stated that full consideration of a new
application can be avoided only if there has been an abuse of the writ
4508
or motion remedy.
In deciding United States v. Donn4509 under the Sanders threepoint formula, the Ninth Circuit determined that the district court
erred in denying Donn's second petition for relief under section 2255.
In his second petition, Donn asserted ineffective assistance of counsel
for the first time. Moreover, there was no showing that his failure to
raise it was an abuse of process. 4 10 The Ninth Circuit held that the
district court was simply incorrect in rejecting the claim on the ground
that it had been previously raised.451'
Donn also raised two claims that had been considered in the first
motion. First, that the presentence report was incomplete and incorrect, and second, that he had never been given an opportunity to see the
report. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of the
claim that Donn was not given a chance to see the report, 45 12 but found
that the claim of false information was not disposed of on the merits in
Dorm's first motion.4513 In reaching the merits of Dorm's claim, however, the court adopted the Government's position that Donn waived
his right to challenge the presentence report because he did not chal4505. Id.
4506. Id. at 17.
4507. Id.
4508. Id. See also Villarreal v. United States, 461 F.2d 765, 767 (9th Cir. 1972) (denial of
successive petition reversed on grounds that district judge failed to find that ends of justice
would not be served by reaching merits of second application).
4509. 661 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981).
4510. Id. at 823.
4511. Id.
4512. Id. The court found that making a copy of the report available to counsel was sufficient. The court noted, however, that this claim was not foreclosed should Donn establish
his claim of ineffective assistance. Id. at 823 n.1.
4513. Id. at 823.
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lenge it before sentencing.4 5 14 The case was remanded for a hearing on
the ineffective assistance of counsel question.4515
F

Challengesto Prison Conditions

1. Generally
The eighth amendment to the Constitution provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor

cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. ' 45

16

Generally, the cruel and

unusual punishment clause has been used to require that punishments
be commensurate with the crime committed. 451 7 Any prison condition
that is an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain without a penological justification is prohibited by the eighth amendment. 45 18 A violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, however, does not
4514. Id. at 824. The court noted that elimination of the false information claims by failure to challenge the report before sentencing served to strengthen the ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. Id.
4515. Id. at 825.
4516. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment applies to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
4517. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910). For a history of the eighth
amendment, see Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment nflicted": The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839 (1969). Granucci notes that when the eighth amendment
was finally adopted in 1791, the phrase was somewhat of a "boilerplate" clause for constitutions; the same phrase had been included in the English Bill of Rights in 1689 as well as in
nine state constitutions. Id. at 840. The clause was also adopted into the United States
Constitution without significant debate. Id. at 840 & n.8.
Originally, the phrase was interpreted to mean that a prisoner should receive a punishment that is appropriate for the crime committed. The clause was not interpreted to prohibit
certain types of punishments of bodily injury to prisoners. Id. at 858-59. In fact, even in
1963, one court stated that punishments which included whippings were neither cruel nor
unusual given the crime committed. Id. at 859 & n.95 (citing State v. Cannon, 55 Del. 587,
596, 190 A.2d 514, 518-19 (1963)).
Recently, the eighth amendment has been construed to proscribe physical torture as
well as any punishment that is inconsistent with "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
4518. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183 (1976). In Gregg, the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, stating that eighth amendment does not prohibit, under all circumstances, a death sentence.
The cruel and unusual punishment clause forbids punishments which are "excessive" because they involve an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or because they are disproportionate to the severity of the sentence.
See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). In Rhodes, the Supreme Court held
that "double ceiling" (placing two inmates in one cell), by itself, does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. When a prison condition neither inflicts unnecessary or wanton
pain, nor is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime for which the inmate is
serving, a prisoner has not sufficiently alleged a violation of his eighth amendment rights.
Id. at 347.
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permit a court to fashion a broad prison reform.451 9 While the judiciary is entitled to correct any specific prison condition that constitutes a
breach of the eighth amendment, the courts can establish only the minimum standards that the Constitution requires.4 520
In Hoptowit v. Ray,452' several inmates at the Washington State
Penitentiary brought an action alleging that various prison conditions
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.4522 After finding that many
of these conditions combined to violate the eighth amendment, the district court provided broad injunctive relief.4523 The district court also

ruled that the following prison conditions, by themselves, violated the
defendants' eighth amendment rights: overcrowding, increasing violence, poorly trained guards, racism, improper classification of inmates,
inadequate medical care, and inadequate vocational, educational, and
recreational opportunities. The district court also discovered constitutional violations concerning the torturous conditions in isolated, segregated, and protected custody units, as well as conditions regarding the
inadequacy of the physical plant, the continuation of a lockdown, and
retaliation for filing a lawsuit.4524
Before reviewing the district court's findings, however, the Ninth
Circuit examined the judicial standard for analyzing eighth amendment claims and for designing appropriate remedies. The Hoptowit
court noted that courts cannot find eighth amendment violations based
4519. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 351 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539
(1979)). The Supreme Court in Rhodes stated a court can only determine if conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment. If so, the court must provide a remedy that will correct the constitutional violation. See id. at 351-52; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (in school desegregation cases, like other cases involving equitable remedies, courts can-only correct conditions that offend the Constitution).
4520. See supra note 4519. The court in Rhodes noted that any complaints of merely harsh
conditions should be addressed to the legislature rather than to the judiciary. 452 U.S. at
348-49.
4521. 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982).
4522. Id. at 1245. The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court had jurisdiction over 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976), and jurisdiction over the
state claims pursuant to pendent jurisdiction. 682 F.2d at 1245 (citing United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). Since the resolution of the state law issues would not
settle the federal constitutional claims, the Ninth Circuit also stated that abstention in this
case would be inappropriate. 682 F.2d at 1245 n.2 (citing Manney v. Cabell, 654 F.2d 1280,
1283, 1285 n.7 (9th Cir. 1980) (abstention only appropriate where the Pullman doctrine
(Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)) applies and where plaintiff has not
sought relief under state law which could provide a significant opportunity for relief), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982)).
4523. 682 F.2d at 1245.
4524. Id. at 1245.
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on the "totality of conditions" in the prison.452 5 In fact, the court stated

the judiciary cannot correct any prison condition unless the condition
specifically violates one of the enumerated constitutional requirements:
adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal
26
safety.

45

In fashioning a remedy to fit a prison condition that violates the
eighth amendment, the Ninth Circuit added that a court should avoid
broad relief; the judge must only attempt to correct the specific violation unless the prison has a history of violating constitutional protections and court orders. 452 7 The Hoptowit court noted that, whenever
possible, the court should defer to the policy choices of prison officials
and the remedy should be tailored to the basic approach of the prison
4525. Id. at 1246 (citing Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1981)). In
Wright, prisoners, claiming their eighth amendment rights had been violated, received injunctive relief from the district court regarding several prison conditions. The Ninth Circuit
reversed, stating that the district court cannot base its findings on the totality of prison conditions in deciding whether cruel and unusual punishment exists. Id. at 1132. The Wright
court held that courts can only fashion a specific remedy for each condition which, by itself,
violates a prisoner's eighth amendment rights. Id. To support its holding, the court in
Wright noted that the Supreme Court had recently stated "the inquiry of federal courts into
prison management must be limited to the issue of whether aparticularsystem violates any
prohibition of the Constitution." Id. at 1132 n. I (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562
(1979) (emphasis added)). The Wright court's reliance on the quote in Bell, however, may
not be correct since a "system" might arguably include several prison conditions.
The Hoptowit court added that the recent Supreme Court decision in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), did not change the necessity of finding a specific eighth amendment violation for each remedy ordered. The court in Rhodes stated that conditions other
than the denial of medical care and deprivation of basic human needs, such as nourishment,
"alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities." 452 U.S. at 347 (emphasis added). The Hoptowit court, however, clarified this
statement by holding that the Supreme Court was not overruling the holding in Wright, but
rather suggesting that deprivation of personal safety and sanitation may also constitute
eighth amendment violations. 682 F.2d at 1246-47 & n.3.
As a result, the Hoptowit court reaffirmed the rule in Wright that a court cannot consider the totality of prison conditions in order to find a violation of an inmate's rights against
cruel and unusual punishment. 682 F.2d at 1247. It seems, however, that the Hoptowit court
was trying to restrict the broad language in Rhodes. The totality of conditions test was not
rejected by the Supreme Court in Rhbdes and the language of the Supreme Court seems to
indicate that several prison conditions may still be combined to constitute an eighth amendment violation. 452 U.S. at 347.
4526. 682 F.2d at 1246-47 (citing Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d at 1132-33 (quoting Wolfish
v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'don othergroundssub no. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520 (1979))). The enumerated constitutional requirements in Wo#Fish v. Levi were also
cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 529 n. 11.
4527. 682 F.2d at 1247. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978) (in remedying
constitutional violations, court entitled to consider severity of past violations and general
history of litigation concerning these violations).
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administration.4528
Turning to the findings of the district court, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district judge's holding that while many of the conditions
were not egregious enough to constitute a breach of the Constitution,
the conditions, taken together, violated the eighth amendment, because
their combination constituted cruel and unusual punishment for the inmates.4 529 In reversing, the Hoptowit court explicitly rejected the use of
a "totality of conditions" test for finding eighth amendment
violations.4530
The district court, however, also held that several conditions, by
themselves, violated the eighth amendment. Therefore the Ninth Circuit examined each of the district judge's findings regarding these
conditions.453 '
The Hoptowit court first reviewed the district court's findings regarding overcrowded prison cells. The Ninth Circuit stated the district
court improperly constitutionalized the minimum square foot standards of the American Correctional Association (ACA); the district
court can only remedy the specific violations caused by overcrowding.4532 The court added that while overcrowding is not, by itself, a
violation of the eighth amendment, overcrowding can form the basis of
a violation by increasing violence, diluting other constitutionally required services, or by creating an inmate shelter that is unfit for human
habitation.4533 Thus, the court remanded the issue of overcrowding to
determine whether overcrowding has caused an unnecessary or wanton
infliction of pain.
In examining the level of violence at the prison, the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the district court's finding that the widespread guard brutality (due in part to improper training or supervision) resulted in a
4528. 682 F.2d at 1247. The Ninth Circuit added that the court should try to follow the
approach of prison officials as long as it is not inconsistent with the eighth amendment. Id.
(citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 562).
4529. 682 F.2d at 1247.
4530. Id.
4531. Id.
4532. Id. at 1249. The ACA established standards for humane and decent confinement
which stated that each prisoner should have 60 square feet of space unless he spends more
than 10 hours per day in the cell, in which case 80 square feet is required. Although none of
the inmates in this prison were confined according to the ACA standards, the Hoptowlt court
stated the ACA recommendations are not necessarily the constitutional minimum below
which the prisoners' eighth amendment rights are violated. Id.
4533. Id. See generally Lareau v.Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1981); Wolfish v. Levi,
573 F.2d at 126-27, 127 n.18.
4534. 682 F.2d at 1249.
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level of violence that constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The
court stated, however, that the relief ordered by the district court was
overly broad. The Ninth Circuit said courts may not require prisons to
conduct recruiting, screening, and training programs for the guards,
since lack of these programs does not amount to cruel and unusual
punishment.4" 3" The Hoptowit court added, however, that courts may
to hire more guards, and to protect inmates from
order prison officials4536
any guard brutality.
Regarding the handling of inmate complaints of guard brutality,
the Ninth Circuit stated that the district court improperly ordered that
a mechanism must be established to deal with inmate grievances, necessarily including review from noncorrectional personnel, staff, inmates, and outside evaluators. 4537 While admitting some mechanism
was necessary in order to effectively deal with inmate complaints, the
court remanded the issue to determine if the state's methods were sufficient and, if not, what further steps would be necessary to comply with
the eighth amendment.4 5 38
Finding that racism was connected to the violence at the prison,
the district court also ordered the prison officials to "eliminate racism. ' 45 3 9 The Ninth Circuit stated that because the district court
found no eighth amendment violation in connection with racism, the
district judge had no power to fashion any relief for racist conditions.45 4 ° Since the district court had already made an order to end violence in the prison, the Hoptowit court stated the district judge had no
question of racism pending. 45 4' The court added that even if the district judge had the power to remedy the problem of racism, his order to
end racism was overbroad; he could only require the state to cease
practices, not attitudes.45 42
4535. Id. at 1250-51. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 562. The court's reasoning in Hoptowit is suspect because it appears the district court was providing a remedy, rather than constitutionalizing a standard for prison training. See 682 F.2d at 1250 n.4. Thus, it seems the
district court did have the power to solve the problem as it ordered.
4536. 682 F.2d at 1251 (citing William v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1213 (5th Cir. 1977)
(number of guards necessary to assure constitutional level of safety for prisoners must be
related to total number of inmates)). See Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir.
1979) (guards can only inflict pain on inmate in proportion to the threat of harm).
4537. 682 F.2d at 1251.
4538. Id.
4539. Id.
4540. Id.
4541. Id. at 1252.
4542. Id. In footnote six, the court counters Judge Tang's statement that the district court
held racism to be a factor leading to unconstitutional levels of violence at the prison. Judge
Tang reasoned that the district court's order on racism was valid since the order was merely
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The Ninth Circuit also reviewed the district court's finding that the

prison classification procedures resulted in improperly placing too
many prisoners in maximum custody. The district court concluded that
the inadequate classification system merely contributed to the potential
for violence at the prison. Because misclassification, by itself, does not
inflict wanton pain under the eighth amendment, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district judge's order to submit new plans for reclassifying
all prisoners.4 54 3

Concerning the prisoners' claim of inadequate medical care, the
district court concluded that the medical care was constitutionally defi-

cient and ordered the state to comply with standards set by the American Public Health Association and the American Medical Association.
The Ninth Circuit agreed that the medical services were so deficient
that they showed a deliberate indifference to the medical needs of the
44
inmates, thereby violating the inmate's eighth amendment rights.4

The court stated that the prison must provide inmates with a system
that allows ready access to adequate medical care, adding that the med-

ical staff must be able to diagnose and treat medical problems or refer
the inmate to services that can help him; prisons must also be able to
respond promptly to medical emergencies.4 54 5
The Ninth Circuit, however, found that the district judge's order
for relief was overbroad. The court stated that by ordering the prison

to comply with the American Medical Association standards, the district court failed to consider the prison's own approach to providing
remedying the impermissible level of violence. Id. at 1264 (Tang, J., dissenting). The majority rebutted this argument by stating the district court intended to hold that racism itself
was an unconstitutional condition at the prison. Id. at 1252 n.6. The majority looked to the
way the district court phrased the racism issue: "whether inmates at [the prison] are segregated by race, and thereby, denied their right to equal protection of the laws, in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment ..
" Id. As a result, the majority stated the district court
was, in effect, trying to order an end to racism because the district judge believed that racism
was an unconstitutional prison condition.
4543. Id. at 1255-56 (citing Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348, 352-53 (3d Cir. 1981) (solitary
confinement does not violate eighth amendment when prison attends to inmate's other
needs); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566-67 (10th Cir. 1980) (shortcomings in areas of
mobility, classification, and idleness are not of constitutional dimension), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1041 (1981); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1977) (eighth amendment only requires prisoners be provided adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety),rev'don othergroundssub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781
(1978).
4544. 682 F.2d at 1253. A deliberate indifference to a serious medical need by a prison
guard or prison doctor violates the eighth amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976).
4545. 682 F.2d at 1253. The court added that access to medical staff is meaningless unless
the staff is competent to deal with the inmate's needs. Id.
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medical care.45 46 Before prescribing such relief, the district judge must
first determine that the prison's approach could not meet the constitutional minimum required. 4547 Therefore, the court remanded the issue
so the district judge could formulate a new remedy which would be no
broader than necessary to correct the violations of the inmates' eighth
amendment rights.4548
Finding that the prisoners' lack of programs, jobs, and educational
opportunities led to frustration, idleness, and violence, the district court
held that the prison failed to provide adequate programs to try to rehabilitate the prisoners, in violation of the eighth amendment. The district judge then ordered the state to implement vocational, educational,
and recreational programs at the prison. In reversing the district
court's order, the Ninth Circuit stated idleness and the lack of rehabilitative programs do not constitute a violation of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause. 4549 The Hoptowit court clearly noted that prisoners
have no right to rehabilitation under the eighth amendment. 4550 The

Ninth Circuit therefore held the district court had no power to grant
the prisoners relief for idleness or the lack of rehabilitative
programs.4551
Examining the prison conditions of isolation, segregation, and protective custody cells, the district court concluded the conditions there
4546. Id. at 1253-54.
4547. Id. at 1254. The prison sought to provide an "infirmary," with additional services to
be supplied outside. Id. at 1253-54.
4548. Id. at 1254.
4549. Id. Idleness and lack of rehabilitative programs cannot be violations of the eighth
amendment because these conditions do not constitute a wanton infliction of pain. Id. at
1254-55. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 347; Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d at 566-67;
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d at 291. See also supra notes 4518 & 4525.
4550. 682 F.2d at 1255. See supra note 4549. The court noted that a recent Ninth Circuit
decision, Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 777-79 (9th Cir. 1981), held that persons in
mental hospitals have a right to rehabilitation. The Hoptowit court stated, however, that the
rationale of Ohlinger does not apply to people serving criminal sentences. In distinguishing
between incarceration for criminal violations and for mental incapacitation, the Hoptowit
court stated that while confinement for a mental illness is to cure or improve a mental condition, imprisonment for a criminal offense "'is primarily for punitive purposes. Although
rehabilitation [of a criminal] may be desirable, it is not necessarily the primary function of
such incarceration.'" 682 F.2d at 1255 n.8 (quoting Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d at 777).
4551. 682 F.2d at 1255. Turning to the state law issues, the Ninth Circuit stated the district
judge's conclusions were insufficient. While the state law provides that prison officials must
establish rehabilitative programs and useful employment for inmates (see WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 72.08.101, 72.64.010-.110 (1982)), these statutes do not seem to grant the prisoners an enforceable right to rehabilitation. Bresolin v. Morris, 88 Wash. 2d 167, 170-71,
558 P.2d 1350, 1352 (1977) (en banc). Thus the Hoptowit court remanded the state issues to
determine whether the prisoners have standing to complain about the state's failure to provide rehabilitative programs. 682 F.2d at 1255.
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violated the prisoners' right against cruel and unusual punishment.
The district judge specifically found that the deprivation of light
(through the use of a solid metal door) as well as the constriction of
space and activity violated the eighth amendment rights of the inmates
in isolation. The district judge also concluded that the inmates in protective custody were subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because they were denied adequate recreation, legal access, and prison
programs as well as being confined to small cells.4 552
The Ninth Circuit stated that the deprivation of light, fresh air,
and adequate medical care was a violation of the eighth amendment
rights of prisoners in isolation.4 " 3 The court held that prisoners in isolation, segregation, and protective custody cells have the same eighth
amendment rights and standards as other prisoners.4 55 4 The Ninth Circuit stated, however, that the district judge was wrong in looking to the
totality of conditions; the district court also erred in considering the
lack of programs as an element of an eighth amendment violation.4 5 5
Thus, the Hoplowit court remanded the issue of custody to determine
which conditions, by themselves, violated the eighth amendment and
for each such condition, the court stated the district judge must fashion
a remedy to satisfy only the constitutional minimum required.4 55 6
4 557
Concerning the many physical plant problems at the prison,
the district court stated that the physical facilities in their totality violated the prisoners' eighth amendment rights and ordered the state to
comply with several governmental health standards.4 558 While accepting most of the district court's findings regarding individual
problems at the prison, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district judge's
conclusion. The court held that the district court must analyze each
condition to determine if it amounts to an unnecessary and wanton in4552. 682 F.2d at 1257.
4553. Id. at 1257-58.
4554. Id. at 1258. The Ninth Circuit stated all prisoners must be given adequate food,
clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety. The Hoplowit court added
that courts may consider the length of time that prisoners were deprived of these rights. Id.
(citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1978) (unconstitutionality of isolation conditions may depend on duration and severity of confinement conditions)).
4555. 682 F.2d at 1258.
4556. Id.
4557. Id. at 1256. Such problems included overcrowding, poor lighting, inadequate
plumbing with a threat of waste water contaminating the drinking water, substandard fire
prevention, poor ventilation, and inadequate cell cleaning supplies. Id.
4558. Id. The district judge ordered the prison to comply with the standards of the United
States Public Health Service, the American Public Health Association, Washington's Department of Health, and the American Correctional Association.
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fliction of pain .4 55 9 The Hoptowit court also stated that the district
court erred by constitutionalizing several government health standards. 56 ° While these health standards may be relevant to correct con-

stitutional violations, the district judge can only order the prison to
comply with the minimum requirements of the eighth amendment.4 5 6'

Turning to the district court's findings concerning the conditions
imposed during a lockdown in 1979, the Ninth Circuit again reversed

the district court's application of the totality of conditions test.4562 The
district court first stated that because the initial loss of control of the

prison was the fault of prison officials, the loss of control was a violation of the inmates' rights. The Ninth Circuit strongly disagreed, however, stating the issue of blame for the lockdown is irrelevant in

determining whether prison conditions during the lockdown violated
the prisoners' eighth amendment rights.4 56 3

Second, the district court found that the long periods of deprivation of basic necessities violated the cruel and unusual punishment
clause.4 564 The Hoptowit court, however, said the district court erred
since the district judge based his findings on the totality of the circumstances. The Ninth Circuit also stated the district court's findings of
fact were clearly erroneous; 4 565 the severe conditions of the lockdown
lasted much less than four months.

Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded the issue of unconstitutional
prison conditions during the lockdown so the district court could analyze each condition separately to determine if it amounted to an infliction of pain without penological justification. 4 566 The Ninth Circuit
4559. Id. The Ninth Circuit added that if none of the conditions violates the eighth
amendment standards, then "two of them together cannot amount to some overall conclusion that the prison is unsafe or unsanitary." Id.
4560. Id. at 1256-57. See supra note 4558.
4561. 682 F.2d at 1257.
4562. Id. at 1259.
4563. Id. Regarding the issue of blame for the lockdown, the Ninth Circuit responded by
stating prison officials have a right and a duty to take necessary steps to restore order when
order is lost. The Hoptowit court added that this duty and right is for the benefit of the
prisoners as well as the prison officials. Id.
4564. Id. at 1258. The district judge found that the prison had imposed a lockdown for
four months following the death of a prisoner and a guard. Id.
4565. Id. at 1259. Concerning the findings of fact, the Hoptowit court stated that while the
district court found that the lockdown lasted over four months, clearly not all lockdown
conditions continued throughout this period. The district court found the inmates were not
allowed out of their crowded cells for the first three weeks. The Hoptowit court thus concluded the prison conditions after this initial period must have been less stringent. Id.
4566. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that on remand, the district court should consider "the
length of time each restriction was in effect, and whether the restriction and its duration bore
a relationship to legitimate attempts to ease the emergency." Id.
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noted, however, that in an emergency situation (such as the loss of control of the prison), prison officials may impose more restrictive conditions and may suspend some necessary services for a short period of
time.45 67

Finally the Ninth Circuit considered the district court's findings on
retaliation by prison officials against inmates for filing this action. The
district court, finding some evidence of retaliation such as verbal harassment, threats, and transfers, enjoined prison officials from retaliating against inmates for the exercise of their right of access to
courts.45 68 The Ninth Circuit, while agreeing with the district court's
statement of law, reversed since there was an insufficient finding of fact
to constitute a violation of the prisoners' rights.4 569

In concurring, Justice Tang disagreed with the majority's opinion
of the district court's orders regarding brutality, racism, and improper
classification of inmates. Tang stated the Ninth Circuit had blurred the
crucial difference between prisoners' rights and remedies, thereby limiting the judicial power to remedy constitutional violations.
While conceding that the district judge's opinion was not clearly
written, Tang stated the district court apparently held that the level of
violence at the prison was unconstitutional. After finding a violation of
the prisoners' rights, the district judge
then ordered several remedies in
4570
order to curb this prison violence.
Regarding prison brutality, Tang stated the district court did not
hold that inmates had a constitutional right to require training for
guards. Instead, Tang said the district court was providing a remedy in
order to cure the unconstitutional level of violence at the prison.45 7
On racism, Tang also stated the remedy was intended to correct the
unconstitutional level of violence at the prison; it was not an order to
4567. Id. The Hoptowit court noted, however, that the constitutional validity of the deprivation (such as denying a prisoner exercise or adequate food) depends on the importance of
the need as well as the length of time that this need is withheld from the inmate. The Ninth
Circuit added that certain services such as medical care probably cannot be denied for any
period of time. Id.
4568. Id. at 1260.
4569. Id. The Hoptowi court noted that this issue was not properly before the court. It
was not raised in the complaint, nor did the inmates seek to raise the issue by amending
their complaint or by filing an appropriate motion. Id.
4570. Id. at 1263-64.
4571. Id. at 1264-65. In a footnote, the majority responded to Tang's concurring opinion
by stating that the district court did not intend to create guard programs as a response to
unconstitutional violence since the findings of fact regarding violence related to conditions
of overcrowding, idleness, physical plant conditions, inadequate medical care and "other
conditions found herein." .d. at 1250-51 n.4.
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solve a problem of racism without a constitutional basis.4 57 2
Third, Tang said the district court appeared to be stating that prisoner misclassification contributed to unconstitutional prison violence.
The district judge seemed to hold that this condition led to the prison's
failure to protect the prisoners from this impermissible level of violence. Thus, the district court was merely remedying the unconstitutional violence.
In concluding, Tang stated that the majority used the wrong test
for reviewing the district court's actions. If the district court held that
the level of violence was unconstitutional, the proper question for the
Ninth Circuit was whether the district judge "abused its remedial
power in ordering these programs to vindicate the prisoners' Eighth
Amendment right to be protected from harm. ' 4573 Tang said the majority erred in inquiring whether these programs were mandated by the
eighth amendment. 4 74 Tang added that the district court has the
power to remedy constitutional violations, even if contributing conditions, by themselves, do not constitute an eighth amendment
violation.45 75
In Pepperling v. Crist,45 76 the Ninth Circuit reviewed additional
challenges to prison conditions, including the use of general lockups as
well as the censorship of nude pictures and two publications, Hustler,
and High Times.4 57 7 Prisoners in the Montana State Prison appealed
the denial of their suits which had claimed that these penitentiary conditions violated their eighth amendment rights.
The inmates first contended the prison had instituted an illegal
mass punishment following an injury to a prison guard. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief, stating that this
lockup was to maintain security, not to discipline.4 57 8 While any pro4572. Id. at 1264. See supra note 4536.
4573. 682 F.2d at 1265.
4574. Id.
4575. Id. (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 n.9 (1978) (if state authorities fail in
their obligation to cure constitutional violations, judicial power may be invoked; if invoked,
court has broad equitable powers to remedy violations); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,
281-83 (1977) (courts allowed broad equitable power to cure constitutional violations concerning school segregation)).
4576. 678 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1982).
4577. Id. at 789-90.
4578. Id. at 789. The court found the 48 hour lockup was designed to find the prisoner
who was armed in order to prevent further harm from this inmate. The Ninth Circuit added
that the decisions of prison officials should be given great deference. Id. See Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977) (wide-ranging deference
accorded decisions by prison administrators); Phillips v. Bureau of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966,
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longed lockup may violate the due process clause or the right against
cruel and unusual punishment, the court affirmed the district court's
there was no such severe or lengthy lockup in
finding that
4 579
Pepperling

The inmate also challenged the prison's use of general censorship.
The Ninth Circuit stated general censorship of a prisoner's mail may be
permitted when the practice furthers "substantial governmental interests and is unrelated to the suppression of expression.

' 45 80

Following a

decision, 458 1

the court noted that prison officials may
Supreme Court
also censor any "obscene" communication. 45 8 2 The prison officials in
Pepperling,however, had a rule prohibiting "sexually explicit" communication, without additional justification. 458 3 As a result, since "sexually
explicit" seems to include more than just "obscene" communication,
45 8 4
the prison regulation violated the inmates' first amendment rights.

Turning to the prisoners' specific right to receive nude pictures of
wives or girlfriends, the Pepperling court stated the prison cannot prohibit these pictures merely because these items often lead to violent
altercations among prisoners.4 5 The court suggested, however, that
the prison may be able to prohibit prisoners from displaying these phoor tacking them up in their cells, in order to maintain internal
tographs
458 6
peace.

972 & n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (deference given to prison officials, especially in matters of
internal affairs).
4579. 678 F.2d at 789. The court added that a determination of the constitutional violation
due to a prolonged lockup "must be based on a careful analysis of the unique factual situations presented by each case." Id.
Concerning the inmates' second challenge that prisoners' property was damaged or stolen due to the manner of the random searches conducted by the guards, the Ninth Circuit
found that there were insufficient facts to slow that the guards were even responsible for this
damage. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's denial of relief on this issue. Id.
4580. Id. at 790. The restriction on prisoner correspondence, however, must be no greater
than necessary to protect the governmental interest. Id. (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974)).
The two legitimate penal objectives outlined by the Supreme Court in Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974), were the deterrence of crime through general confinement and
rehabilitation, and the maintenance of internal security.
4581. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
4582. 678 F.2d at 790 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 416-18 & n.15 (explicitly
approving a set of guidelines for censorship of prison mail)).
4583. 678 F.2d at 790.
4584. Id. Although the prison officials argued that they did not apply the regulation
strictly, the Ninth Circuit replied that this haphazard application "merely demonstrates the
capriciousness of the rule." Id. The additional censorship can only be permitted if it serves
a legitimate governmental interest. Id.
4585. Id. The court, however, failed to outline any further test for allowing such pictures.
4586. Id. at 790-91. The court stressed that it is not the receipt of the photographs which
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Regarding the prohibition of two publications, Hustler and High
Times, the court held that because there were no findings as to the specific content of the magazines, these publications could not be censored. Without close examination of the magazines, the Ninth Circuit
was unable to determine whether the prohibition was proper in order to
promote legitimate penal objectives.4 58 7 The court also admonished
the prison administration, stating that a "blanket prohibition against
receipt of the publication by any prisoner carries a heavy presumption
of unconstitutionality. '45 8 8 Therefore
the Ninth Circuit remanded the
4 58 9
issue for additional findings.
2.

Sua sponte dismissal

In Franklin v. Oregon,4 590 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the district court had federal subject matter jurisdiction over complaints involving certain prison conditions. Franklin, an inmate of an
Oregon state prison, filed thirty-three complaints in federal court and
paid the required filing fees. Many of the complaints alleged unconstitutional prison conditions. After Franklin amended twenty-seven of
the complaints, but before any summons were issued, the district court,
on its own motion, dismissed all thirty-three claims on the ground that
they were frivolous. 4 591 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the sua
sponte dismissal of eleven of the complaints.45 9 2
The Franklin court held that a district court cannot dismiss a complaint on its own motion before a summons is issued unless the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction4593 or the claim is wholly insubstantial
provokes the violence; it is the "interest aroused in other inmates" that causes prison disruption. Id. at 790. Thus, prohibiting the photographs does not directly serve the stated objective of maintaining peace in the prison.
4587. Id. at 791. See Morgan v. LaVallee, 526 F.2d 221, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1975) (prison
must provide affirmative justification for withholding any publication). The Pepperling
court also suggested that what may be an improper magazine for one prisoner, may be
proper for another. Thus, for each prisoner who is denied a magazine, the prison must show
that "the prisoner's receipt of the publication will have an adverse impact on either the
prisoner's rehabilitation or prison security." 678 F.2d at 791.
4588. Id. at 791. The court noted that the prison officials have the burden of justifying
their restriction of the first amendment. Id. (citing Aikens v. Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751, 755 (7th
Cir. 1976)). See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413-14.
4589. 678 F.2d at 791.
4590. 662 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981).
4591. Id. at 1340.
4592. Id.
4593. Id. at 1343. Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a) summonses must be issued before a
case can be dismissed for failure to state a claim. At the time of the Franklin decision rule
4(a) provided in part: "Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue a
summons and deliver it for service to the marshal or to a person specially appointed to serve
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The court then examined each of Franklin's claims

to determine whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction
over the complaints.

In eleven of the complaints, Franklin did not allege a deprivation
of any constitutional right nor state a federal cause of action. 45 95 As a
result, the Franklin court held that the district court was correct in disit." (Current version at FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a), 28 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1983)). Thus, before
a summons is issued, the Ninth Circuit stated, "a district court may not dismiss [a complaint], sua sponte, for failure to state a claim over which it has subject jurisdiction." 662
F.2d at 1341. The Ninth Circuit added that it disapproves of such dispositions "because the
procedure (1) eliminates the traditional adversarial relationship; (2) causes inefficiencies in
the judicial process as a whole; and (3) may give the appearance that the judiciary is a
proponent rather than an independent entity." Id. at 1341-42 (footnote omitted).
But see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (sua sponte dismissal upheld when jurisdiction existed but complaint failed to allege conduct which could violate the Constitution;
issue of propriety of sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, though, not
raised by parties), reh ' denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977).
A district court may, however, properly dismiss a cause of action sua sponte for lack of
jurisdiction. 662 F.2d at 1342. The Ninth Circuit stated, "if the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, it is not required to issue a summons or follow the other procedural requirements." Id. See California Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d 278, 280 (9th
Cir. 1974) (court can dismiss for lack of jurisdiction if it gives notice of intent to dismiss);
Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 58 (9th Cir. 1967) (if no jurisdiction exists, court should only
note lack of jurisdiction and refuse to proceed further with the case).
4594. 662 F.2d at 1342 (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974)). In Hagans, the
Court stated that the terms "wholly insubstantial" and "obviously frivolous" have specific
legal significance. The Court added that "'those words import that claims are constitutionally insubstantial only if the prior decisions inescapably render the claims frivolous; previous decisions that merely render claims of doubtful or questionable merit do not render
them insubstantial.'" 415 U.S. at 537-38 (quoting Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518
(1973)).
The Ninth Circuit added that a complaint should be dismissed only if there is no question that plaintiff cannot prove a set of facts in support of a claim which would allow him to
recover. 662 F.2d at 1343 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). The Franklin court noted that under Scheuer, it does not matter if relief appears "'very remote and
unlikely."' 662 F.2d at 1343 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 236).
4595. 662 F.2d at 1343-44. In six actions, Franklin did not allege an action in tort. He
contended that the state welfare division caused his divorce by giving his wife financial
assistance, that the district attorney refused to prosecute his daughter's boyfriend for statutory rape, that Oregon Prisoners Legal Services refused his requests to see his attorneys, that
the state ombudsman did not respond to his requests for assistance, and finally that prison
officials refused to issue him new T-shirts. Id. at 1343.
In five actions, the court stated that while Franklin may have alleged a tort claim, he
did not plead the deprivation of a constitutional right or otherwise state a federal cause of
action. In these actions, Franklin claimed two letters were lost due to prison inmate handling of the mail, that he suffered severe discomfort due to a ventilation system breakdown,
that a jail officer improperly placed handcuffs on his wrist, that he was slandered by an
Oregon police officer, and that the attorney handling his appeal had committed malpractice.
Id. at 1343-44.
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missing these claims due to lack of jurisdiction.4 5 96 In seven of the
actions Franklin alleged negligent disregard or aggravation of his med-

ical problems.45 97 The Ninth Circuit stated that while these claims

might involve violations of the eighth amendment right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment, the court found that there was an "utterly insubstantial" nexus between the wrongful conduct and the deprivation of the eighth amendment right,4 598 as well as a failure to allege a
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.45 99
Two of Franklin's complaints were also brought against parties

who were immune from 42 U.S.C. section 1983 liability, and therefore
the Ninth Circuit agreed the suits should have been dismissed for lack

of federal jurisdiction. 46°° The Franklin court also stated that one com4596. Id. at 1344.
4597. Id. Franklin claimed that a jail guard caused a delay in Franklin's receipt of medical attention, that a prison official did not supply him with a well-balanced diet after an
insulin injection, and that prison medical personnel improperly administered insulin causing
soreness and swelling of his arm. The Ninth Circuit stressed that there was no allegation of
a deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in these complaints. Id. Franklin also
complained of receiving twelve X-rays when two would have been sufficient. The Franklin
court held that an allegation amounting to a difference in medical opinion does not support
federal jurisdiction. Id. (citing Mayfield v. Craven, 433 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir. 1970)). See
infra note 4599.
Further, the inmate complained that prison officials delayed granting him an elevator
pass, causing him to suffer pain while climbing stairs in order to seek medical attention. The
Ninth Circuit reiterated that without an allegation of deliberate indifference to Franklin's
medical problems there is no subject matter jurisdiction. In one of these complaints, Franklin also claimed a prison official swore at him. The Franklin court stated that there is no
constitutional right to be free from being sworn at. 662 F.2d at 1344-45.
4598. 622 F.2d at 1344 (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. at 536-38 (where welfare recipients' equal protection claim regarding the state's recoupment regulation for prior unscheduled rental payments deemed wholly insubstantial; court lacks jurisdiction to hear
obviously frivolous cases)).
4599. 622 F.2d at 1344 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (deliberate indifference by prison officials to inmate's serious illness or injury constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment, violating the eighth amendment; however, where prisoner was observed by
medical personnel 17 times in three months and injury was treated, failure to perform Xrays or certain diagnostic techniques does not violate inmate's constitutional rights)).
4600. 662 F.2d at 1345. In one of these complaints, Franklin sued his appointed defense
counsel and the state psychiatrist for conspiring to commit him to a mental institution. In a
footnote, however, the court stated that without an allegation that this conspiracy was motivated by some class-based invidious discrimination, there was no subject matter jurisdiction
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 to hear this complaint. Id. at 1345 n.8. In the second complaint,
Franklin contended that the public defender representing him on appeal unnecessarily
delayed his appeal.
The Ninth Circuit stated the parties in these two complaints are immune from 42
U.S.C. § 1983 suits because of the protection afforded participants in the judicial process.
Id. at 1345. See Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1977) (public defenders); Burkes v.
Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (court-appointed psychiatrists), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908 (1971). But see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). In Polk
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plaint was properly dismissed, since Franklin did not claim the negligent conduct of failing to release him for a court hearing violated a
an established state procedure for which
state duty that was a part of
460 1
Oregon provides a remedy.
The Ninth Circuit, however, held that several of Franklin's claims

were improperly dismissed by the district court since Franklin alleged
the prison failed to provide him with proper outdoor exercise in violation of his eighth amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.460 2 In one of these complaints, Franklin claimed he was
deprived of the right to shave and exercise on a daily basis. 4 60 3 In an-

other, Franklin complained of having to live in an unclean cell as well
as being denied adequate exercise privileges. 4 6°4 Further, Franklin al-

leged in a complaint that he was not provided adequate reading light,
reading glasses, proper ventilation or exercise. 460 5 The Ninth Circuit
stated that since each of these complaints alleged a denial of exercise,
the complaints should not have been dismissed because a denial of regular exercise may constitute cruel and unusual punishment.4 60 6

The Ninth Circuit held the district court also improperly dismissed
Franklin's claims that his health was endangered by prison conditions
County, the Supreme Court stated that public defenders were not acting under the color of
state law for purposes of § 1983 when they were performing a lawyer's traditional functions
as counsel to an indigent defendant in a state criminal proceeding. Thus, it seems the decision in Franklin which held public defenders immune from § 1983 liability may no longer be
valid since Polk County was decided after Franklin.
4601. 662 F.2d at 1345-46. In this complaint, Franklin alleged a prison counselor negligently failed to release him for a court appearance and failed to notify the court. The hearing involved the disposition of some of Franklin's property. The Ninth Circuit noted that if
his facts were correct, Franklin could possibly recover in state court under OR. REy. STAT.
§ 18.160 (1973), but that he stated no federal cause of action. 662 F.2d at 1345. See Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). In Parratt,the Supreme Court stated that although an inmate was deprived of property under color of state law, the deprivation did not occur as a
result of an established state procedure. Therefore, the plaintiff did not allege a violation of
the due proceess clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 543.
4602. 662 F.2d at 1346.
4603. Id.
4604. Id. Franklin also alleged that he was placed on a restrictive diet while in the psychiatric security unit.
4605. Id.
4606. 662 F.2d at 1346 (citing Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979) (refusing to give prisoner any outdoor exercise and recreation constituted cruel and unusual punishment when inmates confined to cells almost 24 hours a day)).
Although the Ninth Circuit held that these complaints were improperly dismissed, the
court did not speculate as to whether claims which allege improper ventilation or reading
light or even the failure to be provided a clean cell could constitute an eighth amendment
cause of action.
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in violation of his eighth amendment right.4 607 Franklin alleged in one
complaint that due to a throat tumor, he was subject to serious danger

by being placed in a cell with a heavy cigarette smoker.4 60 8 Franklin
also complained that his special requests for food were denied even
460 9
after informing officials that he was having insulin reactions.
Franklin further alleged that guards failed to protect him from inmates
who threw sharp objects into his cell. 4 6 10 The Ninth Circuit held that
these claims should not have been dismissed by the district court because if these allegations did cause a threat to Franklin's health, they

did in fact state a cause of action for cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the eighth amendment.46 '
Finally, the Ninth Circuit examined two other sua sponte dismis-

sals. In one suit, Franklin claimed that a jail officer violated his constitutional right to privacy by taking legal and personal papers from
Franklin's cell and copying them.4 612 Franklin further alleged that his
cell was bugged so that his prayers may have been overheard. The

Ninth Circuit held that while these claims may be frivolous, they were
4 6 13
not so wholly insubstantial that they should have been dismissed.
4607. 662 F.2d at 1346-47.
4608. Id.
4609. Id. at 1347.
4610. Id.
4611. Id. (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (deliberate indifference to prisoner's serious medical needs violated inmate's eighth amendment rights; inmate
must show that (1) medical need was so serious that lay person would easily recognize the
need for a doctor and (2) prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical need),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981)).
4612. 662 F.2d at 1347.
4613. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that although most warrantless wiretapping in prisons
is permitted, some communications are excepted. The court noted that prayer may constitute privileged communication.
See United States v. Paul, 614 F.2d 115 (6th Cir.) (prison allowed to monitor conversations under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) when wiretapping equipment used in ordinary course of
correctional officers' duties and when inmates have reasonable notice that telephone conversations may be monitored), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980); Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d
387, 392 (1st Cir. 1979) (monitoring inmate's conversation not permitted when defendant
listened on another line-a process not normally used or expected-and did not notify either
party; such monitoring was also not in ordinary course of duties of defendant).
In a concurring opinion, Justice Sneed added that informapauperiscomplaints (unlike
the complaints in Franklin),should be dismissed more readily since they are easily filed and
tend to inundate the district courts. 662 F.2d at 1348 (Sneed, J., concurring). Sneed also
noted that the distinction between complaints which lack jurisdiction and those that fail to
state a claim is often quite unclear. Id. at 1348-49.
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